1. Resources
  2. Detection rules
  3. Signing Key or Certificate Created or Changed in PingOne

Signing Key or Certificate Created or Changed in PingOne detection rules

An attacker with PingOne administrator rights creates, uploads or replaces a signing key or a trusted certificate, changing which keys sign tokens and assertions or which external signatures PingOne accepts.

Platform
Ping Identity
Severity
High
Log source
PingOne audit activities
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
A PingOne role that can manage keys and certificates, such as Environment Admin, and a relying application that trusts the new key.
Impact
The guarantee that only PingOne can sign for the environment is lost, so an attacker can sign assertions for federated applications such as cloud providers.
Response
Make a key generated inside PingOne the default again, move the affected applications back to it, and remove the key that was added.
Mitigation
Restrict the roles that can manage keys and certificates, and prefer keys generated inside PingOne over uploaded key pairs.
Action types
CERTIFICATE.CREATEDCERTIFICATE.UPDATEDCERTIFICATE.DELETEDKEY.CREATEDKEY.UPDATEDKEY.DELETEDKRP.CREATEDKRP.UPDATEDKRP.DELETEDKRP.ROTATED

How the attack works

Every application that trusts PingOne verifies the signature on the token or SAML assertion it receives. PingOne's certificate management service holds the key pairs used for signing and encryption (generated by PingOne or provided by the customer, for example as a PKCS12 file) and the certificates used to verify what partners send, such as the verification certificate of an external identity provider. Each environment has a default key, and applications can be set to use a specific key.

A key pair that was created outside PingOne and then uploaded is a signing key whose private half also exists outside PingOne. An attacker who can manage keys can upload such a key, make it the default or assign it to an application, or replace a trusted certificate with their own. The first prepares forged assertions for the applications that use the key; the second makes PingOne accept signatures the attacker can produce. PingOne records the operations as KEY and CERTIFICATE audit activities (created, updated, deleted). Key rotation policies (KRPs) manage signing key pairs that PingOne creates and rotates on a schedule, and Ping has announced that from March 2, 2027 only KRP keys sign ID tokens and access tokens. A third rule reads the KRP activities (created, updated, deleted, rotated), because a new or changed policy decides which keys sign from then on.

Log source: the rules read PingOne audit activities. Include the Key and Certificate event types in the PingOne webhook that feeds the SIEM, or poll the Audit Activities API, for every environment.

What an attacker needs

  • A PingOne role that can manage keys and certificates in the environment, such as Environment Admin.
  • For a forged assertion to be accepted, the relying application has to trust the new key, either because it follows PingOne's published keys or metadata or because its configuration is also changed.

Impact

Loss of the guarantee that only PingOne can sign for the environment. Depending on what the key is used for, the attacker can sign assertions for federated applications, including cloud providers that trust PingOne, or have PingOne accept assertions from an identity provider they control. Deleting a key in use interrupts sign-on for the applications that depend on it.

Detection rules

PingOne Certificate Created, Updated or Deleted

Detects a certificate being added, updated or deleted in the certificate management service of a PingOne environment (audit activities CERTIFICATE.CREATED, CERTIFICATE.UPDATED and CERTIFICATE.DELETED). Certificates are what PingOne uses to verify signatures from partners such as external identity providers, so a new one can widen whose assertions are accepted.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourcePingOne audit activities
title: PingOne Certificate Created, Updated or Deleted
id: a1be4fec-78ee-47e9-8e54-ca8da4bdf3f3
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a certificate being added, updated or deleted in the certificate
  management service of a PingOne environment (audit activities
  CERTIFICATE.CREATED, CERTIFICATE.UPDATED and CERTIFICATE.DELETED).
  Certificates are what PingOne uses to verify signatures from partners such
  as external identity providers, so a new one can widen whose assertions are
  accepted.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/certificate-management/index.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1484.002
logsource:
  product: pingone
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    action.type:
      - CERTIFICATE.CREATED
      - CERTIFICATE.UPDATED
      - CERTIFICATE.DELETED
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Certificate renewal for an existing identity provider or application connection, and trusted CA certificates uploaded for webhook or gateway connections.
level: medium

False positives

  • Certificate renewal for an existing identity provider or application connection, and trusted CA certificates uploaded for webhook or gateway connections.

PingOne Key Pair Created, Updated or Deleted

Detects a key pair being created, updated or deleted in the certificate management service of a PingOne environment (audit activities KEY.CREATED, KEY.UPDATED and KEY.DELETED). An update can make another key the default key of the environment. Key rotation policies have their own event types (KRP), which this rule does not match.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourcePingOne audit activities
title: PingOne Key Pair Created, Updated or Deleted
id: 2ddb7f41-cf15-4156-8246-f0b199e30ebc
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a key pair being created, updated or deleted in the certificate
  management service of a PingOne environment (audit activities KEY.CREATED,
  KEY.UPDATED and KEY.DELETED). An update can make another key the default
  key of the environment. Key rotation policies have their own event types
  (KRP), which this rule does not match.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/certificate-management/index.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1484.002
logsource:
  product: pingone
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    action.type:
      - KEY.CREATED
      - KEY.UPDATED
      - KEY.DELETED
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned key renewal before a certificate expires, and new keys created for a new application or custom domain.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned key renewal before a certificate expires, and new keys created for a new application or custom domain.

PingOne Key Rotation Policy Created, Changed or Rotated

Detects a key rotation policy (KRP) being created, updated, deleted or rotated in a PingOne environment (audit activities KRP.CREATED, KRP.UPDATED, KRP.DELETED and KRP.ROTATED). A KRP manages signing key pairs that PingOne creates and rotates on a schedule, 90 days by default, and Ping has announced that from March 2, 2027 only KRP keys sign ID tokens and access tokens. An update can make another policy the default of the environment or change the key length, the rotation period and the validity period. The activity does not say which property changed. Ping documents rotation as following the policy's schedule, so expect KRP.ROTATED at each scheduled rotation and look at the ones that do not fit the rotation period.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourcePingOne audit activities
title: PingOne Key Rotation Policy Created, Changed or Rotated
id: 587d900f-de7d-4d2d-af07-7b4fb6c032fe
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a key rotation policy (KRP) being created, updated, deleted or
  rotated in a PingOne environment (audit activities KRP.CREATED, KRP.UPDATED,
  KRP.DELETED and KRP.ROTATED). A KRP manages signing key pairs that PingOne
  creates and rotates on a schedule, 90 days by default, and Ping has
  announced that from March 2, 2027 only KRP keys sign ID tokens and access
  tokens. An update can make another policy the default of the environment or
  change the key length, the rotation period and the validity period. The
  activity does not say which property changed. Ping documents rotation as
  following the policy's schedule, so expect KRP.ROTATED at each scheduled
  rotation and look at the ones that do not fit the rotation period.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
  - https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/certificate-management/key-rotation-policies/index.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1484.002
logsource:
  product: pingone
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    action.type:
      - KRP.CREATED
      - KRP.UPDATED
      - KRP.DELETED
      - KRP.ROTATED
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Scheduled rotation, which PingOne performs for every policy when its rotation period has passed. Compare the time of KRP.ROTATED with the policy's rotation period.
  - Planned work on signing keys, such as a new policy for a group of applications. An environment can hold at most five policies, so these changes are few. Confirm each with the change record.
level: medium

False positives

  • Scheduled rotation, which PingOne performs for every policy when its rotation period has passed. Compare the time of KRP.ROTATED with the policy's rotation period.
  • Planned work on signing keys, such as a new policy for a group of applications. An environment can hold at most five policies, so these changes are few. Confirm each with the change record.

Triage

  • Identify the actor (actors.user.name or actors.client.name) and the key or certificate named in the activity, and check for an approved change such as a renewal.
  • List the keys of the environment and check which one is the default, whether the new key was generated or uploaded, and which applications and identity providers use it.
  • For a certificate change, check which external identity provider or application verifies signatures with it.
  • If unexplained, move applications back to the previous key, remove the new key or certificate, and review sign-ons to the affected applications since the change.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Make a key generated inside PingOne the default again, move the affected applications back to it, and remove the key that was added. Do not reuse a key pair that was uploaded from outside.
  2. For a replaced certificate, restore the partner's certificate on the identity provider or application that verifies with it, and end the sessions of users who signed on through that connection since the change.
  3. Ask the owners of the applications that trust the key, cloud providers first, to confirm which signing certificate they trust now and to review their own sign-in logs. An assertion signed outside PingOne does not pass through PingOne.
  4. Remove the role that lets the actor manage keys and certificates, reset its credentials and end its sessions.
  5. Compare the key inventory of every environment with the reviewed one, including the default flag, the usage type and the applications that use each key.

Mitigation

  • Restrict Environment Admin and custom roles that can manage keys and certificates.
  • Prefer keys generated inside PingOne over uploaded key pairs, and record every uploaded key with its origin and owner.
  • Use key rotation policies where they fit, and keep a reviewed inventory of keys (default flag, usage type, expiry) and of the applications and identity providers that use each one.
  • Alert on key and certificate changes in every environment.

Frequently asked questions

Why is an uploaded key pair riskier than one generated in PingOne?

A key pair that was created outside PingOne and then uploaded is a signing key whose private half also exists outside PingOne. Whoever kept that half can sign tokens or assertions that applications using the key accept. Prefer keys generated inside PingOne, and record every uploaded key with its origin and owner.

Is a new signing key enough to forge sign-ons to an application?

Not always. The relying application has to trust the new key, either because it follows PingOne's published keys or metadata or because its own configuration is changed too. An update that makes the new key the default, or assigns it to an application, is the step that puts it into use, so read `KEY.UPDATED` activities with care.

Do these rules cover key rotation policies?

Yes, with a rule of their own. Key rotation policies have their own event types (KRP), which the key rule does not match and the third rule on this page reads. The other two rules cover `KEY` and `CERTIFICATE` activities that are created, updated or deleted. Planned renewal before a certificate expires and scheduled rotation are the usual benign causes, so confirm each change against a renewal record or the rotation period.

Why does a certificate change matter if no signing key was touched?

Certificates are what PingOne uses to verify signatures from partners such as external identity providers. Replacing a trusted certificate with another makes PingOne accept signatures that the holder of the matching private key can produce. Check which identity provider or application verifies with the changed certificate.

References

We respect your privacy

We use cookies to keep this site secure and working properly. With your permission, we also use optional cookies to understand usage and improve the experience. Cookie Policy

You can change your choice at any time.