How the attack works
Microsoft Entra ID and Azure RBAC are secured separately: the Global Administrator role grants no rights on Azure resources by default. Elevate access (Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action, the "Access management for Azure resources" toggle) bridges the two. It assigns the calling Global Administrator User Access Administrator at the root scope (/), which inherits to every management group, subscription and resource and allows assigning any role, including Owner, anywhere.
Attackers who control a Global Administrator account or session use it to move from the directory into Azure resources. The elevation itself is a tenant-level event: it is written to the Directory Activity log and the Microsoft Entra audit log (service "Azure RBAC (Elevated Access)"), not to the subscription activity log that subscription diagnostic settings export to AzureActivity. What subscription logs do record is every change made through the root-scope assignment: the authorization evidence of those events names a role assignment scope of /, which exists only through elevated access or a deliberate root-scope assignment.
What an attacker needs
- Control of an account that holds, or can activate, the Global Administrator role.
Impact
User Access Administrator over the whole Azure estate: the attacker can assign Owner to any identity on any subscription or management group, read resources everywhere and plant role assignments that outlive the Global Administrator session.
Detection rules
Global Administrator Elevated Access to Azure Resources
Detects the Microsoft Entra audit log entry written when a Global Administrator elevates to User Access Administrator at the Azure root scope ("/"). The entry is logged by the service "Azure RBAC (Elevated Access)"; Microsoft lists these directory audit entries as a preview feature, so also keep the companion rule on root-scope activity in AzureActivity.
title: Global Administrator Elevated Access to Azure Resources
id: 6b757fd9-fa1f-4c9f-90fd-0e32f7c45f2b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the Microsoft Entra audit log entry written when a Global
Administrator elevates to User Access Administrator at the Azure root scope
("/"). The entry is logged by the service "Azure RBAC (Elevated Access)";
Microsoft lists these directory audit entries as a preview feature, so also
keep the companion rule on root-scope activity in AzureActivity.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName: User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Documented emergency or administrative use of elevate access by a Global Administrator; confirm it against the change record and that the root-scope assignment was removed afterwards.
level: high
False positives
- Documented emergency or administrative use of elevate access by a Global Administrator; confirm it against the change record and that the root-scope assignment was removed afterwards.
Azure Change Authorized Through Root-Scope Elevated Access
Detects a successful Azure Resource Manager operation whose authorization evidence shows it was allowed by a role assignment at the root scope ("/"). Elevate access gives a Global Administrator User Access Administrator at exactly that scope, so this surfaces what an elevated account changes in subscriptions. The elevation event itself is tenant-level and is not exported to AzureActivity by subscription diagnostic settings. The match assumes the Authorization column holds the evidence JSON as Azure Monitor writes it; confirm on a sample event in your workspace.
title: Azure Change Authorized Through Root-Scope Elevated Access
id: 33e67086-c2c6-4e11-8fd8-ad25e641df5f
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful Azure Resource Manager operation whose authorization
evidence shows it was allowed by a role assignment at the root scope ("/").
Elevate access gives a Global Administrator User Access Administrator at
exactly that scope, so this surfaces what an elevated account changes in
subscriptions. The elevation event itself is tenant-level and is not exported
to AzureActivity by subscription diagnostic settings. The match assumes the
Authorization column holds the evidence JSON as Azure Monitor writes it;
confirm on a sample event in your workspace.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log-schema
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/azureactivity
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
Authorization|contains:
- '"roleAssignmentScope":"/"'
- '"roleAssignmentScope": "/"'
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Documented emergency use of elevate access by a Global Administrator; correlate with the change record and the Entra audit log entry for the elevation.
- Deliberate role assignments at root scope, which are rare and should themselves be reviewed.
level: high
False positives
- Documented emergency use of elevate access by a Global Administrator; correlate with the change record and the Entra audit log entry for the elevation.
- Deliberate role assignments at root scope, which are rare and should themselves be reviewed.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Access elevated and not removed after the change window
Microsoft says to remove elevated access once the changes that needed it are made, and the Azure portal warns about users who still hold it. An attacker who wants to keep control of every subscription leaves the User Access Administrator assignment at root scope in place. An elevation with no removal for the same user after a few hours is that state, whatever the account did in the meantime.
- In the Microsoft Entra audit log, take the entry
User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources(service Azure RBAC (Elevated Access)). Keep the user inInitiatedByand the time. - Look for the entry
The role assignment of User Access Administrator has been removed from the userfor the same user after the elevation, whether the user is the initiator or appears inTargetResources. - Report the elevations with no removal after 4 hours. Microsoft documents that deactivating the Global Administrator role in Privileged Identity Management does not remove elevated access, so a deactivation is not a removal.
EventsUser has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure ResourcesThe role assignment of User Access Administrator has been removed from the user
LimitsMicrosoft lists the elevate access entries in the directory audit log as a preview and does not say whether every way of removing the assignment writes the removal entry, so confirm open cases against the list of users with elevated access in the portal. Long planned work at root scope looks the same. The 4 hours are a starting point.
Role assignments made while access was elevated that outlive the elevation
Elevated access is temporary by design, so an attacker uses it to create role assignments that stay after the elevation is removed, such as Owner for a principal they control on a subscription or management group. Role assignments written by the elevated user between the elevation and its removal, for principals other than that user and still present afterwards, are the persistence the elevation was used for.
- From the Microsoft Entra audit log, take the elevation entry and the removal entry of the same user to get the window. Without a removal, the window is still open.
- In the Azure Activity log, take the start events of
MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/WRITEin that window whoseCalleris the elevated user. ReadPrincipalId,RoleDefinitionIdandScopefrom the request body inProperties. - Drop the assignments whose
PrincipalIdis the elevated user's own object ID. - For the rest, check that they still exist after the removal: no successful
MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/DELETEwith the same resource ID, or a current listing of the role assignments at the scope.
EventsUser has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure ResourcesThe role assignment of User Access Administrator has been removed from the userMICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/WRITEMICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/DELETE
LimitsGranting access to a user who lost it is one of the reasons Microsoft gives for elevating, so each assignment needs a matching request. Assignments at management group or root scope are not subscription events: check that your collection includes the activity log of those scopes. Caller and InitiatedBy have to be matched on the user principal name.
Triage
- Identify the Caller and what it changed through root-scope access (usually a role assignment at subscription or management group scope) from OperationNameValue and Properties.
- Confirm in the Microsoft Entra audit log who elevated access and when, and whether the sign-in behind it came from a known device and location.
- Remove the root-scope User Access Administrator assignment and any role assignments created while elevated; review the account's other recent activity.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Contain the Global Administrator account. Revoke its sessions, reset its credentials and authentication methods, and remove or deactivate the role until the sign-in behind the elevation is explained.
- Do not rely on deactivating the Global Administrator role to end the elevation. Microsoft documents that deactivating the role in Privileged Identity Management does not set the toggle back to No, so the User Access Administrator assignment at root scope has to be removed explicitly.
- Check the tenant for other users with elevated access. The Azure portal lists them under Access management for Azure resources, and elevation is a per-user setting, so every compromised Global Administrator can hold its own assignment at root scope.
- Review what the identities that received roles during the elevation did with them, and undo it. Look for new credentials, new resources, further role assignments and exported data.
- Confirm that no role assignment at scope
/remains, and that the Microsoft Entra audit log shows the entry for the removal of the User Access Administrator assignment from the user.
Mitigation
- Keep Global Administrator membership minimal, eligible through Privileged Identity Management with approval, and protected with phishing-resistant MFA.
- Set "Access management for Azure resources" back to No after every legitimate use and review role assignments at root scope (
/) regularly. - Collect the Microsoft Entra audit log and alert on "Azure RBAC (Elevated Access)" entries; subscription diagnostic settings do not export the tenant-level elevation event.
Frequently asked questions
Why is the elevation itself missing from the AzureActivity table in our workspace?
The elevation is a tenant-level event. It is written to the Directory Activity log and to the Microsoft Entra audit log under the service Azure RBAC (Elevated Access), not to the subscription activity log that subscription diagnostic settings export. Subscription logs record only what was later changed through the root-scope assignment.
Does deactivating the Global Administrator role in PIM remove the elevated access?
No. Microsoft documents that deactivating the role assignment in Privileged Identity Management does not set the Access management for Azure resources toggle back to No. The same user has to set the toggle to No, or the User Access Administrator assignment at root scope has to be removed with Azure PowerShell, Azure CLI or the REST API.
Is the rule on the Microsoft Entra audit log enough on its own?
Not on its own. Microsoft lists the elevate access entries in the directory audit log as a preview feature, so keep the companion rule that looks for Azure changes authorized by a role assignment at root scope. That rule assumes the Authorization column holds the evidence JSON as Azure Monitor writes it, which should be confirmed on a sample event.
What does a role assignment scope of "/" in an Activity log event mean?
The operation was allowed by a role assignment at the root scope, above every management group and subscription. Such an assignment exists only through elevated access or a deliberate root-scope assignment. An event with that evidence therefore shows what an elevated account changed in a subscription.