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Azure Lighthouse Delegation Created detection rules

Someone delegates a subscription or resource group to another tenant through Azure Lighthouse, giving that tenant's users built-in roles such as Contributor that stay outside your role assignments and Conditional Access.

Platform
Azure
Severity
High
Log source
Azure Activity log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A role with role assignment rights on the subscription being delegated, such as Owner, and a tenant the attacker controls to act as the managing tenant.
Impact
Standing access to the delegated scope from another tenant with the delegated roles, outside the customer's identity lifecycle, MFA and Conditional Access.
Response
Remove the delegation and any other offer to the same managing tenant, then revoke the sessions and role assignment rights of the caller that created it.
Mitigation
Assign the built-in policy that allows only listed managing tenant IDs to onboard through Azure Lighthouse, so delegations to any other tenant are denied.
Operations
MICROSOFT.MANAGEDSERVICES/REGISTRATIONDEFINITIONS/WRITEMICROSOFT.MANAGEDSERVICES/REGISTRATIONASSIGNMENTS/WRITE

How the attack works

Azure Lighthouse lets principals of another Microsoft Entra tenant, the managing tenant, work on a subscription or resource group with built-in Azure roles. Onboarding creates two resources in the delegated subscription: a registration definition, which names the managing tenant and lists principals with their roles, and a registration assignment, which applies it to the scope. Microsoft does not support Owner or roles with data actions in a delegation, but Contributor and many other management roles are allowed.

An attacker who holds role assignment rights on a subscription, such as Owner, can delegate it to a tenant they control. The access that results is durable and easy to overlook: Microsoft documents that the customer cannot see role assignments for the managing tenant's users at the delegated scope, and that the customer tenant's Conditional Access policies do not apply to them. Removing the attacker's accounts from your own tenant does not remove the delegation. Both resources are created through Azure Resource Manager and recorded in the Azure Activity log of the delegated subscription.

What an attacker needs

  • A role with Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write, delete and read on the subscription being delegated, such as Owner.
  • A tenant the attacker controls, or a compromised service provider tenant, to act as the managing tenant.

Impact

Standing access to the delegated scope from another tenant with the delegated roles, for example Contributor over a subscription and every virtual machine, managed identity and storage account in it, outside the customer's identity lifecycle, MFA and Conditional Access.

Detection rules

Azure Lighthouse Registration Definition or Assignment Written

Detects a successful create or update of an Azure Lighthouse registration definition or registration assignment. Together they delegate a subscription or resource group to another tenant, whose principals then hold the built-in roles listed in the definition.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceAzure Activity log
title: Azure Lighthouse Registration Definition or Assignment Written
id: f05aebb8-0aa2-4277-a001-2b4bc24ca728
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a successful create or update of an Azure Lighthouse registration
  definition or registration assignment. Together they delegate a subscription
  or resource group to another tenant, whose principals then hold the built-in
  roles listed in the definition.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/lighthouse/concepts/architecture
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/lighthouse/how-to/view-manage-service-providers
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/management-and-governance
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: activitylogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationNameValue:
      - MICROSOFT.MANAGEDSERVICES/REGISTRATIONDEFINITIONS/WRITE
      - MICROSOFT.MANAGEDSERVICES/REGISTRATIONASSIGNMENTS/WRITE
    ActivityStatusValue:
      - Success
      - Succeeded
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned onboarding of a managed service provider or an internal management tenant, and updates to an existing offer; confirm the managing tenant ID in the registration definition against the providers you expect.
level: high

False positives

  • Planned onboarding of a managed service provider or an internal management tenant, and updates to an existing offer; confirm the managing tenant ID in the registration definition against the providers you expect.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Changes on a delegated scope by users from outside your own domains

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsNeeds your own lists

Users of the managing tenant work on a delegated subscription with their own accounts. Microsoft documents that the Activity log names them, while the access control view of the subscription does not show them or their roles. Write, delete and action operations by callers from domains that are not yours, after a delegation was created, show the delegation in use, also weeks later when the creation event is long forgotten.

  1. In the Azure Activity log, take the successful delegation writes of the rule on this page. Keep the delegated scope from the resource ID, and read the managing tenant and the authorized principals in the registration definition.
  2. From then on, take the Activity log events on that scope whose Caller is a user principal name with a domain that is not one of your tenant's domains. Microsoft publishes a sample workbook for Azure Lighthouse that groups activity by the caller's domain.
  3. Keep the write, delete and action operations, and compare each caller's domain with the service providers you have a contract with.

EventsMICROSOFT.MANAGEDSERVICES/REGISTRATIONASSIGNMENTS/WRITE

LimitsMicrosoft documents that the tenant and role of the caller are not shown, so the domain is the only hint, and service principals of the managing tenant appear without one. Known service providers produce the same events. The Activity log has no read operations, so a provider that only reads is not seen.

Triage

  • Identify the Caller and the subscription or resource group from the event, then read the registration definition for the managing tenant ID and the principals and roles it authorizes.
  • Check the managing tenant against the service providers you have a contract with; an unknown tenant ID is suspicious on its own.
  • Remove an unexplained delegation from Service providers, then review Activity log entries on the delegated scope since it was created, including callers from the managing tenant.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Once the delegation is removed, confirm on the Service providers page that no offer or delegation to the same managing tenant remains on any other subscription or resource group.
  2. Treat the caller that created the delegation as compromised. Revoke its sessions, rotate its credentials and remove its role assignment rights until the sign-in behind the change is explained.
  3. Undo what principals of the managing tenant did on the delegated scope, such as resources they created and changes to virtual machines, managed identities and storage accounts.
  4. Rotate the secrets that a holder of the delegated roles could reach in the scope, such as storage account keys and credentials on virtual machines, and review the role assignments of the managed identities in it.
  5. Watch the Activity log of the subscription for a new registration definition or assignment in the following weeks. Another identity may still hold the right that allowed the first delegation.

Mitigation

  • Assign the built-in policy "Allow managing tenant ids to onboard through Azure Lighthouse" so delegations to any tenant that is not on the list are denied.
  • Assign the built-in policy "Audit delegation of scopes to a managing tenant" and review the Service providers page regularly.
  • Keep Owner, User Access Administrator and other roles with role assignment rights on subscriptions to a few PIM-eligible administrators, because those rights are what allows a delegation.
  • Keep subscriptions that host Tier 0 servers or privileged managed identities out of every delegation.

Frequently asked questions

Does disabling the attacker's accounts in our tenant end their Azure Lighthouse access?

No. The delegation gives access to principals of the managing tenant, which are not accounts in your directory. It stays in place until the delegation is removed, for example on the Service providers page. Microsoft also documents that your Conditional Access policies do not apply to those users.

Why does the role assignment list of the subscription not show the managing tenant's users?

Microsoft documents that the customer cannot see role assignments for the managing tenant's users at the delegated scope. Their access is described by the registration definition, which lists the principals and their roles. Review delegations on the Service providers page, not in the role assignment list.

Can a Lighthouse delegation give another tenant Owner on our subscription?

No. Microsoft does not support Owner or roles with data actions in a delegation. Contributor and many other management roles are allowed, which is enough to control the virtual machines, managed identities and storage accounts in the scope.

How do we tell a planned onboarding from a malicious delegation?

Read the managing tenant ID and the authorized principals and roles in the registration definition. A tenant that matches a service provider you have a contract with, onboarded through a change you know of, is expected. An unknown tenant ID is suspicious on its own.

References

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