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Federated Domain Backdoor detection rules

An attacker with high privileges federates a domain with an identity provider they control, or changes an existing federation trust, so Microsoft Entra ID accepts tokens they sign for any user of that domain.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Critical
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs, Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detections
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A role that can manage domains and federation settings, such as Global Administrator or Hybrid Identity Administrator, or an application with equivalent permissions.
Impact
Sign-in as any user of the federated domain, including administrators, without their password and with self-asserted MFA, which survives every password reset.
Response
Convert the domain back to managed authentication or restore your own signing certificate, then revoke the sessions of users who signed in while the trust was in place.
Mitigation
Keep the roles that can change domain authentication on a few cloud-only, phishing-resistant, PIM-protected accounts, and alert on every federation change.
Audit activities
Set domain authenticationSet federation settings on domainVerify domainAdd verified domainPromote sub domain to root domain
Risk detection type
tokenIssuerAnomaly

How the attack works

For a federated domain, Microsoft Entra ID does not check passwords itself: it accepts SAML or WS-Federation tokens signed by the identity provider configured on the domain. An attacker who holds a role that can manage domains and federation (Global Administrator, Hybrid Identity Administrator, Domain Name Administrator, External Identity Provider Administrator, Security Administrator) can convert a managed domain to federated, add a new verified domain and federate it, or add their own token-signing certificate to an existing federation configuration.

From then on the attacker signs tokens for any user in the domain, with any claims they choose, including a claim that MFA was performed. The effect matches a Golden SAML attack without stealing the original signing key; APT29 used it in the SolarWinds intrusion. The changes appear in the audit log as Set domain authentication and Set federation settings on domain; new domains appear as Add unverified domain followed by Verify domain. A subdomain inherits the authentication type of its root domain until it is promoted to a root domain, and a rule on this page reads that step as Promote sub domain to root domain.

What an attacker needs

  • A compromised identity with a role that can manage domains and federation settings, or an application with equivalent Microsoft Graph permissions.
  • For a new domain, the ability to publish the DNS verification record for a domain the attacker owns.

Impact

The ability to sign in as any user of the federated domain, including administrators, without their password and with self-asserted MFA. The trust persists until the federation configuration is found and removed, and it survives password resets of every account.

Detection rules

Domain Authentication or Federation Settings Changed

Detects a change to a domain's authentication type (managed or federated) or to its federation settings, such as the issuer URI or token-signing certificate. Microsoft recommends alerting on both activities because a rogue federation trust lets an attacker sign tokens for any user.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Domain Authentication or Federation Settings Changed
id: 8d4bef1b-9077-4c06-969d-4062d65e46a1
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a change to a domain's authentication type (managed or federated) or
  to its federation settings, such as the issuer URI or token-signing
  certificate. Microsoft recommends alerting on both activities because a
  rogue federation trust lets an attacker sign tokens for any user.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-monitor-federation-changes
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484.002
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName:
      - Set domain authentication
      - Set federation settings on domain
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Planned federation changes and token-signing certificate renewals; match each event to a change record and to the identity provider's published metadata.
level: high

False positives

  • Planned federation changes and token-signing certificate renewals; match each event to a change record and to the identity provider's published metadata.

New Domain Added and Verified in the Tenant

Detects a domain being verified or added as verified in Microsoft Entra ID. Adding a domain the attacker controls is the usual first step before federating it with a rogue identity provider.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: New Domain Added and Verified in the Tenant
id: 62d68d4f-df55-45f8-8bba-bccd9c11a084
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a domain being verified or added as verified in Microsoft Entra ID.
  Adding a domain the attacker controls is the usual first step before
  federating it with a rogue identity provider.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1484.002
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName:
      - Verify domain
      - Add verified domain
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - New business domains being onboarded; confirm the domain is owned by the organization and expected.
level: medium

False positives

  • New business domains being onboarded; confirm the domain is owned by the organization and expected.

Subdomain Promoted to a Root Domain

Detects the audit activity "Promote sub domain to root domain" of Core Directory. A subdomain inherits the authentication type of its root domain, so the subdomain of a managed domain cannot be federated on its own. Microsoft documents the way around that. The subdomain is promoted to a root domain through Microsoft Graph, and after that its authentication type can be set independently of the parent. An attacker who wants to federate a name that already belongs to the tenant, without touching the domain the defenders watch, promotes a subdomain first and federates it afterwards. Microsoft documents the promotion as a call to Microsoft Graph, and few tenants ever need it. Microsoft lists the activity name without describing the record, so the rule matches on the name only and is rated low. The step that gives the attacker access is the later change of the authentication type, which another rule on this page reads. The domain is in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Subdomain Promoted to a Root Domain
id: a1618bfe-9e61-4b60-9c49-ae60f8ec182c
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the audit activity "Promote sub domain to root domain" of Core
  Directory. A subdomain inherits the authentication type of its root domain,
  so the subdomain of a managed domain cannot be federated on its own.
  Microsoft documents the way around that. The subdomain is promoted to a
  root domain through Microsoft Graph, and after that its authentication type
  can be set independently of the parent. An attacker who wants to federate a
  name that already belongs to the tenant, without touching the domain the
  defenders watch, promotes a subdomain first and federates it afterwards.
  Microsoft documents the promotion as a call to Microsoft Graph, and few
  tenants ever need it. Microsoft lists the activity name without describing the record,
  so the rule matches on the name only and is rated low. The step that gives
  the attacker access is the later change of the authentication type, which
  another rule on this page reads. The domain is in TargetResources and the
  actor in InitiatedBy.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/domains-verify-custom-subdomain
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1484.002
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Promote sub domain to root domain
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Administrators who separate a subdomain from a federated root domain so that it can use managed authentication, which is the case Microsoft's article describes. Confirm the change with the team that owns the domain.
level: low

False positives

  • Administrators who separate a subdomain from a federated root domain so that it can use managed authentication, which is the case Microsoft's article describes. Confirm the change with the team that owns the domain.

ID Protection Detected a Token Issuer Anomaly

Detects the Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detection "Token issuer anomaly" (riskEventType tokenIssuerAnomaly). Microsoft raises it when the issuer of the SAML token used for a sign-in is potentially compromised, because the claims in the token are unusual or match known attacker patterns. It is the trace that forged federated tokens leave in Microsoft Entra ID, whether they were signed through a federation trust an attacker added or changed, or with a token-signing key stolen from the federation service (Golden SAML). The TokenIssuerType column says whether the issuer was Active Directory Federation Services. The detection is calculated offline and needs Microsoft Entra ID P2. Risk detections reach a SIEM through the UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of Microsoft Entra ID.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID Protection risk detections
title: ID Protection Detected a Token Issuer Anomaly
id: 2e5d22c8-eb80-40f7-a707-63973f08ff69
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detection "Token issuer
  anomaly" (riskEventType tokenIssuerAnomaly). Microsoft raises it when the
  issuer of the SAML token used for a sign-in is potentially compromised,
  because the claims in the token are unusual or match known attacker
  patterns. It is the trace that forged federated tokens leave in Microsoft
  Entra ID, whether they were signed through a federation trust an attacker
  added or changed, or with a token-signing key stolen from the federation
  service (Golden SAML). The TokenIssuerType column says whether the issuer
  was Active Directory Federation Services. The detection is calculated
  offline and needs Microsoft Entra ID P2. Risk detections reach a SIEM
  through the UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of Microsoft Entra ID.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-investigate-risk
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/aaduserriskevents
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-15
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1484.002
  - attack.t1606.002
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: riskdetection
detection:
  selection:
    RiskEventType: tokenIssuerAnomaly
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Changes at your own identity provider that alter the claims it issues, such as a migration or new claim rules. Confirm with the team that runs the federation service before dismissing the detection.
level: high

False positives

  • Changes at your own identity provider that alter the claims it issues, such as a migration or new claim rules. Confirm with the team that runs the federation service before dismissing the detection.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Sign-in with a token from an identity provider you do not run

Detection hypothesisNeeds your own listsNeeds a baseline

For a federated sign-in the sign-in log records which identity provider issued the token. A backdoor federation points a domain to the attacker's provider, so sign-ins of that domain's users start to carry an issuer that none of your federation services uses. A list of your issuers turns every such sign-in into an alert, even when the federation change itself was missed.

  1. Keep a list of the issuer names of your own federation services.
  2. Sign-in log: successful sign-ins (ResultType 0) whose TokenIssuerType is ADFederationServices, with TokenIssuerName, UserPrincipalName and IPAddress.
  3. Alert when TokenIssuerName is not on the list, or appears for the first time in the tenant.
  4. Raise the priority when the user holds a privileged role or the sign-in follows a Set domain authentication or Set federation settings on domain event.

EventsSet domain authenticationSet federation settings on domain

LimitsMicrosoft describes TokenIssuerName only as the name of the identity provider, so record the values your own federation services produce before you build the list. A token forged with the stolen signing key of your own provider carries your issuer and is not found this way. A federation server added on purpose matches until the list is updated.

Triage

  • Identify the domain (TargetResources) and the actor (InitiatedBy); compare the new issuer URI and signing certificate with your known identity provider.
  • Check whether the domain was added or verified recently and whether anyone in the organization owns it.
  • Review sign-ins for the domain's users after the change for tokens issued by an unfamiliar identity provider.
  • If malicious, convert the domain back to managed or remove the rogue federation settings, then revoke sessions for affected users and review the actor's other changes.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Remove the rogue trust at once. Convert the domain back to managed authentication, or restore the issuer URI and token-signing certificate of your own identity provider. Remove a domain that was added only to be federated.
  2. Revoke the sessions of every user of the domain who signed in while the rogue trust was in place, administrators first. The attacker could sign in as any of them.
  3. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that changed the federation settings, and remove its role.
  4. Review what was done in the name of the users the attacker signed in as, and remove the persistence left behind, such as application credentials, role assignments and authentication methods.
  5. Check every federated domain of the tenant against your identity provider, and watch for new federation changes and token issuer anomaly detections.

Mitigation

  • Keep the roles that can change domain authentication on a small number of cloud-only, phishing-resistant, PIM-protected accounts.
  • Prefer managed authentication (password hash sync or pass-through authentication) where federation is no longer required.
  • Review federated domains and their signing certificates and issuer URIs regularly; remove stale or unknown domains.
  • Alert on every federation change and every new verified domain, and verify each against a change record.

Frequently asked questions

Do password resets remove a federation backdoor?

No. For a federated domain Microsoft Entra ID does not check passwords. It accepts tokens signed by the identity provider configured on the domain, and the attacker signs those themselves. The trust survives password resets of every account and lasts until the federation configuration is removed.

How does this differ from Golden SAML with a stolen signing key?

The result is the same, forged tokens for any user of the domain. Here the attacker changes the federation configuration of the tenant, which leaves `Set domain authentication` or `Set federation settings on domain` in the audit log. A key stolen from the federation service changes nothing in the tenant, so there the token issuer anomaly detection of ID Protection is the main trace in Microsoft Entra ID.

What does the token issuer anomaly rule depend on?

The detection needs Microsoft Entra ID P2 and is calculated offline, so it arrives after the sign-in. It reaches a SIEM only when the UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of Microsoft Entra ID is exported. Changes at your own identity provider that alter the claims it issues can raise it too.

Why alert on a new verified domain?

Adding a domain the attacker owns is the usual first step before federating it with their own identity provider. New business domains are onboarded from time to time, so confirm that the organization owns the domain and expected it.

References

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