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Safe Member Added or Permissions Changed in Idira (formerly CyberArk) detection rules

An attacker with Manage Safe Members adds a user or group to a Safe, or widens an existing member's permissions, to reach the privileged accounts stored in it.

Platform
Idira (formerly CyberArk)
Severity
High
Log source
Idira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
A Vault user with the Manage Safe Members permission on the target Safe, who can only grant the permissions it holds itself.
Impact
The accounts in the Safe, as passwords or SSH keys with Retrieve accounts or as sessions with Use accounts, which for a Safe of Tier 0 accounts is control of those systems.
Response
Remove the member or set its permissions back, and suspend the Vault user that made the change until it is explained.
Mitigation
Give Manage Safe Members on Tier 0 Safes to a small, named set of Safe managers, and keep dual control there so that a new member still needs a second person.
Vault event codes
2782793233

How the attack works

Access to a privileged account in CyberArk is decided by the Safe it is stored in. Safe members hold permissions such as Use accounts (connect through Privileged Session Manager without seeing the password), Retrieve accounts (view and copy the value) and Manage Safe Members, which lets its holder add members, remove them and set their permissions. The Vault's audit trail still uses the older term owner for a Safe member.

An attacker who holds Manage Safe Members on a Safe, or who has taken over an account that does, can add their own user or a group they belong to, or raise an existing membership to Retrieve accounts and Access Safe without confirmation. The change is quiet, it survives password rotation of the accounts in the Safe, and on a Safe that holds domain, cloud or hypervisor administrator accounts it is a direct route to those systems. A second rule reads codes 278 and 279 (Add Rule, Delete Rule), the Object Level Access rules that allow or deny one user permissions on a single password or file in a Safe with Object Level Access Control. Such a rule changes what a member can retrieve or use while the Safe's member list stays the same.

What must be collected. The rule reads the Vault's audit records forwarded by syslog in CEF format (SIEM integration, configured in DBParm.ini). The CEF header's Device Event Class ID carries the Vault audit action code: 32 is Add Owner and 33 is Update Owner. The record names the Safe and the member; which CEF key carries them depends on the translator file in use, so the rule does not filter on them. SyslogMessageCodeFilter must not exclude these codes.

What an attacker needs

  • A Vault user with the Manage Safe Members permission on the target Safe. A member can only grant the permissions it holds itself.

Impact

The accounts in the Safe: their passwords or SSH keys with Retrieve accounts, or sessions as them with Use accounts. For a Safe that holds Tier 0 accounts of other systems, that is control of those systems.

Detection rules

CyberArk Object Level Access Rule Added or Deleted

Detects an Object Level Access rule being added or deleted in the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action codes 278, Add Rule, and 279, Delete Rule). In a Safe with Object Level Access Control, a rule allows or denies one user permissions on a single password, file or folder, regardless of the user's Safe level permissions. An added Allow rule or a deleted Deny rule lets a Safe member retrieve or use an account the Safe's member list does not show as available to that member. The code table names the object (Info1) and the user (Info2) and does not say whether the rule allows or denies. CyberArk does not state whether the Vault also writes these codes when it applies the members' permissions to a new object, so expect to tune the rule in Safes that use the feature. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Object Level Access Rule Added or Deleted
id: 02a6656d-7014-4fa9-a252-3b30e1723acc
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an Object Level Access rule being added or deleted in the CyberArk
  Digital Vault (audit action codes 278, Add Rule, and 279, Delete Rule). In a
  Safe with Object Level Access Control, a rule allows or denies one user
  permissions on a single password, file or folder, regardless of the user's
  Safe level permissions. An added Allow rule or a deleted Deny rule lets a
  Safe member retrieve or use an account the Safe's member list does not show
  as available to that member. The code table names the object (Info1) and
  the user (Info2) and does not say whether the rule allows or denies.
  CyberArk does not state whether the Vault also writes these codes when it
  applies the members' permissions to a new object, so expect to tune the
  rule in Safes that use the feature. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's
  Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the
  Vault audit action code.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/safes-object-level-access-control.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pacli/folder-and-file-functions.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId:
      - '278'
      - '279'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Safe managers who give a vendor or technician access to one account in a Safe that uses Object Level Access Control. Confirm the object and the user with the Safe's owner.
  - Rules that only narrow access, which use the same codes. Read the permissions of the object to see the direction.
level: medium

False positives

  • Safe managers who give a vendor or technician access to one account in a Safe that uses Object Level Access Control. Confirm the object and the user with the Safe's owner.
  • Rules that only narrow access, which use the same codes. Read the permissions of the object to see the direction.

CyberArk Safe Member Added or Updated

Detects a member being added to a Safe, or a member's permissions being updated, in the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action codes 32, Add Owner, and 33, Update Owner; the audit trail calls a Safe member an owner). The Safe and the member are named in the audit record; prioritise Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Safe Member Added or Updated
id: fb7c3b70-0248-4b5b-8500-9762df7f2e07
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a member being added to a Safe, or a member's permissions being
  updated, in the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action codes 32, Add Owner,
  and 33, Update Owner; the audit trail calls a Safe member an owner). The
  Safe and the member are named in the audit record; prioritise Safes that
  hold Tier 0 accounts. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event
  Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit
  action code.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/safes-add-a-safe-member.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId:
      - '32'
      - '33'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Safe creation, which adds the creator, the predefined groups and the gateway group within seconds; expect a burst after each new Safe.
  - Routine onboarding by Safe managers; narrow the alert in your SIEM to the Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts once you know which field of your translator carries the Safe name.
level: medium

False positives

  • Safe creation, which adds the creator, the predefined groups and the gateway group within seconds; expect a burst after each new Safe.
  • Routine onboarding by Safe managers; narrow the alert in your SIEM to the Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts once you know which field of your translator carries the Safe name.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Member added to a Safe, retrieves from it, and is removed again shortly after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A membership that exists only for a few hours does not show in the next Entitlement report. An attacker who holds Manage Safe Members can add a user they control, take the passwords and remove the member again. An Add Owner and a Remove Owner for the same member and Safe, with retrievals by that member between them, is that pattern.

  1. The Vault records code 32 (Add Owner) or 33 (Update Owner). Keep the issuer (suser), the Safe field of the audit record and the member's user name, which the code table gives in Info1.
  2. The member then retrieves from the same Safe: code 295 (Retrieve password) or 428 (Retrieve SSH Key) with the member as suser.
  3. Within 24 hours of the first record the Vault records code 273 (Remove Owner) for the same Safe, with the same user name in Info1.
  4. Compare the issuer of the removal with the issuer of the addition, and check both against an access request.

Events3233295428273

LimitsTemporary access granted through a request, for a vendor or during an incident, produces the same records, so compare with the requests. When the member is a group, the retrievals come from its members and the join needs the group's membership. The Safe and member fields reach the SIEM under keys that depend on the translator file. The 24 hours are a starting point.

Triage

  • Read the Safe and the member in the audit record and decide whether the Safe holds Tier 0 accounts.
  • Identify the issuer (suser) and confirm the request with the Safe's owner through a separate channel.
  • Read the member's permissions in the Safe (Members tab), looking for Retrieve accounts, Manage Safe Members and Access Safe without confirmation.
  • If it was not approved, remove the member, look for retrievals and sessions by that member since the change, and rotate the accounts it could reach.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Remove the member or set its permissions back. If the member is a group, also remove the accounts that were added to that group and check which other Safes the group belongs to.
  2. Suspend the Vault user that made the change until it is explained, and take away its Manage Safe Members permission on the Safe.
  3. Include the issuer in the review of retrievals and sessions. A member can only grant the permissions it holds itself, so the issuer could reach the same accounts.
  4. Start a password change for the accounts in the Safe that either identity retrieved or used, and review activity on those target systems since the change.
  5. Run the Entitlement report for the member and for the issuer to find other Safes changed in the same way, and confirm the Safe's member list with its owner.

Mitigation

  • Give Manage Safe Members on Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts to a small, named set of Safe managers, not to the people who use the accounts and not to Vault administrators by default.
  • Grant Safe access through directory groups whose membership is itself controlled, and set expiry dates on individual memberships.
  • Keep dual control on Tier 0 Safes so that a new member still needs a second person to release a password, and do not grant Access Safe without confirmation.
  • Review Safe members on a schedule with the Entitlement report, and alert on changes to sensitive Safes.

Frequently asked questions

Why does the audit record say Add Owner when a Safe member was added?

The Vault's audit trail still uses the older term owner for a Safe member. Action code 32 is Add Owner and code 33 is Update Owner, and both describe Safe members and their permissions.

Why does the rule not filter on the Safe name?

The record names the Safe and the member, but which CEF key carries them depends on the translator file in use. The rule therefore matches only the action codes. Once you know which field of your translator holds the Safe name, narrow the alert in your SIEM to the Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts.

Does rotating the passwords in the Safe remove the attacker's access?

No. The access comes from the membership, not from a password that was copied once. The change survives password rotation of the accounts in the Safe, because a member with Retrieve accounts can read the new value. Remove the member or its permissions first, then rotate the accounts it could reach.

Why do many alerts arrive seconds after a new Safe is created?

Safe creation adds the creator, the predefined groups and the gateway group within seconds, and each addition is an Add Owner record. Expect a burst after every new Safe. Routine onboarding by Safe managers produces the same records at a slower pace.

References

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