How the attack works
PingOne can delegate authentication to external identity providers over SAML or OpenID Connect. The connection holds the trust (the provider's issuer, endpoints and verification certificate or client credentials) and the attribute mapping that decides which PingOne user an incoming identity becomes. Users reach an external identity provider through a sign-on policy step, and the Administrator Security setting can make an external identity provider the authentication source for the PingOne admin console itself.
An attacker who can edit this configuration does not need anyone's password. Pointing an existing connection at a provider they control, replacing its verification certificate, adding a new connection, or changing the mapped username or the account linking attribute lets them assert an identity that PingOne accepts. PingOne records the changes as IDENTITY_PROVIDER.CREATED, IDENTITY_PROVIDER.UPDATED and IDP_ATTRIBUTE audit activities. Two further rules read IDENTITY_PROVIDER.DELETED and ACCOUNT.LINKED. A linked account ties one PingOne user to an account at an external identity provider, and the API can create that link without a sign-on by the user, so a link made by anyone but the user deserves a look.
Log source: the rules read PingOne audit activities. Include the Identity Provider and IdP Attribute event types in the PingOne webhook that feeds the SIEM, or poll the Audit Activities API, for every environment.
What an attacker needs
- A PingOne role that can manage external identity providers in the environment, such as Environment Admin.
- For the change to be usable, the identity provider has to be reachable from a sign-on policy or selected in Administrator Security, and the mapped user has to exist or be created at first sign-on.
Impact
Sign-on as chosen PingOne users, and through them to every application that trusts PingOne for those users. When the identity provider is the authentication source of the admin console, the result is administrator access to PingOne. The change persists until the connection is repaired, and survives password and MFA resets of the affected users.
Detection rules
PingOne User Linked to an External Identity Provider Account
Detects a PingOne user being linked to an account at an external identity provider (audit activity ACCOUNT.LINKED). Ping documents two ways a link is made: in an authentication flow after the user has authenticated at the external identity provider, and through the linked accounts API, where the caller names the user, the identity provider and the external account identifier. A link made through the API ties an external account of the caller's choice to one PingOne user without a sign-on by that user. The rule fires on every link, so it is for review: compare the actor (actors.user.name or actors.client.name) with the linked user named in the activity's resources, and act on links made by anyone but the user, above all for administrators.
title: PingOne User Linked to an External Identity Provider Account
id: 7a62e360-7ab5-49ef-9dd8-44f9818df70f
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a PingOne user being linked to an account at an external identity
provider (audit activity ACCOUNT.LINKED). Ping documents two ways a link is
made: in an authentication flow after the user has authenticated at the
external identity provider, and through the linked accounts API, where the
caller names the user, the identity provider and the external account
identifier. A link made through the API ties an external account of the
caller's choice to one PingOne user without a sign-on by that user. The rule
fires on every link, so it is for review: compare the actor
(actors.user.name or actors.client.name) with the linked user named in the
activity's resources, and act on links made by anyone but the user, above
all for administrators.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/users/linked-accounts/index.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type: ACCOUNT.LINKED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Users who sign on through an external identity provider for the first time, which creates the link in the flow. Expect regular volume in environments that use social or partner sign-on.
- Migration and provisioning jobs that create links through the API for many users. Add a filter on actors.client.name for the worker applications that do this, after you have reviewed them.
level: low
False positives
- Users who sign on through an external identity provider for the first time, which creates the link in the flow. Expect regular volume in environments that use social or partner sign-on.
- Migration and provisioning jobs that create links through the API for many users. Add a filter on actors.client.name for the worker applications that do this, after you have reviewed them.
PingOne External Identity Provider Attribute Mapping Changed
Detects a change to the attribute mapping of an external identity provider in PingOne (audit activities IDP_ATTRIBUTE.CREATED, IDP_ATTRIBUTE.UPDATED and IDP_ATTRIBUTE.DELETED). The mapping decides which PingOne user an incoming identity becomes and which attributes it brings.
title: PingOne External Identity Provider Attribute Mapping Changed
id: 3e3793a5-e188-47cc-9aea-3fcee6b3d2e9
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to the attribute mapping of an external identity provider
in PingOne (audit activities IDP_ATTRIBUTE.CREATED, IDP_ATTRIBUTE.UPDATED
and IDP_ATTRIBUTE.DELETED). The mapping decides which PingOne user an
incoming identity becomes and which attributes it brings.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type:
- IDP_ATTRIBUTE.CREATED
- IDP_ATTRIBUTE.UPDATED
- IDP_ATTRIBUTE.DELETED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Attribute mapping work during the setup of a new identity provider, which also creates IDENTITY_PROVIDER.CREATED activities from the same actor.
level: medium
False positives
- Attribute mapping work during the setup of a new identity provider, which also creates IDENTITY_PROVIDER.CREATED activities from the same actor.
PingOne External Identity Provider Created or Updated
Detects an external identity provider being added or changed in PingOne (audit activities IDENTITY_PROVIDER.CREATED, IDENTITY_PROVIDER.UPDATED and the account linking attribute update). A changed issuer, endpoint or verification certificate changes whose assertions PingOne accepts.
title: PingOne External Identity Provider Created or Updated
id: 09aee008-be22-4f59-872e-5fd4a5a600b4
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an external identity provider being added or changed in PingOne
(audit activities IDENTITY_PROVIDER.CREATED, IDENTITY_PROVIDER.UPDATED and
the account linking attribute update). A changed issuer, endpoint or
verification certificate changes whose assertions PingOne accepts.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type:
- IDENTITY_PROVIDER.CREATED
- IDENTITY_PROVIDER.UPDATED
- IDENTITY_PROVIDER.EXTERNAL_IDP_ACCOUNT_LINKING_ATTRIBUTE_UPDATED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned onboarding of a partner or social identity provider, and certificate renewal on an existing connection. Confirm with the change record.
level: high
False positives
- Planned onboarding of a partner or social identity provider, and certificate renewal on an existing connection. Confirm with the change record.
PingOne External Identity Provider Deleted
Detects an external identity provider being deleted in PingOne (audit activity IDENTITY_PROVIDER.DELETED). Users who sign on through that provider can no longer do so, and Ping warns that a misconfigured external identity provider can lock administrators out when it is the authentication source of the admin console. A deletion is also what remains when someone removes a provider that was added for an attack. The provider is named in the activity's resources, the actor in actors.user.name or actors.client.name.
title: PingOne External Identity Provider Deleted
id: b8ddf431-fb51-4b96-ac95-233a230c0746
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an external identity provider being deleted in PingOne (audit
activity IDENTITY_PROVIDER.DELETED). Users who sign on through that provider
can no longer do so, and Ping warns that a misconfigured external identity
provider can lock administrators out when it is the authentication source of
the admin console. A deletion is also what remains when someone removes a
provider that was added for an attack. The provider is named in the
activity's resources, the actor in actors.user.name or actors.client.name.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/administrator-security/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type: IDENTITY_PROVIDER.DELETED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned retirement of a partner or social identity provider, and removal of a test connection. Confirm with the change record, and check for an IDENTITY_PROVIDER.CREATED activity for the same provider in the days before.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned retirement of a partner or social identity provider, and removal of a test connection. Confirm with the change record, and check for an IDENTITY_PROVIDER.CREATED activity for the same provider in the days before.
Triage
- Identify the actor (actors.user.name or actors.client.name) and the identity provider named in the activity, and check for an approved change.
- Compare the connection's issuer, endpoints, verification certificate and attribute mapping with the last reviewed state.
- Check whether the identity provider is the one selected in Settings, Administrator Security, or is used in sign-on policies of sensitive applications.
- Review sign-ons through the identity provider since the change, and role assignments or credential changes made by users who signed on that way.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- If the identity provider is selected in Administrator Security, set the authentication source of the admin console back to the reviewed one before anything else.
- Remove the identity provider that was added, or restore the issuer, endpoints, verification certificate and attribute mapping of the changed one from your reviewed inventory.
- End the sessions of every user who signed on through the identity provider since the change, and remove the accounts and account links that were created at first sign-on through it.
- Reverse the role assignments and credential changes those users made.
- Remove the administrator role of the account that changed the connection, reset its credentials and end its sessions.
- Compare every external identity provider, and the sign-on policies that use them, with the inventory in all environments.
Mitigation
- Restrict Environment Admin and custom roles that can edit identity providers, and review them regularly.
- Use the PingOne and External IdP authentication source for the admin console when an external identity provider is needed, so that PingOne still asks for a second factor.
- Keep a reviewed inventory of external identity providers with their issuer, certificate fingerprint and attribute mapping, and compare it after every change event.
- Alert on identity provider and attribute mapping changes in every environment.
Frequently asked questions
Do password and MFA resets of the affected users close this access?
No. The attacker does not need anyone's password. PingOne accepts the identity that the external provider asserts, and the attribute mapping decides which PingOne user it becomes. The change persists until the connection is repaired and survives password and MFA resets of the affected users.
When does a changed identity provider reach the PingOne admin console?
When the Administrator Security setting makes that external identity provider the authentication source for the PingOne admin console. A sign-on it asserts is then administrator access to PingOne. With the PingOne and External IdP authentication source, PingOne still asks for a second factor.
Is a newly added identity provider usable straight away?
Not by itself. Users reach an external identity provider through a sign-on policy step, or through Administrator Security for the admin console, and the mapped user has to exist or be created at first sign-on. Check whether a sign-on policy refers to the new connection, because that is what makes it usable.
Why is there a separate rule for attribute mapping changes?
The attribute mapping decides which PingOne user an incoming identity becomes. Changing the mapped username or the account linking attribute redirects sign-ons to another user without touching the trust itself. During the setup of a new identity provider the same actor creates both kinds of activity, which is the usual benign cause.