How the attack works
Workload Identity Federation lets external workloads (AWS, Azure, GitHub Actions or any OIDC or SAML identity provider) exchange their own tokens for Google Cloud credentials. A workload identity pool groups external identities; each provider in it names the issuer to trust, how token claims map to Google attributes, and an optional attribute condition that limits which tokens are accepted. Workforce Identity Federation does the same for people, with organization-level workforce pools.
An attacker with pool administration rights adds a provider that trusts an issuer they control, or loosens an existing provider's attribute condition, then grants the pool's principals roles or impersonation rights on service accounts. From then on they sign in through their own identity provider. Pool and provider changes are Admin Activity entries from iam.googleapis.com; grants to federated identities appear in SetIamPolicy policy deltas as principal:// or principalSet:// members. The same log records the other ways to take over or disturb a federation: a new allow policy on a pool, which decides who administers it, a SCIM tenant or token on a workforce pool provider, through which an identity provider provisions users and groups, and the deletion and restoring of pools, providers and workforce subjects. It also records OAuth clients for Workforce Identity Federation and their client credentials, which let an application sign workforce users in and exchange authorization codes for tokens with a client secret.
What an attacker needs
- Permission to create or update workload identity pools and providers (Workload Identity Pool Admin, IAM Admin or Owner) in any project, or workforce pools at organization level.
setIamPolicywhere the federated principals are to be granted access.- No organization policy restricting allowed providers (
constraints/iam.workloadIdentityPoolProviders,constraints/iam.workloadIdentityPoolAwsAccounts).
Impact
Durable access from outside the organization with whatever roles the federated principals hold, without keys, users or passwords that the organization could rotate or disable.
Detection rules
Role Granted to Federated Identities in Google Cloud
Detects SetIamPolicy calls whose policy delta adds a binding for a workload or workforce identity pool principal or principal set (principal:// or principalSet:// members under workloadIdentityPools or workforcePools), for example Workload Identity User on a service account or a role granted to a whole pool (Admin Activity audit log). Covers services that record the change in serviceData.policyDelta.
title: Role Granted to Federated Identities in Google Cloud
id: 33c3a432-a953-40a6-901a-c413ae24657b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects SetIamPolicy calls whose policy delta adds a binding for a workload or
workforce identity pool principal or principal set (principal:// or
principalSet:// members under workloadIdentityPools or workforcePools), for
example Workload Identity User on a service account or a role granted to a
whole pool (Admin Activity audit log). Covers services that record the change
in serviceData.policyDelta.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/principal-identifiers
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/best-practices-for-using-workload-identity-federation
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.methodName|endswith: SetIamPolicy
protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas|contains: '"ADD"'
selection_member:
protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas|contains:
- /workloadIdentityPools/
- /workforcePools/
condition: selection and selection_member
falsepositives:
- Planned federation set-up for CI/CD or workforce access; grants to a whole pool (principalSet ending in /*) deserve review even when planned.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned federation set-up for CI/CD or workforce access; grants to a whole pool (principalSet ending in /*) deserve review even when planned.
IAM Policy Set on a Workforce or Workload Identity Pool
Detects SetIamPolicy calls on a workforce identity pool or on a workload identity pool (Admin Activity audit log, always written). The allow policy of a pool decides who may administer it, and with it who may add providers and change which external issuers are trusted. An attacker who adds themselves there keeps control of the federation after their other roles are removed. Google documents the method names, the permissions and the log type of these events but not the content of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name alone and does not say what was granted. The pool is named in protoPayload.resourceName. Read its current allow policy to see the change.
title: IAM Policy Set on a Workforce or Workload Identity Pool
id: 6fcec9d0-0b9e-42e4-83c7-01c000134060
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects SetIamPolicy calls on a workforce identity pool or on a workload
identity pool (Admin Activity audit log, always written). The allow policy
of a pool decides who may administer it, and with it who may add providers
and change which external issuers are trusted. An attacker who adds
themselves there keeps control of the federation after their other roles
are removed. Google documents the method names, the permissions and the log
type of these events but not the content of the entry, so the rule matches
on the method name alone and does not say what was granted. The pool is
named in protoPayload.resourceName. Read its current allow policy to see
the change.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/best-practices-for-using-workload-identity-federation
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.SetIamPolicy
- google.iam.v1.WorkloadIdentityPools.SetIamPolicy
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Delegation of pool administration by the platform team, usually when a pool is first set up. Changes to a pool's allow policy are rare afterwards. Verify each one with the team that owns federation.
level: medium
False positives
- Delegation of pool administration by the platform team, usually when a pool is first set up. Changes to a pool's allow policy are rare afterwards. Verify each one with the team that owns federation.
Workload or Workforce Identity Pool or Provider Created or Changed in Google Cloud
Detects creation, update and undeletion of workload identity pools and providers (IAM v1 and v1beta APIs), and creation and update of workforce pools and providers (Admin Activity audit log). Several of these methods are long-running operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry for one change.
title: Workload or Workforce Identity Pool or Provider Created or Changed in Google Cloud
id: 871bf0e1-7615-4890-ab03-d31952b2e04f
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects creation, update and undeletion of workload identity pools and
providers (IAM v1 and v1beta APIs), and creation and update of workforce pools
and providers (Admin Activity audit log). Several of these methods are
long-running operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry
for one change.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection_workload:
protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName|endswith:
- WorkloadIdentityPools.CreateWorkloadIdentityPool
- WorkloadIdentityPools.CreateWorkloadIdentityPoolProvider
- WorkloadIdentityPools.CreateWorkloadIdentityPoolProviderKey
- WorkloadIdentityPools.UpdateWorkloadIdentityPool
- WorkloadIdentityPools.UpdateWorkloadIdentityPoolProvider
- WorkloadIdentityPools.UndeleteWorkloadIdentityPool
- WorkloadIdentityPools.UndeleteWorkloadIdentityPoolProvider
selection_workforce:
protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.CreateWorkforcePool
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.CreateWorkforcePoolProvider
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.CreateWorkforcePoolProviderKey
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.UpdateWorkforcePool
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.UpdateWorkforcePoolProvider
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Onboarding of CI/CD systems or partner identity providers by the platform team; allow-list the project that hosts approved pools and the automation identities that manage them.
level: medium
False positives
- Onboarding of CI/CD systems or partner identity providers by the platform team; allow-list the project that hosts approved pools and the automation identities that manage them.
Workforce or Workload Identity Pool or Provider Deleted
Detects deletion of a workforce identity pool or one of its providers, and of a workload identity pool or one of its providers in the IAM v1 and v1beta APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). Sign-ins and token exchanges depend on the provider that trusts the external issuer, so an attacker with pool administration rights can cut off the people or workloads that federate through it. A deletion followed by a restore is also how a trust is taken away and brought back. Google marks these methods as long-running operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry for one change. The rule matches on the method name, and the deleted object is named in protoPayload.resourceName.
title: Workforce or Workload Identity Pool or Provider Deleted
id: 49e9b57e-100c-4891-8b62-07e018cdc4e2
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects deletion of a workforce identity pool or one of its providers, and
of a workload identity pool or one of its providers in the IAM v1 and
v1beta APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). Sign-ins and token
exchanges depend on the provider that trusts the external issuer, so an
attacker with pool administration rights can cut off the people or
workloads that federate through it. A deletion followed by a restore is
also how a trust is taken away and brought back. Google marks these
methods as long-running operations, which usually write a start and a
completion entry for one change. The rule matches on the method name, and
the deleted object is named in protoPayload.resourceName.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection_workforce:
protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.DeleteWorkforcePool
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.DeleteWorkforcePoolProvider
selection_workload:
protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName|endswith:
- WorkloadIdentityPools.DeleteWorkloadIdentityPool
- WorkloadIdentityPools.DeleteWorkloadIdentityPoolProvider
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Clean-up of test pools and retirement of an identity provider or a CI/CD integration. Confirm that the workloads or people who used the pool were moved first.
level: low
False positives
- Clean-up of test pools and retirement of an identity provider or a CI/CD integration. Confirm that the workloads or people who used the pool were moved first.
Workforce Identity Federation OAuth Client or Client Credential Created or Changed
Detects creation, update and restoring of an OAuth client for Workforce Identity Federation, and creation and update of its client credentials (Admin Activity audit log, always written). Google documents that registering an OAuth client lets federated workforce users sign in to an application and access Google Cloud resources, and that a client credential holds the client secret the application uses to exchange authorization codes and refresh tokens. A new client, a changed redirect URI or an extra credential therefore gives its holder a way to receive tokens for workforce users who sign in through it. Google states that this integration works only with Identity-Aware Proxy and Looker, so the calls are rare. Google documents the method names, their permissions and the log type, but publishes no example of these entries, so the rule matches on the method name alone. Read the client named in protoPayload.resourceName and check its redirect URIs and credentials.
title: Workforce Identity Federation OAuth Client or Client Credential Created or Changed
id: 75ea8ec5-eed1-4c22-8064-a6d662d67489
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects creation, update and restoring of an OAuth client for Workforce
Identity Federation, and creation and update of its client credentials
(Admin Activity audit log, always written). Google documents that
registering an OAuth client lets federated workforce users sign in to an
application and access Google Cloud resources, and that a client
credential holds the client secret the application uses to exchange
authorization codes and refresh tokens. A new client, a changed redirect
URI or an extra credential therefore gives its holder a way to receive
tokens for workforce users who sign in through it. Google states that
this integration works only with Identity-Aware Proxy and Looker, so the
calls are rare. Google documents the method names, their permissions and
the log type, but publishes no example of these entries, so the rule
matches on the method name alone. Read the client named in
protoPayload.resourceName and check its redirect URIs and credentials.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/workforce-manage-oauth-app
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.iam.admin.v1.OauthClients.CreateOauthClient
- google.iam.admin.v1.OauthClients.UpdateOauthClient
- google.iam.admin.v1.OauthClients.UndeleteOauthClient
- google.iam.admin.v1.OauthClients.CreateOauthClientCredential
- google.iam.admin.v1.OauthClients.UpdateOauthClientCredential
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- First set-up of an application behind Identity-Aware Proxy or of Looker for workforce users, and planned rotation of a client secret by the team that owns federation. Confirm each change with that team, and check that an older credential is removed after a rotation.
level: medium
False positives
- First set-up of an application behind Identity-Aware Proxy or of Looker for workforce users, and planned rotation of a client secret by the team that owns federation. Confirm each change with that team, and check that an older credential is removed after a rotation.
Deleted Workforce Identity Pool, Provider, Key or Subject Restored
Detects the undelete methods of Workforce Identity Federation, which bring back a deleted workforce pool, pool provider, provider key or pool subject (Admin Activity audit log, always written). Deleting a provider is how a trust in an external issuer is withdrawn, and deleting a subject is how a federated user is removed. A deleted subject stays recoverable for 30 days, so an undelete call restores the user, or the trust, without a new provider or a new grant appearing anywhere. Google marks these methods as long-running operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry for one change. The rule matches on the method name, and the restored object is named in protoPayload.resourceName. The undelete methods of workload identity pools are matched by the pool and provider rule on this page.
title: Deleted Workforce Identity Pool, Provider, Key or Subject Restored
id: 75ac86e2-c21d-4de9-bbf6-298da95fa938
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the undelete methods of Workforce Identity Federation, which bring
back a deleted workforce pool, pool provider, provider key or pool subject
(Admin Activity audit log, always written). Deleting a provider is how a
trust in an external issuer is withdrawn, and deleting a subject is how a
federated user is removed. A deleted subject stays recoverable for 30 days,
so an undelete call restores the user, or the trust, without a new provider
or a new grant appearing anywhere. Google marks these methods as
long-running operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry
for one change. The rule matches on the method name, and the restored
object is named in protoPayload.resourceName. The undelete methods of
workload identity pools are matched by the pool and provider rule on this
page.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/workforce-delete-user-data
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.UndeleteWorkforcePool
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.UndeleteWorkforcePoolProvider
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.UndeleteWorkforcePoolProviderKey
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.UndeleteWorkforcePoolSubject
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- An administrator undoing an accidental deletion. Restores are rare. Confirm each one with the team that owns federation, and for a restored subject confirm that the person is meant to have access again.
level: medium
False positives
- An administrator undoing an accidental deletion. Restores are rare. Confirm each one with the team that owns federation, and for a restored subject confirm that the person is meant to have access again.
SCIM Tenant or Token Created or Changed on a Workforce Identity Pool Provider
Detects creation, update and undeletion of a SCIM tenant, and creation and update of a SCIM token, on a workforce identity pool provider (Admin Activity audit log, always written). Workforce Identity Federation uses SCIM so that an external identity provider can provision and manage users and groups in Google Cloud, and the token is the credential of that provisioning connection. Whoever creates a tenant or a token can therefore push identities and group memberships into the pool from a system of their own. Google documents the method names, the permissions and the log type of these events but no request fields, so the rule matches on the method name alone. The provider is named in protoPayload.resourceName. A pool supports one SCIM tenant and a tenant at most two tokens, so these events are rare.
title: SCIM Tenant or Token Created or Changed on a Workforce Identity Pool Provider
id: e6827a89-0070-47ce-894a-d8a74d174877
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects creation, update and undeletion of a SCIM tenant, and creation and
update of a SCIM token, on a workforce identity pool provider (Admin
Activity audit log, always written). Workforce Identity Federation uses
SCIM so that an external identity provider can provision and manage users
and groups in Google Cloud, and the token is the credential of that
provisioning connection. Whoever creates a tenant or a token can therefore
push identities and group memberships into the pool from a system of their
own. Google documents the method names, the permissions and the log type of
these events but no request fields, so the rule matches on the method name
alone. The provider is named in protoPayload.resourceName. A pool supports
one SCIM tenant and a tenant at most two tokens, so these events are rare.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/workforce-identity-federation-scim
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/configure-scim-okta
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: iam.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.CreateWorkforcePoolProviderScimTenant
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.UpdateWorkforcePoolProviderScimTenant
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.UndeleteWorkforcePoolProviderScimTenant
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.CreateWorkforcePoolProviderScimToken
- google.iam.admin.v1.WorkforcePools.UpdateWorkforcePoolProviderScimToken
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- First set-up of SCIM provisioning for a workforce pool and planned token rotation by the team that owns federation. A second token exists for rotation, so confirm that the older one is removed afterwards.
level: medium
False positives
- First set-up of SCIM provisioning for a workforce pool and planned token rotation by the team that owns federation. A second token exists for rotation, so confirm that the older one is removed afterwards.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Provider created or changed and its identities granted a role by the same caller
A provider that trusts a new issuer is harmless until its identities can do something. An attacker therefore follows the provider change with a role grant to the pool's principals. Each step has a rule on this page, but only the two together, from one caller in a short time, show the finished way in.
- A pool or provider is created or updated: a
CreateWorkloadIdentityPoolProvider,UpdateWorkloadIdentityPoolProvider,CreateWorkforcePoolProviderorUpdateWorkforcePoolProviderentry fromiam.googleapis.com. Note the pool inprotoPayload.resourceNameand the caller inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 24 hours a
SetIamPolicyentry from the same caller adds a binding inserviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltaswhose member is aprincipal://orprincipalSet://identifier of that pool. - Read the role and the resource of the binding. A grant to a whole pool, or impersonation rights on a privileged service account, makes it urgent.
EventsCreateWorkloadIdentityPoolProviderUpdateWorkloadIdentityPoolProviderCreateWorkforcePoolProviderUpdateWorkforcePoolProviderSetIamPolicy
LimitsA planned CI/CD or partner integration produces exactly this sequence, so the callers that own federation have to be excluded by name. The 24 hours are a starting point. A grant made by a second identity, or made before the provider was changed, is not matched. Services that do not write policyDelta are not covered.
First token exchange through a provider that was just created or changed
After an attacker adds a provider or loosens its attribute condition, the next thing that happens is a token exchange through it from their own identity provider. A token exchange through a provider within a short time of a change to it, for a subject the pool has not seen before, is the trust being used.
- A provider is created or updated, as in the first step of the hypothesis above. Note the provider name in
protoPayload.resourceName. - Within 24 hours a
google.identity.sts.v1.SecurityTokenService.ExchangeTokenentry (Data Access) has that provider inprotoPayload.resourceName. - Read the external identity in
authenticationInfo.principalSubjectand the principal it was mapped to inprotoPayload.metadata.mapped_principal, and compare the subject with the ones seen for that pool before the change.
Eventsgoogle.identity.sts.v1.SecurityTokenService.ExchangeTokenCreateWorkloadIdentityPoolProviderUpdateWorkloadIdentityPoolProvider
LimitsThe exchange is logged only while Data Access audit logs are enabled for the Security Token Service API. Google states that exchanges that fail because of a client error are not logged. A new integration that goes live right after set-up looks the same, which is why the subject has to be checked. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Read the pool or provider in protoPayload.resourceName and inspect its issuer, attribute mapping and attribute condition.
- Confirm the caller and the change with the team that owns federation.
- Look for bindings granted to the pool's principals and for token exchanges by the pool (google.identity.sts.v1.SecurityTokenService.ExchangeToken, Data Access log) after the change.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Stop new token exchanges first. Disable the workload or workforce identity pool provider that trusts the unknown issuer, and restore the attribute condition of a provider that was loosened.
- Revoke what the federated identities were given. Remove the IAM roles and the impersonation rights on service accounts that are bound to the pool's
principal://andprincipalSet://members. - Account for tokens that are already issued. Federated access tokens are valid for up to one hour, and removing the role bindings takes away what they can reach. If the pool's identities impersonated a service account, disable that account for the lifetime of its tokens if it is privileged.
- Contain the identity that created or changed the pool or provider, and remove its pool administration rights (Workload Identity Pool Admin, IAM Admin or Owner).
- Review what the federated principals and any impersonated service accounts did, and remove the keys, bindings and resources they created.
- Delete the pool or provider when the investigation no longer needs it, and keep watching it. The rule on this page also matches the undelete methods, which bring a deleted pool or provider back.
Mitigation
- Restrict trusted issuers and AWS accounts with
constraints/iam.workloadIdentityPoolProvidersandconstraints/iam.workloadIdentityPoolAwsAccounts, denying all by default at the organization node. - Manage pools and providers in one dedicated project and limit Workload Identity Pool Admin to it.
- Require an attribute condition on every provider, and grant roles to specific subjects or attributes rather than to a whole pool (
principalSet://…/*).
Frequently asked questions
Why is rotating keys and resetting passwords not enough to remove this access?
The access does not use a Google credential. The attacker signs in at an identity provider they control, and Google Cloud exchanges that provider's tokens for access because a pool provider trusts its issuer. There is no key, user or password in the organization to rotate or disable. The trust itself has to be removed, together with the roles granted to the pool's principals.
Do sign-ins through the new provider show up in audit logs?
Token exchanges by the pool are recorded as `google.identity.sts.v1.SecurityTokenService.ExchangeToken`, which is a Data Access audit log entry and therefore exists only where those logs are enabled. Pool and provider changes, and role grants to `principal://` or `principalSet://` members, are Admin Activity entries and are always written.
What makes a role grant to a whole pool risky even when the federation was planned?
A grant to a `principalSet://` member that ends in `/*` covers every identity the pool accepts, not one workload. If a provider in the pool has no attribute condition, or a loose one, any token from that issuer qualifies. Grant roles to specific subjects or attributes, and require an attribute condition on every provider.
Can the pool and provider rule tell a new trust from maintenance of an existing one?
No. It matches creation, update and undeletion of pools and providers, whatever the content of the change. Inspect the issuer, the attribute mapping and the attribute condition of the provider named in `protoPayload.resourceName`. Several of the methods are long-running operations and usually write a start and a completion entry for one change.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1484.002: Trust Modification
- IAM audit logging
- Best practices for using Workload Identity Federation
- Example logs for Workload Identity Federation
- Respond to compromised Google Cloud credentials
- SCIM provisioning for Workforce Identity Federation
- Delete Workforce Identity Federation users and their data