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DACL Modification on a Privileged Object detection rules

An attacker changes the access control list of the domain object or of a Tier 0 group, user or domain controller to grant themselves control, the root of ACL-based attack paths. Detected as 5136 writes to nTSecurityDescriptor.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
High
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericAll or ownership of the target object, usually reached through an ACL attack path or by compromising an administrator.
Impact
Control of the target object and everything it governs, which on the domain object means every password hash and on an administrative group means domain administrator access.
Response
Disable the account the new ACE names as trustee, remove the ACE to restore the previous security descriptor, and undo what the trustee did with the right.
Mitigation
Remove ACEs that give non-Tier 0 principals WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericAll or GenericWrite on the domain object, administrative groups and accounts, and domain controllers.
Event ID
5136

How the attack works

Every Active Directory object carries a security descriptor (nTSecurityDescriptor) whose DACL decides who can read, write, reset passwords, change membership or change the DACL itself. An ACE on the domain object can grant the directory replication rights used by DCSync; an ACE on Domain Admins can grant the right to add members; an ACE on an administrator account can grant password reset or GenericAll.

Attackers who reach WriteDacl, WriteOwner or GenericAll on such an object use it to add an ACE for an account they control, then use the new right (DCSync, adding themselves to a group, resetting a password, writing Shadow Credentials) and sometimes remove the ACE again. The DACL change itself is logged by the domain controller as event 5136 for nTSecurityDescriptor, with the full new SDDL in the event, when the object has a SACL that audits permission changes.

What an attacker needs

  • WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericAll or ownership of the target object, usually reached through an ACL attack path or by compromising an administrator.

Impact

Control of the target object and everything it governs: replication rights on the domain object mean every password hash, rights on an administrative group or account mean domain administrator access. Added ACEs are also a quiet persistence mechanism that survives password resets.

Detection rules

Domain Object Security Descriptor Modified

Detects a change to the nTSecurityDescriptor of the domain object (object class domainDNS). ACEs on the domain object grant domain-wide rights such as directory replication (DCSync), so changes are rare and high impact. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes; the default domain SACL may need an entry that audits permission changes.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Domain Object Security Descriptor Modified
id: 7fda383e-6361-4d35-91f6-ae9a7c6f3f06
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a change to the nTSecurityDescriptor of the domain object (object class
  domainDNS). ACEs on the domain object grant domain-wide rights such as directory
  replication (DCSync), so changes are rare and high impact. Requires Audit
  Directory Service Changes; the default domain SACL may need an entry that
  audits permission changes.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/c-domaindns
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
    ObjectClass: domainDNS
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: nTSecurityDescriptor
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Installation or upgrade of software that delegates rights at the domain root (Microsoft Entra Connect, Exchange, identity management tools) and schema or forest preparation. Validate the added ACEs against the product documentation.
level: high

False positives

  • Installation or upgrade of software that delegates rights at the domain root (Microsoft Entra Connect, Exchange, identity management tools) and schema or forest preparation. Validate the added ACEs against the product documentation.

Security Descriptor Modified on a Tier 0 Group, Account or Domain Controller

Detects a change to the nTSecurityDescriptor of a built-in administrative group, the built-in Administrator or krbtgt account, or an object in the Domain Controllers OU, identified by their default distinguished names. A new ACE on these objects is the usual step that turns an ACL attack path into control of the domain. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and SACLs that audit permission changes on these objects.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Security Descriptor Modified on a Tier 0 Group, Account or Domain Controller
id: aa73c457-19d4-487f-b0f3-5e46d9a0cf5d
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a change to the nTSecurityDescriptor of a built-in administrative
  group, the built-in Administrator or krbtgt account, or an object in the Domain
  Controllers OU, identified by their default distinguished names. A new ACE on
  these objects is the usual step that turns an ACL attack path into control of
  the domain. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and SACLs that audit
  permission changes on these objects.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-ntsecuritydescriptor
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: nTSecurityDescriptor
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
  selection_tier0_object:
    - ObjectDN|startswith:
        - 'CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,'
        - 'CN=Enterprise Admins,CN=Users,'
        - 'CN=Schema Admins,CN=Users,'
        - 'CN=Domain Controllers,CN=Users,'
        - 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,'
        - 'CN=krbtgt,CN=Users,'
        - 'CN=Administrators,CN=Builtin,'
        - 'CN=Account Operators,CN=Builtin,'
        - 'CN=Backup Operators,CN=Builtin,'
        - 'CN=Server Operators,CN=Builtin,'
        - 'OU=Domain Controllers,'
    - ObjectDN|contains: ',OU=Domain Controllers,'
  condition: selection and selection_tier0_object
falsepositives:
  - SDProp restoring the AdminSDHolder ACL on protected objects (logged on the PDC emulator up to an hour after another change, with a new SDDL that matches AdminSDHolder). If Tier 0 objects were renamed or moved from their default containers, add their distinguished names to selection_tier0_object.
level: medium

False positives

  • SDProp restoring the AdminSDHolder ACL on protected objects (logged on the PDC emulator up to an hour after another change, with a new SDDL that matches AdminSDHolder). If Tier 0 objects were renamed or moved from their default containers, add their distinguished names to selection_tier0_object.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

New ACE on a Tier 0 object grants control to a principal outside Tier 0

Detection hypothesisCompares with an earlier valueNeeds your own lists

The rules report that a security descriptor changed, on objects found by their default names. What makes a change an attack is its content: an added entry that gives a principal outside Tier 0 a right to control the object, a new owner, or an entry that denies administrators access to hide the object. Comparing the old and new descriptor of each change on your own list of Tier 0 objects, found by object GUID so that renamed and moved objects stay covered, isolates exactly that entry.

  1. Take event 5136 on nTSecurityDescriptor for the objects on your Tier 0 list, matched on ObjectGUID: the domain object, the administrative groups and their members, AdminSDHolder, domain controllers and the objects your own delegation model treats as Tier 0.
  2. Pair the OperationType Value Deleted event (old descriptor) with the Value Added event (new descriptor) that has the same OpCorrelationID, and list the entries that exist only in the new AttributeValue, and a changed owner (O:).
  3. Keep added allow entries whose rights include WD (write DACL), WO (write owner), WP (write property) or CR (control access, which covers the replication rights), and added deny entries (D or OD) that name administrators or Everyone.
  4. Report each one whose trustee SID is not on your Tier 0 list, and every case where the trustee SID equals SubjectUserSid: the writer granted the right to itself.

Events5136

LimitsProducts that delegate rights at install time, such as Microsoft Entra Connect or Exchange, add entries for their own groups and need to be on the list. SDProp restores protected objects within the hour and logs its own pair of events. The list has to follow changes to your delegation model, and the events need SACLs that audit permission changes on these objects.

Triage

  • Compare the new SDDL (OperationType "Value Added") with the previous one (the "Value Deleted" event with the same OpCorrelationID) and identify the added ACE, its rights and its trustee SID.
  • On the domain object, look for ACEs with the replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) for non-domain-controller principals.
  • Confirm the writer (SubjectUserName) and correlate with 4662 events showing the trustee using the new right shortly after.
  • On protected accounts and groups, a second change logged on the PDC emulator up to an hour later that restores the AdminSDHolder ACL is SDProp reverting the first one; the first change is still the one to investigate.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Disable the account that the new ACE names as trustee, and the account that wrote it if it was not an approved administrator.
  2. Remove the ACE and restore the previous security descriptor, with the "Value Deleted" event as the reference. Check the owner of the object as well.
  3. Undo what the trustee did with the right. On the domain object, replication by the trustee means that every password hash is exposed and calls for the DCSync response. On a group, remove the members it added. On an account, reset the password and remove credentials it added.
  4. Find the path that gave the writer WriteDacl, WriteOwner or GenericAll on the object and remove it, or the ACE will be added again.
  5. Compare the DACLs of the domain object and of the Tier 0 objects with the baseline.

Mitigation

  • Analyze and remove ACEs that give non-Tier 0 principals WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericAll or GenericWrite on the domain object, administrative groups and accounts, and domain controllers.
  • Keep ownership of Tier 0 objects with Domain Admins or Enterprise Admins.
  • Baseline the DACL of the domain object and alert on any added ACE that grants replication rights.
  • Configure SACLs that audit permission and owner changes on the domain object and Tier 0 objects, and enable "Audit Directory Service Changes" on domain controllers.

Frequently asked questions

SDProp restored the ACL within the hour. Is the incident over?

No. SDProp puts the AdminSDHolder ACL back on protected accounts and groups, but the trustee held the new right until then and may have used it to reset a password, add a member or write a credential. Those results stay. Investigate the first change and what the trustee did before the ACL was restored.

Why is there no event for a DACL change on an object we consider Tier 0?

Event 5136 is written only when the object has a SACL that audits permission changes and Audit Directory Service Changes is enabled. The Tier 0 rule also identifies objects by their default distinguished names. A privileged group or account that was renamed, moved or created by your organization is not matched until its name is added to the rule.

How do I find the added ACE in the long SDDL string of the event?

Each change writes two events with the same OpCorrelationID, "Value Deleted" with the previous descriptor and "Value Added" with the new one. Compare the two strings. The entry that exists only in the new one is the added ACE, and it gives the rights and the SID of the trustee. On the domain object, look for the replication rights first.

Which benign changes touch the DACL of the domain object?

Installing or upgrading software that delegates rights at the domain root, such as Microsoft Entra Connect, Exchange or identity management tools, and schema or forest preparation. These changes are planned and rare. Validate the added ACEs against the product documentation instead of excluding the account that made them.

References

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