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Delegation User Right Assigned (SeEnableDelegationPrivilege) detection rules

The user right that lets an account mark users and computers as trusted for delegation is given to a new principal on a domain controller. Its holder can set up delegation that leads to domain compromise. Detected as event 4704.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
High
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
Edit rights on a Group Policy Object that applies to domain controllers, or administrator rights on a domain controller.
Impact
The holder can mark any account it can write to as trusted for delegation, which opens a short path to the identities of domain administrators, and the right survives password resets.
Response
Remove the right in the policy that assigns it, disable the account that received it, and clear Trusted for Delegation on every account the holder configured.
Mitigation
Keep the right with the built-in Administrators group only, and limit who can edit or link Group Policy Objects that apply to domain controllers to Tier 0 administrators.
Event ID
4704

How the attack works

Kerberos delegation lets a service act on behalf of the users who connect to it. A service that is trusted for delegation can impersonate those users to other services, so Active Directory does not let every account that can write to a user or computer object switch it on. Setting Trusted for Delegation on an account also takes the user right Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation (SeEnableDelegationPrivilege) on the domain controller that processes the change. By default only the built-in Administrators group holds that right on domain controllers.

The right is assigned through the user rights policy that domain controllers apply, normally a Group Policy Object linked to the Domain Controllers organizational unit. An attacker who can edit such a policy, or who already administers a domain controller, can give the right to an account they control. That account does not need to be in any administrative group. If it also has write access to the account control flags of a user or computer object, it can turn that object into a delegation-trusted service and use it to collect the identities of privileged users who authenticate to it. Because the account holds no group membership that reviews look for, the assignment is also a quiet way to keep a path back to domain control.

When the policy is applied, each domain controller records the change to its local security policy in event 4704, one event per account, with the SID of the account and the list of rights it received. The event is written under the SYSTEM account of the domain controller, which applies the policy, so it does not name the person who edited the policy. That person is found in the change to the Group Policy Object.

What an attacker needs

  • The ability to change the user rights assignment that domain controllers apply. That is edit rights on a Group Policy Object linked to the Domain Controllers organizational unit (or to the domain or a site that holds domain controllers), or administrator rights on a domain controller.
  • To profit from the right, write access to the account control flags of at least one user or computer object.

Impact

The holder can mark any account it can write to as trusted for delegation, including unconstrained delegation, where the service receives a reusable ticket-granting ticket from the users and computers that authenticate to it. From there the path to the identities of domain administrators and domain controllers is short. The right survives password resets and clean-ups of group memberships, because it is stored in the security policy of the domain controllers and not on the account.

Detection rules

User Right to Enable Delegation Assigned to an Account

Detects event 4704 (a user right was assigned) on a domain controller where the list of assigned rights contains SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, the right to mark user and computer accounts as trusted for delegation. On domain controllers only the built-in Administrators group (S-1-5-32-544) holds it by default, and that default assignment is excluded. The event is written when the domain controller applies the changed policy, under its SYSTEM account, so the subject is the domain controller and not the person who edited the policy. Requires the audit subcategory Audit Authorization Policy Change on domain controllers.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: User Right to Enable Delegation Assigned to an Account
id: a6de6ef5-b4d1-4c89-9311-2fadd0e50202
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 4704 (a user right was assigned) on a domain controller where
  the list of assigned rights contains SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, the right
  to mark user and computer accounts as trusted for delegation. On domain
  controllers only the built-in Administrators group (S-1-5-32-544) holds it by
  default, and that default assignment is excluded. The event is written when
  the domain controller applies the changed policy, under its SYSTEM account,
  so the subject is the domain controller and not the person who edited the
  policy. Requires the audit subcategory Audit Authorization Policy Change on
  domain controllers.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4704
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4704
    PrivilegeList|contains: SeEnableDelegationPrivilege
  filter_builtin_administrators:
    TargetSid: 'S-1-5-32-544'
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - A planned assignment of the right to an identity management or provisioning service account. Confirm the change record and add a filter block with the TargetSid of that account.
  - A policy that assigns the right to an administrative group other than the built-in Administrators. The event then appears on every domain controller when the policy is first applied and when a new domain controller is promoted. Add the SID of that group as a filter block.
level: high

False positives

  • A planned assignment of the right to an identity management or provisioning service account. Confirm the change record and add a filter block with the TargetSid of that account.
  • A policy that assigns the right to an administrative group other than the built-in Administrators. The event then appears on every domain controller when the policy is first applied and when a new domain controller is promoted. Add the SID of that group as a filter block.

Triage

  • Resolve the SID in the Target Account field. A principal other than the built-in Administrators group needs a documented reason.
  • Find out how the right arrived. Look for a change to a Group Policy Object that applies to domain controllers shortly before the event (5136 on the policy object, or a new version of the policy in SYSVOL), and for who made it.
  • Check whether the same assignment appears on every domain controller. An assignment on a single domain controller points to a local change on that machine.
  • Look for use of the right. Search events 4738 and 4742 in which Trusted For Delegation or Trusted To Authenticate For Delegation was enabled by the account after the assignment.
  • If the assignment is not explained, remove the right, undo the delegation settings the account created, and treat the editor of the policy as compromised.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Remove the right in the policy that assigns it, not only on one domain controller, and disable the account that received it. A local removal is undone at the next policy refresh while the policy still grants the right.
  2. Disable the account that edited the policy and remove its edit rights on Group Policy Objects that apply to domain controllers. Review the same policy for other changes made in that edit.
  3. Clear Trusted for Delegation on every account the holder configured. Where unconstrained delegation was set, treat that host as compromised, because it received reusable tickets from the users and computers that authenticated to it.
  4. Reset the credentials of privileged accounts that authenticated to such a host while the setting was active, and treat a domain controller that did so as exposed.
  5. After the next policy refresh, confirm on every domain controller that only the built-in Administrators group holds the right.

Mitigation

  • Keep the right with the built-in Administrators group only, as in the default. Define it explicitly in the policy that applies to domain controllers, so that a local change on one domain controller is overwritten at the next policy refresh.
  • Limit who can edit or link Group Policy Objects that apply to domain controllers to Tier 0 administrators, and review the delegation on those objects and on the Domain Controllers organizational unit.
  • Do not assign the right on member servers and workstations. Microsoft notes that it has no meaning there.
  • Mark privileged accounts as sensitive (Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated) or add them to Protected Users, so that their credentials are not delegated even where delegation has been configured.
  • Enable the audit subcategory Audit Authorization Policy Change on domain controllers, so that event 4704 is written.

Frequently asked questions

Why does event 4704 name the domain controller and not the person who assigned the right?

The event is written when the domain controller applies the changed policy, and it does that under its own SYSTEM account. The person who made the change edited a Group Policy Object. Look for the change to that object shortly before the event, as event 5136 on the policy object or as a new version of the policy in SYSVOL.

Does the right alone let an account set up delegation?

No. The holder also needs write access to the account control flags of a user or computer object. With both, it can mark that object as trusted for delegation, including unconstrained delegation. When the right appears on an unexpected account, check which accounts that account can write to.

Why does the same alert arrive from every domain controller at once?

The right is assigned through a policy that all domain controllers apply, and each one records its own event 4704 when it applies the change. That is the normal picture for a policy change. An assignment that appears on a single domain controller points to a local change on that machine.

Would a review of privileged group memberships find this?

No. The right is stored in the security policy of the domain controllers, not on the account, and its holder does not need to be in any administrative group. It also survives password resets and clean-ups of group memberships. Event 4704, or a review of the user rights assignment on domain controllers, is what reveals it.

References

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