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  3. Privileged Group Membership Change

Privileged Group Membership Change detection rules

A member is added to Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators or another built-in privileged group. Detected with 4728, 4732 and 4756, matched on the group's well-known SID rather than its name.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
Critical
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Rights to change the group's membership, through an administrator account or an ACL path such as GenericAll, GenericWrite or WriteDacl on the group.
Impact
Immediate administrative control of the domain or forest for members of the top groups, and a short path to it for the operator groups.
Response
Remove the added member from the group, disable it and end its sessions, and disable or reset the account that made the addition.
Mitigation
Keep the privileged groups small, review their membership regularly, and remove ACEs that let non-administrators change the membership of privileged groups.
Event IDs
4764472847324756

How the attack works

Membership of the built-in administrative groups is the most direct form of control over Active Directory. Domain Admins (RID 512), Enterprise Admins (519), Schema Admins (518) and the built-in Administrators group (S-1-5-32-544) control the domain or forest outright; the operator groups (Account, Server, Backup and Print Operators), Key Admins, Group Policy Creator Owners, Cert Publishers and DnsAdmins hold rights that lead to the same result through one more step. Incoming Forest Trust Builders (S-1-5-32-557) can create incoming, one-way trusts to the forest, and a domain controller added to Cloneable Domain Controllers (RID 522) can be cloned. Distributed COM Users (S-1-5-32-562), Performance Log Users (S-1-5-32-559) and Cryptographic Operators (S-1-5-32-569) carry narrower rights on domain controllers and are tracked at a lower level.

Attackers add an account they control to one of these groups once they reach an identity that can change membership, for example through GenericAll, GenericWrite or WriteProperty on member (an ACL attack path), or after compromising an administrator. Domain controllers log 4728 (global group), 4732 (domain local and built-in group) and 4756 (universal group) for every added member, with the group's SID in TargetSid. Matching on the SID survives renamed or localized group names. Two further rules watch built-in groups that are not administrative but open a way in on domain controllers: Remote Desktop Users (S-1-5-32-555), Remote Management Users (S-1-5-32-580) and Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access (S-1-5-32-554). One of them reports Everyone or Anonymous Logon being added to the last group, which extends its read access to all users and groups beyond authenticated accounts. A further rule reads event 4764 for a distribution group that is converted to a security group, which gives all its members the access of that group, including any privileged group it is nested in, without a member-added event.

What an attacker needs

  • Rights to change the group's membership: an administrator account, or an ACL path such as GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDacl or WriteProperty on the member attribute of the group.

Impact

Immediate administrative control of the domain or forest for members of the top groups, and a short path to it for the operator groups (backing up the directory database, logging on to domain controllers, managing accounts). Added members are also a simple and common persistence mechanism.

Detection rules

Distribution Group Converted to a Security Group

Detects event 4764 (a group's type was changed) in which a group that was not security-enabled becomes security-enabled. A distribution group gives its members no access, so its membership is rarely reviewed. Once it is converted, every member receives the group in their access token, together with all permissions and group memberships the group already had, and no member-added event (4728, 4732, 4756) is written for any of them. The Change Type field has the form "Security Disabled ... Group Changed to Security Enabled ... Group", and the rule matches that direction for local, global and universal groups. The group is in TargetUserName and TargetSid and the account that made the change in SubjectUserName. The event shows neither the members nor what the group can access, so both have to be looked up. Logged only on domain controllers. Requires Audit Security Group Management.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Distribution Group Converted to a Security Group
id: d9000e5a-d1cf-42f8-910e-d144af2897ba
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 4764 (a group's type was changed) in which a group that was
  not security-enabled becomes security-enabled. A distribution group gives
  its members no access, so its membership is rarely reviewed. Once it is
  converted, every member receives the group in their access token, together
  with all permissions and group memberships the group already had, and no
  member-added event (4728, 4732, 4756) is written for any of them. The
  Change Type field has the form "Security Disabled ... Group Changed to
  Security Enabled ... Group", and the rule matches that direction for local,
  global and universal groups. The group is in TargetUserName and TargetSid
  and the account that made the change in SubjectUserName. The event shows
  neither the members nor what the group can access, so both have to be
  looked up. Logged only on domain controllers. Requires Audit Security Group
  Management.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4764
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/appendix-l--events-to-monitor
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.007
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4764
    GroupTypeChange|startswith: 'Security Disabled'
    GroupTypeChange|contains: 'to Security Enabled'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrators who convert a mail distribution group so that it can also be used for permissions. Check the members of the group, the groups it belongs to and the permissions granted to it before accepting the change.
level: medium

False positives

  • Administrators who convert a mail distribution group so that it can also be used for permissions. Check the members of the group, the groups it belongs to and the permissions granted to it before accepting the change.

Everyone or Anonymous Logon Added to Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access

Detects the well-known identities Everyone (S-1-1-0) or Anonymous Logon (S-1-5-7) being added to the built-in group Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access (S-1-5-32-554). Members of this group have read access to all users and groups in the domain. Microsoft lists Everyone and Anonymous as its members only for a domain that was created in the Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Permissions mode. In the Windows 2000-only mode the member is Authenticated Users. Adding Everyone or Anonymous Logon later puts the domain back into the legacy mode, in which that read access is no longer limited to authenticated accounts. The list of users, groups and their attributes is the material for account enumeration and for finding attack paths. Microsoft states that the group should have no members once no Windows NT 4.0 or older system remains in the domain, so an addition of this kind has no place in a current domain. Matched on the SID of the group and of the member, so renamed or localized names are covered. Requires Audit Security Group Management.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Everyone or Anonymous Logon Added to Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access
id: 538a972f-a496-441c-9674-aa898816f037
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the well-known identities Everyone (S-1-1-0) or Anonymous Logon
  (S-1-5-7) being added to the built-in group Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible
  Access (S-1-5-32-554). Members of this group have read access to all users
  and groups in the domain. Microsoft lists Everyone and Anonymous as its
  members only for a domain that was created in the Pre-Windows 2000
  Compatible Permissions mode. In the Windows 2000-only mode the member is
  Authenticated Users. Adding Everyone or Anonymous Logon later puts the
  domain back into the legacy mode, in which that read access is no longer
  limited to authenticated accounts. The list of users, groups and their
  attributes is the material for account enumeration and for finding attack
  paths. Microsoft states that the group should have no members once no
  Windows NT 4.0 or older system remains in the domain, so an addition of
  this kind has no place in a current domain. Matched on the SID of the group
  and of the member, so renamed or localized names are covered. Requires
  Audit Security Group Management.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-groups
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.007
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728
      - 4732
      - 4756
    TargetSid: 'S-1-5-32-554'
    MemberSid:
      - 'S-1-1-0'
      - 'S-1-5-7'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - An application that was documented, years ago, to need pre-Windows 2000 compatible permissions and whose installer adds Everyone to the group. Remove the member and fix the application instead of excluding the event.
level: high

False positives

  • An application that was documented, years ago, to need pre-Windows 2000 compatible permissions and whose installer adds Everyone to the group. Remove the member and fix the application instead of excluding the event.

Member Added to a Domain or Forest Administrative Group

Detects a member added to Domain Admins (RID 512), Enterprise Admins (519), Schema Admins (518), Domain Controllers (516) or the built-in Administrators group (S-1-5-32-544), matched on the group's SID so renamed or localized groups are covered. Each of these memberships gives control of the domain or forest. Requires Audit Security Group Management.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Member Added to a Domain or Forest Administrative Group
id: 34ece2a4-7ff2-4800-a0d3-8d32dc0fd416
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a member added to Domain Admins (RID 512), Enterprise Admins (519),
  Schema Admins (518), Domain Controllers (516) or the built-in Administrators
  group (S-1-5-32-544), matched on the group's SID so renamed or localized
  groups are covered. Each of these memberships gives control of the domain or
  forest. Requires Audit Security Group Management.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-security-group-management
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.007
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728
      - 4732
      - 4756
  selection_admin_group:
    - TargetSid|endswith:
        - '-512'
        - '-516'
        - '-518'
        - '-519'
    - TargetSid: 'S-1-5-32-544'
  condition: selection and selection_admin_group
falsepositives:
  - Approved administrator onboarding and domain controller promotion (computer added to Domain Controllers). If member servers and workstations also forward their Security log, S-1-5-32-544 there is the local Administrators group; scope the rule to domain controllers or handle those hosts separately.
level: high

False positives

  • Approved administrator onboarding and domain controller promotion (computer added to Domain Controllers). If member servers and workstations also forward their Security log, S-1-5-32-544 there is the local Administrators group; scope the rule to domain controllers or handle those hosts separately.

Member Added to Distributed COM Users, Performance Log Users or Cryptographic Operators

Detects a member added to the built-in groups Distributed COM Users (S-1-5-32-562), Performance Log Users (S-1-5-32-559) or Cryptographic Operators (S-1-5-32-569). On a domain controller their members can launch and activate DCOM objects, schedule the logging of performance counters remotely and perform cryptographic operations. These rights are narrower than those of the operator groups and additions are more likely to be routine, so the groups are kept in this separate low-level rule instead of the operator-group rule. The same SIDs exist as local groups on member servers and workstations; scope the rule to domain controllers. Requires Audit Security Group Management.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Member Added to Distributed COM Users, Performance Log Users or Cryptographic Operators
id: 8c507642-1d11-43d1-9822-3049975a7276
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a member added to the built-in groups Distributed COM Users
  (S-1-5-32-562), Performance Log Users (S-1-5-32-559) or Cryptographic
  Operators (S-1-5-32-569). On a domain controller their members can launch and
  activate DCOM objects, schedule the logging of performance counters remotely
  and perform cryptographic operations. These rights are narrower than those of
  the operator groups and additions are more likely to be routine, so the groups
  are kept in this separate low-level rule instead of the operator-group rule.
  The same SIDs exist as local groups on member servers and workstations; scope
  the rule to domain controllers. Requires Audit Security Group Management.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-groups
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-security-group-management
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.007
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728
      - 4732
      - 4756
    TargetSid:
      - 'S-1-5-32-559'
      - 'S-1-5-32-562'
      - 'S-1-5-32-569'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Software that adds its service accounts to these groups, such as monitoring and management agents, most often on member servers. Scope the rule to domain controllers and document the members expected there.
level: low

False positives

  • Software that adds its service accounts to these groups, such as monitoring and management agents, most often on member servers. Scope the rule to domain controllers and document the members expected there.

Member Added to a Built-in Privileged Operator Group

Detects a member added to a built-in group whose rights lead towards control of the domain: Account Operators, Server Operators, Print Operators, Backup Operators, Incoming Forest Trust Builders, Cert Publishers, Group Policy Creator Owners, Cloneable Domain Controllers, Key Admins, Enterprise Key Admins (matched on SID) and DnsAdmins (no fixed SID, matched on its default name). Distributed COM Users, Performance Log Users and Cryptographic Operators are covered by a separate low-level rule of this attack, because their rights are narrower and additions are more likely to be routine. Requires Audit Security Group Management.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Member Added to a Built-in Privileged Operator Group
id: 517d5ad0-501c-41c0-99d0-b5a9cefaa732
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a member added to a built-in group whose rights lead towards control
  of the domain: Account Operators, Server Operators, Print Operators, Backup
  Operators, Incoming Forest Trust Builders, Cert Publishers, Group Policy
  Creator Owners, Cloneable Domain Controllers, Key Admins, Enterprise Key Admins
  (matched on SID) and DnsAdmins (no fixed SID, matched on its default name).
  Distributed COM Users, Performance Log Users and Cryptographic Operators are
  covered by a separate low-level rule of this attack, because their rights are
  narrower and additions are more likely to be routine. Requires Audit Security
  Group Management.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-security-group-management
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.007
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728
      - 4732
      - 4756
  selection_operator_group:
    - TargetSid:
        - 'S-1-5-32-548'
        - 'S-1-5-32-549'
        - 'S-1-5-32-550'
        - 'S-1-5-32-551'
        - 'S-1-5-32-557'
    - TargetSid|endswith:
        - '-517'
        - '-520'
        - '-522'
        - '-526'
        - '-527'
    - TargetUserName: DnsAdmins
  condition: selection and selection_operator_group
falsepositives:
  - Approved delegation (backup software service accounts in Backup Operators, CA servers in Cert Publishers). Document expected members and exclude them by MemberSid.
level: medium

False positives

  • Approved delegation (backup software service accounts in Backup Operators, CA servers in Cert Publishers). Document expected members and exclude them by MemberSid.

Member Added to Remote Desktop Users, Remote Management Users or Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access

Detects a member added to three built-in groups that the other rules of this attack do not watch: Remote Desktop Users (S-1-5-32-555), Remote Management Users (S-1-5-32-580) and Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access (S-1-5-32-554). In the Builtin container of a domain these groups apply to the domain controllers. Remote Desktop Users is the group for remote desktop access, and Microsoft's guidance is that only administrators should use remote desktop sessions on a domain controller and that the group should be kept empty. Members of Remote Management Users can access WMI resources over management protocols such as WS-Management. Members of Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access have read access to all users and groups in the domain, and Microsoft states that the group should have no members once no Windows NT 4.0 or older system remains. None of these memberships is administrative by itself, so the rule is kept at a low level. The same SIDs are local groups on member servers and workstations, where additions to Remote Desktop Users are routine. Scope the rule to domain controllers. Requires Audit Security Group Management.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Member Added to Remote Desktop Users, Remote Management Users or Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access
id: 6c25ed3b-b1ca-4c00-be55-7e9ff79bf3ee
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a member added to three built-in groups that the other rules of
  this attack do not watch: Remote Desktop Users (S-1-5-32-555), Remote
  Management Users (S-1-5-32-580) and Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access
  (S-1-5-32-554). In the Builtin container of a domain these groups apply to
  the domain controllers. Remote Desktop Users is the group for remote
  desktop access, and Microsoft's guidance is that only administrators
  should use remote desktop sessions on a domain controller and that the
  group should be kept empty. Members of Remote Management Users can access
  WMI resources over management protocols such as WS-Management. Members of
  Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access have read access to all users and groups
  in the domain, and Microsoft states that the group should have no members
  once no Windows NT 4.0 or older system remains. None of these memberships
  is administrative by itself, so the rule is kept at a low level. The same
  SIDs are local groups on member servers and workstations, where additions
  to Remote Desktop Users are routine. Scope the rule to domain controllers.
  Requires Audit Security Group Management.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-groups
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.007
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728
      - 4732
      - 4756
    TargetSid:
      - 'S-1-5-32-554'
      - 'S-1-5-32-555'
      - 'S-1-5-32-580'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Additions to the local Remote Desktop Users or Remote Management Users group of a member server or workstation, which are routine. Scope the rule to domain controllers.
  - Monitoring and management products whose service accounts are added to Remote Management Users on domain controllers. Document the expected members and exclude them by MemberSid.
level: low

False positives

  • Additions to the local Remote Desktop Users or Remote Management Users group of a member server or workstation, which are routine. Scope the rule to domain controllers.
  • Monitoring and management products whose service accounts are added to Remote Management Users on domain controllers. Document the expected members and exclude them by MemberSid.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Account added to a privileged group and removed again shortly after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

An attacker who needs a privileged group only for one action adds an account, uses the membership and removes it again, so that a later membership review shows nothing. An addition and a removal of the same member in the same privileged group within a short time is rarely administrative work.

  1. A member is added to a privileged group: event 4728, 4732 or 4756, with the group in TargetUserName and the member in MemberSid.
  2. Within 60 minutes the same member is removed from the same group: event 4729, 4733 or 4757 with the same TargetUserName and MemberSid.
  3. Between the two events, look for logons and directory changes by that member, because that is the window in which the membership was used.

Events472847324756472947334757

LimitsJust-in-time access products add and remove members on purpose, and their accounts have to be excluded by name. The 60 minutes are a starting point. A membership that is kept for longer does not match and is covered by the single-event rules on this page.

Privileged group changed by an account outside its administrators, or by the added member itself

Detection hypothesisNeeds your own lists

Only a few Tier 0 administrators and a just-in-time or provisioning product should change the membership of the privileged groups. An addition made by any other account shows that this account holds a right on the group that it should not have, typically through an ACL path. An addition whose subject and member are the same account is an account adding itself, which needs no more than write access to member or the Self-Membership validated write on the group.

  1. Take events 4728, 4732 and 4756 whose TargetSid is one of the privileged groups the rules on this page watch.
  2. Compare SubjectUserSid with your allowlist of accounts that may change these groups: the Tier 0 administrators and the service account of the just-in-time or provisioning product. Microsoft's monitoring recommendation for these events describes such an allowlist.
  3. Report every addition made by an account outside the list, and every addition whose SubjectUserSid equals MemberSid, which is an account adding itself.
  4. For a finding, read the access control list of the group to find the entry that let the subject change it.

Events472847324756

LimitsThe allowlist has to follow staffing changes, or a new administrator shows up as a finding. An addition made with a compromised allowed administrator passes the check. Compare SIDs, not names: for local groups the member name is often a dash.

Triage

  • Identify the group (TargetUserName, TargetSid), the added member (MemberName, MemberSid) and who added it (SubjectUserName, SubjectLogonId).
  • Match the change to an approved request; additions outside a change window or by an account that does not normally administer groups are suspicious.
  • Check whether the member was created or modified shortly before (4720, 4738) and whether it logs on to domain controllers afterwards (4624, 4672).
  • Membership can also be gained by changing an account's primaryGroupID, which does not raise these events; review 4738 events with a changed PrimaryGroupId.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Remove the added member from the group, disable it and end its sessions.
  2. Disable or reset the account that made the addition and isolate the host it worked from. It was able to change a privileged group, so it is compromised or misused at that level.
  3. If the writer was not an administrator, remove the access control entry on the group that let it change the membership.
  4. Review what the member did while it was in the group, such as logons to domain controllers, directory replication, new accounts and policy changes. For Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins or Administrators, handle it as a domain compromise unless the review shows otherwise.
  5. Check the other privileged groups for further additions by the same subject, including nested groups and accounts whose primaryGroupID points to such a group.

Mitigation

  • Keep the privileged groups small, review their membership regularly and keep Schema Admins and Enterprise Admins empty except during planned changes.
  • Remove ACEs that let non-administrators change the membership of privileged groups; analyze ACL attack paths to them.
  • Manage privileged membership through a just-in-time or approval workflow so every addition has a matching request.
  • Enable "Audit Security Group Management" on all domain controllers.

Frequently asked questions

Why do the rules match on the SID of the group and not on its name?

The built-in privileged groups have well-known SIDs or RIDs that stay the same when a group is renamed or shown under a localized name. A match on TargetSid survives both. DnsAdmins is the exception, because it has no fixed SID and is matched on its default name, so a renamed DnsAdmins group is not covered.

Can an account become a member of a privileged group without one of these events?

Yes. Changing the primaryGroupID of an account to the RID of the group makes it a member without raising event 4728, 4732 or 4756. Review 4738 events with a changed Primary Group ID for that case, which has its own page in this library.

Why does the rule for Administrators fire on member servers and workstations?

S-1-5-32-544 is the built-in Administrators group of the domain on a domain controller and the local Administrators group on every other computer. If those computers forward their Security log, additions to the local group match too. Scope the rule to domain controllers or handle the other hosts separately.

Which additions to these groups are expected?

Approved administrator onboarding, a computer added to Domain Controllers during a promotion, backup software accounts in Backup Operators and CA servers in Cert Publishers. Each of them should have a matching request. An addition outside a change window, or by an account that does not normally administer groups, is not explained by routine.

References

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