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Password Reset by the Entra Connect Connector Account detection rules

Password writeback lets a reset made in Microsoft Entra ID set the password of an on-premises account. A cloud role that resets passwords, or control of the sync server, becomes control of directory accounts.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
High
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1098Account Manipulation
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
An Entra role that can reset the password of a synchronized user with password writeback enabled, or control of the Microsoft Entra Connect server.
Impact
The attacker sets a password of their choice on an on-premises account and signs in as that account, while the directory records an ordinary reset by a service account.
Response
Reset the target's password again through a trusted path, and disable the cloud account that initiated the reset until it has been investigated.
Mitigation
Keep privileged on-premises accounts out of the scope of synchronization, and limit the connector account's Reset password permission to the units that need it.
Event ID
4724

How the attack works

Microsoft Entra Connect reads and writes Active Directory with an account called the AD DS Connector account. An installation with express settings creates it in the Users container of the forest root domain with a name that starts with MSOL_, and gives it, among other permissions, Reset password on user objects as preparation for password writeback. With writeback enabled, a password that is reset in the cloud is set on the on-premises account as well. Microsoft documents this for self-service password reset and for a reset by an administrator in the Microsoft Entra admin center or through the Microsoft Graph API.

This makes the connector account a bridge from the cloud into the directory. An attacker who holds an Entra role that may reset passwords picks a synchronized user, resets the password in the cloud, and then signs in on-premises with the new password. An attacker who controls the sync server can use the connector account directly. In both cases the domain controller sees the same thing: event 4724, an attempt to reset an account's password, with the connector account as the subject. The cloud identity that asked for the reset appears only in the Entra audit log.

Microsoft states that the account that handles writeback cannot change the passwords of users in protected groups, so Domain Admins and similar accounts are out of reach in a default setup. Service accounts, application owners and administrators of single systems usually are not in a protected group. No public incident report describes this path at the level of the audit event, and the page is written from Microsoft's description of the feature.

What an attacker needs

  • An Entra role that can reset the password of a synchronized user, with password writeback enabled, or control of the Microsoft Entra Connect server and through it the connector account.
  • A target account that is in the scope of synchronization and on which the connector account holds Reset password. Members of protected groups are excluded unless the permission was also applied to AdminSDHolder.

Impact

The attacker sets a password of their choice on an on-premises account and signs in as that account. The legitimate owner is locked out until the next reset, which is often the first sign. Because the reset is made by a service account that resets passwords all day, the change does not stand out in the directory.

Detection rules

Password Reset by the Entra Connect Connector Account

Detects event 4724 (an attempt was made to reset an account's password) in which the subject is an account whose name starts with MSOL_. That is the prefix Microsoft Entra Connect gives the AD DS Connector account in an installation with express settings, and the account holds Reset password on user objects for password writeback. The event therefore marks a reset that reached the directory through the connector account, either because someone reset the password in Microsoft Entra ID or because the account was used directly. Where password writeback is enabled this happens for every self-service and help desk reset, so the level is low and the event should be judged together with the Entra audit log. Where writeback is not used, the connector account has no reason to reset any password and the rule can be raised to high. The target is in TargetUserName and TargetSid. An account with a custom name, or the service account of Microsoft Entra Cloud Sync, is not matched.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Password Reset by the Entra Connect Connector Account
id: fa8f1cfc-3ffd-4ef3-af39-61938a75fcb7
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 4724 (an attempt was made to reset an account's password) in
  which the subject is an account whose name starts with MSOL_. That is the
  prefix Microsoft Entra Connect gives the AD DS Connector account in an
  installation with express settings, and the account holds Reset password on
  user objects for password writeback. The event therefore marks a reset that
  reached the directory through the connector account, either because someone
  reset the password in Microsoft Entra ID or because the account was used
  directly. Where password writeback is enabled this happens for every
  self-service and help desk reset, so the level is low and the event should
  be judged together with the Entra audit log. Where writeback is not used,
  the connector account has no reason to reset any password and the rule can
  be raised to high. The target is in TargetUserName and TargetSid. An account
  with a custom name, or the service account of Microsoft Entra Cloud Sync, is
  not matched.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/reference-connect-accounts-permissions
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-sspr-writeback
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4724
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4724
    SubjectUserName|startswith: 'MSOL_'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Every reset through password writeback, which includes self-service password reset and resets by the help desk in the Microsoft Entra admin center. Use the rule as a record of these resets and compare it with the Entra audit log, or exclude it from alerting where writeback is in daily use.
level: low

False positives

  • Every reset through password writeback, which includes self-service password reset and resets by the help desk in the Microsoft Entra admin center. Use the rule as a record of these resets and compare it with the Entra audit log, or exclude it from alerting where writeback is in daily use.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Connector account reset a password that has no matching reset in the Entra audit log

Detection hypothesisJoins two logs

A reset that came through password writeback always has a cloud side. When the connector account resets a password on a domain controller and the Entra audit log has no reset for that user at that time, the account was not used by the sync service on behalf of the cloud, but by someone who holds its credentials.

  1. A password is reset by the connector account: event 4724 on a domain controller in which SubjectUserName starts with MSOL_ (or is your connector account). Keep TargetUserName and the time.
  2. Search the Entra audit log five minutes around that time for a password reset of the same user: OperationName Reset password (by admin) or Reset password (self-service), with the user in TargetResources.
  3. No cloud event for that user is the finding. Where a cloud event exists, read InitiatedBy and decide whether that identity should reset this account.

Events4724Reset password (by admin)Reset password (self-service)

LimitsThe two logs name the user differently, by logon name on the domain controller and by user principal name in the cloud, so the join needs a mapping between them. Audit log ingestion can lag by several minutes, and the five minutes are a starting point.

Connector account reset the password of an account that writeback should never reach

Detection hypothesisNeeds your own lists

Password writeback acts on users that are synchronized to the cloud. A reset by the connector account of an account outside the scope of synchronization, or of an account you count as privileged, cannot be explained by the feature and points to direct use of the connector account or to a scope that is wider than intended.

  1. Keep two lists of your own: the accounts that are in the scope of synchronization, and the accounts you treat as privileged, including service accounts with wide rights.
  2. Find event 4724 in which SubjectUserName is the connector account.
  3. Compare TargetUserName and TargetSid with both lists. A target that is not synchronized, or that is on the privileged list, is the finding.

Events4724

LimitsBoth lists have to be kept current, and the synchronization scope changes when organizational units are added. Event 4724 is not written when the reset is refused with access denied, so attempts against protected accounts that fail leave no trace here.

Triage

  • Read the account whose password was reset (TargetUserName, TargetSid) and confirm that the subject (SubjectUserName) is the connector account.
  • Find the reset in the Entra audit log at the same time and read who initiated it. A self-service reset names the user, a reset by an administrator names the administrator.
  • Ask the owner of the account whether they reset their password. A reset nobody asked for is the finding.
  • If the Entra audit log shows no reset for that user at that time, the connector account was used outside the sync service. Check the sign-ins to the Microsoft Entra Connect server and the logons of the connector account (event 4624) for a source that is not that server.
  • Look at the first sign-ins of the target account after the reset (events 4768 and 4624) and where they came from.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Reset the password of the target account again through a trusted path and end its sessions.
  2. Disable or restrict the cloud account that initiated the reset and revoke its sessions and role assignments until it has been investigated.
  3. If the connector account was used directly, treat the Microsoft Entra Connect server as compromised. Rebuild it and change the credentials of the connector account, which also holds directory replication permissions.
  4. Review what the target account did between the reset and the containment, including the systems it administers.
  5. Narrow the Reset password permission of the connector account and the scope of synchronization so that the same account cannot be reached again.

Mitigation

  • Keep privileged on-premises accounts out of the scope of synchronization, so that a reset in the cloud cannot reach them.
  • Give the connector account Reset password only on the organizational units that need writeback. Microsoft's Set-ADSyncPasswordWritebackPermissions cmdlet accepts a target object for this. Do not apply the permission to AdminSDHolder.
  • Remove Reset password from the connector account when password writeback is not used.
  • Treat the Microsoft Entra Connect server as a Tier 0 system, as Microsoft requires, and limit who can sign in to it.
  • Limit the Entra roles that can reset passwords to few accounts, activate them on request and require strong authentication for them.

Frequently asked questions

Can password writeback reset the password of a Domain Admin?

Not in a default setup. Microsoft states that the on-premises account that handles writeback cannot change the passwords of users that belong to protected groups. The permission cmdlet has an option that also applies the permission to AdminSDHolder, and where that was used the protection no longer holds.

Why does the event name the connector account and not the person who asked for the reset?

The reset is made in Active Directory by the sync service with the AD DS Connector account, so event 4724 has that account as its subject. The user or administrator who started the reset in the cloud is recorded in the Entra audit log, which is why both logs are needed to judge one reset.

Does the rule work when the connector account has another name?

No. The rule matches the MSOL_ prefix that an installation with express settings gives the account. A custom installation uses an account the organization named, and Microsoft Entra Cloud Sync runs with a group managed service account. Add the name of your account to the rule in those cases.

Is every password reset by the connector account an attack?

No. Where password writeback is enabled, every self-service reset and every reset by the help desk in the Entra admin center produces this event. The rule is a record of resets that came through the bridge, and the hypotheses under Detection logic describe how to find the ones that do not belong.

References

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