How the attack works
What separates a domain controller's account from any other computer account is one bit of userAccountControl: SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT (0x2000) instead of WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT (0x1000). When the bit is set, Active Directory also changes the account's primaryGroupID to 516, which makes it a member of the Domain Controllers group. The directory replication rights that DCSync needs are normally held by domain controllers, so the account inherits them without being added to any administrative group.
Setting the bit requires write access to the account's userAccountControl and the DS-Install-Replica control access right ("Add/Remove Replica In Domain") on the domain, which normally only administrators hold. An attacker who already has that level of access flips the bit on an ordinary computer account whose password they know and keeps a quiet replication backdoor. The domain controller logs the change in event 4742 (or 4738 if the object is a user, and 4741 if the account is created with the flag) with %%2088 ("'Server Trust Account' - Enabled") in UserAccountControl. A genuine domain controller promotion produces the same event, so the context decides. On domain controllers with the November 2021 updates, a non-administrator who tries to create an account whose object class and account type flags do not match is refused, and the System log records the attempt as Directory-Services-SAM event 16990, which a second rule on this page matches.
What an attacker needs
- Write access to
userAccountControlon a computer account and the DS-Install-Replica control access right on the domain object. - The password or keys of that computer account.
Impact
The account can request the password hashes of every account in the domain through replication, including krbtgt, while reviews of Domain Admins and other administrative groups show nothing unusual. The backdoor survives password resets of the real administrators.
Detection rules
SAM Blocked an Account With Mismatched Object Class and Account Type Flags
Detects event 16990 of the source Directory-Services-SAM in the System log of a domain controller. The Security Accounts Manager writes it when it blocks a non-administrator from creating an Active Directory account whose objectClass and userAccountControl account type flags do not match. Since the November 9, 2021 updates for CVE-2021-42278 a computer object must carry the workstation trust or the server trust flag, and a user object the normal account or the interdomain trust flag. For existing objects the check runs when a user without administrator rights for machine accounts changes sAMAccountName or userAccountControl. A refused request of this kind is an attempt to give an account a type it should not have, for example a user object that carries a computer or domain controller account type. The event text holds the account name, its objectClass, the userAccountControl value, the caller address and the caller SID. Microsoft's article gives the event text and does not name the event data fields, so the rule matches the event ID and the provider only. A change made by an administrator is not validated and is covered by the flag rule of this page. Collect the System log of every domain controller.
title: SAM Blocked an Account With Mismatched Object Class and Account Type Flags
id: b842826c-51ba-4c2f-a5fc-dae2e2e5c396
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 16990 of the source Directory-Services-SAM in the System log
of a domain controller. The Security Accounts Manager writes it when it
blocks a non-administrator from creating an Active Directory account whose
objectClass and userAccountControl account type flags do not match. Since
the November 9, 2021 updates for CVE-2021-42278 a computer object must
carry the workstation trust or the server trust flag, and a user object the
normal account or the interdomain trust flag. For existing objects the
check runs when a user without administrator rights for machine accounts
changes sAMAccountName or userAccountControl. A refused request of this
kind is an attempt to give an account a type it should not have, for
example a user object that carries a computer or domain controller account
type. The event text holds the account name, its objectClass, the
userAccountControl value, the caller address and the caller SID.
Microsoft's article gives the event text and does not name the event data
fields, so the rule matches the event ID and the provider only. A change
made by an administrator is not validated and is covered by the flag rule
of this page. Collect the System log of every domain controller.
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008102-active-directory-security-accounts-manager-hardening-changes-cve-2021-42278-5975b463-4c95-45e1-831a-d120004e258e
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: Directory-Services-SAM
EventID: 16990
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A provisioning tool or script that creates accounts with a userAccountControl value that does not fit the object class. It fails every time on an updated domain controller. Fix the tool, and confirm the caller SID and address in the event before closing the alert.
level: medium
False positives
- A provisioning tool or script that creates accounts with a userAccountControl value that does not fit the object class. It fails every time on an updated domain controller. Fix the tool, and confirm the caller SID and address in the event before closing the alert.
Server Trust Account Flag Enabled on an Account
Detects a computer or user account created or changed (4741, 4742, 4738) with "'Server Trust Account' - Enabled" (%%2088) in its User Account Control changes. The flag marks the account as a domain controller: Active Directory moves it into the Domain Controllers group (primaryGroupID 516), whose members can replicate directory secrets. Outside a domain controller promotion this is a rogue domain controller account. Requires Audit Computer Account Management and Audit User Account Management.
title: Server Trust Account Flag Enabled on an Account
id: fc17d95a-25ec-4709-a646-9804c54c4030
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a computer or user account created or changed (4741, 4742, 4738) with
"'Server Trust Account' - Enabled" (%%2088) in its User Account Control
changes. The flag marks the account as a domain controller: Active Directory
moves it into the Domain Controllers group (primaryGroupID 516), whose members
can replicate directory secrets. Outside a domain controller promotion this is
a rogue domain controller account. Requires Audit Computer Account Management
and Audit User Account Management.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4742
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-samr/a2ad3e15-b839-49dc-9fa2-ee81b85bdcb1
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4738
- 4741
- 4742
UserAccountControl|contains: '%%2088'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Promotion of a new domain controller, which enables the flag on that server's computer account. Match the event to the change record and confirm that the computer became a domain controller.
level: high
False positives
- Promotion of a new domain controller, which enables the flag on that server's computer account. Match the event to the change record and confirm that the computer became a domain controller.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Server trust flag set on an account with no domain controller promotion around it
A real promotion gives the computer a server object and an NTDS Settings (nTDSDSA) object, which represents its directory service, under its site in the Configuration partition. An account that only gains the flag gets no such object. Joining the flag change to the creation of directory service objects for the same host separates a promotion from a backdoor, and a replication request by an account without that object confirms it.
- Take event 4742, 4738 or 4741 whose
UserAccountControlcontains %%2088 (Server Trust Account enabled), and keepTargetSid,TargetUserNameand the time. - Look in a window of 24 hours before and after, a starting value, for event 5137 with
ObjectClassnTDSDSA or server whoseObjectDNholds CN=<the computer name without $>,CN=Servers under CN=Sites,CN=Configuration. - Report every flag change with no such object in the window.
- Raise the priority when event 4662 with the replication rights GUIDs in
Propertiesshows the same account inSubjectUserSidrequesting replication.
Events47424738474151374662
LimitsThe 5137 events need a SACL that audits child creation under CN=Sites, otherwise every flag change is reported. A promotion that fails and is rolled back looks the same. A server object named differently from the computer account is missed by the name match, so compare it with the serverReference of the object where you can.
Triage
- Identify the account (TargetUserName, TargetSid) and who changed it (SubjectUserName, SubjectLogonId), and compare OldUacValue with NewUacValue in the same event.
- Confirm whether a domain controller promotion was planned. A promoted server ends up in the Domain Controllers OU with an NTDS Settings object under its site; an account that only gained the flag has neither.
- Look for directory replication requested by the account afterwards (event 4662 with the replication rights) and for its logons (4624, 4768) from unexpected addresses.
- If not explained, restore the workstation trust flag, reset the account's password and, if replication was requested, treat all domain credentials as exposed.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Disable the account that gained the flag at once, so that it can no longer request replication.
- Restore the workstation trust flag on the account, confirm that its primary group is Domain Computers (515) again, and reset its password, which the attacker knows.
- Disable or reset the account that set the flag. Setting it takes the DS-Install-Replica right on the domain, so an identity with administrator-level rights is compromised.
- If the account requested directory replication while it carried the flag, every credential in the domain is exposed, krbtgt included. Start the recovery described for DCSync.
- Sweep the domain for further accounts of this kind right away. One unauthorized domain controller account is a reason to expect a second.
Mitigation
- Review regularly which computer accounts carry SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT or have primaryGroupID 516 and confirm that each one is a real domain controller.
- Restrict the DS-Install-Replica right on the domain object and write access to userAccountControl on computer objects to Tier 0 administrators.
- Keep domain controllers on current security updates; the SAM hardening in KB5008102 validates the account-type flags of computer accounts created or changed by non-administrators.
- Enable "Audit Computer Account Management" and "Audit User Account Management" on all domain controllers.
Frequently asked questions
How do I tell a real domain controller promotion from an unauthorized account?
A promoted server ends up in the Domain Controllers OU and has an NTDS Settings object under its site. An account that only gained the flag has neither. A promotion also has a change record, so match the event to it and confirm that the computer became a domain controller.
Why does the account not show up when administrative groups are reviewed?
It is not a member of Domain Admins or of any other administrative group. When the flag is set, Active Directory changes the primary group of the account to Domain Controllers (516), and the replication rights come with that group. A review of the administrative groups therefore shows nothing unusual.
Do the November 2021 updates prevent this change?
Only for non-administrators. The SAM hardening in KB5008102 validates the account-type flags of computer accounts that non-administrators create or change. An attacker who already has write access to userAccountControl and the DS-Install-Replica right on the domain can still set the flag, which is why the event matters.
Why does resetting administrator passwords not remove this backdoor?
The rights do not come from an administrator account. They come from the flag on a computer account whose password the attacker knows. Until the flag is removed and the password of that account is reset, it can keep requesting the password hashes of the domain through replication.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- Event 4742: A computer account was changed
- MS-SAMR: userAccountControl (constraints for UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)
- DS-Install-Replica extended right
- Use the UserAccountControl flags to manipulate user account properties
- Event 5137: A directory service object was created
- NTDS-DSA class
- Event 4662: An operation was performed on an object
- KB5008102: Active Directory Security Accounts Manager hardening changes (CVE-2021-42278)