How the attack works
Every domain controller has a local Administrator account for logging on in Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM). It lives in the DC's local SAM database rather than in Active Directory, its password is set at promotion, and changes to it are invisible in the directory.
An attacker with administrative rights on a domain controller can set the DSRM password to a known value and set the DsrmAdminLogonBehavior registry value under HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa to 2, which allows the DSRM account to log on at any time, including over the network. The result is a local administrator on the domain controller that survives domain password resets. Setting the password is logged as event 4794 on the DC; the registry change is logged as event 4657 when the Lsa key has a SACL that audits Set Value.
What an attacker needs
- Administrative rights on a domain controller.
Impact
The attacker keeps administrator access to the domain controller, and through it to the domain, even after every domain account password has been reset.
Detection rules
DSRM Administrator Logon Behavior Changed
Detects a change to the DsrmAdminLogonBehavior registry value (HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa) in event 4657. A value of 2 lets the DSRM administrator log on to the domain controller at any time, including over the network, turning the DSRM account into a persistent local administrator. Requires Audit Registry and a SACL that audits Set Value on the Lsa key.
title: DSRM Administrator Logon Behavior Changed
id: 91f45b05-37e2-4c5c-a66b-b461e198839e
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to the DsrmAdminLogonBehavior registry value
(HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa) in event 4657. A value of 2 lets
the DSRM administrator log on to the domain controller at any time, including
over the network, turning the DSRM account into a persistent local
administrator. Requires Audit Registry and a SACL that audits Set Value on the
Lsa key.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/cc732714(v=ws.10)
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4657
ObjectValueName: DsrmAdminLogonBehavior
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Single-domain-controller or isolated environments where an administrator deliberately set the value to 1 for recovery; values other than 0 should still be documented.
level: high
False positives
- Single-domain-controller or isolated environments where an administrator deliberately set the value to 1 for recovery; values other than 0 should still be documented.
Directory Services Restore Mode Administrator Password Set
Detects an attempt to set the DSRM administrator password on a domain controller (4794). Microsoft recommends alerting on every occurrence: the DSRM account is a local administrator of the domain controller that is not managed in Active Directory, and setting its password is a known persistence step. Requires Audit User Account Management.
title: Directory Services Restore Mode Administrator Password Set
id: f614fa3d-ffca-413d-894f-438b16bd9279
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an attempt to set the DSRM administrator password on a domain
controller (4794). Microsoft recommends alerting on every occurrence: the
DSRM account is a local administrator of the domain controller that is not
managed in Active Directory, and setting its password is a known persistence
step.
Requires Audit User Account Management.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4794
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4794
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Scheduled DSRM password rotation by Tier 0 administrators. Windows LAPS can also manage the DSRM password; Microsoft does not document whether its rotations raise 4794 or with which subject, so check this in your environment before treating such events as expected. Verify against the change record or LAPS configuration rather than excluding the event.
level: high
False positives
- Scheduled DSRM password rotation by Tier 0 administrators. Windows LAPS can also manage the DSRM password; Microsoft does not document whether its rotations raise 4794 or with which subject, so check this in your environment before treating such events as expected. Verify against the change record or LAPS configuration rather than excluding the event.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Domain controller's local DSRM administrator logs on while the directory is running
The DSRM administrator is the only local account of a domain controller. Outside a restore it should not log on at all, so a successful logon with it is the backdoor being used, whatever way the password and the registry value were set. The logon event names a local account by the computer's name in the account domain field, which separates it from the domain Administrator that shares RID 500.
- On every domain controller, take successful logons (event 4624) whose
TargetUserSidends in -500. - Keep those whose
TargetDomainNameis the domain controller's own computer name rather than the domain's NetBIOS name, or whoseTargetUserSiddoes not start with one of your domain SIDs. Microsoft documents that for a local account this field holds the computer name. - Report each one with
LogonType,IpAddressandWorkstationName; a network logon (type 3) or a remote interactive logon (type 10) is the strongest sign. - On that domain controller, read DsrmAdminLogonBehavior and look for event 4794 or event 4657 before the logon.
Events462447944657
LimitsA planned restore in Directory Services Restore Mode, and maintenance with DsrmAdminLogonBehavior set to 1 while AD DS is stopped, produce the same logon and need a change record. The list of domain SIDs has to cover every domain in the forest. Audit Logon must be enabled on the domain controllers.
Triage
- Check whether a DSRM password rotation was scheduled and who performed it (SubjectUserName and Workstation in 4794).
- On the same domain controller, check DsrmAdminLogonBehavior and look for network logons by the DC's local Administrator account (4624 with a TargetUserSid ending in -500 that is not the domain Administrator).
- If not explained, reset the DSRM password, set DsrmAdminLogonBehavior to 0 and investigate the account that made the change.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Set DsrmAdminLogonBehavior back to 0 on the affected domain controller before anything else. That closes the logon path while AD DS is running, even if the attacker still knows the DSRM password.
- Disable the domain account that set the password or changed the registry value, and isolate the hosts from which the local Administrator account of the domain controller logged on.
- Check the registry value and reset the DSRM password on every domain controller, not only the one that raised the alert. An account with administrative rights on one domain controller may have them on the others.
- Treat the domain controller, and through it the domain, as compromised for the time the backdoor existed.
- Confirm afterwards that the local Administrator account of a domain controller no longer logs on while AD DS is running.
Mitigation
- Manage the DSRM password with Windows LAPS, or set a unique long password per domain controller, store it in a vault and rotate it after any compromise.
- Keep DsrmAdminLogonBehavior unset or 0 on all domain controllers, enforce it through Group Policy and audit the Lsa key with a SACL.
- Restrict administrative logon to domain controllers to Tier 0 administrators.
Frequently asked questions
Does resetting every domain password remove a DSRM backdoor?
No. The DSRM administrator is a local account in the SAM database of each domain controller, not an Active Directory account, so domain password resets do not touch it. The DSRM password has to be reset on the domain controller itself, and DsrmAdminLogonBehavior has to be returned to 0.
Is a new DSRM password alone enough for the attacker to log on?
Not while the domain controller runs normally with the default setting. By default the DSRM administrator can log on only when the domain controller is started in Directory Services Restore Mode. With DsrmAdminLogonBehavior set to 2 the account can log on at any time, including over the network. That is why the registry value matters as much as the password.
Why is the registry change not logged on our domain controllers?
Event 4657 is written only when Audit Registry is enabled and the Lsa key has a SACL that audits Set Value. Both have to be configured. Event 4794 for the password itself needs only Audit User Account Management, so the password change can be visible while the registry change is not.
Do Windows LAPS rotations of the DSRM password raise event 4794?
Microsoft does not document whether rotations by Windows LAPS raise event 4794 or with which subject. Check it in your own environment before treating such events as expected, and verify an event against the LAPS configuration or a change record instead of excluding it.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- Event 4794: An attempt was made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password
- Event 4657: A registry value was modified
- Restartable AD DS Step-by-Step Guide (DSRMAdminLogonBehavior)
- What is Windows LAPS? (DSRM password management)
- Event 4624: An account was successfully logged on