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Exchange Management Role or Admin Role Group Granted detection rules

An attacker assigns a powerful Exchange management role, adds an account to Organization Management or Discovery Management, or assigns the Entra role Exchange Administrator, to control Exchange Online and reach every mailbox.

Platform
Microsoft Exchange
Severity
High
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs, Microsoft 365 unified audit log (Exchange)
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
An account with the Role Management role, by default a member of Organization Management, or an identity that can assign Microsoft Entra roles.
Impact
Control of Exchange administration or access to the content of every mailbox, through role holders that do not appear in Microsoft Entra role reviews.
Response
Contain the account that made the change and remove the access on both sides, in Exchange role groups and direct assignments and in Microsoft Entra ID.
Mitigation
Keep Organization Management small, reach it through just-in-time elevation of Exchange Administrator, and review role groups and direct role assignments on a schedule.
Audit activities
Add member to roleAdd eligible member to roleAdd scoped member to roleAdd member to role outside of PIM (permanent)Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent)Add member to role in PIM completed (timebound)Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (permanent)Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
Operations
Add-RoleGroupMemberUpdate-RoleGroupMemberNew-ManagementRoleAssignment

How the attack works

Exchange authorizes administration through its own role based access control. Management roles carry the cmdlets, role groups collect roles, and a role assignment (New-ManagementRoleAssignment) gives a role to a role group, a user, a security group or, in Exchange Online, an application's service principal. Membership of a role group changes with Add-RoleGroupMember and Update-RoleGroupMember. None of this is visible in Microsoft Entra role assignments: Microsoft documents that adding a user to an Exchange Online role group grants administrative rights without adding them to a Microsoft Entra role.

A few roles matter more than the rest. Role Management lets its holder configure any role group and assign any role. Mailbox Search and Mailbox Import Export, which no administrator holds by default in Exchange Online beyond Discovery Management for search, open the content of mailboxes. The application roles of RBAC for Applications (Application Mail.Read, Application Mail.ReadWrite, Application Mail.Send, Application Mail Full Access, Application Exchange Full Access, Application EWS.AccessAsApp and the MailboxItem and MailboxFolder roles) give an app mailbox access. Organization Management holds almost every role. An attacker who reaches an account with Role Management uses these assignments to widen and keep access.

The same control can be granted from the other side. Members of the Microsoft Entra role Exchange Administrator are members of Organization Management through a role group that Microsoft manages, so one directory role assignment hands over every Exchange Online role. That change is written to the Microsoft Entra audit log, not to the Exchange records of the unified audit log, which is why this attack has a rule on each log.

What an attacker needs

  • For Exchange role assignments and role group changes: an account with the Role Management role (by default only members of Organization Management, which includes Global Administrators and Exchange Administrators in Exchange Online), or a delegating assignment for the role being granted.
  • For the Exchange Administrator role: an identity that can assign Microsoft Entra roles, such as Privileged Role Administrator or Global Administrator.

Impact

Control of Exchange administration, or access to the content of every mailbox. An Exchange role group member or direct role assignee does not appear in Microsoft Entra role reviews, and role assignments to service principals give the same access to an application with no user and no MFA.

Detection rules

Exchange Administrator Role Assigned in Microsoft Entra ID

Detects an active or eligible assignment of the Microsoft Entra role Exchange Administrator, made directly, through PIM or outside PIM. Members of the role are members of the Organization Management role group in Exchange Online. The role is matched in TargetResources by the two display names Microsoft documents for it: Exchange Administrator, and Exchange Service Administrator, the name used in Microsoft Graph. No Role.WellKnownObjectName value is documented for this role, so the rule matches display names only. Requires Microsoft Entra audit logs.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Exchange Administrator Role Assigned in Microsoft Entra ID
id: 7b4a511c-764e-4d1f-84c4-a06e081bbba3
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an active or eligible assignment of the Microsoft Entra role Exchange
  Administrator, made directly, through PIM or outside PIM. Members of the role
  are members of the Organization Management role group in Exchange Online. The
  role is matched in TargetResources by the two display names Microsoft
  documents for it: Exchange Administrator, and Exchange Service Administrator,
  the name used in Microsoft Graph. No Role.WellKnownObjectName value is
  documented for this role, so the rule matches display names only. Requires
  Microsoft Entra audit logs.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#exchange-administrator
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/permissions-exo
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection_activity:
    Category: RoleManagement
    OperationName:
      - Add member to role
      - Add eligible member to role
      - Add scoped member to role
      - Add member to role outside of PIM (permanent)
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
  selection_role:
    TargetResources|contains:
      - Exchange Administrator
      - Exchange Service Administrator
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: all of selection_* and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Planned onboarding of Exchange administrators and PIM eligibility grants; match each event to a request. In PIM-enabled tenants role activations can also appear as role additions, so confirm the initiator before excluding PIM's own service activity.
  - Assignments of the role to a service principal for Exchange Online PowerShell automation; confirm the app, its owner and whether a custom role group would do instead.
level: high

False positives

  • Planned onboarding of Exchange administrators and PIM eligibility grants; match each event to a request. In PIM-enabled tenants role activations can also appear as role additions, so confirm the initiator before excluding PIM's own service activity.
  • Assignments of the role to a service principal for Exchange Online PowerShell automation; confirm the app, its owner and whether a custom role group would do instead.

Member Added to Organization Management or Discovery Management

Detects Add-RoleGroupMember or Update-RoleGroupMember in Exchange Online for the Organization Management role group (administrative access to the whole Exchange Online organization, including the Role Management role) or the Discovery Management role group (the Mailbox Search and Legal Hold roles). The role group name is matched in the Parameters array and in ObjectId, the name of the object the cmdlet modified, so a role group passed to the cmdlet by GUID is still matched. Requires Microsoft 365 audit logging and the Exchange records of the unified audit log in the SIEM.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft 365 unified audit log (Exchange)
title: Member Added to Organization Management or Discovery Management
id: 4b27905c-7d45-479b-be88-e706766f51e8
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects Add-RoleGroupMember or Update-RoleGroupMember in Exchange Online for
  the Organization Management role group (administrative access to the whole
  Exchange Online organization, including the Role Management role) or the
  Discovery Management role group (the Mailbox Search and Legal Hold roles). The
  role group name is matched in the Parameters array and in ObjectId, the name
  of the object the cmdlet modified, so a role group passed to the cmdlet by
  GUID is still matched. Requires Microsoft 365 audit logging and the Exchange
  records of the unified audit log in the SIEM.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/permissions-exo
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: m365
  service: exchange
detection:
  selection_operation:
    Operation:
      - Add-RoleGroupMember
      - Update-RoleGroupMember
  selection_group_in_parameters:
    Parameters|contains:
      - Organization Management
      - Discovery Management
  selection_group_in_object:
    ObjectId|contains:
      - Organization Management
      - Discovery Management
  condition: selection_operation and 1 of selection_group_*
falsepositives:
  - Approved administrator onboarding. The text also matches View-Only Organization Management, which is read only; check the Identity value in Parameters or the name in ObjectId.
level: high

False positives

  • Approved administrator onboarding. The text also matches View-Only Organization Management, which is read only; check the Identity value in Parameters or the name in ObjectId.

Sensitive Exchange Management Role Assigned

Detects New-ManagementRoleAssignment in Exchange Online for a role that controls role assignments or opens mailbox content: Role Management (also matches Unscoped Role Management), Mailbox Search, Mailbox Import Export, ApplicationImpersonation and the application roles of RBAC for Applications that read, write or send mail, including Application Mail Full Access, Application Exchange Full Access and Application EWS.AccessAsApp. The role name is matched in the Parameters array. Requires Microsoft 365 audit logging and the Exchange records of the unified audit log in the SIEM.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft 365 unified audit log (Exchange)
title: Sensitive Exchange Management Role Assigned
id: b265c0a5-cf61-4283-8901-0d8de43bdb4b
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects New-ManagementRoleAssignment in Exchange Online for a role that
  controls role assignments or opens mailbox content: Role Management (also
  matches Unscoped Role Management), Mailbox Search, Mailbox Import Export,
  ApplicationImpersonation and the application roles of RBAC for Applications
  that read, write or send mail, including Application Mail Full Access,
  Application Exchange Full Access and Application EWS.AccessAsApp. The role
  name is matched in the Parameters array. Requires Microsoft 365 audit logging and the Exchange records of the
  unified audit log in the SIEM.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/permissions-exo
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/application-rbac
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: m365
  service: exchange
detection:
  selection:
    Operation: New-ManagementRoleAssignment
    Parameters|contains:
      - Role Management
      - Mailbox Search
      - Mailbox Import Export
      - ApplicationImpersonation
      - Application Mail.
      - Application Mail Full Access
      - Application Mail-Advanced.
      - Application Exchange Full Access
      - Application EWS.AccessAsApp
      - Application SMTP.SendAsApp
      - Application MailboxItem.
      - Application MailboxFolder.
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned delegation, for example a scoped application role for a mail integration or Mailbox Import Export for a migration. Match each event to a request and check that the assignment has a recipient scope.
level: high

False positives

  • Planned delegation, for example a scoped application role for a mail integration or Mailbox Import Export for a migration. Match each event to a request and check that the assignment has a recipient scope.

Triage

  • For Exchange records, read Parameters for the role (Role), the assignee (User, SecurityGroup or App) and any scope; for role group changes read the role group in Identity and the new member in Member or Members.
  • For the Entra role, read TargetResources for the principal that received Exchange Administrator and InitiatedBy for who assigned it, and whether the assignment is active or eligible.
  • Identify who made the change (UserId or InitiatedBy) and whether that account elevated or signed in unusually just before.
  • An assignment to the account that made it, to a new account or to a service principal needs a matching request.
  • Remove unexplained assignments and members, then review what the assignee did with the role in the audit log.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Contain the account that made the change. Revoke its sessions, reset its credentials and remove its Role Management rights or its right to assign Microsoft Entra roles.
  2. Remove the access on both sides. Check Exchange role groups and direct role assignments, and in Microsoft Entra ID the active and eligible assignments of Exchange Administrator. Cleaning one side leaves the other in place.
  3. If the assignee is a service principal, remove its Exchange role assignment and its credentials, and review who owns the application.
  4. Undo what was done with the role, such as mailbox searches and exports, mail flow rules, delegate permissions and changes to audit settings made by the assignee.
  5. Look for role groups and custom management roles created by the same actor, which can carry the same rights under a new name.
  6. After cleanup, compare the members of every admin role group and the direct role assignments with the approved list.

Mitigation

  • Keep Organization Management small and reach it through just-in-time elevation of the Exchange Administrator role, not through direct role group membership.
  • Protect Exchange Administrator like a privileged role (eligible assignments, strong authentication, access reviews); Microsoft does not label it privileged, so label-based policies skip it.
  • Review direct role assignments to users and service principals and the members of every role group on a schedule; Exchange role groups are outside Microsoft Entra access reviews.
  • Assign Mailbox Search, Mailbox Import Export and application mail roles only with a recipient scope and an owner.
  • Alert on every role assignment and admin role group change in the unified audit log, and on Exchange Administrator assignments in the Microsoft Entra audit log.

Frequently asked questions

Why do Microsoft Entra role reviews miss a member of an Exchange role group?

Exchange has its own role based access control. Microsoft documents that adding a user to an Exchange Online role group grants administrative rights without adding the user to a Microsoft Entra role. Role group members and direct role assignees therefore do not appear in Microsoft Entra role assignments or access reviews.

Why does this attack have rules on two different logs?

Role assignments and role group changes made in Exchange are written to the Exchange records of the unified audit log. An assignment of the Microsoft Entra role Exchange Administrator, whose members are members of Organization Management, is written to the Microsoft Entra audit log. Collecting only one of the two logs leaves one of the routes unseen.

Why did an addition to View-Only Organization Management raise the alert?

The rule matches the text Organization Management in the parameters and in the name of the modified object. That text is also part of View-Only Organization Management, which is read only. Check the Identity value in Parameters or the name in ObjectId to see which role group was changed.

Do role activations in Privileged Identity Management trigger the Exchange Administrator rule?

They can. In tenants that use PIM, role activations can also appear as role additions. Confirm who initiated the event before you exclude the activity of the PIM service itself, and match new eligible and permanent assignments to a request.

References

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