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BadSuccessor (dMSA Abuse) detection rules

An attacker who can create or edit a delegated managed service account (dMSA) links it to a privileged account as its predecessor and inherits its privileges. Detected via dMSA creation (5137) and migration link writes (5136).

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
Critical
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
At least one Windows Server 2025 domain controller, and the right to create a dMSA in any OU or container or to write the migration link on an existing one.
Impact
On an unpatched domain controller the attacker gains the privileges of any chosen account, up to Domain Admins, which leads to DCSync and full domain compromise.
Response
Disable the delegated managed service account and the account that created or modified it, then reset the password of the account the dMSA was linked to.
Mitigation
Install the security updates for CVE-2025-53779 on every domain controller, and limit create-child rights on OUs and containers to Tier 0 and service-account administrators.
Event IDs
51375136

How the attack works

Windows Server 2025 introduced delegated managed service accounts (msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount) to replace legacy service accounts. During a migration the dMSA's msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink points to the account it supersedes and msDS-DelegatedMSAState records the state (1 = migration started, 2 = completed, 3 = standalone dMSA). Once a migration is complete the KDC issues tickets for the dMSA that carry the superseded account's group memberships, and the key package can include the superseded account's keys.

BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779) abuses this flow: a principal that can create objects in a single OU or container, or that controls an existing dMSA, links a dMSA to a privileged target (for example a domain administrator) and marks the migration as completed. The dMSA then authenticates with the target's privileges without any change to the target account itself. Domain controllers patched for CVE-2025-53779 close the escalation, but the rights that allow it remain sensitive and the directory changes are still the signal.

What an attacker needs

  • At least one Windows Server 2025 domain controller (dMSA schema present).
  • Create-child rights for msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount (or all child objects) on any OU or container, or write access to msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink and msDS-DelegatedMSAState on an existing dMSA.

Impact

On an unpatched domain controller, the privileges of any chosen account (up to Domain Admins) and potentially its long-term keys, leading to DCSync and full domain compromise. Even on patched systems an unexpected privileged migration link is a strong compromise indicator.

Detection rules

Delegated Managed Service Account Created

Detects the creation of a delegated managed service account (object class msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount). BadSuccessor starts by creating a dMSA in an OU where the attacker has create-child rights; if the migration link is set in the same operation, this creation event is the only directory trace. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits dMSA creation on OUs and containers.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Delegated Managed Service Account Created
id: f7b58cc2-814b-4a84-a82e-c528749f9f3a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the creation of a delegated managed service account (object class
  msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount). BadSuccessor starts by creating a dMSA in
  an OU where the attacker has create-child rights; if the migration link is set
  in the same operation, this creation event is the only directory trace.
  Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits dMSA creation
  on OUs and containers.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adsc/2c3e6e0a-134d-47e3-9ed5-edb71145def3
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5137
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5137
    ObjectClass: msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned dMSA deployments and migrations by service account administrators. dMSAs are new and rare; review each creation and exclude only documented creators by SubjectUserName.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned dMSA deployments and migrations by service account administrators. dMSAs are new and rare; review each creation and exclude only documented creators by SubjectUserName.

Superseded Account Linked to a Delegated Managed Service Account

Detects a value written to msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink, the dMSA attribute that names the account the dMSA supersedes and whose privileges it inherits once the migration is marked complete. BadSuccessor sets it to a privileged account. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits writes to dMSA objects.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Superseded Account Linked to a Delegated Managed Service Account
id: c60f1370-1c4b-49fb-9124-e7fdddc8cb8a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a value written to msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink, the dMSA
  attribute that names the account the dMSA supersedes and whose privileges it
  inherits once the migration is marked complete. BadSuccessor sets it to a
  privileged account. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that
  audits writes to dMSA objects.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/delegated-managed-service-accounts/delegated-managed-service-accounts-overview
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A legitimate service account migration started with Start-ADServiceAccountMigration. Confirm that the linked account (AttributeValue) is the service account named in the change request and not a privileged user.
level: high

False positives

  • A legitimate service account migration started with Start-ADServiceAccountMigration. Confirm that the linked account (AttributeValue) is the service account named in the change request and not a privileged user.

Triage

  • Identify the dMSA (ObjectDN), who created or modified it (SubjectUserName) and, in 5136, the account it now supersedes (AttributeValue of msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink).
  • Treat a link to a privileged account, or a dMSA created by a non-administrative account, as an incident; legitimate migrations are planned and target service accounts.
  • Check msDS-DelegatedMSAState on the dMSA. A jump straight to 2 without a prior migration in state 1 is not how the supported migration cmdlets behave.
  • Look for Kerberos activity of the dMSA (4768/4769 for the dMSA's sAMAccountName) right after the change and confirm the domain controllers are patched.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Disable the delegated managed service account so that it can no longer request tickets, and disable the account that created or modified it.
  2. Clear the link to the superseded account and delete the dMSA once the evidence has been saved. Remove the create-child rights on the OU or container that made its creation possible.
  3. Reset the password of the account the dMSA was linked to. The key package of a dMSA can include the keys of the superseded account, so treat them as exposed.
  4. If the dMSA obtained tickets while it was linked to a domain administrator on an unpatched domain controller, respond as for a full domain compromise. Its tickets carried the group memberships of that account.
  5. List every dMSA in the domain with the account it supersedes, and confirm that each link belongs to a planned migration.

Mitigation

  • Install the security updates for CVE-2025-53779 on every domain controller.
  • Remove create-child rights on OUs and containers from principals that are not Tier 0 or service-account administrators, including inherited and "all child objects" grants.
  • Restrict write access to msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink, msDS-DelegatedMSAState and msDS-GroupMSAMembership on existing dMSAs.
  • Configure SACLs that audit dMSA creation and writes to these attributes, and enable "Audit Directory Service Changes" on domain controllers.

Frequently asked questions

Is BadSuccessor still worth detecting after the CVE-2025-53779 updates are installed?

Yes. Patched domain controllers close the escalation, but the rights that allow the attempt remain sensitive. An unexpected migration link to a privileged account is still a strong indicator that an account with create-child rights is in the wrong hands. The directory changes look the same on patched and unpatched systems.

Why does nothing change on the privileged account that is targeted?

The attack writes only to the dMSA. The migration link and the migration state are attributes of the dMSA object, and the target account is not modified at all. Monitoring that watches privileged accounts and group memberships sees nothing. The signals are the creation of the dMSA (5137) and the write of the link (5136), and both need SACLs.

How does a legitimate dMSA migration differ from the attack in the logs?

A real migration is planned, is started by a service account administrator with the supported migration cmdlets, and links the dMSA to a service account. The migration state goes to 1 first and to 2 when it completes. A dMSA created by an ordinary account, a link to a privileged user, or a state that jumps straight to 2 does not fit that pattern.

Can the creation event be the only trace of the attack?

Yes. If the migration link is set in the same operation that creates the dMSA, the creation event (5137) is the only directory trace. That is why every dMSA creation deserves a review while these accounts are still rare.

References

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