How the attack works
Federation lets an external identity provider (IdP) vouch for users. OCI trusts the assertions of every active IdP, and group mappings decide what a federated user can do. In tenancies with identity domains, a SAML IdP can use just-in-time (JIT) provisioning that creates or updates the user at sign-in and assigns identity domain groups from an assertion attribute, either by explicit mapping or implicitly by matching group names. In tenancies without identity domains, an IdP group mapping ties an IdP group to an IAM group. In both models a mapping to Administrators turns a group in the external directory into tenancy administrators.
An attacker who can manage identity providers therefore does not need any OCI user. They register an IdP they control, or replace the signing certificate or metadata of an existing one, and map a group to Administrators or to another group with strong policies. The Audit log records com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateIdentityProvider and UpdateIdentityProvider, and for the mapping resource com.oraclecloud.identitycontrolplane.addidpgroupmapping and UpdateIdpGroupMapping, whose reference event carries idpGroupName and groupId in data.additionalDetails. With identity domains, JIT group mapping is part of the identity provider's own configuration, so expect it as an identity provider update. Oracle's event reference does not describe separately how provider changes made inside an identity domain are recorded, so confirm with one test change that they reach your SIEM under these event types. Three further rules read DeleteIdentityProvider and com.oraclecloud.identitycontrolplane.removeidpgroupmapping, ResetIdpScimClient, and the events for federated users and groups managed from OCI: CreateIdpUser, CreateIdentityProviderGroup and AddUserToIdpGroup. A user added to an IdP group that is mapped to an OCI group receives that group's permissions without any change to the mapping, and a SCIM client reset returns new credentials for the client that provisions federated users.
Collection: ship the _Audit log group of the root compartment (subcompartments included) to the SIEM through a service connector and a stream, and include the home region. The CIS OCI Foundations Benchmark asks for notifications on exactly these two event families.
What an attacker needs
- A principal with
manage identity-providersin the tenancy, anduse groupsfor a mapping; or the identity domain administrator or security administrator role in the domain. - An identity provider the attacker controls, or control of the signing key of a trusted one.
Impact
Sign-in to the Console as any mapped identity without touching OCI passwords or MFA: the IdP asserts the user and the groups. With a mapping to Administrators this is full control of the tenancy, and it survives password resets and the removal of the attacker's original account because the trust lives in the federation configuration.
Detection rules
OCI Identity Provider Created or Updated
Detects CreateIdentityProvider and UpdateIdentityProvider operations of the OCI IAM control plane. A new or changed identity provider can sign users in to the tenancy; with identity domains its just-in-time group mapping is part of the same resource. Review the provider named in data.resourceName.
title: OCI Identity Provider Created or Updated
id: 1b83e67b-b597-40e8-a776-a90993091e10
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects CreateIdentityProvider and UpdateIdentityProvider operations of the
OCI IAM control plane. A new or changed identity provider can sign users in
to the tenancy; with identity domains its just-in-time group mapping is part
of the same resource. Review the provider named in data.resourceName.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/identityproviders/add-saml-identity-provider.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
eventType:
- com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateIdentityProvider
- com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.UpdateIdentityProvider
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned federation changes such as a signing certificate rollover or a new corporate identity provider. These are rare; confirm each one against a change record.
level: high
False positives
- Planned federation changes such as a signing certificate rollover or a new corporate identity provider. These are rare; confirm each one against a change record.
OCI Identity Provider or IdP Group Mapping Deleted
Detects the IAM control plane events for a deleted identity provider and a deleted IdP group mapping. Oracle documents that deleting an identity provider also deletes all its group mappings, and that federated users who are left without membership in any mapped group lose their provisioned users in OCI. A deletion can therefore lock federated administrators out, or remove the mapping an attacker used once it has served its purpose. For the mapping event Oracle's reference event carries idpGroupName and the groupId of the OCI group in data.additionalDetails. Oracle documents the mapping event type in lower case; matching is case-insensitive.
title: OCI Identity Provider or IdP Group Mapping Deleted
id: 80e2bbf5-1cfd-46a1-931b-0d699a32fecd
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the IAM control plane events for a deleted identity provider and a
deleted IdP group mapping. Oracle documents that deleting an identity
provider also deletes all its group mappings, and that federated users who
are left without membership in any mapped group lose their provisioned users
in OCI. A deletion can therefore lock federated administrators out, or
remove the mapping an attacker used once it has served its purpose. For the
mapping event Oracle's reference event carries idpGroupName and the groupId
of the OCI group in data.additionalDetails. Oracle documents the mapping
event type in lower case; matching is case-insensitive.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Tasks/federatingIDCS.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
eventType:
- com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteIdentityProvider
- com.oraclecloud.identitycontrolplane.removeidpgroupmapping
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned retirement of an identity provider or of a directory group. Oracle notes that a group mapping cannot be updated in the Console, only deleted and added again, so a correction shows as a delete followed by an add.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned retirement of an identity provider or of a directory group. Oracle notes that a group mapping cannot be updated in the Console, only deleted and added again, so a correction shows as a delete followed by an add.
OCI IdP Group Mapping Added or Updated
Detects the IAM control plane events for a new or changed mapping between an identity provider group and an OCI group. data.additionalDetails carries idpGroupName and the groupId of the OCI group. A mapping to Administrators makes an external group tenancy administrators. Oracle documents the add event type in lower case; matching is case-insensitive.
title: OCI IdP Group Mapping Added or Updated
id: 77f50058-aec0-4b0e-902c-d526cfd37eca
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the IAM control plane events for a new or changed mapping between an
identity provider group and an OCI group. data.additionalDetails carries
idpGroupName and the groupId of the OCI group. A mapping to Administrators
makes an external group tenancy administrators. Oracle documents the add
event type in lower case; matching is case-insensitive.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/policyreference/iampolicyreference.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
eventType:
- com.oraclecloud.identitycontrolplane.addidpgroupmapping
- com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.UpdateIdpGroupMapping
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- The identity team mapping a new directory group during onboarding. Confirm the OCI group in data.additionalDetails.groupId and alert on mappings to administrator groups.
level: high
False positives
- The identity team mapping a new directory group during onboarding. Confirm the OCI group in data.additionalDetails.groupId and alert on mappings to administrator groups.
OCI Identity Provider SCIM Client Credentials Reset
Detects the IAM control plane operation ResetIdpScimClient, which Oracle describes as resetting the OAuth2 client credentials for the SCIM client associated with an identity provider. The response returns the new client credentials to the caller. These are the credentials the identity provider presents to OCI's SCIM endpoint when it provisions federated users, so the caller of the reset now holds them and the identity provider's own copy stops working until it is updated. Oracle's reference events give no additional details for this operation: identify the provider from data.resourceName and the caller from data.identity.principalName.
title: OCI Identity Provider SCIM Client Credentials Reset
id: 13874c3b-2306-4f0c-a871-8a257eac7514
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the IAM control plane operation ResetIdpScimClient, which Oracle
describes as resetting the OAuth2 client credentials for the SCIM client
associated with an identity provider. The response returns the new client
credentials to the caller. These are the credentials the identity provider
presents to OCI's SCIM endpoint when it provisions federated users, so the
caller of the reset now holds them and the identity provider's own copy
stops working until it is updated. Oracle's reference events give no
additional details for this operation: identify the provider from
data.resourceName and the caller from data.identity.principalName.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/api/#/en/identity/20160918/ScimClientCredentials/ResetIdpScimClient
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Tasks/usingscim.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
eventType: com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.ResetIdpScimClient
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Periodic rotation of the SCIM client credentials, which Oracle describes as a security measure. Confirm that the identity team did it and that the identity provider was updated with the new credentials.
level: medium
False positives
- Periodic rotation of the SCIM client credentials, which Oracle describes as a security measure. Confirm that the identity team did it and that the identity provider was updated with the new credentials.
OCI IdP User or IdP Group Created or User Added to an IdP Group
Detects the IAM control plane events CreateIdpUser, CreateIdentityProviderGroup and AddUserToIdpGroup. Oracle's event reference lists them as Create IdP User, Create Identity Provider Group and Add User to IdP Group without further description. The names match the Console feature for managing Oracle Identity Cloud Service users and groups of a federated tenancy, where a new user is also provisioned in OCI and receives permissions through an IdP group that is mapped to an OCI group. A user added to such a group gains the mapped group's permissions although no mapping changed. For AddUserToIdpGroup the reference event carries the IdP group in data.resourceName and the user OCID in data.additionalDetails.userId. Oracle states that managing these resources through the OCI Console is ending, so expect the events only in tenancies that still use it.
title: OCI IdP User or IdP Group Created or User Added to an IdP Group
id: db20b4bc-ed16-48a0-a385-0c776d12ee8f
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the IAM control plane events CreateIdpUser,
CreateIdentityProviderGroup and AddUserToIdpGroup. Oracle's event reference
lists them as Create IdP User, Create Identity Provider Group and Add User
to IdP Group without further description. The names match the Console
feature for managing Oracle Identity Cloud Service users and groups of a
federated tenancy, where a new user is also provisioned in OCI and receives
permissions through an IdP group that is mapped to an OCI group. A user
added to such a group gains the mapped group's permissions although no
mapping changed. For AddUserToIdpGroup the reference event carries the IdP
group in data.resourceName and the user OCID in
data.additionalDetails.userId. Oracle states that managing these resources
through the OCI Console is ending, so expect the events only in tenancies
that still use it.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Tasks/addingidcsusersandgroups.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
eventType:
- com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateIdpUser
- com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.CreateIdentityProviderGroup
- com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.AddUserToIdpGroup
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Routine onboarding of federated users by the identity team. Alert when the IdP group in data.resourceName is one that your group mappings tie to Administrators or to another privileged OCI group.
level: medium
False positives
- Routine onboarding of federated users by the identity team. Alert when the IdP group in data.resourceName is one that your group mappings tie to Administrators or to another privileged OCI group.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
IdP group mapping added and deleted again shortly after
An attacker who needs a privileged mapping only long enough to sign in and plant other access adds it, uses it and deletes it, so that a later review of the mappings shows nothing. A mapping that is added and deleted within a short time is rarely planned federation work.
- The Audit log records
com.oraclecloud.identitycontrolplane.addidpgroupmapping. Oracle's reference event carries the IdP group indata.additionalDetails.idpGroupName, the OCI group indata.additionalDetails.groupIdand the identity provider indata.resourceName. - Within 24 hours the Audit log records
com.oraclecloud.identitycontrolplane.removeidpgroupmappingwith the sameidpGroupNameandgroupId. - Resolve
groupIdto the OCI group. Between the two events, look for Console sign-ins through that identity provider and for new policies, credentials and group members.
Eventsaddidpgroupmappingremoveidpgroupmapping
LimitsOracle notes that a mapping cannot be edited in the Console, only deleted and added again, so a correction shows the two events in the opposite order within minutes. A mapping that is left in place does not match and is covered by the rules on this page. In tenancies with identity domains group mapping is part of the identity provider's configuration, so expect an identity provider update there instead of these two events. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Read the identity provider named in data.resourceName. Check its metadata or issuer, signing certificate, activation state, JIT provisioning settings and group mappings against the last approved state.
- For a mapping event, resolve data.additionalDetails.groupId to the OCI group and check the policies that name that group.
- Identify the caller (data.identity.principalName, data.identity.ipAddress, or data.additionalDetails.actorName) and confirm a change record.
- Look for Console sign-ins through that provider after the change, especially by users created at sign-in.
- If not approved, deactivate the provider or remove the mapping, remove users and memberships it created, and review their activity.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Deactivate the identity provider that was added, or restore the signing certificate and metadata of the one that was changed, and remove group mappings to privileged groups that were not approved.
- Remove the users that were created at sign-in through the provider and their group memberships, and delete API keys and auth tokens that those users hold.
- Review what the federated identities did since the change and undo it, with priority on policies, dynamic groups, credentials and new resources.
- Contain the account that changed the federation settings. Reset its credentials and remove its right to manage identity providers until its owner is verified.
- Compare every identity provider, its certificate, JIT settings and group mappings with your inventory, and confirm that a sign-in through the removed provider fails.
Mitigation
- Limit
manage identity-providersand the identity domain administrator and security administrator roles to a few named accounts. - Map IdP groups to OCI groups explicitly; avoid implicit mapping by name, and never map an external group to Administrators without the same controls you apply to local administrators.
- Keep an inventory of identity providers, their signing certificates and JIT settings, and compare it with the live configuration on a schedule.
- Configure the notifications the CIS OCI Foundations Benchmark recommends for identity provider changes and IdP group mapping changes.
Frequently asked questions
Why does resetting passwords not remove this kind of access?
The identity provider asserts the user and the groups, so no OCI password or MFA is involved in the sign-in. The trust lives in the federation configuration. It survives password resets and the removal of the attacker's original account, and it ends only when the provider or the mapping is removed or restored.
In a tenancy with identity domains, where does a group mapping change show up?
Just-in-time group mapping is part of the identity provider's own configuration there, so expect it as an identity provider update and not as a separate mapping event. In tenancies without identity domains a mapping is a resource of its own that ties an IdP group to an IAM group, with its own add, update and delete events.
Why should I make a test change before I rely on these rules?
Oracle's event reference does not describe separately how provider changes made inside an identity domain are recorded. One test change to an identity provider in your domain shows whether the event reaches your SIEM under the event types the rules match.
What does a legitimate identity provider change look like?
A planned signing certificate rollover, a new corporate identity provider, or the identity team mapping a new directory group during onboarding. These changes are rare and come with a change record. A mapping to Administrators or to another group with strong policies needs confirmation in every case.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1484.002: Trust Modification
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Managing a SAML identity provider
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Adding a SAML just-in-time identity provider (group mapping)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Services that produce events, identity provider event types
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Details for IAM with Identity Domains (identity-providers permissions)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure security guide: IAM federation