How the attack works
Google Workspace and Cloud Identity can hand the sign-in of their users to a third-party identity provider (IdP). The settings live in SSO profiles. A SAML profile holds the IdP entity ID, the sign-in page URL and the certificate whose public key verifies sign-ins from the IdP, and profiles are assigned to organizational units or groups. Organizations that have not migrated use the legacy SSO profile, which serves a single IdP. Whoever holds the private key that matches the certificate in a profile can assert a sign-in for any user the profile covers, and the same identities sign in to Google Cloud.
An attacker who controls a super admin, or an admin with the Security Settings privilege, can replace the sign-in page URL and the certificate with those of an IdP they run, or turn SSO on where it was off. From then on they sign in as the organization's users without knowing a password. This is the Workspace counterpart of a federation backdoor. The legacy profile reaches furthest: Google documents that while it is enabled, assertions sent to its address are accepted even when the user is a super admin or is assigned to another profile. Turning SSO off is the opposite move, and it sends users back to whatever Google password their accounts have.
Google documents two Admin audit events for these settings. CHANGE_SSO_SETTINGS records that the SSO settings of the domain changed, and TOGGLE_SSO_ENABLED records SSO being turned on or off, with the new value. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level, under the service name admin.googleapis.com, with the method names google.admin.AdminService.changeSsoSettings and google.admin.AdminService.toggleSsoEnabled.
What an attacker needs
- Control of a super admin account, or of an admin whose role includes the Security Settings privilege.
- An identity provider the attacker controls, with a signing key of their own.
- No second approver. With multi-party approval turned on for the SSO settings, another admin has to approve the change.
Impact
Sign-in as any user the changed profile covers, without the user's password, including delegated admins and principals that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud. With the legacy SSO profile the exposure can include super admins: Google warns that if the IdP is compromised, a third party can access the Admin console and every aspect of the organization's account. The access lasts until the settings are restored and does not depend on any account the defenders can reset.
Detection rules
Single Sign-On Settings Changed in Google Workspace
Detects a change to the single sign-on settings of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CHANGE_SSO_SETTINGS). A changed sign-in page URL or certificate can hand the sign-in of the organization's users to an identity provider the defenders do not control. The event names only the domain (DOMAIN_NAME in protoPayload.metadata), not the setting that changed, so compare the current settings with your identity provider. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Single Sign-On Settings Changed in Google Workspace
id: b27d7b22-e257-4a2b-a9c4-6cb0cc5c1234
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to the single sign-on settings of a Google Workspace or
Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CHANGE_SSO_SETTINGS). A changed
sign-in page URL or certificate can hand the sign-in of the organization's
users to an identity provider the defenders do not control. The event names
only the domain (DOMAIN_NAME in protoPayload.metadata), not the setting that
changed, so compare the current settings with your identity provider. The
entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization
level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled,
and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/setting-up-sso
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.changeSsoSettings
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Certificate rotation, a migration to another identity provider or the move from the legacy SSO profile to SSO profiles, planned by the identity team. These changes are rare, so check each event against a change record and compare the sign-in page URL and certificates with the expected values.
level: medium
False positives
- Certificate rotation, a migration to another identity provider or the move from the legacy SSO profile to SSO profiles, planned by the identity team. These changes are rare, so check each event against a change record and compare the sign-in page URL and certificates with the expected values.
Single Sign-On Turned On or Off in Google Workspace
Detects single sign-on with a third-party identity provider being turned on or off for a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event TOGGLE_SSO_ENABLED). Turning it on can put an identity provider the defenders do not control in charge of sign-ins, and turning it off sends users back to their Google passwords. The rule fires on both directions, because the method name does not carry the new value. Read NEW_VALUE (true or false) and DOMAIN_NAME in the event parameters (protoPayload.metadata). The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
title: Single Sign-On Turned On or Off in Google Workspace
id: 3cf50970-2d66-4fe0-a2a4-ca46828917b7
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects single sign-on with a third-party identity provider being turned on
or off for a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event
TOGGLE_SSO_ENABLED). Turning it on can put an identity provider the
defenders do not control in charge of sign-ins, and turning it off sends
users back to their Google passwords. The rule fires on both directions,
because the method name does not carry the new value. Read NEW_VALUE (true
or false) and DOMAIN_NAME in the event parameters (protoPayload.metadata).
The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at
organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google
Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs
are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/super-administrator-sso
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.toggleSsoEnabled
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- The first setup of single sign-on, a migration between identity providers or the retirement of the legacy SSO profile. Each is a planned project of the identity team, so confirm the event against its change record.
level: medium
False positives
- The first setup of single sign-on, a migration between identity providers or the retirement of the legacy SSO profile. Each is a planned project of the identity team, so confirm the event against its change record.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
SSO settings changed and SAML sign-ins from unfamiliar addresses soon after
With an identity provider of their own in place, the attacker signs in as the organization's users without their passwords, and those sign-ins arrive as SAML sign-ins in the Login audit log. SAML sign-ins from addresses the accounts have not used, in the hours after the SSO settings changed, are that use, and the first of them name the accounts the attacker went for.
- A
google.admin.AdminService.changeSsoSettingsentry, or agoogle.admin.AdminService.toggleSsoEnabledentry whoseNEW_VALUEis true, ofadmin.googleapis.com. Note the time and the admin inauthenticationInfo.principalEmail. - Within 24 hours,
google.login.LoginService.loginSuccessentries oflogin.googleapis.comwhose event parameterlogin_typeissaml, with the account inauthenticationInfo.principalEmailand the address inrequestMetadata.callerIp. - Raise the sign-ins from an address the account has not used in the past 30 days, first for admins and for accounts with IAM roles in Google Cloud, and any account that signs in with
samlfor the first time.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.changeSsoSettingsgoogle.admin.AdminService.toggleSsoEnabledgoogle.login.LoginService.loginSuccess
LimitsA planned move to a new identity provider changes the settings and is followed by many SAML sign-ins, most from the usual addresses. An attacker who signs in through a proxy near the users looks familiar. The Login audit log reaches the SIEM only with the organization-level Data Access log. The 24 hours and 30 days are starting points.
Triage
- Identify the admin (principalEmail) and confirm the change with them through a second channel. Check that admin's recent sign-ins.
- For SSO turned on or off, read NEW_VALUE and DOMAIN_NAME in the event parameters (protoPayload.metadata). The value is true or false.
- For a settings change, the event names only the domain. Open the SSO settings in the Admin console and compare the entity ID, the sign-in page URL and the certificates of every profile with the values of your identity provider. Check the profile assignments of organizational units and groups as well.
- Look in the Alert Center for an SSO profile added, updated or deleted alert at the same time. It names the actor and the profile.
- Check whether the change matches a certificate rotation or an identity provider migration that the identity team planned.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Restore the SSO settings. Put back the entity ID, sign-in page URL and certificate of your own identity provider, remove certificates and profiles nobody recognises, and correct the profile assignments. If the right values cannot be confirmed quickly, assign no profile to the affected organizational units, which turns SSO off for them until the settings are verified.
- Secure the admin account that made the change. Reset its password, end its sessions and review its 2-Step Verification methods and recovery options from a session you trust.
- Treat every account the changed profile covered as possibly used by someone else since the change. Review their sign-ins for that period, starting with admins and with principals that hold IAM roles in Google Cloud, and reset the sign-in cookies of accounts with sign-ins nobody can explain.
- Review what those accounts did, such as admin role assignments, domain-wide delegation grants, changes to 2-Step Verification and new role bindings in the Google Cloud organization, and undo it.
- Check the other security settings the same admin changed in that period.
Mitigation
- Migrate from the legacy SSO profile to SSO profiles. Single sign-on for super admins is supported only by the legacy profile, and Google names the migration as the way to turn it off.
- Turn on multi-party approval for changes to the SSO settings with a third-party identity provider.
- Keep super admins and holders of the Security Settings privilege few, on separate accounts with security keys or passkeys.
- Send the Alert Center alerts for SSO profiles being added, updated and deleted to the people who own the identity provider.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.
Frequently asked questions
Does the audit event say what was changed in the SSO settings?
No. Google documents `CHANGE_SSO_SETTINGS` with a single parameter, the primary domain name, so the entry does not say whether the sign-in page URL, the certificate or something else changed. `TOGGLE_SSO_ENABLED` carries the domain name and the new value, true or false. The current values have to be read in the Admin console and compared with your identity provider.
Can a rogue identity provider sign in as a super admin?
It depends on the profile. Google states that single sign-on for super admins is supported only with the legacy SSO profile, and that while the legacy profile is enabled, assertions sent to its address are accepted even when the user is a super admin. Google also warns that with super admin SSO a compromised identity provider gives access to the Admin console. The newer SSO profiles do not support super admin SSO.
Do these rules see every change to an SSO profile?
That is not certain. Google's audit event reference lists two events for SSO settings, and the rules read both. It does not list separate events for adding, updating, deleting or assigning the newer SSO profiles, and it does not say whether those actions are recorded under the same two events. The Alert Center has its own alerts for SSO profiles being added, updated and deleted, so use those as a second source.
When is a change to the SSO settings expected?
During a certificate rotation, for which Google lets a profile hold two certificates, during a migration to another identity provider and during the move from the legacy profile to SSO profiles. These are planned by the identity team and happen rarely, so every event can be checked against a change record.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1484.002: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: domain settings (CHANGE_SSO_SETTINGS, TOGGLE_SSO_ENABLED)
- Setting up SSO
- Super administrator SSO
- Multi-party approval for sensitive actions
- View alert details (SSO profile added, updated, deleted)
- Alert Center API: alert types
- Login audit events (login_success, login_type saml)