How the attack works
A Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account has one primary domain and can hold several hundred more. A secondary domain has its own users, who get accounts, addresses and mailboxes at that domain and are managed in the same Admin console. A user alias domain gives every existing user and group an additional address at the alias domain. To add either kind, an administrator enters the domain name and proves ownership of the domain, for example with a DNS record. The primary domain can also be replaced by a secondary domain.
The ownership check protects the owner of the domain, not the organization. An attacker who holds an admin account can add a domain that they registered themselves and verify it, because they control its DNS. Accounts created at that domain are users of the organization. Google states that Drive sharing cannot be restricted by domain and follows the organization and its organizational units, so such an account is internal for sharing, and a name that resembles the real domain makes it hard to spot. Changing the primary domain alters the identity of the whole account and disrupts every user.
The Admin audit log records ADD_SECONDARY_DOMAIN and ADD_DOMAIN_ALIAS when an unverified domain is created in the account, VERIFY_SECONDARY_DOMAIN and VERIFY_DOMAIN_ALIAS when it is verified, CHANGE_PRIMARY_DOMAIN when the primary domain name changes and CHANGE_DOMAIN_NAME when a change of domain name is started. The parameters hold the domain names. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. Domains are added rarely, and every one can be checked against the list of domains the company owns.
What an attacker needs
- An admin account with the Domain Settings or Domain Management privilege, or a super admin account.
- A registered domain whose DNS the attacker controls, to pass the ownership check.
Impact
The account holds a domain the organization does not control. Accounts at that domain are users of the organization, for sharing among other things, and they give the attacker a way back that does not depend on any existing user. An alias domain adds an address at the attacker's domain to every user and group. A change of the primary domain disrupts sign-in addresses and mail for everyone and is hard to reverse quickly.
Detection rules
Primary Domain Changed or Domain Name Change Started in Google Workspace
Detects a change of the primary domain of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CHANGE_PRIMARY_DOMAIN, rendered as "Primary domain name changed from {DOMAIN_NAME} to {NEW_VALUE}") or the start of a domain name change (CHANGE_DOMAIN_NAME, rendered as "Change of domain name for {DOMAIN_NAME} to {NEW_VALUE} started"). The primary domain is the identity of the account. Google describes changing it as an involved process that affects email addresses, Drive sharing and other services, and that follows a rebranding or a new domain. An unplanned change disrupts every user and can hand the identity of the account to a domain the attacker added first. The old domain is in the event parameter DOMAIN_NAME in protoPayload.metadata and the new one in NEW_VALUE. The admin is in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Primary Domain Changed or Domain Name Change Started in Google Workspace
id: 0b34e57d-84bd-4ae7-8224-29377456f60b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change of the primary domain of a Google Workspace or Cloud
Identity account (Admin audit event CHANGE_PRIMARY_DOMAIN, rendered as
"Primary domain name changed from {DOMAIN_NAME} to {NEW_VALUE}") or the
start of a domain name change (CHANGE_DOMAIN_NAME, rendered as "Change of
domain name for {DOMAIN_NAME} to {NEW_VALUE} started"). The primary domain
is the identity of the account. Google describes changing it as an
involved process that affects email addresses, Drive sharing and other
services, and that follows a rebranding or a new domain. An unplanned
change disrupts every user and can hand the identity of the account to a
domain the attacker added first. The old domain is in the event parameter
DOMAIN_NAME in protoPayload.metadata and the new one in NEW_VALUE. The
admin is in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin
Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once
Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the
SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/domains/change-your-primary-domain-for-google-workspace
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.admin.AdminService.changePrimaryDomain
- google.admin.AdminService.changeDomainName
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A planned rebranding in which the company moves to a new primary domain. This happens once in years and is announced to every user beforehand, so an event without a project behind it needs an immediate check.
level: high
False positives
- A planned rebranding in which the company moves to a new primary domain. This happens once in years and is announced to every user beforehand, so an event without a project behind it needs an immediate check.
Secondary Domain or Domain Alias Added or Verified in Google Workspace
Detects a domain being added to a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account or verified in it. The Admin audit log writes ADD_SECONDARY_DOMAIN ("An unverified {SECONDARY_DOMAIN_NAME} created as a secondary domain of {DOMAIN_NAME}") and ADD_DOMAIN_ALIAS ("An unverified {DOMAIN_ALIAS} created as an alias of {DOMAIN_NAME}") when the domain is entered, and VERIFY_SECONDARY_DOMAIN and VERIFY_DOMAIN_ALIAS when its ownership is verified. A secondary domain has its own users, and an alias domain gives every existing user and group an additional address. An attacker with admin rights adds a domain they registered themselves, which passes the ownership check, and gains a place for accounts inside the organization. The domain is in the event parameter SECONDARY_DOMAIN_NAME or DOMAIN_ALIAS in protoPayload.metadata, with the primary domain in DOMAIN_NAME and, for an alias, the method in DOMAIN_VERIFICATION_METHOD. The admin is in principalEmail. Removing a domain is a different event and does not match. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Secondary Domain or Domain Alias Added or Verified in Google Workspace
id: 4ea0336f-d88b-4a9d-8b89-4cc413d646ad
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a domain being added to a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity
account or verified in it. The Admin audit log writes ADD_SECONDARY_DOMAIN
("An unverified {SECONDARY_DOMAIN_NAME} created as a secondary domain of
{DOMAIN_NAME}") and ADD_DOMAIN_ALIAS ("An unverified {DOMAIN_ALIAS}
created as an alias of {DOMAIN_NAME}") when the domain is entered, and
VERIFY_SECONDARY_DOMAIN and VERIFY_DOMAIN_ALIAS when its ownership is
verified. A secondary domain has its own users, and an alias domain gives
every existing user and group an additional address. An attacker with
admin rights adds a domain they registered themselves, which passes the
ownership check, and gains a place for accounts inside the organization.
The domain is in the event parameter SECONDARY_DOMAIN_NAME or
DOMAIN_ALIAS in protoPayload.metadata, with the primary domain in
DOMAIN_NAME and, for an alias, the method in DOMAIN_VERIFICATION_METHOD.
The admin is in principalEmail. Removing a domain is a different event
and does not match. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity
entries at organization level, which are always written once Google
Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM
only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/domains/add-a-user-alias-domain-or-secondary-domain
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.admin.AdminService.addSecondaryDomain
- google.admin.AdminService.verifySecondaryDomain
- google.admin.AdminService.addDomainAlias
- google.admin.AdminService.verifyDomainAlias
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A rebranding, an acquisition or a new brand, for which the company adds a domain it owns. Domains are added rarely. Check each one against the list of domains the company has registered, and expect a creation event and a verification event for the same domain.
level: medium
False positives
- A rebranding, an acquisition or a new brand, for which the company adds a domain it owns. Domains are added rarely. Check each one against the list of domains the company has registered, and expect a creation event and a verification event for the same domain.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Domain added and accounts created at that domain soon after
A domain added for a rebranding or an acquisition is filled by a planned migration. A domain added as a foothold gets one or two accounts within hours or days, often by the same admin. Joining the new domain name to the addresses of newly created users shows it.
- A
google.admin.AdminService.addSecondaryDomainorverifySecondaryDomainentry. Note the domain in the event parameterSECONDARY_DOMAIN_NAMEand the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 7 days,
google.admin.AdminService.createUserentries whoseUSER_EMAILends with that domain. - Check whether the new accounts received admin roles (
assignRolewith the sameUSER_EMAIL) or were added to groups.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.addSecondaryDomaingoogle.admin.AdminService.verifySecondaryDomaingoogle.admin.AdminService.createUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRole
LimitsA real acquisition produces the same sequence at a larger scale, so the ownership of the domain decides. Existing users who are renamed to the new domain do not produce a creation event. The 7 days are a starting point.
Triage
- Read the domain in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. It is in SECONDARY_DOMAIN_NAME for a secondary domain, in DOMAIN_ALIAS for an alias and in NEW_VALUE for a primary domain change. DOMAIN_NAME holds the primary domain.
- Check whether the company owns that domain, with the team that manages domain registrations. A domain nobody in the company registered, or one that resembles the real domain, is an incident.
- Look for the verification event after the creation event. For an alias, DOMAIN_VERIFICATION_METHOD shows how ownership was proved.
- Search for accounts, groups and aliases at the new domain, for example google.admin.AdminService.createUser entries whose USER_EMAIL ends with it.
- Identify the admin who made the change (principalEmail), confirm it with that person through a second channel and check the recent sign-ins of that account.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Suspend every account at the unauthorized domain at once, and record what those accounts own, which groups they are in and what was shared with them.
- Secure the admin account that made the change. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies so that existing sessions end, and review its 2-Step Verification methods and admin roles.
- Remove the domain from the account. Google's steps for a secondary domain start with deleting its groups, removing its aliases and renaming or removing its users.
- Review what the accounts at that domain accessed and what was shared with them, and withdraw that access.
- If the primary domain was changed, follow Google's procedure to change it back and tell users which addresses are valid, because sign-in addresses and mail are affected.
Mitigation
- Turn on multi-party approval for the sensitive domain settings where your edition offers it. Google lists adding a user alias domain or secondary domain, changing the primary domain and removing a domain among the actions it can protect.
- Give the Domain Settings and Domain Management privileges only to the few administrators who need them, and keep super admins few.
- Keep an inventory of the domains the company owns and compare the Manage domains page of the Admin console with it regularly.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.
Frequently asked questions
Does Google's domain verification stop an attacker from adding a domain?
Only from adding a domain that belongs to someone else. Verification proves that whoever adds the domain controls it, for example by placing a record in its DNS. An attacker who registered a domain for the purpose passes the check. It does not ask whether the organization wants that domain in its account, so the audit event is where the question has to be asked.
What is the difference between a secondary domain and a user alias domain here?
A secondary domain has its own set of users, so it is where new accounts can be created at an address the attacker chose. A user alias domain creates no accounts. It gives every existing user and group an additional email address at that domain. Google states that users cannot sign in with their alias domain addresses.
Are accounts at a secondary domain treated as internal users?
They are users of the same Google Workspace account and are managed in the same Admin console. Google states that settings cannot be set per domain and that Drive sharing cannot be restricted by domain, because sharing options are based on the organization and its organizational units. An account at an added domain is therefore inside the organization as far as sharing is concerned.
Can multi-party approval protect domain changes?
In the editions that offer it, yes. Google lists three sensitive domain settings that can require approval, namely adding a user alias domain or secondary domain, changing the primary domain and removing a domain. A super administrator or an administrator with the matching review privilege then has to approve the request before it takes effect.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1484.002: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification
- Add a user alias domain or secondary domain
- Limitations with multiple domains
- Change your primary domain for Google Workspace
- Remove a domain from your managed Google Account
- Multi-party approval for sensitive actions
- Administrator privilege definitions (Domains)
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: domain settings (ADD_SECONDARY_DOMAIN, ADD_DOMAIN_ALIAS, CHANGE_PRIMARY_DOMAIN)
- Admin audit events: user settings (CREATE_USER)