How the attack works
API Access Management in PingOne Authorize works with an API gateway: the gateway hands each API call to PingOne Authorize, which rejects requests without a valid access token and evaluates the access policies of the API service. The tokens can come from PingOne itself or from an external token source. For the second case an administrator adds an external OAuth server, which Ping describes as allowing PingOne Authorize to validate access tokens from that issuer. The server holds the expected issuer values, which the runtime compares with the iss claim of the token, and the keys for validation, either as the URL of the issuer's JWKS endpoint or as a JWKS document.
That makes the server a trust anchor. An attacker who can edit it adds an issuer value of their own, or points the JWKS URL at a host they control, or replaces the JWKS document with their own public key. From then on a token they sign themselves is a valid access token for every API service that uses the server. Ping documents that the token source of an API service cannot be changed after the service is saved, so the change that affects existing APIs is an update to a server they already use, and a new server is the preparation for a new API service. PingOne records the operations as EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.CREATED and EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.UPDATED audit activities.
Log source: the rules read PingOne audit activities. Include the External OAuth Server event types in the PingOne webhook that feeds the SIEM, or poll the Audit Activities API, for every environment that uses PingOne Authorize.
What an attacker needs
- A PingOne role that can manage external OAuth servers in the environment.
- An API service that uses the external OAuth server as its access token source, and a signing key of the attacker's own whose public half goes into the server's key configuration.
Impact
Requests that carry a token the attacker signed pass the token validation of API Access Management, with whatever subject and scopes the attacker wrote into the token. The access policies of the API service still run, but they evaluate claims the attacker controls. No user account and no client secret is involved, and the access lasts until the issuers and keys of the server are restored.
Detection rules
PingOne External OAuth Server Created
Detects a new external OAuth server in PingOne Authorize (audit activity EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.CREATED). Ping describes adding one as allowing PingOne Authorize to validate access tokens from that issuer. The server has an effect once an API service uses it as its access token source, and Ping documents that the token source of an existing API service cannot be changed, so a new server is the preparation for a new API service. Review its issuer values and key source, and which API services refer to it. Deletions (EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.DELETED) are not matched: Ping documents that a server still in use by an API service cannot be deleted.
title: PingOne External OAuth Server Created
id: 67a9ef28-3995-47e3-9a48-135c2bace1f8
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a new external OAuth server in PingOne Authorize (audit activity
EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.CREATED). Ping describes adding one as allowing
PingOne Authorize to validate access tokens from that issuer. The server has
an effect once an API service uses it as its access token source, and Ping
documents that the token source of an existing API service cannot be
changed, so a new server is the preparation for a new API service. Review
its issuer values and key source, and which API services refer to it.
Deletions (EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.DELETED) are not matched: Ping documents
that a server still in use by an API service cannot be deleted.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/authorize/api-access-management/external-oauth-servers/
- https://docs.pingidentity.com/pingone/authorization_using_pingone_authorize/p1az_add_api_service.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type: EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.CREATED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Onboarding of an API whose tokens come from another authorization server. An environment can hold at most 25 external OAuth servers, so these are few. Confirm each with the team that owns the API.
level: low
False positives
- Onboarding of an API whose tokens come from another authorization server. An environment can hold at most 25 external OAuth servers, so these are few. Confirm each with the team that owns the API.
PingOne External OAuth Server Updated
Detects an external OAuth server being updated in PingOne Authorize (audit activity EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.UPDATED). The server holds the issuer values that PingOne Authorize expects in the iss claim of an access token and the keys it validates the token with, as a JWKS URL or a JWKS document. A new issuer value or a new key source makes tokens from another signer valid for every API service that uses the server as its access token source. The activity does not say which property changed: compare the server with your reviewed copy.
title: PingOne External OAuth Server Updated
id: c8f6f400-35d9-4518-8343-3d73f20429d0
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an external OAuth server being updated in PingOne Authorize (audit
activity EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.UPDATED). The server holds the issuer values
that PingOne Authorize expects in the iss claim of an access token and the
keys it validates the token with, as a JWKS URL or a JWKS document. A new
issuer value or a new key source makes tokens from another signer valid for
every API service that uses the server as its access token source. The
activity does not say which property changed: compare the server with your
reviewed copy.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/authorize/api-access-management/external-oauth-servers/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type: EXTERNAL_OAUTH_SERVER.UPDATED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned key renewal at the external token issuer when the server holds a JWKS document, and changes of the issuer's address. Confirm with the change record and with the team that runs the issuer.
- Edits of the name or description, which use the same activity.
level: high
False positives
- Planned key renewal at the external token issuer when the server holds a JWKS document, and changes of the issuer's address. Confirm with the change record and with the team that runs the issuer.
- Edits of the name or description, which use the same activity.
Triage
- Identify the actor (actors.user.name or actors.client.name) and the external OAuth server named in the activity's resources, and check for an approved change.
- Compare the server's issuer values and its JWKS URL or JWKS document with the reviewed inventory. A new issuer, a JWKS URL on an unfamiliar host or a new key is the change to act on.
- List the API services that use the server as their access token source, because those are the APIs the change reaches.
- Review the API gateway's logs for requests to those APIs since the change, looking for tokens from the new issuer or signed with the new key.
- If the change is not explained, restore the server's configuration and review what else the actor changed in the same session.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Restore the issuer values and the JWKS URL or keys of the changed server from the reviewed inventory. Delete a server that was added, once no API service uses it.
- Treat the requests that the affected API services accepted since the change as unverified. Pull them from the API gateway's logs and review what they read or changed in the systems behind the API.
- Remove the role that lets the actor manage this configuration, reset its credentials and end its sessions. For a worker application, replace its client secret.
- Compare every external OAuth server and API service of the environment with the inventory, and confirm that a token signed with the removed key is rejected.
Mitigation
- Restrict the roles that can manage PingOne Authorize configuration, and review who holds them.
- Keep a reviewed inventory of external OAuth servers with their issuer values and their JWKS URL or key identifiers, and compare it after every change event.
- Do not let the policies of an API service rely on token claims alone. An allow list of IP addresses, which API Access Management supports, still holds when the token validation is subverted.
- Alert on external OAuth server changes in every environment, including test environments whose APIs reach production data.
Frequently asked questions
Does a new external OAuth server give access to an API by itself?
No. An external OAuth server matters once an API service uses it as its access token source, and Ping documents that the token source of an API service cannot be changed after the service is saved. A new server is therefore the preparation for a new API service. An update to a server that API services already use takes effect for those services, which is why the rule for updates has the higher level.
What can an update to an external OAuth server change?
The server holds the expected issuer values and the keys used to validate access tokens, as a JWKS URL or as a JWKS document. Ping documents that the runtime checks the `iss` claim of a token against the issuer values. A new issuer or a new key source makes tokens from that issuer, or signed with that key, valid. The activity does not say which property changed, so compare the server with your reviewed copy.
Do the access policies of the API service still protect the API after such a change?
They still run. API Access Management rejects requests without a valid access token and then evaluates the policies of the service, which can use token scopes, user characteristics and an allow list of IP addresses. After the change the attacker decides what a valid token says, so a policy that relies on token claims alone no longer tells them from a real client. A condition on the source address still does.