How the attack works
Privileged Identity Management (PIM) wraps privileged roles in rules: an eligible user must activate the role, and the role's settings decide whether activation requires MFA or a Conditional Access authentication context, a justification, a ticket number or approval, how long an activation lasts, whether permanent assignments are allowed, and who is notified. These settings exist per role for Microsoft Entra roles, PIM for Groups and Azure resource roles.
An attacker with Privileged Role Administrator or Global Administrator (or Owner or User Access Administrator for Azure resource roles) can quietly remove approval and MFA from Global Administrator, lengthen activations, allow permanent active assignments or turn off the notifications defenders rely on. The change is logged by PIM as Update role setting in PIM. Disabling PIM security alerts, such as the alert for roles assigned outside PIM, is logged as Disable PIM alert or Update PIM alert setting.
What an attacker needs
- A compromised identity with Privileged Role Administrator or Global Administrator, or Owner or User Access Administrator on the Azure scope for resource roles.
Impact
Privileged roles that can be activated by a compromised eligible account without approval or step-up authentication, longer or permanent elevated access, and fewer notifications to the people who would notice.
Detection rules
PIM Security Alert Disabled or Its Settings Changed
Detects a Privileged Identity Management security alert being disabled or its settings changed. Alerts such as roles assigned outside PIM or too many Global Administrators are an early warning for role abuse.
title: PIM Security Alert Disabled or Its Settings Changed
id: ce8d2f10-17fb-4cb1-8a74-03a3c29d7bd2
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a Privileged Identity Management security alert being disabled or
its settings changed. Alerts such as roles assigned outside PIM or too many
Global Administrators are an early warning for role abuse.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Disable PIM alert
- Update PIM alert setting
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Tuning of noisy alerts by the PIM owners; confirm the change and the reason.
level: medium
False positives
- Tuning of noisy alerts by the PIM owners; confirm the change and the reason.
PIM Role Setting Updated
Detects a change to the settings of a role managed by Privileged Identity Management (Microsoft Entra roles, PIM for Groups or Azure resource roles), such as activation approval, MFA, duration, assignment expiry or notifications.
title: PIM Role Setting Updated
id: 7e28f2d9-d06a-442d-a496-e336dcf1c7ec
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a change to the settings of a role managed by Privileged Identity
Management (Microsoft Entra roles, PIM for Groups or Azure resource roles),
such as activation approval, MFA, duration, assignment expiry or
notifications.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-change-default-settings
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName: Update role setting in PIM
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Planned PIM configuration changes during deployment or governance reviews; match each change to a change record.
level: high
False positives
- Planned PIM configuration changes during deployment or governance reviews; match each change to a change record.
Triage
- Identify the role (TargetResources) and compare the old and new rule values for approval, MFA or authentication context, activation duration, permanent assignment and notifications.
- Confirm the actor (InitiatedBy) and a change record.
- Look for activations or assignments of the same role shortly after the change.
- If unauthorized, restore the settings, review activations since the change and investigate the actor.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Restore the settings of the role from your baseline (approval, MFA or authentication context, activation duration, permanent assignment and notifications) and turn the disabled PIM alerts back on.
- Review every activation and assignment of the role since the change. Remove the assignments nobody approved, end the activations and revoke the sessions of those accounts.
- Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that changed the settings, and remove its Privileged Role Administrator or Global Administrator role.
- Review what was done with the role during those activations and undo it.
- Compare the settings of every other role with the baseline, in Microsoft Entra roles, PIM for Groups and Azure resource roles, because the same actor may have changed more than one.
Mitigation
- Require approval and phishing-resistant MFA (or an authentication context) on activation of Tier 0 roles, and keep notifications to a monitored mailbox.
- Limit Privileged Role Administrator to a few PIM-managed accounts and alert on every role setting change.
- Export PIM role settings regularly and compare them with the approved baseline.
Frequently asked questions
No role was assigned, so why is a settings change serious?
The settings decide whether an activation needs MFA, an authentication context, a justification or approval, how long it lasts and who is notified. Once they are weakened, a compromised eligible account can activate a privileged role without approval or step-up authentication, and fewer people are told.
Which settings should be compared after an alert?
The rule matches the activity `Update role setting in PIM` and does not say what changed. Identify the role in TargetResources and compare the old and the new rule values for approval, MFA or authentication context, activation duration, permanent assignment and notifications.
Does the rule cover Azure resource roles and PIM for Groups?
It is written to. Role settings exist per role for Microsoft Entra roles, PIM for Groups and Azure resource roles, and the rule matches the PIM activity for a settings change. For Azure resource roles the change can be made by an Owner or a User Access Administrator of the scope, not only by a directory administrator.
Why watch PIM alerts being disabled?
PIM security alerts, such as the alert for roles assigned outside PIM or for too many Global Administrators, are an early warning for role abuse. Disabling one removes that warning. Owners of PIM do tune noisy alerts, so confirm the change and the reason.