How the attack works
The identity source of IAM Identity Center decides where users and groups come from and who authenticates them: the built-in Identity Center directory, Active Directory, or an external identity provider that signs SAML assertions. AWS documents that a change between the Identity Center directory and an external identity provider, or between two external identity providers, preserves users, groups, memberships and assignments, and that the assignments keep working as long as the new provider sends a SAML NameID that matches the user name in Identity Center. A change to Active Directory removes users, groups, memberships and assignments.
This makes the identity source a trust anchor for every account behind the access portal. Whoever controls the external identity provider can assert any user name, including one that holds an administrator permission set in every account. An attacker with administration rights in the management account or the delegated administrator account can switch the source, or change the configuration or the certificate of the provider that is already connected. The console makes these changes through operations that are not part of the public Identity Center API: AssociateDirectory and DisassociateDirectory under sso.amazonaws.com, and the external identity provider operations under sso-directory.amazonaws.com. AWS lists them in the Service Authorization Reference and states that console operations can appear in CloudTrail, but it publishes no example event for them, so the rules on this page match on event source and event name only. Two neighbouring trust settings are public API events under sso.amazonaws.com: a trusted token issuer (CreateTrustedTokenIssuer, UpdateTrustedTokenIssuer) is an external identity provider whose tokens applications enabled for Identity Center can use for authentication, and CreateInstance creates a separate Identity Center instance in an account. The page has rules for both, and for the application grants (PutApplicationGrant) that name the trusted token issuers an application accepts.
What an attacker needs
- Administration rights for IAM Identity Center in the Organizations management account or in the Identity Center delegated administrator account.
- A directory or an external identity provider that the attacker controls, or a signing certificate of their own to import.
Impact
Sign-in as any existing Identity Center user with that user's assignments, which usually includes administrator access to every account in the organization. A switch to Active Directory instead removes users, groups and assignments and locks the workforce out. In both cases the access has to be repaired in Identity Center, not in the member accounts.
Detection rules
IAM Identity Center Application Grant or Authentication Method Set
Detects PutApplicationGrant and PutApplicationAuthenticationMethod calls to IAM Identity Center. PutApplicationGrant sets a grant type of an application (authorization code, refresh token, JWT bearer or token exchange), and its JWT bearer grant names the trusted token issuers whose tokens the application accepts. PutApplicationAuthenticationMethod adds or updates an authentication method for the application. Together they decide who can obtain Identity Center tokens through an application, so a change by anyone but the Identity Center administrators deserves a look. AWS lists both events among the CloudTrail events of the public Identity Center API, with the event source sso.amazonaws.com, and publishes no example record for them, so the rule matches the event names only. Read the application ARN and the grant in the request. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center Application Grant or Authentication Method Set
id: 917620f2-c0be-4add-a1aa-90c24c9f10ac
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects PutApplicationGrant and PutApplicationAuthenticationMethod calls
to IAM Identity Center. PutApplicationGrant sets a grant type of an
application (authorization code, refresh token, JWT bearer or token
exchange), and its JWT bearer grant names the trusted token issuers whose
tokens the application accepts. PutApplicationAuthenticationMethod adds or
updates an authentication method for the application. Together they
decide who can obtain Identity Center tokens through an application,
so a change by anyone but the Identity Center administrators deserves a
look. AWS lists both events among the CloudTrail events of the public
Identity Center API, with the event source sso.amazonaws.com, and
publishes no example record for them, so the rule matches the event names
only. Read the application ARN and the grant in the request.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_PutApplicationGrant.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- PutApplicationGrant
- PutApplicationAuthenticationMethod
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Setup of AWS managed applications and of customer managed applications by the Identity Center administrators or by the AWS service that creates the application. Add the roles and services that do this to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn or userIdentity.invokedBy.
level: low
False positives
- Setup of AWS managed applications and of customer managed applications by the Identity Center administrators or by the AWS service that creates the application. Add the roles and services that do this to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn or userIdentity.invokedBy.
IAM Identity Center External Identity Provider Configuration or Certificate Changed
Detects changes to the external identity provider configuration of the Identity Center directory: the configuration created, updated or deleted, and a certificate for verifying the provider's responses imported or deleted. These operations decide whose SAML assertions IAM Identity Center accepts, without changing the type of identity source. They are console operations of sso-directory.amazonaws.com that the Service Authorization Reference lists. AWS states that such operations can appear in CloudTrail and publishes no example event, so the rule matches on event source and event name only and should be tested in your environment. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center External Identity Provider Configuration or Certificate Changed
id: a8ea1c3c-484b-487b-8234-a5ea0b7b6b32
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects changes to the external identity provider configuration of the
Identity Center directory: the configuration created, updated or deleted,
and a certificate for verifying the provider's responses imported or
deleted. These operations decide whose SAML assertions IAM Identity Center
accepts, without changing the type of identity source. They are console
operations of sso-directory.amazonaws.com that the Service Authorization
Reference lists. AWS states that such operations can appear in CloudTrail
and publishes no example event, so the rule matches on event source and
event name only and should be tested in your environment.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_sso-directory.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso-directory.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- CreateExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory
- UpdateExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory
- DeleteExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory
- ImportExternalIdPCertificate
- DeleteExternalIdPCertificate
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rotation of the identity provider's signing certificate and updates of its metadata by the identity team; confirm that the certificate and the settings come from your own identity provider.
level: medium
False positives
- Rotation of the identity provider's signing certificate and updates of its metadata by the identity team; confirm that the certificate and the settings come from your own identity provider.
IAM Identity Center External Identity Provider Enabled or Disabled
Detects EnableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory and DisableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory events from sso-directory.amazonaws.com. The Service Authorization Reference describes them as enabling and disabling the authentication of end users with an external identity provider. Enabling hands the sign-in of every Identity Center user to that provider, and disabling takes it away from the provider in use. They are console operations without a public API. AWS states that such operations can appear in CloudTrail and publishes no example event, so the rule matches on event source and event name only and should be tested in your environment. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center External Identity Provider Enabled or Disabled
id: 767a1801-928a-4d52-b44f-773a7d26eb00
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects EnableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory and
DisableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory events from
sso-directory.amazonaws.com. The Service Authorization Reference describes
them as enabling and disabling the authentication of end users with an
external identity provider. Enabling hands the sign-in of every Identity
Center user to that provider, and disabling takes it away from the provider
in use. They are console operations without a public API. AWS states that
such operations can appear in CloudTrail and publishes no example event, so
the rule matches on event source and event name only and should be tested
in your environment.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_sso-directory.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/manage-your-identity-source-considerations.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso-directory.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- EnableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory
- DisableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A planned move to or away from an external identity provider, which is a rare project with a change record; confirm the record and the provider that was configured.
level: high
False positives
- A planned move to or away from an external identity provider, which is a rare project with a change record; confirm the record and the provider that was configured.
IAM Identity Center Instance Created
Detects CreateInstance calls to IAM Identity Center. The call creates an instance of Identity Center in an account, with an identity store of its own, next to the instance of the organization. AWS documents how to deny sso:CreateInstance with a service control policy for all accounts except an approved list, because an instance that nobody planned is a second place where users and application access are managed outside the central one. AWS lists CreateInstance among the CloudTrail events of the public Identity Center API, with the event source sso.amazonaws.com, and publishes no example record for it, so the rule matches the event name only. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center Instance Created
id: f5ae0dac-d3e5-4501-8e58-8a0afb484fa7
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects CreateInstance calls to IAM Identity Center. The call creates an
instance of Identity Center in an account, with an identity store of its
own, next to the instance of the organization. AWS documents how to deny
sso:CreateInstance with a service control policy for all accounts except
an approved list, because an instance that nobody planned is a second
place where users and application access are managed outside the central
one. AWS lists CreateInstance among the CloudTrail events of the public
Identity Center API, with the event source sso.amazonaws.com, and
publishes no example record for it, so the rule matches the event name
only.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/control-account-instance.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName: CreateInstance
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Teams that are allowed to run an account instance for one application, and AWS services that offer to create one during their setup. Confirm each event with the Identity Center administrators, and add approved accounts to a filter_* selection on recipientAccountId.
level: medium
False positives
- Teams that are allowed to run an account instance for one application, and AWS services that offer to create one during their setup. Confirm each event with the Identity Center administrators, and add approved accounts to a filter_* selection on recipientAccountId.
IAM Identity Center Directory Associated or Disassociated
Detects AssociateDirectory and DisassociateDirectory events from sso.amazonaws.com. The Service Authorization Reference describes them as connecting a directory to be used by IAM Identity Center and disassociating it, which is what a change of the identity source does. They are console operations without a public API. AWS states that such operations can appear in CloudTrail and publishes no example event, so the rule matches on event source and event name only and should be tested in your environment. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center Directory Associated or Disassociated
id: 97ff32b4-c57e-4c9c-9c86-20f3c6cf6f61
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects AssociateDirectory and DisassociateDirectory events from
sso.amazonaws.com. The Service Authorization Reference describes them as
connecting a directory to be used by IAM Identity Center and disassociating
it, which is what a change of the identity source does. They are console
operations without a public API. AWS states that such operations can appear
in CloudTrail and publishes no example event, so the rule matches on event
source and event name only and should be tested in your environment.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_iam-identity-center.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/manage-your-identity-source-considerations.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- AssociateDirectory
- DisassociateDirectory
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- The first setup of IAM Identity Center and a planned migration of the identity source, which are rare projects with a change record; confirm the record and the directory that was connected.
level: high
False positives
- The first setup of IAM Identity Center and a planned migration of the identity source, which are rare projects with a change record; confirm the record and the directory that was connected.
IAM Identity Center Trusted Token Issuer Created or Updated
Detects CreateTrustedTokenIssuer and UpdateTrustedTokenIssuer calls to IAM Identity Center. AWS describes a trusted token issuer as an external identity provider that can generate claims or assertions in the form of access tokens for a user, which applications enabled for Identity Center can use for authentication. A new issuer, or a changed configuration of an existing one, therefore adds or changes a party whose tokens Identity Center accepts for its users. AWS lists both events among the CloudTrail events of the public Identity Center API, with the event source sso.amazonaws.com, and publishes no example record for them, so the rule matches the event names only. Read the issuer URL and the attribute mapping in the request and compare them with your own identity provider. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center Trusted Token Issuer Created or Updated
id: 86bece47-adf2-4020-9147-e40f689e240d
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects CreateTrustedTokenIssuer and UpdateTrustedTokenIssuer calls to IAM
Identity Center. AWS describes a trusted token issuer as an external
identity provider that can generate claims or assertions in the form of
access tokens for a user, which applications enabled for Identity Center
can use for authentication. A new issuer, or a changed configuration of an
existing one, therefore adds or changes a party whose tokens Identity
Center accepts for its users. AWS lists both events among the CloudTrail
events of the public Identity Center API, with the event source
sso.amazonaws.com, and publishes no example record for them, so the rule
matches the event names only. Read the issuer URL and the attribute
mapping in the request and compare them with your own identity provider.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_CreateTrustedTokenIssuer.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- CreateTrustedTokenIssuer
- UpdateTrustedTokenIssuer
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Projects that set up trusted identity propagation for an analytics or AI service, done once by the Identity Center administrators. These are rare and planned, so confirm each event with that team.
level: medium
False positives
- Projects that set up trusted identity propagation for an analytics or AI service, done once by the Identity Center administrators. These are rare and planned, so confirm each event with that team.
Triage
- Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn), the account and the source address, and check for an approved migration of the identity source.
- Read which operation was called. A directory association, an external identity provider switched on or off, a changed provider configuration and an imported certificate each point to a different variant.
- Compare the identity source settings now in place, such as the sign-in URL, the issuer and the certificates of the provider, with the values of your own identity provider.
- Look for sign-ins to the AWS access portal after the change, with priority on users that hold administrator permission sets and on new source addresses.
- Look for account assignments or permission set changes made by the same caller around the same time.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Restore the identity source from the break-glass role. Connect the known directory or provider again, enter the metadata and certificate of your own identity provider, and remove every certificate you do not recognize.
- Contain the administrator identity that made the change by deactivating its access keys or revoking its role sessions.
- Block the sessions that were opened while the changed source was active. Role sessions started through the access portal keep working until they expire, so identify the users that signed in during that time and deny them as AWS describes for revoking active permission set sessions.
- If the source was switched to Active Directory and the assignments were removed, rebuild users, groups and assignments from your pipeline or records.
- Review what the roles of the affected permission sets did in each account during that period, and compare all permission sets and assignments with the approved state.
Mitigation
- Limit Identity Center administration to a small group, and keep access to the management account to as few people as possible.
- If Identity Center is administered from a delegated administrator account, deny the directory and external identity provider actions there with a service control policy, except for a break-glass role. Service control policies do not affect the management account.
- Treat a change of the identity source as a planned project with a change record, and alert on these events at once, because they are rare.
- Keep a break-glass role in the management account that does not depend on Identity Center sign-in, so that you can repair the identity source when sign-in is in the wrong hands.
- Protect the external identity provider itself with the same care, because its signing key can assert every Identity Center user.
Frequently asked questions
Why do existing assignments make a change of the identity source dangerous?
AWS documents that a change between the Identity Center directory and an external identity provider, or between two external providers, preserves users, groups, memberships and assignments. The assignments keep working when the new provider sends a SAML NameID that matches the user name in Identity Center. A provider under the control of an attacker can send any user name, so it can sign in as a user that already holds administrator access.
Why do the rules match console operations and not public API calls?
The public IAM Identity Center API has no operation that changes the identity source. The console uses AssociateDirectory and DisassociateDirectory and the external identity provider operations of the Identity Center directory, which AWS lists as actions in the Service Authorization Reference. AWS states that such console operations can appear in CloudTrail but publishes no example event, so the rules match on event source and event name only. Test them in your own environment.
Which variant is the hardest to notice?
A change to the provider that is already connected. Switching the source or turning the external provider off is a visible change in how the workforce signs in. Importing a certificate for verifying the provider's responses, or updating the provider configuration, keeps the same kind of identity source in place, so it is less likely to be noticed by anyone who is not watching these events. The third rule on this page matches those quieter operations.
Do these rules cover users and groups that are provisioned automatically?
No. Automatic provisioning from an identity provider uses a provisioning tenant and bearer tokens, which the Identity Center directory creates with its own operations, and the provisioned users and groups arrive through the SCIM API. The rules on this page match the directory association, the external identity provider configuration, trusted token issuers, new instances and application grants, not provisioning.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1484.002: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification
- Considerations for changing your identity source
- IAM Identity Center information in CloudTrail
- Service Authorization Reference: AWS IAM Identity Center (sso)
- Service Authorization Reference: AWS IAM Identity Center directory (sso-directory)
- IAM Identity Center delegated administration
- Service control policies (SCPs do not affect the management account)
- IAM Identity Center: Use a Deny policy to revoke active user permissions