How the attack works
CVE-2021-42291 is a security bypass in the way Active Directory handled the creation of computer objects. Microsoft describes it as a vulnerability that allows certain users to set arbitrary values on security-sensitive attributes of specific objects. A user who has enough rights to create a computer-derived object, for example the permission to create computer objects in an organizational unit, could create the account with an LDAP add call that allows overly permissive access to its security descriptor. Creators and owners could also modify security-sensitive attributes after creating the account. Microsoft states that this can be leveraged to perform an elevation of privilege in certain scenarios.
The fix has two parts, both controlled by the forest-wide dSHeuristics attribute. The first adds authorization checks when a user without domain administrator rights creates a computer-derived object with an LDAP add operation (character 28). The second temporarily removes the implicit owner privileges when such a user writes the security descriptor of an object with an LDAP modify operation, and checks whether the write would be allowed without them (character 29). Each part runs in audit mode by default on domain controllers with the updates of November 9, 2021 or later. In audit mode the request succeeds and the domain controller logs a warning. In enforcement mode the request is denied and logged. A third value switches the check and its events off, which Microsoft does not recommend.
The events are written to the Directory Service log of the domain controller that received the request. Events 3047, 3048 and 3049 say that an add or modify request would have been blocked and was allowed because of audit mode. Events 3044, 3045 and 3046 say that the request was denied. Each names the object, its class, the user who made the request and the client IP address. Events 3051, 3052, 3054 and 3055 announce that one of the two checks is not enforced or is switched off. This page is the companion of Computer Account Created by a User, which reports every computer account a user creates. The events here report the smaller set in which the creator asked for more than the default.
What an attacker needs
- An account that may create computer objects, through the machine account quota of the domain or through delegated create rights on an organizational unit.
- A domain controller that does not enforce the checks. It is missing the November 2021 or later updates, or the two
dSHeuristicscharacters are still at audit mode or set to disabled.
Impact
The attacker ends up with a computer account whose security-sensitive attributes or security descriptor they chose. Microsoft describes the result as an elevation of privilege in certain scenarios. In practice the account is a controlled identity with settings that the default permissions of its creator would not have allowed, and it can serve the attack chains that start from a computer account.
Detection rules
LDAP Add or Modify That Would Have Been Blocked (CVE-2021-42291 Audit)
Detects events 3047, 3048 and 3049 in the Directory Service log of a domain controller. They are the audit events of the protections for CVE-2021-42291. Event 3047 says that an LDAP add request would have been blocked because the client did not have permission to write one or more attributes included in the request. Event 3048 says the same for an add request that included an nTSecurityDescriptor the client had no explicit permission to write in full. Event 3049 reports an LDAP modify request of that kind on an existing object. In all three the request was allowed to proceed because the directory is in audit-only mode for the check, so the object exists with the settings that were asked for. The event text names the object, its class, the user and the client IP address. Microsoft's article gives the event text and not the names of the event data fields, and it does not name the event source, so the rule matches the event IDs together with the provider that the other rules for this log use. The events exist on domain controllers with the updates of November 9, 2021 or later.
title: LDAP Add or Modify That Would Have Been Blocked (CVE-2021-42291 Audit)
id: babc83ef-6dae-46fb-918f-e8a96537ef42
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects events 3047, 3048 and 3049 in the Directory Service log of a
domain controller. They are the audit events of the protections for
CVE-2021-42291. Event 3047 says that an LDAP add request would have been
blocked because the client did not have permission to write one or more
attributes included in the request. Event 3048 says the same for an add
request that included an nTSecurityDescriptor the client had no explicit
permission to write in full. Event 3049 reports an LDAP modify request of
that kind on an existing object. In all three the request was allowed to
proceed because the directory is in audit-only mode for the check, so the
object exists with the settings that were asked for. The event text names
the object, its class, the user and the client IP address. Microsoft's
article gives the event text and not the names of the event data fields,
and it does not name the event source, so the rule matches the event IDs
together with the provider that the other rules for this log use. The
events exist on domain controllers with the updates of November 9, 2021
or later.
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008383-active-directory-permissions-updates-cve-2021-42291-536d5555-ffba-4248-a60e-d6cbc849cde1
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: directory-service
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: DomainService
EventID:
- 3047
- 3048
- 3049
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Domain join, imaging and provisioning tools that create computer accounts with attributes or a security descriptor beyond what their account may write. Microsoft expects these and recommends delegating the missing permission on a dedicated organizational unit. Exclude what remains by the user in the event.
level: medium
False positives
- Domain join, imaging and provisioning tools that create computer accounts with attributes or a security descriptor beyond what their account may write. Microsoft expects these and recommends delegating the missing permission on a dedicated organizational unit. Exclude what remains by the user in the event.
LDAP Add or Modify Denied by the CVE-2021-42291 Permission Checks
Detects events 3044, 3045 and 3046 in the Directory Service log of a domain controller. They are written in the enforcement mode of the protections for CVE-2021-42291. Event 3044 says that an LDAP add request was denied because the client did not have permission to write one or more attributes included in the request. Event 3045 says that an add request was denied because it included an nTSecurityDescriptor the client had no explicit permission to write in full. Event 3046 reports a denied LDAP modify request of that kind on an existing object. Each event is an attempt, by a user without domain administrator rights, to give a computer-derived object settings beyond what that user may write. The event text names the object, its class, the user and the client IP address. Microsoft's article gives the event text and not the names of the event data fields or the event source, so the rule matches the event IDs together with the provider that the other rules for this log use. The events appear only where character 28 or 29 of dSHeuristics is set to 1.
title: LDAP Add or Modify Denied by the CVE-2021-42291 Permission Checks
id: 8367878d-c9a9-45eb-8c14-3e9e0f303858
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects events 3044, 3045 and 3046 in the Directory Service log of a
domain controller. They are written in the enforcement mode of the
protections for CVE-2021-42291. Event 3044 says that an LDAP add request
was denied because the client did not have permission to write one or
more attributes included in the request. Event 3045 says that an add
request was denied because it included an nTSecurityDescriptor the client
had no explicit permission to write in full. Event 3046 reports a denied
LDAP modify request of that kind on an existing object. Each event is an
attempt, by a user without domain administrator rights, to give a
computer-derived object settings beyond what that user may write. The
event text names the object, its class, the user and the client IP
address. Microsoft's article gives the event text and not the names of
the event data fields or the event source, so the rule matches the event
IDs together with the provider that the other rules for this log use.
The events appear only where character 28 or 29 of dSHeuristics is set to
1.
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008383-active-directory-permissions-updates-cve-2021-42291-536d5555-ffba-4248-a60e-d6cbc849cde1
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: directory-service
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: DomainService
EventID:
- 3044
- 3045
- 3046
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A provisioning or deployment process that was not adjusted before enforcement was switched on and now fails. Microsoft recommends delegating the missing permission on a dedicated organizational unit, not adding the account to Domain Admins.
level: medium
False positives
- A provisioning or deployment process that was not adjusted before enforcement was switched on and now fails. Microsoft recommends delegating the missing permission on a dedicated organizational unit, not adding the account to Domain Admins.
CVE-2021-42291 Permission Checks Switched Off
Detects events 3052 and 3055 in the Directory Service log of a domain controller. Event 3052 says that the directory has been configured to not enforce per-attribute authorization during LDAP add operations and that no events will be logged and no requests blocked. Event 3055 says the same for implicit owner privileges when the nTSecurityDescriptor attribute is set or modified. Microsoft logs both as errors and calls the setting not secure. They are written when character 28 or 29 of the forest-wide dSHeuristics attribute is changed to 2, which disables the check and its audit events. After that a user who may create computer accounts can again set attributes and security descriptors beyond their permissions, and events 3044 to 3049 no longer report it. The warning events 3051 and 3054, which announce audit mode, are the default state of an updated forest and are not matched. Microsoft's article does not name the event source, so the rule matches the event IDs together with the provider that the other rules for this log use. The directory change itself is covered by the attack dSHeuristics Modification.
title: CVE-2021-42291 Permission Checks Switched Off
id: 5db4e520-9d95-403e-8bed-49f9767acc42
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects events 3052 and 3055 in the Directory Service log of a domain
controller. Event 3052 says that the directory has been configured to
not enforce per-attribute authorization during LDAP add operations and
that no events will be logged and no requests blocked. Event 3055 says
the same for implicit owner privileges when the nTSecurityDescriptor
attribute is set or modified. Microsoft logs both as errors and calls
the setting not secure. They are written when character 28 or 29 of the
forest-wide dSHeuristics attribute is changed to 2, which disables the
check and its audit events. After that a user who may create computer
accounts can again set attributes and security descriptors beyond their
permissions, and events 3044 to 3049 no longer report it. The warning
events 3051 and 3054, which announce audit mode, are the default state of
an updated forest and are not matched. Microsoft's article does not name
the event source, so the rule matches the event IDs together with the
provider that the other rules for this log use. The directory change
itself is covered by the attack dSHeuristics Modification.
references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008383-active-directory-permissions-updates-cve-2021-42291-536d5555-ffba-4248-a60e-d6cbc849cde1
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-dsheuristics
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: directory-service
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains: DomainService
EventID:
- 3052
- 3055
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A forest administrator who disables a check as a temporary troubleshooting step, which Microsoft describes as the only acceptable use. Confirm the change record and that the setting was restored.
level: medium
False positives
- A forest administrator who disables a check as a temporary troubleshooting step, which Microsoft describes as the only acceptable use. Confirm the change record and that the setting was restored.
Triage
- Read the object, its class, the user and the client IP address in the event. In events 3044 and 3047 the security descriptor that was attempted is included as well.
- Decide whether the user is a provisioning, deployment or domain join account. Tools that create computer accounts with extra attributes are the routine source of these events.
- For an audit event (3047 to 3049) the request succeeded. Read the new object in the directory, above all its security descriptor, its owner and its account control flags, and compare them with a computer account created the normal way.
- Look for what the same user did next with the account, such as a rename (event 4781), a write of delegation attributes (event 5136) or service ticket requests (event 4769).
- For the mode events (3051, 3052, 3054, 3055) find the change to
dSHeuristicsand who made it.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Disable the computer account that was created or changed and reset the password of the user who made the request.
- Correct the security descriptor and the attributes of the object, or delete the account once the evidence is preserved.
- Search for other computer accounts created by the same user and review them in the same way.
- Move the forest to enforcement mode for both checks once the legitimate provisioning cases are resolved.
Mitigation
- Install the current updates on every domain controller and, once the audit events are resolved, set characters 28 and 29 of
dSHeuristicsto 1 so that both checks are enforced. - Set
ms-DS-MachineAccountQuotato 0 and delegate the creation of computer accounts to a dedicated provisioning group on specific organizational units. - Resolve every audit event. Microsoft advises giving a provisioning process the specific permission it lacks on a dedicated organizational unit instead of adding it to Domain Admins.
- Collect the Directory Service log of every domain controller.
Frequently asked questions
Do events 3047 to 3049 mean that the request was blocked?
No. They are the audit events. The domain controller detected a request that would have been blocked and allowed it to proceed because the directory is in audit-only mode for the check. The object was created or changed. Events 3044 to 3046 are the ones that report a denied request, and they appear only in enforcement mode.
Which setting moves a forest from audit mode to enforcement?
Characters 28 and 29 of the dSHeuristics attribute on the Directory Service object in the configuration partition. Character 28 controls the checks for LDAP add operations and character 29 the removal of implicit owner privileges for LDAP modify operations. In both, 0 is audit mode, 1 is enforcement and 2 disables the check and its events.
Who triggers these events in normal operation?
Accounts without domain administrator rights that create computer objects and set more than their permissions allow, typically domain join, imaging or provisioning tools. Microsoft's guidance is to read the event, see which permission is missing and delegate that permission on a dedicated organizational unit.
Is there a public report of this vulnerability being used in an attack?
This page does not rely on one. The description follows Microsoft's article for CVE-2021-42291, which explains what the checks audit and block. The events are worth collecting because they report the precondition, a user who creates computer accounts with settings beyond the default.