How the attack works
A VMware ESXi hypervisor that is joined to an Active Directory domain for user management gives full administrative access to the members of one domain group, which is named ESX Admins by default. Microsoft, which reported the flaw as CVE-2024-37085, describes two properties that make this dangerous. The group is not a built-in group and does not exist in a domain by default, and the host determines membership by the name of the group and not by its security identifier (SID), without checking that the group is the one an administrator intended.
Anyone who can create a group in the domain can therefore create ESX Admins, add an account to it and become administrator of every affected hypervisor. Microsoft observed ransomware operators doing exactly that. It also describes two variants: renaming an existing group to ESX Admins, and keeping access for a while after the host was pointed at another group, because the privileges of the old group are not removed immediately. Control of a hypervisor means control of every virtual machine on it, which often includes domain controllers.
The directory side of the attack is ordinary group management, which domain controllers log when Audit Security Group Management is enabled: 4727, 4731 and 4754 for a new global, domain local or universal security group, 4728, 4732 and 4756 for a member added to one, and 4735, 4737 and 4755 for a change, with the new SAM account name when the group was renamed. A rename also writes 4781 when Audit User Account Management is enabled. The rules match on the name because the hypervisor does.
What an attacker needs
- An account that can create a security group in the domain, or rename a group or change its members. Ordinary users cannot do that by default, so the attacker has usually compromised an administrative or delegated account first, for example a member of Account Operators.
- At least one ESXi host that is joined to the domain and still gives administrator rights to the group by name. Broadcom fixed the behavior in ESXi 8.0 Update 3, planned no patch for ESXi 7.0 and documents host settings as a workaround for older versions.
Impact
Full administrative access to every affected ESXi hypervisor. Microsoft describes what follows: the attacker can encrypt the file system of the hypervisor, which stops the hosted servers from running, and can access the hosted virtual machines to take data or move further into the network. Where domain controllers run as virtual machines on those hosts, control of the hypervisor reaches them as well. Microsoft reports that several ransomware operators used this technique in numerous attacks.
Detection rules
Security Group Named ESX Admins Created
Detects the creation of a security group named ESX Admins (4727 global, 4731 domain local, 4754 universal). Domain-joined VMware ESXi hosts affected by CVE-2024-37085 give full administrative access to the members of a group with that name and find the group by name, and Microsoft reports that the group does not exist in a domain by default. In a domain that does not use the group, its creation is the first step of the attack Microsoft observed. Event 4731 is also written for local groups on member servers and workstations, which the hypervisor does not use. Requires Audit Security Group Management on domain controllers.
title: Security Group Named ESX Admins Created
id: 3a785687-c02d-4632-a9b7-034328cc3a1e
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the creation of a security group named ESX Admins (4727 global, 4731
domain local, 4754 universal). Domain-joined VMware ESXi hosts affected by
CVE-2024-37085 give full administrative access to the members of a group
with that name and find the group by name, and Microsoft reports that the
group does not exist in a domain by default. In a domain that does not use
the group, its creation is the first step of the attack Microsoft observed.
Event 4731 is also written for local groups on member servers and
workstations, which the hypervisor does not use. Requires Audit Security
Group Management on domain controllers.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/07/29/ransomware-operators-exploit-esxi-hypervisor-vulnerability-for-mass-encryption/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4731
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-security-group-management
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.007
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4727
- 4731
- 4754
TargetUserName: 'ESX Admins'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- An administrator who creates the group on purpose, either to use it for hypervisor administration or to occupy the name with a hardened group as Microsoft advises. Both happen once and have a change record.
- A local group with that name created on a member server or workstation (event 4731 with the computer name as the group domain). The hypervisor looks the group up in the domain, so scope the rule to domain controllers.
- If the administrators group of your ESXi hosts was set to another name, this rule does not see it. Replace the name with the one configured on the hosts.
level: high
False positives
- An administrator who creates the group on purpose, either to use it for hypervisor administration or to occupy the name with a hardened group as Microsoft advises. Both happen once and have a change record.
- A local group with that name created on a member server or workstation (event 4731 with the computer name as the group domain). The hypervisor looks the group up in the domain, so scope the rule to domain controllers.
- If the administrators group of your ESXi hosts was set to another name, this rule does not see it. Replace the name with the one configured on the hosts.
Group Renamed to ESX Admins
Detects an existing group that is renamed to ESX Admins. Microsoft lists renaming any group in the domain to that name as a second way to exploit CVE-2024-37085, because domain-joined VMware ESXi hosts find their administrators group by name. The rule reads two documented traces of a rename. A group change event (4735 domain local, 4737 global, 4755 universal) holds the new name in SamAccountName when the sAMAccountName attribute was changed and a dash otherwise, and Microsoft documents that a group rename also writes event 4781 with the old and the new account name. A renamed group keeps its members, so no member addition has to follow. Requires Audit Security Group Management for the change events or Audit User Account Management for 4781, on domain controllers.
title: Group Renamed to ESX Admins
id: 84d3ec29-a85a-4768-a155-a7984416bde5
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an existing group that is renamed to ESX Admins. Microsoft lists
renaming any group in the domain to that name as a second way to exploit
CVE-2024-37085, because domain-joined VMware ESXi hosts find their
administrators group by name. The rule reads two documented traces of a
rename. A group change event (4735 domain local, 4737 global, 4755
universal) holds the new name in SamAccountName when the sAMAccountName
attribute was changed and a dash otherwise, and Microsoft documents that a
group rename also writes event 4781 with the old and the new account name.
A renamed group keeps its members, so no member addition has to follow.
Requires Audit Security Group Management for the change events or Audit
User Account Management for 4781, on domain controllers.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/07/29/ransomware-operators-exploit-esxi-hypervisor-vulnerability-for-mass-encryption/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4735
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4781
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-security-group-management
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.007
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_group_changed:
EventID:
- 4735
- 4737
- 4755
SamAccountName: 'ESX Admins'
selection_account_renamed:
EventID: 4781
NewTargetUserName: 'ESX Admins'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- An administrator who renames a group on purpose to use it for hypervisor administration. That is a one-time change with a change record. Review the members the group already had, because they become hypervisor administrators with the rename.
- A local group renamed on a member server or workstation. The hypervisor uses the domain group, so scope the rule to domain controllers.
- If the administrators group of your ESXi hosts was set to another name, replace the name in the rule with the one configured on the hosts.
level: high
False positives
- An administrator who renames a group on purpose to use it for hypervisor administration. That is a one-time change with a change record. Review the members the group already had, because they become hypervisor administrators with the rename.
- A local group renamed on a member server or workstation. The hypervisor uses the domain group, so scope the rule to domain controllers.
- If the administrators group of your ESXi hosts was set to another name, replace the name in the rule with the one configured on the hosts.
Member Added to the ESX Admins Group
Detects a member added to a security group named ESX Admins (4728 global, 4732 domain local, 4756 universal). Domain-joined VMware ESXi hosts give full administrative access to the members of that group, so each new member is a new hypervisor administrator. On hosts affected by CVE-2024-37085 this is true for any group that carries the name, including one an attacker created or renamed. The group is matched by name because the hypervisor finds it by name and it has no well-known SID. Requires Audit Security Group Management on domain controllers.
title: Member Added to the ESX Admins Group
id: cfa10383-9d05-46ef-8468-35a2bbb21941
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a member added to a security group named ESX Admins (4728 global,
4732 domain local, 4756 universal). Domain-joined VMware ESXi hosts give
full administrative access to the members of that group, so each new member
is a new hypervisor administrator. On hosts affected by CVE-2024-37085 this
is true for any group that carries the name, including one an attacker
created or renamed. The group is matched by name because the hypervisor
finds it by name and it has no well-known SID. Requires Audit Security Group
Management on domain controllers.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/07/29/ransomware-operators-exploit-esxi-hypervisor-vulnerability-for-mass-encryption/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-security-group-management
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.007
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4728
- 4732
- 4756
TargetUserName: 'ESX Admins'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Approved onboarding of a virtualization administrator in an organization that uses the group. Match the addition to a request and document the expected members, then exclude them by MemberSid if needed.
- A local group with that name on a member server or workstation. The hypervisor uses the domain group, so scope the rule to domain controllers.
- If the administrators group of your ESXi hosts was set to another name, replace the name in the rule with the one configured on the hosts.
level: high
False positives
- Approved onboarding of a virtualization administrator in an organization that uses the group. Match the addition to a request and document the expected members, then exclude them by MemberSid if needed.
- A local group with that name on a member server or workstation. The hypervisor uses the domain group, so scope the rule to domain controllers.
- If the administrators group of your ESXi hosts was set to another name, replace the name in the rule with the one configured on the hosts.
Triage
- Read the group (TargetUserName, TargetSid), the account that made the change (SubjectUserName, SubjectLogonId) and, for an addition, the new member (MemberName, MemberSid).
- Establish whether the organization uses this group for hypervisor administration. If nobody can name its owner, a new
ESX Adminsgroup is malicious until proven otherwise. - For a rename, look up the group by its SID, read its previous name (OldTargetUserName in event 4781) and list its members. A renamed group brings its existing members with it.
- Check the subject. Was the account created or changed shortly before, does it normally manage groups, and from which host did it log on (event 4624 with the same logon ID)?
- Look at the ESXi hosts for logons by members of the group after the change, for new local accounts and for changed host settings.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the unauthorized members from the group at once. If the group itself is not legitimate, empty it and keep the name occupied by a hardened group that Tier 0 administrators own, because deleting it lets the next attacker create it again.
- Disable the account that created, renamed or filled the group and the accounts that were added, end their sessions, and isolate the host the change was made from.
- Treat every domain-joined ESXi host as accessed with full rights. Review its logons, local accounts and settings, and check the virtual machines and datastores for tampering or encryption.
- If domain controllers or other Tier 0 systems run as virtual machines on those hosts, handle the incident as a possible domain compromise, since an administrator of the hypervisor has access to their disks.
- Update the hosts or apply the documented host settings before they return to normal operation, and find out how the attacker obtained the right to create or change groups.
Mitigation
- Install the VMware update that fixes CVE-2024-37085 on every domain-joined ESXi host (ESXi 8.0 Update 3 or later, according to Broadcom's advisory VMSA-2024-0013).
- On hosts that cannot be updated, apply the settings Broadcom documents. Set
Config.HostAgent.plugins.hostsvc.esxAdminsGroupAutoAddto false, empty or changeConfig.HostAgent.plugins.hostsvc.esxAdminsGroup, shortenConfig.HostAgent.plugins.vimsvc.authValidateInterval, and then remove the administrator permission the group already holds on the host. - Make sure a group with that name exists in the domain and is hardened, as Microsoft advises. Keep it in a location only Tier 0 administrators can manage, with a short and reviewed member list, so that nobody else can create or fill it.
- Limit who can create and rename groups in the domain. Review delegated rights on organizational units and containers, and keep Account Operators empty.
- Enable Audit Security Group Management on all domain controllers, and send ESXi logs to the SIEM so that a logon to a hypervisor by a new administrator can be tied to the group change.
Frequently asked questions
Why do the rules match the group by its name and not by a SID?
Because the hypervisor does. Microsoft describes that a domain-joined ESXi host determines membership in its administrators group by the name of the group and not by its security identifier, and that the group does not exist in a domain by default. Any group that carries the name counts, so the name is the only stable value to match on. If you changed the group name in the host settings, replace the name in the rules with yours.
We do not use an ESX Admins group. Are we still affected?
Possibly, and that is the more dangerous case. An affected host that is joined to the domain grants administrator rights to a group with that name as soon as somebody creates it. Microsoft advises to make sure the group exists and is hardened, or to change the host settings so that the group is not trusted. As long as the name is unused, the rule for a newly created group should never fire, which makes it a reliable alarm.
Does the VMware update make this detection unnecessary?
No. Broadcom fixed the behavior in ESXi 8.0 Update 3 and planned no patch for ESXi 7.0, and its workaround article notes that a host that was already joined keeps the administrator permission of the group until someone removes it. If you use the group on purpose, its members are hypervisor administrators on every version, so an addition to it deserves the same attention as an addition to an administrative group of the domain.
Which events show a group that was renamed to ESX Admins?
A change event for the group (4735, 4737 or 4755, depending on the group type) carries the new name in its SAM Account Name field when that attribute was changed and a dash when it was not. Microsoft documents that renaming a group also writes event 4781, with the old and the new name, if Audit User Account Management is enabled. The rule reads both, so either audit subcategory is enough.
References
- Microsoft Security Blog: Ransomware operators exploit ESXi hypervisor vulnerability for mass encryption
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.007: Additional Local or Domain Groups
- Audit Security Group Management (4727, 4728, 4737, 4754, 4755, 4756)
- Event 4731: A security-enabled local group was created
- Event 4732: A member was added to a security-enabled local group
- Event 4735: A security-enabled local group was changed
- Event 4781: The name of an account was changed
- Broadcom security advisory VMSA-2024-0013 (CVE-2024-37085)
- Broadcom KB 369707: secure default settings for ESXi Active Directory integration
- Microsoft Defender for Identity alerts (suspicious creation of ESXi group)
- Active Directory security groups (Account Operators)