How the attack works
A password reset sets a new password without knowing the old one. It needs the Reset Password extended right on the target, which attackers obtain through delegated helpdesk rights, misconfigured ACLs or nested group membership. Resetting a privileged account's password is a direct takeover of that account. Resetting krbtgt is also part of the legitimate Golden Ticket recovery procedure, so it should be planned and expected.
Every reset is logged on the domain controller in event 4724 with the account that performed it and the target's SID. Well-known relative identifiers identify the built-in accounts even when they are renamed: -500 is the Administrator and -502 is krbtgt. Other Tier 0 accounts (Domain Admins members, break-glass and Tier 0 service accounts) differ per environment and have to be added by the defender.
What an attacker needs
- The Reset Password extended right, or equivalent control such as GenericAll, on the target account, directly or through a group.
Impact
The attacker can sign in as the privileged account straight away. For the built-in Administrator or another Domain Admin this is full domain control, and the legitimate owner usually notices only when their own password stops working.
Detection rules
Password Reset on the Built-in Administrator or krbtgt Account
Detects a password reset (4724) of an account whose SID ends in -500 (the built-in Administrator) or -502 (krbtgt), matched by SID so that renamed accounts are covered, whoever performs it: a reset made with a computer account, for example as SYSTEM on a compromised server, is matched as well. Add your own Tier 0 accounts to the selection. Requires Audit User Account Management.
title: Password Reset on the Built-in Administrator or krbtgt Account
id: 20d173c1-15f8-468e-9646-95143a96a0a8
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a password reset (4724) of an account whose SID ends in -500 (the
built-in Administrator) or -502 (krbtgt), matched by SID so that renamed
accounts are covered, whoever performs it: a reset made with a computer
account, for example as SYSTEM on a compromised server, is matched as well.
Add your own Tier 0 accounts to the selection. Requires Audit User Account
Management.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4724
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4724
TargetSid|endswith:
- '-500'
- '-502'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Scheduled krbtgt rotation and documented break-glass procedures. Correlate with change records instead of excluding the accounts.
- Resets of local Administrator accounts on member servers and workstations, by administrators or by local password management that runs as SYSTEM there (LAPS, for example), can match where those hosts forward their Security log. Scope the rule to domain controllers if only domain accounts matter, or exclude those hosts by Computer.
level: high
False positives
- Scheduled krbtgt rotation and documented break-glass procedures. Correlate with change records instead of excluding the accounts.
- Resets of local Administrator accounts on member servers and workstations, by administrators or by local password management that runs as SYSTEM there (LAPS, for example), can match where those hosts forward their Security log. Scope the rule to domain controllers if only domain accounts matter, or exclude those hosts by Computer.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Tier 0 account reset by an account outside Tier 0, then signing in from a new address
The rule covers the two built-in accounts. The other Tier 0 accounts differ per environment, and a reset of one of them is a takeover when the subject is not a Tier 0 administrator. The attacker then signs in with the new password, usually from a host the account has never used. A reset of a watched account by an outside subject, followed by the account's first ticket request from a new address, ties the two steps together.
- Take event 4724 (an attempt was made to reset an account's password) whose
TargetSidis on your Tier 0 watchlist: the members of the protected groups, break-glass accounts and Tier 0 service accounts. - Keep the resets whose
SubjectUserSidis not one of your Tier 0 administrators. - Within 24 hours, a starting value, look for event 4768 (a TGT was requested) with the target account in
TargetUserNameand anIpAddressfrom which that account requested no TGT in the previous 30 days. - Report the reset with the subject, the target and the new address, and list what the target did from that address.
Events47244768
LimitsHelpdesk or identity management tools that are allowed to reset some privileged accounts need to be on the list of subjects. A first sign-in from a new workstation after a legitimate reset looks the same. The look-back and the 24 hours are starting points, and 4768 needs Audit Kerberos Authentication Service on every domain controller.
Triage
- Confirm whether SubjectUserName is a Tier 0 administrator and whether a change, such as a planned krbtgt rotation, was scheduled.
- Extend the rule with your own privileged accounts by adding their SIDs or names to the selection, or join the event with a watchlist of Domain Admins members, Tier 0 service accounts and break-glass accounts.
- Check what the target account did right after the reset (4624 and 4768 from new source addresses) and whether the same subject reset other accounts.
- If not explained, reset the password again from a trusted administrative account, remove the subject's rights and review the ACL path that allowed the reset.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- End the sessions of the target account and disable the account that performed the reset. The attacker knows the new password, so every logon of the target since the reset is theirs.
- Reset the password of the target again from a Tier 0 administrator account on a trusted workstation and hand the account back to its owner. If the target was krbtgt and the reset was not planned, complete the documented two-step reset procedure.
- Remove the right that made the reset possible. Find the access control entry or group membership behind it and check the AdminSDHolder template for the same entry, because SDProp applies that template to protected accounts.
- Review what the target account did between the reset and the containment, such as new accounts, group and policy changes and logons to domain controllers, and undo it.
- Repeat these steps for every other account the same subject reset.
Mitigation
- Review who holds Reset Password, GenericAll, WriteDACL or WriteOwner on privileged accounts and on the AdminSDHolder template, and remove every delegation that is not Tier 0.
- Keep privileged accounts in protected groups so that SDProp enforces the AdminSDHolder ACL, and do not delegate helpdesk rights over OUs that contain them.
- Require a change record for krbtgt resets and follow the documented two-step reset procedure.
Frequently asked questions
Is a krbtgt password reset always a bad sign?
No. Resetting krbtgt is part of the legitimate Golden Ticket recovery procedure, so it should be planned and expected. A krbtgt reset without a change record, or one made by an account outside Tier 0, needs an immediate explanation.
Does this rule cover the members of Domain Admins?
Not out of the box. It matches the well-known relative identifiers 500 (the built-in Administrator) and 502 (krbtgt). Other Tier 0 accounts differ per environment. Add their SIDs or names to the selection, or join event 4724 with a watchlist of Domain Admins members, Tier 0 service accounts and break-glass accounts.
Why does the rule match on the end of the SID and not on the account name?
The built-in Administrator and krbtgt keep their relative identifiers when they are renamed. A match on -500 and -502 at the end of the target SID therefore still works after a rename, while a match on the name would not.
Why does the rule fire for servers and workstations that are not domain controllers?
Every computer has a local Administrator account whose SID also ends in -500. If member servers and workstations forward their Security log, resets of that account by administrators or by local password management such as LAPS match as well. Scope the rule to domain controllers if only domain accounts matter, or exclude those hosts.