How the attack works
Classic Kerberos constrained delegation is configured on the account that runs a front-end service: msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo lists the SPNs it may request tickets for on behalf of users (S4U2Proxy). If the account is also flagged TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION ("use any authentication protocol", protocol transition), it can obtain a ticket for any user without that user ever authenticating to it.
Setting these values requires the "Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation" right (by default Administrators on domain controllers) plus write access to the account. An attacker who has these rights, or who compromises an account that already has delegation, points the list at a high-value service (for example cifs or ldap on a domain controller) and impersonates a domain administrator to it. Because the service class in a delegated ticket can be swapped, delegation to any SPN on a host effectively exposes the whole host.
What an attacker needs
SeEnableDelegationPrivilegeon the domain controllers and write access to the delegating account, or control of an account that already has constrained delegation.- The credentials or keys of the delegating account (for example a computer account or a service account the attacker controls).
Impact
The delegating account can act as any non-protected user, including domain administrators, against every service on the listed hosts. Delegation to a domain controller service amounts to domain compromise and is a durable backdoor.
Detection rules
Constrained Delegation Target Added to an Account
Detects a service principal name added to msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo on a user or computer account, which allows that account to request Kerberos tickets to the listed service on behalf of other users. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits writes to msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo.
title: Constrained Delegation Target Added to an Account
id: 85e0ec63-3d0e-4e4f-8c3d-740ce695abbb
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a service principal name added to msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo on a user
or computer account, which allows that account to request Kerberos tickets to
the listed service on behalf of other users. Requires Audit Directory Service
Changes and a SACL that audits writes to msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-msds-allowedtodelegateto
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo
OperationType:
- '%%14674'
- 'Value Added'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned delegation changes for multi-tier applications (web front end to SQL Server, for example). Exclude documented service accounts by ObjectDN and keep alerting on any value that names a domain controller.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned delegation changes for multi-tier applications (web front end to SQL Server, for example). Exclude documented service accounts by ObjectDN and keep alerting on any value that names a domain controller.
Delegation Service List Changed on a User or Computer Account
Detects 4738 (user) or 4742 (computer) events whose AllowedToDelegateTo field holds an SPN list, meaning msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo was set on the account. The field is "-" when unchanged and "<value not set>" when the list was cleared; neither contains the "/" that every SPN has. These events come from Audit User/Computer Account Management and need no object SACL, so they complement the 5136 rule.
title: Delegation Service List Changed on a User or Computer Account
id: 20a9e3fa-8c52-490c-99c5-f0dc9dc067bd
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects 4738 (user) or 4742 (computer) events whose AllowedToDelegateTo field
holds an SPN list, meaning msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo was set on the account.
The field is "-" when unchanged and "<value not set>" when the list was
cleared; neither contains the "/" that every SPN has. These events come from
Audit User/Computer Account Management and need no object SACL, so they
complement the 5136 rule.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4742
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4738
- 4742
AllowedToDelegateTo|contains: '/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned delegation changes for multi-tier applications. Exclude documented service accounts by TargetUserName and keep alerting on any SPN that names a domain controller.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned delegation changes for multi-tier applications. Exclude documented service accounts by TargetUserName and keep alerting on any SPN that names a domain controller.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Delegation list set on an account, then delegated logons as privileged users on a listed host
A new delegation entry helps an attacker only once the delegating account obtains tickets as other users to a listed service. Microsoft documents that event 4769 lists the transited services when constrained delegation was used, and that event 4624 on the target lists them for a logon that came from an S4U logon process. Such tickets and logons for privileged users on a host that joined the list shortly before show the new delegation in use.
- The list changes: event 4738 or 4742 whose
AllowedToDelegateToholds service names, or event 5136 withAttributeLDAPDisplayNamemsDS-AllowedToDelegateTo andOperationTypeValue Added. Keep the account and the hosts the service names point to. - Within 24 hours, find on the domain controllers successful event 4769 whose
ServiceNameis the account of a listed host and whoseTransmittedServicesis not a dash. ReadTargetUserNameandTransmittedServicestogether. - On the listed hosts, find event 4624 with
LogonType3 and aTransmittedServicesvalue that is not a dash, and readTargetUserName. - Report impersonated users who belong to privileged groups, and every case where a listed host is a domain controller.
Events47384742513647694624
LimitsAn approved delegation produces the same tickets for the users of the front-end service, so compare with the users it normally serves. Microsoft does not document which account each field of event 4769 names during delegation. The logons on the hosts are seen only where their Security log is collected. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Read the new SPN list (AttributeValue in 5136, AllowedToDelegateTo in 4738/4742) and identify the target hosts; any domain controller or Tier 0 server in the list is critical.
- Check whether the account also has protocol transition enabled (UserAccountControl change "Trusted To Authenticate For Delegation" in the same 4738/4742 event or a 5136 on userAccountControl).
- Confirm the change with the service owner and a change record; correlate SubjectLogonId with 4624 for the source host.
- Look for 4769 events where the delegating account requests tickets to the listed services for privileged users.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the added service names from
msDS-AllowedToDelegateToon the account, and clear protocol transition if it was enabled in the same change. - Reset the credentials of the delegating account, because the attacker needs its password or keys to use the delegation. For a computer account, treat the host as compromised.
- Disable the account that made the change, and find out how it came to hold the delegation user right on domain controllers and write access to the delegating account.
- Identify the users the delegating account impersonated to the listed services, and review what was done on those hosts in their name. Delegation to a service on a domain controller means a domain compromise.
- Compare all accounts that have a delegation list with the approved inventory.
Mitigation
- Keep
SeEnableDelegationPrivilegelimited to Tier 0 administrators and review accounts withmsDS-AllowedToDelegateToregularly. - Never configure delegation to services hosted on domain controllers; prefer "Kerberos only" over protocol transition.
- Mark privileged accounts "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" or add them to Protected Users.
- Audit writes to
msDS-AllowedToDelegateTowith a SACL and enable "Audit User Account Management" and "Audit Computer Account Management".
Frequently asked questions
Why do two rules alert on the same delegation change?
They read different events. One uses event 5136, which needs a SACL that audits writes to `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo`. The other uses the AllowedToDelegateTo field of events 4738 and 4742, which only need the account management audit subcategories and no SACL. Where the SACL is missing, only the second rule fires.
Delegation was added for one service only. Why treat the whole host as exposed?
The service class in a delegated ticket can be swapped. An account that may delegate to one service name on a host can therefore reach the other services on that host as the impersonated user. Judge the change by the host in the list, and treat any domain controller or Tier 0 server there as critical.
Can privileged accounts be protected from a malicious delegation entry?
Yes. Accounts marked "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" and members of Protected Users are not delegated, so the delegating account cannot act as them. Every other user, including administrators without that protection, can be impersonated to the listed services.
Do these rules cover resource-based constrained delegation?
No. They watch classic constrained delegation, which is configured on the front-end account in `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo`. Resource-based constrained delegation is configured on the account of the target service in a different attribute and needs its own detection.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- Kerberos constrained delegation overview
- Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation (user right)
- ms-DS-Allowed-To-Delegate-To attribute
- Event 4769: A Kerberos service ticket was requested (Transited Services)
- Event 4624: An account was successfully logged on (Transited Services for S4U logons)
- Event 5136: A directory service object was modified
- Event 4738: A user account was changed
- Event 4742: A computer account was changed