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AdminSDHolder Modification detection rules

An attacker adds an ACE to the AdminSDHolder object; SDProp copies that ACL onto every protected admin account and group within an hour. Detected as a 5136 write to the nTSecurityDescriptor of CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
High
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Write access to the security descriptor of the AdminSDHolder object, which by default Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins and Administrators hold.
Impact
Within an hour the controlled account holds persistent full control over every protected account and group, and can reset admin passwords or add itself to Domain Admins.
Response
Disable the account the added ACE names as trustee, and remove the ACE from the AdminSDHolder object itself, because SDProp undoes a removal from individual accounts.
Mitigation
Limit who can write to AdminSDHolder to Tier 0 administrators, and keep a baseline of its ACL with an alert on any difference.
Event IDs
51364780

How the attack works

CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,<domain> holds the template security descriptor for protected accounts and groups (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators, the operator groups, krbtgt and their members, marked with adminCount = 1). Every 60 minutes the Security Descriptor Propagator (SDProp) on the PDC emulator compares each protected object's ACL with the AdminSDHolder ACL and overwrites any difference.

An attacker who already has administrative rights grants a controlled account a right such as GenericAll or WriteDacl on AdminSDHolder. SDProp then stamps that ACE onto every protected object, and keeps restoring it if an administrator removes it from an individual account. The backdoor survives password resets and group membership clean-up because it lives in a single, rarely reviewed object.

What an attacker needs

  • Write access to the security descriptor of the AdminSDHolder object (by default Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins and Administrators), or an account that already controls it.

Impact

The controlled account gains, within an hour and persistently, full control over every protected account and group: it can reset admin passwords, add itself to Domain Admins or take over krbtgt. It is a classic post-compromise persistence technique.

Detection rules

AdminSDHolder Security Descriptor Modified

Detects a write to the nTSecurityDescriptor of CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System. Any ACE added there is propagated by SDProp to every protected account and group within 60 minutes, which makes it a persistence backdoor on all Tier 0 identities. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL on the AdminSDHolder object.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: AdminSDHolder Security Descriptor Modified
id: 91be6ca2-ab1f-4b0f-ae1d-93a7dd2f2f9e
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a write to the nTSecurityDescriptor of CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System.
  Any ACE added there is propagated by SDProp to every protected account and
  group within 60 minutes, which makes it a persistence backdoor on all Tier 0
  identities. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL on the
  AdminSDHolder object.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
    ObjectDN|startswith: 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,'
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: nTSecurityDescriptor
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Rare, documented changes to the protected-object template by Tier 0 administrators (for example a delegated security tool). Review the added ACE instead of excluding the account.
level: high

False positives

  • Rare, documented changes to the protected-object template by Tier 0 administrators (for example a delegated security tool). Review the added ACE instead of excluding the account.

SDProp Reset the ACL of a Protected Account

Detects event 4780, logged by the PDC emulator when SDProp finds a protected account (adminCount = 1) whose ACL differs from AdminSDHolder and overwrites it. A burst of 4780 events follows a change to the AdminSDHolder ACL; a single event means the ACL of that privileged account was changed directly. Requires Audit User Account Management on domain controllers; Microsoft notes the event is not generated on some OS versions.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: SDProp Reset the ACL of a Protected Account
id: c3f43bd3-537f-471b-97dc-b1571c77002b
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 4780, logged by the PDC emulator when SDProp finds a protected
  account (adminCount = 1) whose ACL differs from AdminSDHolder and overwrites
  it. A burst of 4780 events follows a change to the AdminSDHolder ACL; a single
  event means the ACL of that privileged account was changed directly. Requires
  Audit User Account Management on domain controllers; Microsoft notes the event
  is not generated on some OS versions.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4780
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4780
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - An account recently added to a protected group gets its ACL reset once by SDProp. Correlate with 4728/4732/4756 for the same account (TargetUserName) before escalating.
level: medium

False positives

  • An account recently added to a protected group gets its ACL reset once by SDProp. Correlate with 4728/4732/4756 for the same account (TargetUserName) before escalating.

Triage

  • Read the new SDDL in AttributeValue (OperationType "Value Added") and compare it with the previous value (the "Value Deleted" event with the same OpCorrelationID) to find the added ACE and its trustee SID.
  • Confirm whether the change was made by an approved Tier 0 administrator (SubjectUserName) under a change record.
  • Check the trustee for recent use of the granted rights on protected accounts (password resets 4724, group changes 4728/4732/4756).
  • Expect a burst of 4780 events on the PDC emulator after the next SDProp run if the ACE was propagated.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Disable the account that the added ACE names as trustee, and the account that wrote the ACE if it was not an approved administrator.
  2. Remove the ACE from the AdminSDHolder object itself and compare the result with the baseline. Then wait for SDProp on the PDC emulator, or run it manually as Microsoft describes, and confirm that protected accounts and groups no longer carry the ACE.
  3. Undo what the trustee did with the rights while it had them. Reset the passwords of protected accounts it reset (4724), remove the members it added to privileged groups (4728, 4732 and 4756), and check krbtgt for a password change.
  4. Find out how the writer obtained write access to AdminSDHolder. By default that takes Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins or Administrators rights, so treat the change as the result of an earlier domain-level compromise.
  5. Review the AdminSDHolder ACL again after the following SDProp runs, and keep the SACL and the alert in place.

Mitigation

  • Keep a baseline of the AdminSDHolder ACL and alert on any difference; it should only contain the default entries.
  • Limit who can write to AdminSDHolder to Tier 0 administrators and protect those accounts (Protected Users, privileged access workstations).
  • Configure a SACL on AdminSDHolder that audits writes to its security descriptor, and enable "Audit Directory Service Changes" on domain controllers.
  • After an incident, clean AdminSDHolder first; removing the ACE from individual accounts is undone by SDProp.

Frequently asked questions

Why does the ACE come back after it was removed from an administrator account?

Every 60 minutes SDProp on the PDC emulator compares the ACL of each protected account and group with the ACL of AdminSDHolder and overwrites any difference. As long as the ACE is on AdminSDHolder, it is stamped back onto every protected object. Remove it from AdminSDHolder first, then check the individual accounts.

What does a single event 4780 mean when AdminSDHolder was not changed?

SDProp found one protected account whose ACL differed from AdminSDHolder and reset it. Either the ACL of that privileged account was changed directly, which deserves a look, or the account was recently added to a protected group and had its ACL reset once. Correlate with 4728, 4732 or 4756 for the same account. Microsoft notes that 4780 is not generated on some OS versions, so its absence proves nothing.

Does resetting the passwords of all administrators remove an AdminSDHolder backdoor?

No. The backdoor is an ACE on one object, not a credential. The account it names keeps control over every protected account and group, so it can reset the new passwords or add itself to Domain Admins again. The ACE has to be removed from AdminSDHolder, and the account it names has to be disabled and investigated.

References

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