How the attack works
Exchange Server Setup creates universal security groups in the forest root domain and gives them rights in every prepared domain. In the default shared permissions model, Exchange Windows Permissions holds access control entries on the domain that let it create and delete users, groups and computers, write group membership and change permissions on user objects; Exchange Trusted Subsystem, which contains the computer accounts of the Exchange servers, is a member of it; and Organization Management has full control of the organizational unit that holds these groups. None of the three is protected by AdminSDHolder the way Domain Admins is.
An account added to one of these groups inherits those rights without touching a built-in administrative group, so the change is easy to miss in reviews that only watch Domain Admins. The groups are universal groups, so domain controllers record a new member as event 4756; 4728 and 4732 are included in case the group type was changed. The groups have no well-known SID, so the rule matches their default names.
What an attacker needs
- Rights to change the group's membership: Organization Management (full control of the Microsoft Exchange Security Groups organizational unit), a domain or enterprise administrator, or an access control entry such as GenericAll, GenericWrite or WriteProperty on
member. - The rights are useful in the shared and RBAC split permissions models. With Active Directory split permissions, Exchange Windows Permissions holds no rights on the domain.
Impact
The new member can use the domain rights of Exchange: changing the membership of groups that are not protected, editing permissions on user accounts that are not protected (which opens the way to taking those accounts over), and creating accounts. In most domains that reaches Tier 0 through one more object. Membership of Organization Management also gives administrative control of the whole Exchange organization.
Detection rules
Member Added to a Privileged Exchange Security Group
Detects a member added to Exchange Windows Permissions, Exchange Trusted Subsystem or Organization Management, the universal security groups through which Exchange Server holds its rights in Active Directory. The groups have no well-known SID, so they are matched on their default names. Universal groups log 4756; 4728 and 4732 cover a changed group type. Requires Audit Security Group Management on domain controllers.
title: Member Added to a Privileged Exchange Security Group
id: 7d44adf0-808c-484e-944e-e4994048c71a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a member added to Exchange Windows Permissions, Exchange Trusted
Subsystem or Organization Management, the universal security groups through
which Exchange Server holds its rights in Active Directory. The groups have
no well-known SID, so they are matched on their default names. Universal
groups log 4756; 4728 and 4732 cover a changed group type. Requires Audit
Security Group Management on domain controllers.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions/split-permissions/split-permissions
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-security-group-management
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.007
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4728
- 4732
- 4756
TargetUserName:
- Exchange Windows Permissions
- Exchange Trusted Subsystem
- Organization Management
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Installation of a new Exchange server, which adds its computer account to Exchange Trusted Subsystem, and approved onboarding of Exchange administrators to Organization Management. Exclude expected computer accounts by MemberSid and match the rest to requests.
- Renamed groups are not matched; adjust the names if your organization renamed them.
level: high
False positives
- Installation of a new Exchange server, which adds its computer account to Exchange Trusted Subsystem, and approved onboarding of Exchange administrators to Organization Management. Exclude expected computer accounts by MemberSid and match the rest to requests.
- Renamed groups are not matched; adjust the names if your organization renamed them.
Triage
- Identify the group (
TargetUserName), the new member (MemberName,MemberSid) and who added it (SubjectUserName). - A computer account added to Exchange Trusted Subsystem during the installation of a new Exchange server is expected. A user account in Exchange Trusted Subsystem or Exchange Windows Permissions is not.
- Match additions to Organization Management to an approved request.
- Check what the new member did afterwards (group membership changes 4728, 4732 and 4756, password resets 4724, permission changes 5136 and 4662), and remove it if unexplained.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the member from the group and disable the account that was added until it is explained. If it is a real user's account, reset its password.
- Contain the account that made the change, and review who else can write the membership of these groups and of the organizational unit that holds them.
- Reverse what the member did with the rights of Exchange. Remove members it added to other groups, reset the passwords of accounts whose password or permissions it changed, restore the permissions on those accounts and delete accounts it created.
- If the group was Organization Management, review the Exchange organization as well, including role assignments, mailbox permissions and mail flow rules changed by that member.
- Confirm that Exchange Trusted Subsystem and Exchange Windows Permissions hold no user accounts, and that Organization Management matches the approved list.
Mitigation
- Apply the reduced permissions that Microsoft shipped with Exchange Server 2019 CU1 and 2016 CU12 by running
Setup /PrepareADand/PrepareDomainin every domain, and consider Active Directory split permissions. - Treat these groups, and the organizational unit that holds them, as Tier 0. Keep human accounts out of Exchange Windows Permissions and Exchange Trusted Subsystem; Microsoft warns against changing the membership of Exchange Trusted Subsystem by hand.
- Keep Organization Management small and use dedicated administrative accounts for it.
- Enable "Audit Security Group Management" on all domain controllers.
Frequently asked questions
Why does the rule look for event 4756 and not only 4728?
The Exchange security groups are universal groups, and domain controllers record a new member of a universal security group as event 4756. Events 4728 and 4732, for global and local groups, are included in case the group type was changed. All three need Audit Security Group Management on domain controllers.
Does AdminSDHolder protect these groups like Domain Admins?
No. None of the three groups is protected by AdminSDHolder the way Domain Admins is. Treat the groups, and the organizational unit that holds them, as Tier 0, and review who can change their membership.
We renamed the Exchange groups. Does the rule still match?
No. The groups have no well-known SID, so the rule matches their default names, which are Exchange Windows Permissions, Exchange Trusted Subsystem and Organization Management. If your organization renamed them, adjust the names in the rule.
Does the membership matter with Active Directory split permissions?
Less for the domain, still for Exchange. With Active Directory split permissions, Exchange Windows Permissions holds no rights on the domain. The domain rights are useful in the shared and RBAC split permissions models. Membership of Organization Management also gives administrative control of the whole Exchange organization.
References
- Microsoft Learn: Split permissions in Exchange Server
- Microsoft Learn: Exchange 2013 deployment permissions reference
- Microsoft Support KB4490059: Reducing permissions required to run Exchange Server when you use the Shared Permissions Model
- Microsoft Learn: Audit Security Group Management (4728, 4732, 4756)
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.007: Additional Local or Domain Groups