How the attack works
A Group Policy Object has two halves: a groupPolicyContainer object in CN=Policies,CN=System and a folder in SYSVOL that holds the actual settings. The container records which client-side extensions the policy uses (gPCMachineExtensionNames, gPCUserExtensionNames), where its SYSVOL folder is (gPCFileSysPath) and a versionNumber that changes on every edit. Domains, OUs and sites point to the policies that apply to them through their gPLink attribute.
With edit rights on a GPO an attacker can add a startup script, a scheduled task, a local group membership or a registry setting that every targeted computer applies on its next refresh (by default every 90 minutes plus a random offset of up to 30, and every 5 minutes on domain controllers). With write access to gPLink they can instead link a policy they control to an OU, the domain root or the Domain Controllers OU. Adding a new type of setting registers a new extension in the container, which is the clearest directory-side trace of the change. Editing a script, scheduled task or setting of a type the policy already uses adds no extension: the one attribute Microsoft documents as incremented whenever the administrative tools change a GPO is versionNumber, and a file changed directly in SYSVOL leaves no trace in the directory at all. A write to the script, scheduled task, service, group or security template files through the SYSVOL share is logged by the share access event 5145 on the domain controller, and Microsoft recommends watching the deletion of policy objects (event 5141). Disabling a policy for users, computers or both writes its flags attribute, which event 5136 records like any other attribute of the container.
What an attacker needs
- Edit rights on a GPO (GenericWrite, GenericAll or write on the container and its SYSVOL folder), or write access to
gPLinkon a domain, OU or site, or membership of Group Policy Creator Owners plus a link right.
Impact
Code execution as SYSTEM, or configuration changes, on every computer and user in scope of the policy. A GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU or the domain root gives control of the whole domain; it is also a common way to deploy ransomware domain-wide.
Detection rules
Default Domain Policy or Default Domain Controllers Policy Changed
Detects a write to the groupPolicyContainer object of the Default Domain Policy ({31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}) or of the Default Domain Controllers Policy ({6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}). These two policies exist in every domain with the same GUIDs and are linked by default to the domain root and to the Domain Controllers OU, so a change to them reaches every computer or every domain controller. Every edit with the administrative tools writes at least versionNumber. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL on CN=Policies,CN=System.
title: Default Domain Policy or Default Domain Controllers Policy Changed
id: c3e4e852-e621-4d42-940d-6e32689c4539
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a write to the groupPolicyContainer object of the Default Domain
Policy ({31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}) or of the Default Domain
Controllers Policy ({6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}). These two
policies exist in every domain with the same GUIDs and are linked by default
to the domain root and to the Domain Controllers OU, so a change to them
reaches every computer or every domain controller. Every edit with the
administrative tools writes at least versionNumber. Requires Audit Directory
Service Changes and a SACL on CN=Policies,CN=System.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/group-policy/rebuild-sysvol-tree-and-content-in-a-domain
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpol/3b027be3-62ac-4b85-9334-37f79c83bfea
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5136
ObjectClass: groupPolicyContainer
ObjectDN|startswith:
- 'CN={31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9},'
- 'CN={6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9},'
OperationType:
- '%%14674'
- 'Value Added'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned changes to the domain password, account lockout or Kerberos policy, to user rights on domain controllers, or to the audit policy of domain controllers, which are often kept in these two policies. Match each change to a change record by SubjectUserName and time.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned changes to the domain password, account lockout or Kerberos policy, to user rights on domain controllers, or to the audit policy of domain controllers, which are often kept in these two policies. Match each change to a change record by SubjectUserName and time.
Group Policy Object Deleted
Detects the deletion of a groupPolicyContainer object, which removes the policy and every setting in it from all the domains, OUs and sites it was linked to. Microsoft recommends monitoring the deletion of group policy objects with event 5141 and the groupPolicyContainer class. Deleting the policy that carries security settings (audit policy, user rights, firewall, endpoint protection) weakens every computer in its scope at the next policy refresh. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits Delete on CN=Policies,CN=System.
title: Group Policy Object Deleted
id: 7877803c-cce7-49db-a9bb-98e7ecee9581
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the deletion of a groupPolicyContainer object, which removes the
policy and every setting in it from all the domains, OUs and sites it was
linked to. Microsoft recommends monitoring the deletion of group policy
objects with event 5141 and the groupPolicyContainer class. Deleting the
policy that carries security settings (audit policy, user rights, firewall,
endpoint protection) weakens every computer in its scope at the next policy
refresh. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits
Delete on CN=Policies,CN=System.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5141
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/c-grouppolicycontainer
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5141
ObjectClass: groupPolicyContainer
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Clean-up of unused or test policies by Group Policy administrators. Match the deletion to a change record by SubjectUserName and the GPO GUID in ObjectDN.
level: medium
False positives
- Clean-up of unused or test policies by Group Policy administrators. Match the deletion to a change record by SubjectUserName and the GPO GUID in ObjectDN.
Group Policy Object Disabled for Users, Computers or Both
Detects a write to the flags attribute of a groupPolicyContainer that disables the policy for user policy mode (1), for computer policy mode (2) or for both (3), as the Group Policy core protocol defines the bits. Clients ignore a disabled policy, so turning off the policy that carries audit, user rights, firewall or endpoint protection settings weakens every computer in its scope at the next refresh, while the policy and its links stay in place. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL on CN=Policies,CN=System.
title: Group Policy Object Disabled for Users, Computers or Both
id: 01c7858a-2283-4884-a5ce-654e84af99a7
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a write to the flags attribute of a groupPolicyContainer that
disables the policy for user policy mode (1), for computer policy mode (2) or
for both (3), as the Group Policy core protocol defines the bits. Clients
ignore a disabled policy, so turning off the policy that carries audit,
user rights, firewall or endpoint protection settings weakens every computer
in its scope at the next refresh, while the policy and its links stay in
place. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL on
CN=Policies,CN=System.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpol/b0e5c9e8-e858-4a7a-a94a-4a3d0a9d87a2
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-flags
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5136
ObjectClass: groupPolicyContainer
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: flags
AttributeValue:
- 1
- 2
- 3
OperationType:
- '%%14674'
- 'Value Added'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrators who disable the unused half of a policy (for example the user settings of a computer-only policy) for faster processing, or who switch off a policy during troubleshooting. Match the change to a change record by SubjectUserName and the GPO GUID in ObjectDN.
level: medium
False positives
- Administrators who disable the unused half of a policy (for example the user settings of a computer-only policy) for faster processing, or who switch off a policy during troubleshooting. Match the change to a change record by SubjectUserName and the GPO GUID in ObjectDN.
Script, Scheduled Task, Service, Group or Security Template File Written in a GPO Folder of SYSVOL
Detects write access over the network (5145 on the SYSVOL share with WriteData, %%4417, in the access list) to the files in a GPO's SYSVOL folder that make computers or users run code, install services or change local group membership and user rights: the script lists scripts.ini and psscripts.ini, the Group Policy Preferences files ScheduledTasks.xml, Services.xml and Groups.xml, and the security template GptTmpl.inf. Editing an existing script or scheduled task adds no client-side extension to the GPO, and a file changed directly in SYSVOL does not update the version in the directory, so this file write is the trace those edits leave. Requires "Audit Detailed File Share" on the domain controllers. A change made locally on a domain controller, not through the share, does not produce this event.
title: Script, Scheduled Task, Service, Group or Security Template File Written in a GPO Folder of SYSVOL
id: 8b05f2fb-f4d8-4c07-9055-e2441902c25a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects write access over the network (5145 on the SYSVOL share with
WriteData, %%4417, in the access list) to the files in a GPO's SYSVOL folder
that make computers or users run code, install services or change local
group membership and user rights: the script lists scripts.ini and
psscripts.ini, the Group Policy Preferences files ScheduledTasks.xml,
Services.xml and Groups.xml, and the security template GptTmpl.inf. Editing
an existing script or scheduled task adds no client-side extension to the
GPO, and a file changed directly in SYSVOL does not update the version in the
directory, so this file write is the trace those edits leave. Requires "Audit
Detailed File Share" on the domain controllers. A change made locally on a
domain controller, not through the share, does not produce this event.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5145
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpscr/e1857ceb-fdef-4c1b-a545-5c4f3f4a55a2
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/2014/05/ms14-025-vulnerability-in-group-policy-preferences-could-allow-elevation-of-privilege-may-13-2014
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/group-policy/reset-user-rights-in-default-domain-group-policy
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5145
ShareName|endswith: '\SYSVOL'
RelativeTargetName|contains: '\Policies\'
RelativeTargetName|endswith:
- '\scripts.ini'
- '\psscripts.ini'
- '\ScheduledTasks.xml'
- '\Services.xml'
- '\Groups.xml'
- '\GptTmpl.inf'
AccessList|contains: '%%4417'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Group Policy administrators who edit scripts, scheduled tasks, services, local group settings or security settings with the management console, which writes these files through the SYSVOL share. Exclude the management workstations by IpAddress or the administrators by exact SubjectUserName, and review the rest.
- Backup or GPO management products that restore or import policies through the share with a service account. Exclude that account by exact SubjectUserName.
level: medium
False positives
- Group Policy administrators who edit scripts, scheduled tasks, services, local group settings or security settings with the management console, which writes these files through the SYSVOL share. Exclude the management workstations by IpAddress or the administrators by exact SubjectUserName, and review the rest.
- Backup or GPO management products that restore or import policies through the share with a service account. Exclude that account by exact SubjectUserName.
Group Policy Object Extensions or SYSVOL Path Modified
Detects a change to the client-side extension lists (gPCMachineExtensionNames, gPCUserExtensionNames) or the SYSVOL path (gPCFileSysPath) of a groupPolicyContainer. A new extension means a new type of setting (scripts, scheduled tasks, group membership, registry) was added to the GPO; a changed path redirects the policy to another file location. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL on CN=Policies,CN=System. An edit to a script, scheduled task or setting of a type the GPO already uses adds no extension and is not detected by this rule; the versionNumber rule of this attack covers it at a lower level.
title: Group Policy Object Extensions or SYSVOL Path Modified
id: 843cc042-5d8d-4bfd-8da9-fa573e247440
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to the client-side extension lists (gPCMachineExtensionNames,
gPCUserExtensionNames) or the SYSVOL path (gPCFileSysPath) of a
groupPolicyContainer. A new extension means a new type of setting (scripts,
scheduled tasks, group membership, registry) was added to the GPO; a changed
path redirects the policy to another file location. Requires Audit Directory
Service Changes and a SACL on CN=Policies,CN=System.
An edit to a script, scheduled task or setting of a type the GPO already uses
adds no extension and is not detected by this rule; the versionNumber rule of
this attack covers it at a lower level.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/c-grouppolicycontainer
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-gpcmachineextensionnames
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-gpcfilesyspath
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5136
ObjectClass: groupPolicyContainer
AttributeLDAPDisplayName:
- gPCMachineExtensionNames
- gPCUserExtensionNames
- gPCFileSysPath
OperationType:
- '%%14674'
- 'Value Added'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Routine GPO editing by administrators that adds a new setting type. Prioritize GPOs linked to the domain root or Tier 0 OUs and writers outside the GPO administration group.
level: medium
False positives
- Routine GPO editing by administrators that adds a new setting type. Prioritize GPOs linked to the domain root or Tier 0 OUs and writers outside the GPO administration group.
Group Policy Link Modified on a Domain, OU or Site
Detects a change to gPLink, the attribute through which a domain, OU or site points to the GPOs that apply to it. Linking an attacker-controlled GPO to the domain root, the Domain Controllers OU or a Tier 0 OU applies its settings to every object below it. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits writes to gPLink.
title: Group Policy Link Modified on a Domain, OU or Site
id: 74c524de-1af6-4bc7-b967-368d71fbb017
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to gPLink, the attribute through which a domain, OU or site
points to the GPOs that apply to it. Linking an attacker-controlled GPO to the
domain root, the Domain Controllers OU or a Tier 0 OU applies its settings to
every object below it. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that
audits writes to gPLink.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-gplink
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: gPLink
OperationType:
- '%%14674'
- 'Value Added'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrators linking, unlinking or reordering GPOs. Raise priority when ObjectDN is the domain root or an OU that contains domain controllers or Tier 0 accounts.
level: medium
False positives
- Administrators linking, unlinking or reordering GPOs. Raise priority when ObjectDN is the domain root or an OU that contains domain controllers or Tier 0 accounts.
Group Policy Object Version Number Changed
Detects a write to versionNumber on a groupPolicyContainer object. The Group Policy administrative tools increment this attribute whenever they change a GPO, so the rule also sees edits that add no new extension, such as changing an existing script, scheduled task or setting. Every legitimate GPO edit matches, which is why the level is low: use it as a baseline and scope it to the GPOs linked to the domain root and the Domain Controllers OU. A file changed directly in SYSVOL without updating the version in the directory is not detected. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL on CN=Policies,CN=System.
title: Group Policy Object Version Number Changed
id: 1077adfa-1fa0-4ca9-8db9-16433e8baed8
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a write to versionNumber on a groupPolicyContainer object. The Group
Policy administrative tools increment this attribute whenever they change a
GPO, so the rule also sees edits that add no new extension, such as changing
an existing script, scheduled task or setting. Every legitimate GPO edit
matches, which is why the level is low: use it as a baseline and scope it to
the GPOs linked to the domain root and the Domain Controllers OU. A file
changed directly in SYSVOL without updating the version in the directory is
not detected. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL on
CN=Policies,CN=System.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpol/3b027be3-62ac-4b85-9334-37f79c83bfea
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/c-grouppolicycontainer
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-versionnumber
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5136
ObjectClass: groupPolicyContainer
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: versionNumber
OperationType:
- '%%14674'
- 'Value Added'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Every legitimate edit of any GPO by Group Policy administrators or by products that manage GPOs. Restrict ObjectDN to the GUIDs of the GPOs linked to the domain root, the Domain Controllers OU and other Tier 0 OUs, and review each change there against a change record.
level: low
False positives
- Every legitimate edit of any GPO by Group Policy administrators or by products that manage GPOs. Restrict ObjectDN to the GUIDs of the GPOs linked to the domain root, the Domain Controllers OU and other Tier 0 OUs, and review each change there against a change record.
Triage
- Identify the GPO from ObjectDN (its GUID) and resolve its display name; for gPLink changes, read the linked GPOs in AttributeValue and the OU in ObjectDN.
- Check where the policy applies; links to the domain root or the Domain Controllers OU are the highest impact.
- Confirm the writer (SubjectUserName) is a GPO administrator acting under a change record.
- Inspect the GPO's SYSVOL folder for new scripts, scheduled task XML or group membership files written at the same time.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Stop the policy from spreading. Disable the link or the policy object at once, because domain controllers refresh policy every 5 minutes and other computers within about two hours.
- Disable the account that made the change and remove its edit rights on the policy object or its write access to
gPLink. - Restore the policy object from a known-good backup, or remove the added settings in both halves, the container in the directory and the folder in SYSVOL.
- Find the computers that applied the changed policy while it was linked and treat them as compromised. Removing the policy does not remove what a script, a scheduled task or an added local administrator already did there. If domain controllers were in scope, respond as for a domain compromise.
- Compare the policy objects linked to the domain root, the Domain Controllers OU and Tier 0 OUs with the baseline, in the directory and in SYSVOL.
Mitigation
- Review who can edit GPOs and who can write
gPLinkon the domain root, the Domain Controllers OU and Tier 0 OUs; remove non-administrative principals. - Keep the membership of Group Policy Creator Owners empty or tightly controlled.
- Baseline the GPOs linked to Tier 0 OUs and monitor SYSVOL policy folders for file changes (file system auditing on the domain controllers).
- Configure a SACL that audits writes on
CN=Policies,CN=Systemand on OUs, and enable "Audit Directory Service Changes" on domain controllers.
Frequently asked questions
How quickly does a changed GPO reach the computers in its scope?
At their next policy refresh. By default that is every 90 minutes plus a random offset of up to 30 minutes for most computers, and every 5 minutes on domain controllers. A change to a policy linked to the Domain Controllers OU is therefore applied within minutes, which leaves little time between the alert and the effect.
Can a GPO be changed without any of these rules firing?
Yes. A file changed directly in the SYSVOL folder of the policy, without an update of the version in the directory, leaves no trace in the directory at all. The SYSVOL file rule sees such a write when it goes through the SYSVOL share and Audit Detailed File Share is on, but not a change made locally on a domain controller, and it watches only the files that run code or change groups and rights. The directory rules also need a SACL on the Policies container and on the objects whose `gPLink` is watched.
Why is the version number rule only rated low?
The administrative tools increment versionNumber on every edit, so the rule matches every legitimate change of every policy. Its value is coverage. It sees edits that add no new extension, such as a changed script or scheduled task, which the extension rule misses. Scope it to the policies linked to the domain root and the Domain Controllers OU.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1484.001: Group Policy Modification
- Group-Policy-Container class
- GPC-Machine-Extension-Names attribute
- GP-Link attribute
- MS-GPOL: GPO Extension Update (versionNumber is incremented when a GPO is modified)
- Group Policy processing (refresh intervals)
- Event 5136: A directory service object was modified
- Event 5141: A directory service object was deleted (monitor groupPolicyContainer deletions)
- Event 5145: A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access
- MS-GPSCR: Common Message Requirements (scripts.ini and psscripts.ini in the GPO path)
- MS14-025: Vulnerability in Group Policy Preferences (preference files in SYSVOL)
- Reset user rights in the default domain GPO (GptTmpl.inf in the policy folder)
- Rebuild the SYSVOL tree: GUIDs of the Default Domain Policy and Default Domain Controllers Policy
- MS-GPOL: GPO Search (the flags attribute: policy ignored for user mode, computer mode or both)