How the attack works
Exchange authorizes administration through its own role based access control. Management roles carry the cmdlets, role groups collect roles, and a role assignment (New-ManagementRoleAssignment) gives a role to a role group, a user, a security group or, in Exchange Online, an application's service principal. Membership of a role group changes with Add-RoleGroupMember and Update-RoleGroupMember. None of this is visible in Microsoft Entra role assignments: Microsoft documents that adding a user to an Exchange Online role group grants administrative rights without adding them to a Microsoft Entra role.
A few roles matter more than the rest. Role Management lets its holder configure any role group and assign any role. Mailbox Search and Mailbox Import Export, which no administrator holds by default in Exchange Online beyond Discovery Management for search, open the content of mailboxes. The application roles of RBAC for Applications (Application Mail.Read, Application Mail.ReadWrite, Application Mail.Send, Application Mail Full Access, Application Exchange Full Access, Application EWS.AccessAsApp and the MailboxItem and MailboxFolder roles) give an app mailbox access. Organization Management holds almost every role. An attacker who reaches an account with Role Management uses these assignments to widen and keep access.
The same control can be granted from the other side. Members of the Microsoft Entra role Exchange Administrator are members of Organization Management through a role group that Microsoft manages, so one directory role assignment hands over every Exchange Online role. That change is written to the Microsoft Entra audit log, not to the Exchange records of the unified audit log, which is why this attack has a rule on each log.
What an attacker needs
- For Exchange role assignments and role group changes: an account with the Role Management role (by default only members of Organization Management, which includes Global Administrators and Exchange Administrators in Exchange Online), or a delegating assignment for the role being granted.
- For the Exchange Administrator role: an identity that can assign Microsoft Entra roles, such as Privileged Role Administrator or Global Administrator.
Impact
Control of Exchange administration, or access to the content of every mailbox. An Exchange role group member or direct role assignee does not appear in Microsoft Entra role reviews, and role assignments to service principals give the same access to an application with no user and no MFA.
Detection rules
Exchange Administrator Role Assigned in Microsoft Entra ID
Detects an active or eligible assignment of the Microsoft Entra role Exchange Administrator, made directly, through PIM or outside PIM. Members of the role are members of the Organization Management role group in Exchange Online. The role is matched in TargetResources by the two display names Microsoft documents for it: Exchange Administrator, and Exchange Service Administrator, the name used in Microsoft Graph. No Role.WellKnownObjectName value is documented for this role, so the rule matches display names only. Requires Microsoft Entra audit logs.
title: Exchange Administrator Role Assigned in Microsoft Entra ID
id: 7b4a511c-764e-4d1f-84c4-a06e081bbba3
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an active or eligible assignment of the Microsoft Entra role Exchange
Administrator, made directly, through PIM or outside PIM. Members of the role
are members of the Organization Management role group in Exchange Online. The
role is matched in TargetResources by the two display names Microsoft
documents for it: Exchange Administrator, and Exchange Service Administrator,
the name used in Microsoft Graph. No Role.WellKnownObjectName value is
documented for this role, so the rule matches display names only. Requires
Microsoft Entra audit logs.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#exchange-administrator
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/permissions-exo
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection_activity:
Category: RoleManagement
OperationName:
- Add member to role
- Add eligible member to role
- Add scoped member to role
- Add member to role outside of PIM (permanent)
- Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
- Add member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
- Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
- Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
selection_role:
TargetResources|contains:
- Exchange Administrator
- Exchange Service Administrator
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: all of selection_* and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Planned onboarding of Exchange administrators and PIM eligibility grants; match each event to a request. In PIM-enabled tenants role activations can also appear as role additions, so confirm the initiator before excluding PIM's own service activity.
- Assignments of the role to a service principal for Exchange Online PowerShell automation; confirm the app, its owner and whether a custom role group would do instead.
level: high
False positives
- Planned onboarding of Exchange administrators and PIM eligibility grants; match each event to a request. In PIM-enabled tenants role activations can also appear as role additions, so confirm the initiator before excluding PIM's own service activity.
- Assignments of the role to a service principal for Exchange Online PowerShell automation; confirm the app, its owner and whether a custom role group would do instead.
Member Added to Organization Management or Discovery Management
Detects Add-RoleGroupMember or Update-RoleGroupMember in Exchange Online for the Organization Management role group (administrative access to the whole Exchange Online organization, including the Role Management role) or the Discovery Management role group (the Mailbox Search and Legal Hold roles). The role group name is matched in the Parameters array and in ObjectId, the name of the object the cmdlet modified, so a role group passed to the cmdlet by GUID is still matched. Requires Microsoft 365 audit logging and the Exchange records of the unified audit log in the SIEM.
title: Member Added to Organization Management or Discovery Management
id: 4b27905c-7d45-479b-be88-e706766f51e8
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects Add-RoleGroupMember or Update-RoleGroupMember in Exchange Online for
the Organization Management role group (administrative access to the whole
Exchange Online organization, including the Role Management role) or the
Discovery Management role group (the Mailbox Search and Legal Hold roles). The
role group name is matched in the Parameters array and in ObjectId, the name
of the object the cmdlet modified, so a role group passed to the cmdlet by
GUID is still matched. Requires Microsoft 365 audit logging and the Exchange
records of the unified audit log in the SIEM.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/permissions-exo
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: m365
service: exchange
detection:
selection_operation:
Operation:
- Add-RoleGroupMember
- Update-RoleGroupMember
selection_group_in_parameters:
Parameters|contains:
- Organization Management
- Discovery Management
selection_group_in_object:
ObjectId|contains:
- Organization Management
- Discovery Management
condition: selection_operation and 1 of selection_group_*
falsepositives:
- Approved administrator onboarding. The text also matches View-Only Organization Management, which is read only; check the Identity value in Parameters or the name in ObjectId.
level: high
False positives
- Approved administrator onboarding. The text also matches View-Only Organization Management, which is read only; check the Identity value in Parameters or the name in ObjectId.
Sensitive Exchange Management Role Assigned
Detects New-ManagementRoleAssignment in Exchange Online for a role that controls role assignments or opens mailbox content: Role Management (also matches Unscoped Role Management), Mailbox Search, Mailbox Import Export, ApplicationImpersonation and the application roles of RBAC for Applications that read, write or send mail, including Application Mail Full Access, Application Exchange Full Access and Application EWS.AccessAsApp. The role name is matched in the Parameters array. Requires Microsoft 365 audit logging and the Exchange records of the unified audit log in the SIEM.
title: Sensitive Exchange Management Role Assigned
id: b265c0a5-cf61-4283-8901-0d8de43bdb4b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects New-ManagementRoleAssignment in Exchange Online for a role that
controls role assignments or opens mailbox content: Role Management (also
matches Unscoped Role Management), Mailbox Search, Mailbox Import Export,
ApplicationImpersonation and the application roles of RBAC for Applications
that read, write or send mail, including Application Mail Full Access,
Application Exchange Full Access and Application EWS.AccessAsApp. The role
name is matched in the Parameters array. Requires Microsoft 365 audit logging and the Exchange records of the
unified audit log in the SIEM.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/permissions-exo
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/application-rbac
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: m365
service: exchange
detection:
selection:
Operation: New-ManagementRoleAssignment
Parameters|contains:
- Role Management
- Mailbox Search
- Mailbox Import Export
- ApplicationImpersonation
- Application Mail.
- Application Mail Full Access
- Application Mail-Advanced.
- Application Exchange Full Access
- Application EWS.AccessAsApp
- Application SMTP.SendAsApp
- Application MailboxItem.
- Application MailboxFolder.
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned delegation, for example a scoped application role for a mail integration or Mailbox Import Export for a migration. Match each event to a request and check that the assignment has a recipient scope.
level: high
False positives
- Planned delegation, for example a scoped application role for a mail integration or Mailbox Import Export for a migration. Match each event to a request and check that the assignment has a recipient scope.
Triage
- For Exchange records, read
Parametersfor the role (Role), the assignee (User,SecurityGrouporApp) and any scope; for role group changes read the role group inIdentityand the new member inMemberorMembers. - For the Entra role, read
TargetResourcesfor the principal that received Exchange Administrator andInitiatedByfor who assigned it, and whether the assignment is active or eligible. - Identify who made the change (
UserIdorInitiatedBy) and whether that account elevated or signed in unusually just before. - An assignment to the account that made it, to a new account or to a service principal needs a matching request.
- Remove unexplained assignments and members, then review what the assignee did with the role in the audit log.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Contain the account that made the change. Revoke its sessions, reset its credentials and remove its Role Management rights or its right to assign Microsoft Entra roles.
- Remove the access on both sides. Check Exchange role groups and direct role assignments, and in Microsoft Entra ID the active and eligible assignments of Exchange Administrator. Cleaning one side leaves the other in place.
- If the assignee is a service principal, remove its Exchange role assignment and its credentials, and review who owns the application.
- Undo what was done with the role, such as mailbox searches and exports, mail flow rules, delegate permissions and changes to audit settings made by the assignee.
- Look for role groups and custom management roles created by the same actor, which can carry the same rights under a new name.
- After cleanup, compare the members of every admin role group and the direct role assignments with the approved list.
Mitigation
- Keep Organization Management small and reach it through just-in-time elevation of the Exchange Administrator role, not through direct role group membership.
- Protect Exchange Administrator like a privileged role (eligible assignments, strong authentication, access reviews); Microsoft does not label it privileged, so label-based policies skip it.
- Review direct role assignments to users and service principals and the members of every role group on a schedule; Exchange role groups are outside Microsoft Entra access reviews.
- Assign Mailbox Search, Mailbox Import Export and application mail roles only with a recipient scope and an owner.
- Alert on every role assignment and admin role group change in the unified audit log, and on Exchange Administrator assignments in the Microsoft Entra audit log.
Frequently asked questions
Why do Microsoft Entra role reviews miss a member of an Exchange role group?
Exchange has its own role based access control. Microsoft documents that adding a user to an Exchange Online role group grants administrative rights without adding the user to a Microsoft Entra role. Role group members and direct role assignees therefore do not appear in Microsoft Entra role assignments or access reviews.
Why does this attack have rules on two different logs?
Role assignments and role group changes made in Exchange are written to the Exchange records of the unified audit log. An assignment of the Microsoft Entra role Exchange Administrator, whose members are members of Organization Management, is written to the Microsoft Entra audit log. Collecting only one of the two logs leaves one of the routes unseen.
Why did an addition to View-Only Organization Management raise the alert?
The rule matches the text Organization Management in the parameters and in the name of the modified object. That text is also part of View-Only Organization Management, which is read only. Check the Identity value in Parameters or the name in ObjectId to see which role group was changed.
Do role activations in Privileged Identity Management trigger the Exchange Administrator rule?
They can. In tenants that use PIM, role activations can also appear as role additions. Confirm who initiated the event before you exclude the activity of the PIM service itself, and match new eligible and permanent assignments to a request.
References
- Microsoft Learn: Permissions in Exchange Online
- Microsoft Learn: Role Based Access Control for Applications in Exchange Online
- Microsoft Learn: Role Management role
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra built-in roles, Exchange Administrator
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra audit log activity reference
- Microsoft Learn: Office 365 Management Activity API schema, Exchange Admin schema
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.003: Additional Cloud Roles