How the attack works
The PASSWD_NOTREQD bit of userAccountControl ("Password not required") exempts an account from the password policy, so its password can be set to an empty string even where long passwords are enforced. The flag does not blank the password by itself, but it removes the control that would stop a weak or empty password from being set later.
Some legacy provisioning tools and migrations set the flag. Attackers set it to keep a dormant account they can reactivate with no password, or to give an account they can reset a trivially guessable credential. When the flag is enabled, the domain controller logs event 4738 (users) or 4742 (computers) with %%2082 ("'Password Not Required' - Enabled") in UserAccountControl.
What an attacker needs
- Write access to the account's userAccountControl attribute, for example through Account Operators membership, delegated helpdesk rights or control of the object.
Impact
The account can be given an empty or trivial password that bypasses policy, which enables easy takeover and persistence that survives later password policy changes.
Detection rules
Password Not Required Enabled on an Account
Detects a user or computer account change (4738, 4742) whose User Account Control changes include "'Password Not Required' - Enabled" (%%2082). The account is then exempt from the password policy and can be given an empty password. Account creation (4720) is not covered because newly created accounts routinely carry the flag until a password is set, as Microsoft's 4720 example shows. Requires Audit User Account Management and Audit Computer Account Management.
title: Password Not Required Enabled on an Account
id: cf2c6a5c-c1c3-4ae5-b9af-6cec9a5fd45e
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a user or computer account change (4738, 4742) whose User Account
Control changes include "'Password Not Required' - Enabled" (%%2082). The
account is then exempt from the password policy and can be given an empty
password. Account creation (4720) is not covered because newly created
accounts routinely carry the flag until a password is set, as Microsoft's
4720 example shows.
Requires Audit User Account Management and Audit Computer Account Management.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4742
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4738
- 4742
UserAccountControl|contains: '%%2082'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legacy provisioning tools or migration utilities that set the flag. Fix the tool where possible, or exclude its account by SubjectUserName.
level: medium
False positives
- Legacy provisioning tools or migration utilities that set the flag. Fix the tool where possible, or exclude its account by SubjectUserName.
Triage
- Identify who changed the account (SubjectUserName) and whether the change came from a known provisioning tool or migration.
- Check the account's password age and recent logons; a password reset (4724) or logon right after the change is a strong indicator of abuse.
- If not explained, clear the flag, reset the password and review the subject's rights.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Set a strong password on the affected account before anything else, or disable it if nobody owns it. While the flag is on, the account may hold an empty password.
- Clear the Password Not Required flag, so that the password policy applies to the account again.
- Reset the credentials of the account that set the flag and take away its write access to userAccountControl until it is clear how the account was used.
- Review the logons of the affected account since the change and the resources it reached, and undo what was done in those sessions.
- Search the domain for other accounts that received the flag from the same subject or in the same period, and treat them the same way.
Mitigation
- Clear PASSWD_NOTREQD from all users and computers that do not have a documented dependency, and set strong passwords on them.
- Restrict who can write userAccountControl and who can reset passwords.
- Audit regularly for accounts with the flag and alert on new occurrences.
Frequently asked questions
Does the Password Not Required flag mean that the account has no password?
No. The flag only exempts the account from the password policy, so that an empty or trivial password can be set on it later. The password the account already has stays as it is. This is why a password reset or a logon right after the flag change is the stronger indicator of abuse.
Why does the rule ignore accounts that are created with the flag?
Newly created accounts routinely carry the flag until a password is set, as Microsoft's example for event 4720 shows. Alerting on creation would report normal provisioning. The rule therefore matches changes to existing user and computer accounts (4738 and 4742) in which the flag is turned on.
What sets this flag without bad intent?
Legacy provisioning tools and migration utilities. Identify the tool by the account in SubjectUserName and fix it where possible, or exclude that account. The flag should still be cleared from the accounts it touched, because it is an exposure whatever set it.
What does an attacker gain from the flag on an account they can already change?
An easy way back. An account with the flag can be given an empty or trivially guessable password that the policy would otherwise reject, and it keeps that exemption through later changes of the password policy. A dormant account prepared this way can be reactivated later without a password.