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Vault User Password Reset by Another User in Idira (formerly CyberArk) detection rules

An attacker who controls a Vault user with the Reset Users' Passwords authorization sets a new password for a more useful user, such as a member of Vault Admins, and logs on as that user.

Platform
Idira (formerly CyberArk)
Severity
High
Log source
Idira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
A Vault user with the Reset Users' Passwords authorization and a target user in the same Location or lower that logs on with a Vault password.
Impact
A logon as the target user with all its Safe memberships and Vault authorizations, up to control of the Vault's configuration for a member of Vault Admins.
Response
Take the user back together with its owner with a new password and second factor, and suspend the issuer until the reset is explained.
Mitigation
Give Reset Users' Passwords to few named help desk administrators and place the users of Vault administrators in a Location above theirs.
Vault event codes
314315316317

How the attack works

A Vault user with the Reset Users' Passwords authorization can set a new password for other users in the same Location or lower in the Vault hierarchy. It is a help desk task, and the REST method for it needs only this authorization and Audit Users. Nothing in the authorization separates the forgotten password of an operator from the password of a Vault administrator who sits at the same level or below. An attacker who controls a user with this authorization resets the password of a more useful user, logs on with it, and holds that user's Safe memberships and Vault authorizations.

The Vault records a reset with code 317 (Reset User Password) and code 316 (Reset User Password Detailed Information). For both, the code table gives the user whose password was reset in Info1. Refused attempts have their own codes: 314 (Reset Password User (Unauthorized)) and 315 (Reset Password Your User (Unauthorized)). The code table also lists code 88 (Set Password) without fields or a description, and the rules do not read it. The same authorization lets its holder add a public SSH key to another user, which the Vault records with code 441.

What must be collected. The rules read the Vault's audit records forwarded by syslog in CEF format (SIEM integration, configured in DBParm.ini). The CEF header's Device Event Class ID carries the Vault audit action code and the extension key suser carries the issuer, the Vault user who performed the reset. SyslogMessageCodeFilter must not exclude codes 314 to 317. By default all codes are sent.

What an attacker needs

  • A Vault user with the Reset Users' Passwords authorization, and with Audit Users for the REST method.
  • A target user in the same Location or lower in the Vault hierarchy whose authentication method is a Vault password.

Impact

A logon as the target user, with every Safe it is a member of and every Vault authorization it holds. On a member of Vault Admins that is control of the Vault's configuration. The owner's password stops working, so the reset is noticed quickly on a user in daily use and can stay unnoticed on dormant, break-glass and integration users.

Detection rules

CyberArk Vault Refused a User Password Reset

Detects an attempt to reset the password of a user of the CyberArk Digital Vault that the Vault refused: audit action codes 314 (Reset Password User (Unauthorized)) and 315 (Reset Password Your User (Unauthorized)). The code table flags both in its Alert column, which CyberArk explains as an unauthorized operation, and gives a user name in Info1. A reset needs the Reset Users' Passwords authorization and a target in the same Location or lower in the Vault hierarchy. A refusal means that one of the two was missing and the issuer tried anyway. No password changed, but someone tried to set the password of a user they have no right over. Look for a successful reset (codes 316 and 317) of the same target by another issuer afterwards. The code table gives no reason for the refusal, so the rule matches the codes alone. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Vault Refused a User Password Reset
id: 77984246-3750-41b0-9de9-461d46f13ecf
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an attempt to reset the password of a user of the CyberArk Digital
  Vault that the Vault refused: audit action codes 314 (Reset Password User
  (Unauthorized)) and 315 (Reset Password Your User (Unauthorized)). The code
  table flags both in its Alert column, which CyberArk explains as an
  unauthorized operation, and gives a user name in Info1. A reset needs the
  Reset Users' Passwords authorization and a target in the same Location or
  lower in the Vault hierarchy. A refusal means that one of the two was
  missing and the issuer tried anyway. No password changed, but someone tried
  to set the password of a user they have no right over. Look for a successful reset (codes 316 and 317) of the same target by
  another issuer afterwards. The code table gives no reason for the refusal,
  so the rule matches the codes alone. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's
  Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the
  Vault audit action code.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/sdk/reset-user-password.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/users-groups-add-users-pa.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId:
      - '314'
      - '315'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A help desk administrator who tries to reset a user in a Location above their own, or a user who opens the reset function without the authorization. Confirm with the issuer which user they meant to reset.
  - Provisioning tools that run with a user that lacks the authorization. Fix the permissions of the tool.
level: medium

False positives

  • A help desk administrator who tries to reset a user in a Location above their own, or a user who opens the reset function without the authorization. Confirm with the issuer which user they meant to reset.
  • Provisioning tools that run with a user that lacks the authorization. Fix the permissions of the tool.

CyberArk Vault User Password Reset

Detects the password of a user of the CyberArk Digital Vault being reset by another user (audit action codes 317, Reset User Password, and 316, Reset User Password Detailed Information). The Reset Users' Passwords authorization lets its holder set a new password for users in the same Location or lower in the Vault hierarchy, which turns a help desk user into a way to take over a Vault administrator at that level. The code table gives the user whose password was reset in Info1 for both codes and additional information in Info2 for code 316. CyberArk does not say whether both codes are written for every reset, so the rule matches both and one reset may raise two alerts. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code; the issuer who performed the reset is in suser.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Vault User Password Reset
id: b1ba0712-f718-4c00-88ad-43fd96a08677
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the password of a user of the CyberArk Digital Vault being reset by
  another user (audit action codes 317, Reset User Password, and 316, Reset
  User Password Detailed Information). The Reset Users' Passwords
  authorization lets its holder set a new password for users in the same
  Location or lower in the Vault hierarchy, which turns a help desk user into
  a way to take over a Vault administrator at that level. The code table
  gives the user whose password was reset in Info1 for both codes and
  additional information in Info2 for code 316. CyberArk does not say whether
  both codes are written for every reset, so the rule matches both and one
  reset may raise two alerts. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device
  Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault
  audit action code; the issuer who performed the reset is in suser.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/sdk/reset-user-password.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/users-groups-add-users-pa.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId:
      - '316'
      - '317'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - The help desk resetting a forgotten password on request. Match the alert with a ticket, and give resets of members of Vault Admins and of users with Vault authorizations a higher priority than the rest.
  - Onboarding and provisioning tools that set a first password through the REST API.
level: medium

False positives

  • The help desk resetting a forgotten password on request. Match the alert with a ticket, and give resets of members of Vault Admins and of users with Vault authorizations a higher priority than the rest.
  • Onboarding and provisioning tools that set a first password through the REST API.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Password reset followed by a logon of the reset user from the issuer's station

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsNeeds a baseline

A help desk reset ends with the owner logging on from their own workstation. A takeover ends with the person who performed the reset logging on as the target. The reset and the logon are two ordinary records. The station they share is what tells the two cases apart.

  1. A password is reset: code 317 (Reset User Password) or 316 (Reset User Password Detailed Information). Keep the issuer (suser), the Station of the audit record and the target user, which the code table gives in Info1.
  2. Within 60 minutes the target logs on: code 7 (Logon) with the target as suser.
  3. Compare the Station of the logon with the Station of the reset. CyberArk's sample CEF translator sends Station as src. The same station on both records means the issuer of the reset is using the target's user.
  4. Where the stations differ, compare the station of the logon with the stations the target logged on from in the last 30 days.

Events3163177

LimitsA help desk agent who resets a password at the user's desk, or users who share one address behind a proxy or a terminal server, share a station without any takeover. The station comparison needs the key your translator writes. An attacker who waits longer than the window, or who uses another station that the target also uses, is not seen. The 60 minutes and the 30 days are starting points.

Triage

  • Read the issuer (suser) and the station of the audit record, and the user whose password was reset, which the code table gives in Info1.
  • Check what the target is. A member of Vault Admins, a user with Vault authorizations or a member of Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts raises the priority.
  • Confirm the reset with the target user, or with the help desk ticket, through a channel other than the Vault.
  • Look for a logon (code 7) of the target after the reset and compare its station with the station of the issuer and with the target's usual one.
  • Look for other changes to the same target by the same issuer, such as an activated Trusted Network Area (code 318), an updated user (codes 182 and 211) or an added SSH public key (code 441).
  • If the reset was not requested, list what the target user did since, above all retrievals (codes 295 and 428) and changes to users and Safe members.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Take the user back together with its owner. Set a new password that the owner must change at the next logon, and enroll the second factor again.
  2. Remove SSH public keys that were added to the target and check its Trusted Network Areas, so that no second way in remains.
  3. Suspend the issuer until the reset is explained and take away its Reset Users' Passwords authorization.
  4. Start a password change for every account the target retrieved or used since the reset, and reverse the changes it made to users, groups and Safe members.
  5. Review the other resets by the same issuer over the last weeks and handle each unexplained one in the same way.

Mitigation

  • Give the Reset Users' Passwords authorization to as few named help desk administrators as possible, and remove it from service and integration users.
  • Place the users of Vault administrators in a Location above the Location of the help desk. The authorization reaches only users in the same Location or lower.
  • Require multi-factor authentication for all users and administrators of the Vault, as CyberArk's security fundamentals do, so that a new password alone does not open the Vault.
  • Give administrators only the Trusted Network Areas they work from, so that a reset password cannot be used from another place.
  • Forward the Vault audit to your SIEM and alert on every reset of a member of Vault Admins or of a user with Vault authorizations.

Frequently asked questions

Who can reset the password of a Vault user?

A user with the Reset Users' Passwords authorization, for users in the same Location or lower in the Vault hierarchy. CyberArk's REST method for the reset also requires the Audit Users authorization and states that the caller must be in the same Vault Location as the target or higher. The built-in Administrator is at the highest level of the hierarchy and can manage users on any level.

How do I keep the help desk from resetting administrator passwords?

Use the Vault hierarchy. The authorization only reaches users in the same Location or lower, so users of Vault administrators that are placed in a Location above the help desk's are out of its reach. Check where your administrators' users are located, and who holds the authorization at that level or above.

Why does one reset raise two alerts?

The code table has two codes for a reset: 317, Reset User Password, and 316, Reset User Password Detailed Information, which adds a field with more information. CyberArk does not say whether the Vault writes both for every reset. The rule matches both so that neither version of the record is missed. Group the alerts by target user and time.

Is there a public incident report that describes this path?

No public incident report describes this at the audit event level. The page rests on what CyberArk documents about the Reset Users' Passwords authorization, the REST method and the audit codes for a reset.

References

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