How the attack works
Two settings decide how hard it is to take a password out of the Vault once you have some access. The Master Policy sets the baseline for every privileged account: whether access needs approval from a second person (dual control), whether an account is checked out exclusively, whether its password is changed after each use, and whether sessions are monitored and isolated. Rules can be overridden for a platform with an exception. For applications, the authentication methods registered for an application ID (allowed machines, OS user, path, hash, client certificate) decide which callers a Credential Provider will hand a password to.
An attacker who controls a member of Vault Admins can set a rule to inactive or remove the exception that protects Tier 0 platforms, and then retrieve passwords without a second person. An attacker who can manage applications can add their own machine or OS user to an application ID, or delete the restrictions, and then ask the Central Credential Provider for the application's credentials. Both changes look like administration and neither touches a privileged account directly, which is why they need their own alert.
What must be collected. The rules read the Vault's audit records forwarded by syslog in CEF format (SIEM integration, configured in DBParm.ini). The CEF header's Device Event Class ID carries the Vault audit action code: 385 is a successful change to the Master Policy, 382 is Add App Authentication and 383 is Delete App Authentication. Master Policy changes also appear in the Activity Log report. A third rule reads code 386, a change to the Master Policy that failed, which shows an attempt even when nothing changed. SyslogMessageCodeFilter must not exclude these codes.
What an attacker needs
- For the Master Policy, a Vault user who is a member of the Vault Admins group.
- For application authentication, a Vault user who is allowed to manage applications.
Impact
The safeguards that would have stopped or exposed a credential theft are gone: passwords of the affected platforms can be retrieved without approval and stay valid after use, or an attacker-controlled host receives the passwords an application is entitled to.
Detection rules
CyberArk Application Authentication Method Added or Deleted
Detects an authentication method being added to, or deleted from, an application ID in the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action codes 382, Add App Authentication, and 383, Delete App Authentication). The record names the application ID, the authentication type and its value. An added machine address or OS user widens who can retrieve the application's credentials; a deleted method removes a restriction. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
title: CyberArk Application Authentication Method Added or Deleted
id: 448c7e6f-c7cb-40a9-b335-1edb69321686
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an authentication method being added to, or deleted from, an
application ID in the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action codes 382, Add
App Authentication, and 383, Delete App Authentication). The record names
the application ID, the authentication type and its value. An added machine
address or OS user widens who can retrieve the application's credentials; a
deleted method removes a restriction. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's
Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the
Vault audit action code.
references:
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/credential-providers/latest/en/content/cp%20and%20ascp/application-authentication-methods-general.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: cyberark
service: vault
detection:
selection:
deviceEventClassId:
- '382'
- '383'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Onboarding a new application or moving one to new servers; confirm the machine, user or certificate with the application's owner.
level: medium
False positives
- Onboarding a new application or moving one to new servers; confirm the machine, user or certificate with the application's owner.
CyberArk Master Policy Change Failed
Detects a change to the CyberArk Master Policy that did not succeed (audit action code 386, Changes to the Master Policy failed). The record shows that someone tried to change the rules for dual control, exclusive access, one-time passwords or session monitoring, even though nothing changed. The code table gives the attempted action in Info1 and no reason for the failure. Look for a successful change (code 385) by the same issuer shortly after. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
title: CyberArk Master Policy Change Failed
id: 317be80d-53d5-4abf-bef1-db8b7ecd13b9
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to the CyberArk Master Policy that did not succeed (audit
action code 386, Changes to the Master Policy failed). The record shows that
someone tried to change the rules for dual control, exclusive access,
one-time passwords or session monitoring, even though nothing changed. The
code table gives the attempted action in Info1 and no reason for the
failure. Look for a successful change (code 385) by the same issuer shortly
after. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which
CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
references:
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/the-master-policy.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484
logsource:
product: cyberark
service: vault
detection:
selection:
deviceEventClassId: '386'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A member of the PAM team whose approved change did not go through. Confirm with the issuer what was attempted.
level: low
False positives
- A member of the PAM team whose approved change did not go through. Confirm with the issuer what was attempted.
CyberArk Master Policy Changed
Detects a successful change to the CyberArk Master Policy (audit action code 385, Changes were made successfully to the Master Policy). The Master Policy holds the rules for dual control, exclusive access, one-time passwords and session monitoring, and their exceptions per platform. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
title: CyberArk Master Policy Changed
id: 91b4353e-afa8-48ed-9cca-1c87a9c0358b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful change to the CyberArk Master Policy (audit action code
385, Changes were made successfully to the Master Policy). The Master Policy
holds the rules for dual control, exclusive access, one-time passwords and
session monitoring, and their exceptions per platform. deviceEventClassId is
the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator
fills with the Vault audit action code.
references:
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/the-master-policy.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484
logsource:
product: cyberark
service: vault
detection:
selection:
deviceEventClassId: '385'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Approved policy changes by the PAM team; the Master Policy changes rarely, so confirm each alert against a change record.
level: medium
False positives
- Approved policy changes by the PAM team; the Master Policy changes rarely, so confirm each alert against a change record.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Master Policy changed, passwords retrieved, and the Master Policy changed again by the same issuer
An administrator who wants a password without a second person's approval does not need to leave the Master Policy relaxed. They switch a rule off, retrieve, and switch it back, so that the Master Policy page shows the approved state at the next review. Two Master Policy changes by one issuer with password retrievals between them is that pattern.
- The Vault records code 385 (Changes were made successfully to the Master Policy), for which the code table gives the action in Info1. Keep the issuer (
suser) and the time. - After it, the Vault records code 295 (Retrieve password) or 428 (Retrieve SSH Key) by an issuer that is not a component, above all on Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts. Keep each retrieval's issuer and the Safe and File fields of the audit record.
- Within 24 hours of the first change the same issuer writes another code 385.
- Read both changes in the Activity Log report. The same rule or platform exception switched off and back on, with retrievals in between, is the case to act on.
Events385295428
LimitsAn administrator who corrects a change, or who makes a planned change in two steps, writes two code 385 records without any misuse, so read the Activity Log report before acting. The audit record does not say which rule changed. The retrievals may come from a user other than the issuer, and the Safe and File fields reach the SIEM under keys that depend on the translator file. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- For a Master Policy change, open the Master Policy page and the Activity Log report and find which rule or exception changed and what its value was before.
- For an application change, read the application ID, the authentication type and the value in the audit record, and check whether the machine or user belongs to the application.
- Identify the issuer (suser) and confirm the change with that administrator through a separate channel.
- If it was not approved, restore the setting, then look for password retrievals (codes 295 and 319) on the affected platforms or by the affected application since the change.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Set the Master Policy rule or exception back to its approved value. For an application, remove the machine, OS user or other method that was added and put back the restrictions that were deleted.
- Suspend the Vault user that made the change until it is explained, and remove it from Vault Admins or from the group that manages applications.
- Start a password change for every account that was retrieved while the control was off, by people and by the affected application ID alike.
- If an unapproved machine was allowed on an application ID, treat every credential that application may retrieve as handed over, and examine that machine.
- Compare all Master Policy rules, platform exceptions and the authentication methods of each application with the approved state before the incident is closed.
Mitigation
- Keep Vault Admins small and its members on native accounts with multi-factor authentication, and administer the Vault through isolated, recorded sessions as CyberArk recommends.
- Treat Master Policy rules and exceptions for Tier 0 platforms as change controlled, with a second person reviewing each change.
- Give every application ID at least allowed machines and an OS user or client certificate, and review the Applications Inventory report on a schedule.
- Forward the Vault audit to your SIEM and alert on every Master Policy change and every application authentication change.
Frequently asked questions
Does the alert say which Master Policy rule was changed?
No. Action code 385 states only that changes were made successfully to the Master Policy. Open the Master Policy page and the Activity Log report to find the rule or exception that changed and the value it had before.
Why is an added machine on an application ID a security event?
The authentication methods of an application ID decide which callers a Credential Provider hands a password to. An added machine address or OS user widens that set, so a host the attacker controls can ask for the application's credentials. A deleted method matters as much, because it removes a restriction that callers had to meet.
How do I find out whether the relaxed control was used?
Search the Vault audit for password retrievals after the change. Code 295 is a retrieval by a user and code 319 is a retrieval through a Credential Provider. Limit the search to the platforms affected by the Master Policy change, or to the application ID whose authentication methods changed.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1484: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- CyberArk Docs: Understand the master policy framework
- CyberArk Docs: Application authentication methods
- CyberArk Docs: Vault Audit Action Codes
- CyberArk Docs: Create a Custom XSL Translator File (audit record fields)