How the attack works
With unconstrained Kerberos delegation (the TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION userAccountControl flag), the KDC places a forwardable copy of the client's TGT inside every service ticket issued for that account's services. Whoever controls the account's host or keys can extract those TGTs and act as the users who connected, including domain controller machine accounts coerced into authenticating to it.
Domain controllers have the flag by default; on any other account it is a high-value target. Setting it requires the "Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation" user right (SeEnableDelegationPrivilege) and write access to userAccountControl, so it is normally done by administrators, or by attackers who obtained those rights to build a TGT-harvesting host. The change is logged in event 4742 (computers) or 4738 (users), and a computer created with the flag in 4741, with %%2093 ("'Trusted For Delegation' - Enabled") in UserAccountControl.
What an attacker needs
- SeEnableDelegationPrivilege (held by Administrators on domain controllers by default) and write access to the target account's userAccountControl.
- Control of the account's host or keys to collect the delegated TGTs.
Impact
Combined with authentication coercion, a host with unconstrained delegation captures the domain controller's TGT, which allows DCSync and full domain compromise. Any privileged user who connects to the host also exposes their TGT.
Detection rules
Trusted For Delegation Enabled on an Account
Detects a user or computer account created or changed (4738, 4741, 4742) with "'Trusted For Delegation' - Enabled" (%%2093) in its User Account Control changes, which turns on unconstrained Kerberos delegation. Outside domain controller promotions this is rare and creates a host that collects the TGTs of everyone who authenticates to it. Requires Audit User Account Management and Audit Computer Account Management.
title: Trusted For Delegation Enabled on an Account
id: a3b94fc2-a6ca-4934-b225-207f5b547442
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a user or computer account created or changed (4738, 4741, 4742)
with "'Trusted For Delegation' - Enabled" (%%2093) in its User Account
Control changes, which turns on unconstrained Kerberos delegation. Outside
domain controller promotions this is rare and creates a host that collects
the TGTs of everyone who authenticates to it.
Requires Audit User Account Management and Audit Computer Account Management.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4742
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4741
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4738
- 4741
- 4742
UserAccountControl|contains: '%%2093'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Domain controller promotion, which enables the flag on the new domain controller's account. Confirm the computer is a newly promoted domain controller.
level: high
False positives
- Domain controller promotion, which enables the flag on the new domain controller's account. Confirm the computer is a newly promoted domain controller.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Domain controller account obtains a service ticket for a host trusted for unconstrained delegation
A host with unconstrained delegation receives a copy of the ticket-granting ticket of every account that authenticates to it with Kerberos. When a domain controller's account does that, the host holds the domain controller's ticket, which is what coercion against such a host aims for. The domain controller logs the service ticket it issues for the host, so its own account in event 4769 for a delegation host that is not a domain controller marks the moment of capture.
- Keep a list of the accounts other than domain controllers that are trusted for unconstrained delegation: those named in events 4738, 4741 and 4742 with %%2093 in
UserAccountControl, completed by an inventory of the directory. - Find successful event 4769 (
Status0x0) whoseServiceNameis one of those accounts and whoseTargetUserNameis the account of a domain controller, its name with a dollar sign followed by the domain. - If the Security log of the delegation host is collected, the same connection appears there as event 4624 with
LogonType3 and the domain controller's account inTargetUserName. - Look on that domain controller for a coercion pipe opened just before (event 5145 for efsrpc, spoolss, netdfs or FssagentRpc on IPC$) and read the caller.
Events4769474246245145
LimitsDomain controllers connect to a few member servers for their own work, so expect some known pairs and list them. A flag set before collection began is found only through the inventory. Privileged users who connect to the host expose their tickets in the same way, but their visits are harder to tell apart from normal use.
Triage
- Check whether the event belongs to a domain controller promotion; the computer then ends up in the Domain Controllers OU and becomes a server trust account.
- Identify who made the change (SubjectUserName) and whether a change record exists; unconstrained delegation is rarely a legitimate new requirement.
- Inspect the target host for compromise and look for authentication coercion against domain controllers (5145) and for DC machine-account logons to that host.
- If not explained, clear the flag, reset the account's password and investigate.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Isolate the host whose account received the flag. It is the place where ticket-granting tickets are collected.
- Clear the Trusted For Delegation flag on the account and reset its password.
- Disable or reset the account that set the flag, and find out how it came to hold the user right to enable delegation, which is normally limited to administrators.
- List who authenticated to that host while the flag was on and reset the passwords of those users. If the computer account of a domain controller is among them, handle it as described for DCSync.
- Confirm that no account other than the domain controllers still carries the flag.
Mitigation
- Remove unconstrained delegation from every account that is not a domain controller; use constrained or resource-based constrained delegation where delegation is needed.
- Limit "Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation" to Tier 0 administrators.
- Mark privileged accounts "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" or add them to Protected Users.
- Disable the Print Spooler and other coercible services on domain controllers.
Frequently asked questions
Why is unconstrained delegation a problem on a server but normal on domain controllers?
Domain controllers have the flag by default. On any other account it means that the KDC places a forwardable copy of the client's ticket-granting ticket inside every service ticket for the services of that account. Whoever controls that host can act as the users who connected, including a domain controller that was coerced into authenticating to it.
Who is able to turn unconstrained delegation on?
An account that holds the user right Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation (SeEnableDelegationPrivilege) and has write access to userAccountControl of the target. Administrators hold the right on domain controllers by default. Limit it to Tier 0 administrators.
Does the rule find accounts that already have unconstrained delegation?
No. It reports the moment the flag is turned on, in events 4738, 4741 and 4742. Accounts that carried the flag before the events were collected produce no alert and have to be found by an inventory of the directory.
How do I recognize a domain controller promotion in these events?
A promotion enables the flag on the account of the new domain controller. The computer then ends up in the Domain Controllers OU and becomes a server trust account. Confirm both, and that a promotion was planned, before closing the alert.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- Event 4742: A computer account was changed
- Event 4738: A user account was changed
- Event 4769: A Kerberos service ticket was requested
- Event 4624: An account was successfully logged on
- Event 5145: A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access
- User-Account-Control attribute (ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION)
- Defender for Identity: Unsecure Kerberos delegation