How the attack works
Organizations that do not want their users to share with the whole internet can limit external sharing to trusted domains. An administrator adds the domains of partner organizations to an allowlist and then chooses sharing settings that refer to it. Google states that there is one allowlist for the whole account and that Google Drive, Sites, Classroom, Chat, Data Studio and Gemini Notebook use it. A domain on the list must itself use Google Workspace and be domain-verified.
The allowlist is a statement of trust between two organizations, and an attacker who holds an admin account can extend that trust to an organization of their own. Once the attacker's domain is on the list, a file shared with an account at that domain is an allowed share, and where Chat is limited to trusted domains its users can message employees. The change moves no data by itself. It removes the control that would have stopped the next step, whether that step is taken by an account the attacker holds or by an employee who is asked to share.
The Admin audit log records ADD_TRUSTED_DOMAINS, which Google renders as the named domains added to the Trusted Domains list, and REMOVE_TRUSTED_DOMAINS for the opposite. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. The allowlist only matters where sharing is restricted to it. In an organization that lets users share with anyone, adding a domain changes nothing in practice, and the event is a hygiene signal.
What an attacker needs
- An admin account with the Domain Settings privilege, which Google requires for the Allowlisted domains page, or a super admin account.
- A Google Workspace organization of the attacker's own with a domain-verified domain, because only such domains can be allowlisted.
Impact
Accounts at the added domain can be given access to Drive files, and in the other services that use the allowlist, as if they belonged to a partner. Sharing with them is no longer refused, so an account the attacker controls inside the organization can pass files out, and people in the attacker's organization can approach employees in Chat with fewer barriers. The exposure lasts until the domain is removed and the shares made in the meantime are withdrawn.
Detection rules
Domain Added to the Trusted Domains Allowlist in Google Workspace
Detects domains being added to the allowlist of trusted domains of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event ADD_TRUSTED_DOMAINS, rendered as "Domains {DOMAIN_NAME} added to Trusted Domains list"). Organizations that limit external sharing to trusted domains use this one allowlist for Google Drive, Sites, Classroom, Chat, Data Studio and Gemini Notebook. An attacker with admin rights adds the domain of a Google Workspace organization of their own, after which sharing with accounts at that domain is no longer refused. The added domains are in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. Google's message prints them from the parameter DOMAIN_NAME, which its reference otherwise describes as the primary domain name, so confirm on a test change what the parameter holds. The admin is in principalEmail. Removing a domain from the list is a different event (REMOVE_TRUSTED_DOMAINS) and does not match. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Domain Added to the Trusted Domains Allowlist in Google Workspace
id: f642500e-d25b-48f6-a391-c478ab5b9430
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects domains being added to the allowlist of trusted domains of a
Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event
ADD_TRUSTED_DOMAINS, rendered as "Domains {DOMAIN_NAME} added to Trusted
Domains list"). Organizations that limit external sharing to trusted
domains use this one allowlist for Google Drive, Sites, Classroom, Chat,
Data Studio and Gemini Notebook. An attacker with admin rights adds the
domain of a Google Workspace organization of their own, after which
sharing with accounts at that domain is no longer refused. The added
domains are in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. Google's
message prints them from the parameter DOMAIN_NAME, which its reference
otherwise describes as the primary domain name, so confirm on a test
change what the parameter holds. The admin is in principalEmail. Removing
a domain from the list is a different event (REMOVE_TRUSTED_DOMAINS) and
does not match. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity
entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/domains/allow-external-sharing-with-only-trusted-domains
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.addTrustedDomains
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A new partner, customer or supplier whose domain is added so that teams can share files with it. Each addition should have a business owner. Verify the domain with that owner, and in organizations that do not restrict sharing to trusted domains treat the event as a hygiene signal.
level: medium
False positives
- A new partner, customer or supplier whose domain is added so that teams can share files with it. Each addition should have a business owner. Verify the domain with that owner, and in organizations that do not restrict sharing to trusted domains treat the event as a hygiene signal.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Domain added to the allowlist and removed again within days
A partner domain is added for a relationship that lasts. An attacker who needs the allowlist only to move files out adds a domain, shares and removes it again, so that a later review of the list finds nothing. The pair of opposite events for the same domain is the trace.
- A
google.admin.AdminService.addTrustedDomainsentry. Note the domains from the event parameterDOMAIN_NAMEand the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 7 days, a
google.admin.AdminService.removeTrustedDomainsentry that names the same domain. - Review the Drive log events between the two entries for files shared with accounts at that domain.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.addTrustedDomainsgoogle.admin.AdminService.removeTrustedDomains
LimitsAn admin who corrects a typing mistake, or a short project with a partner, produces the same pair. Google's reference describes the parameter as the primary domain name while the message prints the added domains from it, so check on a test change what the parameter holds in your logs. The 7 days are a starting point.
Triage
- Read the added domains in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. Google prints them from the parameter DOMAIN_NAME in the message of the event.
- Find out who owns each domain and which business relationship it belongs to. A domain no team can explain, or one that resembles a real partner, needs an answer.
- Identify the admin who made the change (principalEmail), confirm it with that person through a second channel and check the recent sign-ins of that account.
- Check which sharing settings refer to the allowlist in your organization, to know what the change opened.
- Review the Drive log events after the change for files shared with accounts at the added domain, and review what else the same admin changed, including Drive sharing settings.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the domain from the allowlist of trusted domains.
- Find the files and shared drives that were shared with accounts at that domain after the change, and remove that access.
- Secure the admin account that made the change. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies so that existing sessions end, and review its 2-Step Verification methods and admin roles.
- Identify the internal accounts that shared with the domain. Treat an account that shared in bulk as compromised until its owner explains it.
- Treat the content that was shared as disclosed, and compare the whole allowlist with your record in case more than one domain was added.
Mitigation
- Give the Domain Settings privilege and the Domain Allowlist Management privilege only to the few administrators who need them, and keep super admins few.
- Keep a record of the trusted domains with the business owner of each relationship, and compare the Allowlisted domains page with it regularly.
- Remove domains from the allowlist when the partnership ends, so that the list stays short enough to review.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.
Frequently asked questions
Does adding a trusted domain share any data by itself?
No. The allowlist changes what users are allowed to do. Data leaves only when someone shares a file with an account at the added domain, or invites its users. That is why the response does not end with removing the domain. The shares that were made while it was on the list stay in place until they are removed one by one.
Which domains can be added to the trusted domains allowlist?
Google states that allowlisted domains must use Google Workspace and be domain-verified, that a primary or secondary domain, a domain alias or a subdomain can be added, and that the domain of Google service accounts cannot be used. An attacker therefore needs a Google Workspace organization of their own with a verified domain.
Does the allowlist matter if users may already share with anyone?
Much less. Google describes the allowlist as the way to let users share only with certain organizations, together with sharing settings that refer to it. Where users may share outside the organization without that restriction, an added domain opens nothing new for Drive. Check which of your sharing settings use the allowlist before judging an event.
Is sharing to a Google Group checked against the allowlist?
Google states that allowlist policies are not checked when a document is shared to a group in Google Groups, because the members of a group can be in different domains. A file shared with a group that has external members can therefore reach accounts outside the trusted domains. This is a limit of the control itself and not something the rule sees.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1484.002: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification
- Allow external sharing with only trusted domains
- Administrator privilege definitions (Domains)
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: domain settings (ADD_TRUSTED_DOMAINS, REMOVE_TRUSTED_DOMAINS)