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Domain Password, Lockout or Kerberos Policy Weakened detection rules

The password, account lockout and Kerberos policies of a domain protect every account at once. Weakening them makes guessing easier and tickets live longer. Events 4739, 4713 and 5136 record the change.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
Medium
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Edit rights on a Group Policy Object that is linked to the domain and defines the account policies, or write access to a Password Settings object.
Impact
Every account the weakened policy applies to becomes easier to take over, because passwords can be guessed without a lockout and stolen tickets stay valid for longer.
Response
Set the policy back to the baseline values, disable the account that edited it, and have the passwords that were set under the weaker policy changed again.
Mitigation
Limit who can edit Group Policy Objects at the domain level and Password Settings objects to Tier 0 administrators, and compare the live policy with a baseline.
Event IDs
473951364713
Threat groups
None listed in MITRE ATT&CK for this technique

How the attack works

Three policies of a domain apply to every account in it. The password policy sets the minimum length, the complexity requirement, the history and the age of passwords. The account lockout policy sets after how many failed sign-ins an account is locked and for how long. The Kerberos policy sets how long a ticket-granting ticket and a service ticket are valid, how long a ticket can be renewed and whether the domain controller checks the user's logon restrictions for every service ticket. All three are edited in a Group Policy Object linked to the domain, normally the Default Domain Policy. Fine-grained password policies (Password Settings objects, class msDS-PasswordSettings) carry the same password and lockout settings for the users and groups they are applied to and take precedence over the domain policy.

An attacker who can edit that policy, or who can write to a Password Settings object, does not need to attack one account. Setting the lockout threshold to 0 means accounts are never locked, so passwords can be guessed without a limit. A minimum length of 0 means no password is required, and switching complexity off lets users and the attacker set trivial passwords. Longer ticket lifetimes extend the time a stolen ticket stays usable. Applying a lax Password Settings object to one privileged account weakens that account alone and leaves the domain policy untouched, which a review of the domain policy will not show.

Domain controllers record these changes without a system access control list. Event 4739 is written when the password or lockout policy changes and holds the new value of each changed setting, with a dash for the settings that did not change. Event 4713 is written when the Kerberos policy changes and lists each changed parameter with its new and old value. Both are usually written under the computer account of the domain controller that applied the policy, not under the account of the person who edited it. Changes to Password Settings objects are directory changes and appear as event 5136 when an auditing entry covers the Password Settings Container. This page differs from Reversible Password Encryption Enabled, whose rules read the reversible encryption bit of the same events.

What an attacker needs

  • Edit rights on a Group Policy Object that is linked to the domain and defines the account policies, or membership in a group that has them, such as Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners for policies they own.
  • For fine-grained policies, write access to a Password Settings object or the right to create one. By default only members of Domain Admins have it.

Impact

Every account the weakened policy applies to becomes easier to take over. Without a lockout threshold an attacker can guess passwords at any speed, short and simple passwords fall to guessing and to offline cracking of captured hashes, and longer ticket lifetimes extend the use of stolen tickets. The change also lets the attacker set a weak password on an account they control and keep it. Because the settings are policy, the weakness stays until someone compares the policy with the baseline.

Detection rules

Account Lockout Switched Off in the Domain Policy

Detects event 4739 (domain policy was changed) in which the Lockout Threshold field holds 0. The field carries the new value of the setting Account lockout threshold when that setting changed, and a dash otherwise. Microsoft documents that a value of 0 means accounts are never locked out. After this change failed sign-ins no longer lock an account, so passwords can be guessed without a limit and event 4740 stops appearing. An attacker who can edit the domain policy makes this change before guessing passwords, or to stop lockouts from giving the guessing away. The event does not hold the old value. A threshold of 0 is also the default of a new domain, but the event is written only when the setting changes. The field is a string, so the value is matched as text. Fine-grained password policies are covered by another rule of this attack. Requires Audit Authentication Policy Change. The event needs no SACL.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Account Lockout Switched Off in the Domain Policy
id: 32e5a800-88a0-4266-b960-df3b42750f89
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 4739 (domain policy was changed) in which the Lockout
  Threshold field holds 0. The field carries the new value of the setting
  Account lockout threshold when that setting changed, and a dash otherwise.
  Microsoft documents that a value of 0 means accounts are never locked
  out. After this change failed sign-ins no longer lock an account, so
  passwords can be guessed without a limit and event 4740 stops appearing.
  An attacker who can edit the domain policy makes this change before
  guessing passwords, or to stop lockouts from giving the guessing away.
  The event does not hold the old value. A threshold of 0 is also the
  default of a new domain, but the event is written only when the setting
  changes. The field is a string, so the value is matched as text.
  Fine-grained password policies are covered by another rule of this
  attack. Requires Audit Authentication Policy Change. The event needs no
  SACL.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4739
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-threshold
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4739
    LockoutThreshold|re: '^0$'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A decision to run without account lockout, which Microsoft describes as acceptable only where passwords are long and complex and failed sign-ins are monitored. Confirm the decision with the change record.
level: medium

False positives

  • A decision to run without account lockout, which Microsoft describes as acceptable only where passwords are long and complex and failed sign-ins are monitored. Confirm the decision with the change record.

Password or Lockout Policy of the Domain Changed

Detects event 4739 (domain policy was changed) in which the change type is the password policy or the account lockout policy. The event holds the new value of every setting that changed (minimum and maximum password age, minimum length, history length, password properties, lockout threshold, duration and observation window) and a dash for the others. It does not hold the old values, so the rule reports every change and the comparison with the baseline is done in triage. Microsoft states that changes to these policies must be monitored. The other rules of this attack report the values that are a weakening on their own. This one is the baseline that also catches a threshold raised from 5 to 500 or a history shortened to one password. The subject is usually the domain controller that applied the policy, not the person who edited it. Changes of the machine account quota and of the domain functional level use the same event with another change type and are not matched. Requires Audit Authentication Policy Change. The event needs no SACL.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Password or Lockout Policy of the Domain Changed
id: 2c23f057-8f9d-43d4-9c67-88571669d816
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 4739 (domain policy was changed) in which the change type is
  the password policy or the account lockout policy. The event holds the new
  value of every setting that changed (minimum and maximum password age,
  minimum length, history length, password properties, lockout threshold,
  duration and observation window) and a dash for the others. It does not
  hold the old values, so the rule reports every change and the comparison
  with the baseline is done in triage. Microsoft states that changes to
  these policies must be monitored. The other rules of this attack report
  the values that are a weakening on their own. This one is the baseline
  that also catches a threshold raised from 5 to 500 or a history shortened
  to one password. The subject is usually the domain controller that
  applied the policy, not the person who edited it. Changes of the machine
  account quota and of the domain functional level use the same event with
  another change type and are not matched. Requires Audit Authentication
  Policy Change. The event needs no SACL.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4739
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-authentication-policy-change
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4739
    DomainPolicyChanged|contains:
      - 'Password Policy'
      - 'Lockout Policy'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned changes of the password or lockout policy, including hardening changes, which this rule cannot tell from a weakening. They are rare. Match the event to the change record and compare the new values with the baseline.
level: low

False positives

  • Planned changes of the password or lockout policy, including hardening changes, which this rule cannot tell from a weakening. They are rare. Match the event to the change record and compare the new values with the baseline.

Fine-Grained Password Policy Weakened

Detects a weak value written to a Password Settings object (event 5136, Value Added, object class msDS-PasswordSettings). Three attributes are read. msDS-LockoutThreshold set to 0 means the accounts the object applies to are never locked out. msDS-PasswordComplexityEnabled set to FALSE drops the complexity requirement. msDS-MinimumPasswordLength below 8 allows short passwords, and the limit of 8 is a starting point to adjust to your baseline. A Password Settings object takes precedence over the domain policy for the users and groups it applies to, and events 4739 and 4713 are not written for it, so this is the only event that shows the change. The event reports a change to an existing object. The creation of a new object is logged as event 5137, which carries no attribute values, so review new objects separately. Reversible encryption on these objects is covered by the attack Reversible Password Encryption Enabled. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and an auditing entry (SACL) for writes on the Password Settings Container.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Fine-Grained Password Policy Weakened
id: f461dc46-1fad-4bed-8dd8-aa1d4c083d78
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a weak value written to a Password Settings object (event 5136,
  Value Added, object class msDS-PasswordSettings). Three attributes are
  read. msDS-LockoutThreshold set to 0 means the accounts the object applies
  to are never locked out. msDS-PasswordComplexityEnabled set to FALSE drops
  the complexity requirement. msDS-MinimumPasswordLength below 8 allows
  short passwords, and the limit of 8 is a starting point to adjust to your
  baseline. A Password Settings object takes precedence over the domain
  policy for the users and groups it applies to, and events 4739 and 4713
  are not written for it, so this is the only event that shows the change.
  The event reports a change to an existing object. The creation of a new
  object is logged as event 5137, which carries no attribute values, so
  review new objects separately. Reversible encryption on these objects is
  covered by the attack Reversible Password Encryption Enabled. Requires
  Audit Directory Service Changes and an auditing entry (SACL) for writes
  on the Password Settings Container.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/c-msds-passwordsettings
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/minimum-password-length
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
    ObjectClass: msDS-PasswordSettings
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
  selection_weak_lockout:
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-LockoutThreshold
    AttributeValue: 0
  selection_weak_complexity:
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-PasswordComplexityEnabled
    AttributeValue: 'FALSE'
  selection_weak_length:
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-MinimumPasswordLength
    AttributeValue|re: '^[0-7]$'
  condition: selection and 1 of selection_weak_*
falsepositives:
  - A Password Settings object made on purpose for accounts that cannot meet the domain policy, such as accounts of a legacy application. Confirm the change record and check which accounts the object applies to (msDS-PSOAppliesTo).
level: medium

False positives

  • A Password Settings object made on purpose for accounts that cannot meet the domain policy, such as accounts of a legacy application. Confirm the change record and check which accounts the object applies to (msDS-PSOAppliesTo).

Kerberos Policy of the Domain Changed

Detects event 4713 (Kerberos policy was changed), which is generated only on domain controllers. The Kerberos policy sets the maximum lifetime of a user ticket (KerMaxT) and of a service ticket (KerMinT), the maximum time a user ticket can be renewed (KerMaxR), the tolerance for clock differences (KerProxy) and whether user logon restrictions are enforced (KerOpts, 0x80 enabled, 0x0 disabled). The field KerberosPolicyChange lists each changed parameter as its name, the new value and the old value in parentheses, and two dashes mean that nothing changed. Longer lifetimes extend the time a stolen ticket stays usable, and switching off the logon restrictions check removes the validation of each service ticket request against the account. Microsoft recommends an alert for every change this event reports. The rule does not interpret the values, which are hexadecimal time units, so the direction of the change is read in triage. The subject is usually the domain controller that applied the policy. Requires Audit Authentication Policy Change. The event needs no SACL.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Kerberos Policy of the Domain Changed
id: ccfbd840-da7d-4eee-af5d-0bbe9322ce78
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 4713 (Kerberos policy was changed), which is generated only
  on domain controllers. The Kerberos policy sets the maximum lifetime of a
  user ticket (KerMaxT) and of a service ticket (KerMinT), the maximum time a
  user ticket can be renewed (KerMaxR), the tolerance for clock differences
  (KerProxy) and whether user logon restrictions are enforced (KerOpts, 0x80
  enabled, 0x0 disabled). The field KerberosPolicyChange lists each changed
  parameter as its name, the new value and the old value in parentheses, and
  two dashes mean that nothing changed. Longer lifetimes extend the time a
  stolen ticket stays usable, and switching off the logon restrictions check
  removes the validation of each service ticket request against the account.
  Microsoft recommends an alert for every change this event reports. The
  rule does not interpret the values, which are hexadecimal time units, so
  the direction of the change is read in triage. The subject is usually the
  domain controller that applied the policy. Requires Audit Authentication
  Policy Change. The event needs no SACL.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4713
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-authentication-policy-change
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4713
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A planned change of the Kerberos policy, for example shorter ticket lifetimes in a hardening project. The policy changes very rarely. Match the event to the change record and read the new and old values.
level: medium

False positives

  • A planned change of the Kerberos policy, for example shorter ticket lifetimes in a hardening project. The policy changes very rarely. Match the event to the change record and read the new and old values.

Password Length or Complexity Reduced in the Domain Policy

Detects event 4739 (domain policy was changed) with a weak new value in the password policy. The first case is a Min. Password Length below 8. Microsoft recommends a minimum of at least 8 characters and documents that 0 means no password is required. The limit of 8 is a starting point, so raise the pattern to your own baseline. The second case is a Password Properties value in which the bit for "Password must meet complexity requirements" (1) is not set, which is every even number. Microsoft documents the values 0 and 16 for this event as complexity disabled. Both fields hold the new value only when the setting changed and a dash otherwise, and they are strings, so they are matched as text. With shorter or simpler passwords allowed, users and an attacker can set passwords that fall to guessing, and the attacker can do so on an account they control. A later change of the policy while the weak value stays in place can report the same value again. Requires Audit Authentication Policy Change. The event needs no SACL.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Password Length or Complexity Reduced in the Domain Policy
id: c61641a8-f59c-41f7-a716-70830431701a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 4739 (domain policy was changed) with a weak new value in
  the password policy. The first case is a Min. Password Length below 8.
  Microsoft recommends a minimum of at least 8 characters and documents that
  0 means no password is required. The limit of 8 is a starting point, so
  raise the pattern to your own baseline. The second case is a Password
  Properties value in which the bit for "Password must meet complexity
  requirements" (1) is not set, which is every even number. Microsoft
  documents the values 0 and 16 for this event as complexity disabled. Both
  fields hold the new value only when the setting changed and a dash
  otherwise, and they are strings, so they are matched as text. With shorter
  or simpler passwords allowed, users and an attacker can set passwords that
  fall to guessing, and the attacker can do so on an account they control.
  A later change of the policy while the weak value stays in place can
  report the same value again. Requires Audit Authentication Policy Change.
  The event needs no SACL.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4739
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/minimum-password-length
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-pwdproperties
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4739
  selection_weak_length:
    MinPasswordLength|re: '^[0-7]$'
  selection_weak_complexity:
    PasswordProperties|re: '^[0-9]*[02468]$'
  condition: selection and 1 of selection_weak_*
falsepositives:
  - A domain whose approved policy has a minimum length below 8 or no complexity requirement, for example because long passphrases are enforced by another product. Adjust the length pattern to your baseline or drop the complexity block.
  - A change of another password setting while complexity is already disabled can report the same Password Properties value again. Enable complexity instead of excluding the event.
level: medium

False positives

  • A domain whose approved policy has a minimum length below 8 or no complexity requirement, for example because long passphrases are enforced by another product. Adjust the length pattern to your baseline or drop the complexity block.
  • A change of another password setting while complexity is already disabled can report the same Password Properties value again. Enable complexity instead of excluding the event.

Password Settings Object Applied to an Account or Group

Detects a value added to msDS-PSOAppliesTo on a Password Settings object (event 5136, Value Added). The attribute lists the users and groups the fine-grained password policy applies to, and the distinguished name of the account or group that was added is in AttributeValue. Applying an existing lax object to an account weakens the password and lockout rules of that account without any change to the settings of the object or to the domain policy, so the rules that read those settings stay silent. The rule cannot tell whether the object is stricter or weaker than the domain policy. Most organizations use these objects to give privileged accounts a stricter policy, so read the settings of the object after an alert. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and an auditing entry (SACL) for writes on the Password Settings Container.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Password Settings Object Applied to an Account or Group
id: 52558638-0c1a-40ce-9f5f-b24fefd98dd0
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a value added to msDS-PSOAppliesTo on a Password Settings object
  (event 5136, Value Added). The attribute lists the users and groups the
  fine-grained password policy applies to, and the distinguished name of
  the account or group that was added is in AttributeValue. Applying an
  existing lax object to an account weakens the password and lockout rules
  of that account without any change to the settings of the object or to
  the domain policy, so the rules that read those settings stay silent. The
  rule cannot tell whether the object is stricter or weaker than the domain
  policy. Most organizations use these objects to give privileged accounts
  a stricter policy, so read the settings of the object after an alert.
  Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and an auditing entry (SACL) for
  writes on the Password Settings Container.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/c-msds-passwordsettings
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-msds-psoappliesto
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-PSOAppliesTo
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrators who apply a stricter policy to privileged or service accounts, which is the intended use of the feature. Check the settings of the object and exclude the objects that are stricter than the domain policy by ObjectDN.
level: low

False positives

  • Administrators who apply a stricter policy to privileged or service accounts, which is the intended use of the feature. Check the settings of the object and exclude the objects that are stricter than the domain policy by ObjectDN.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

New policy value is weaker than the last value recorded for the same setting

Detection hypothesisCompares with an earlier value

Event 4739 holds only the new value of a setting, so a single event cannot say whether the policy became weaker or stricter. Keeping the last value seen for each setting and comparing it with the new one turns every policy change into a statement about its direction, without a fixed limit that may not fit your policy.

  1. Collect event 4739 from the domain controllers and keep, per domain in DomainName, the last value other than a dash of MinPasswordLength, PasswordHistoryLength, LockoutThreshold, LockoutDuration and LockoutObservationWindow.
  2. For each new event 4739, compare every setting that is not a dash with the value kept for it.
  3. Report a shorter minimum length, a shorter history, a lockout threshold that changed to 0 or to a higher number, and a shorter lockout duration.
  4. Update the kept values after the comparison, and treat the first event for a domain as the start of the record.

Events4739

LimitsThe first change after collection starts cannot be compared. The numbers of the lockout duration and observation window fields are documented only as numeric values, so compare them with each other and do not read them as minutes without checking. A planned hardening project that later relaxes one value matches as well.

Policy weakened and restored shortly after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

An attacker who needs the weaker policy for one step, such as setting a short password on an account, changes the policy, acts and changes it back so that a later review finds the old values. Two policy changes of the same kind within a short time, with password changes or resets in between, are not how administrators work.

  1. A password or lockout policy change is recorded: event 4739 with Password Policy or Lockout Policy in DomainPolicyChanged. Keep the time and the changed settings.
  2. Within 24 hours another event 4739 changes the same settings again.
  3. Between the two events, list the password changes and resets: events 4723 and 4724 with the account in TargetUserName and the actor in SubjectUserName.

Events473947234724

LimitsAn administrator who corrects a mistake in a policy change produces the same two events, usually within minutes and with a change record. The 24 hours are a starting point. Password changes in between are normal user activity in a large domain and gain meaning only together with the two policy changes.

Triage

  • Read which settings changed. In event 4739 a changed setting holds its new value and every other setting holds a dash. In event 4713 each parameter is followed by its new value and, in parentheses, the old one.
  • Compare the new values with your baseline. A lockout threshold of 0, a shorter minimum length, complexity switched off or a longer ticket lifetime is a weakening. A stricter value is a hardening change.
  • Find the editor. The subject of the event is usually the domain controller, so look for the change to the Group Policy Object shortly before the event (event 5136 on the policy object, or a new version of the policy in SYSVOL) and for who made it.
  • For a Password Settings object, read the object in ObjectDN, the attribute and its new value, and list the accounts the object applies to.
  • Match the change to a change record. Account policies change rarely and a change nobody ordered has no routine explanation.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Set the policy back to the baseline values and confirm on a domain controller that the restored values are in effect.
  2. Disable the account that edited the policy and remove its edit rights on Group Policy Objects that are linked to the domain. Review the same policy for other changes made in that edit.
  3. Find the passwords that were set while the weaker policy applied, using the password change and reset events of that period, and have those accounts change their passwords again.
  4. Remove a Password Settings object that nobody ordered, or remove the accounts it was applied to, and reset the passwords of those accounts.
  5. Review failed sign-ins and lockouts since the change for password guessing that the weaker policy allowed.

Mitigation

  • Limit who can edit or link Group Policy Objects at the domain level to Tier 0 administrators, and review the delegation on the Default Domain Policy.
  • Leave the creation and change of Password Settings objects with Domain Admins, and review which accounts and groups each object applies to (msDS-PSOAppliesTo).
  • Record the intended values of the password, lockout and Kerberos policies as a baseline and compare the live policy with it on a schedule.
  • Give privileged accounts a stricter fine-grained password policy, so that a weakened domain policy does not reach them.
  • Enable the audit subcategory Audit Authentication Policy Change on all domain controllers, and add an auditing entry for writes on the Password Settings Container.

Frequently asked questions

Why does event 4739 name the domain controller and not the person who changed the policy?

The event is written when the domain controller applies the changed policy, and it does that under its own computer account. The person who made the change edited a Group Policy Object. Look for the change to that object shortly before the event, as event 5136 on the policy object or as a new version of the policy in SYSVOL.

Does event 4739 show the old value of a setting?

No. It holds the new value of each setting that changed and a dash for the others. To tell a weakening from a hardening change you need your baseline or the last value you recorded. Event 4713 is different. It lists each changed Kerberos parameter with the new value and the old value in parentheses.

Can a fine-grained password policy weaken one account without touching the domain policy?

Yes. A Password Settings object carries its own length, complexity and lockout settings and takes precedence over the domain policy for the users and groups it applies to. Events 4739 and 4713 are not written for it. The change shows as event 5136 on the object, and only if an auditing entry covers the Password Settings Container.

Is a lockout threshold of 0 always an attack?

No. Microsoft describes a threshold of 0 as one of two accepted configurations, to be chosen only where passwords are long and complex and failed sign-ins are monitored. It is also the default of a new domain. The rule reports a change to 0, and whether that change was decided or not is what triage has to establish.

References

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