How the attack works
Active Directory has three safeguards that are set on an account to limit how its credentials can be used. Members of the Protected Users group cannot authenticate with NTLM, cannot use DES or RC4 in Kerberos pre-authentication, cannot be delegated with unconstrained or constrained delegation, and receive ticket-granting tickets that last four hours and are not renewed beyond that. The account option Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated (the NOT_DELEGATED flag) keeps the security context of the account from being delegated to a service, even where that service is trusted for delegation. An authentication policy, assigned directly or through an authentication policy silo, restricts the devices an account may sign in from and the services it may request tickets to.
Each safeguard blocks an attack that works against an unprotected account. A stolen NTLM hash is useless for a Protected Users member, a delegation host cannot collect the identity of a sensitive account, and a siloed administrator cannot be used from a workstation outside the silo. An attacker who has write access to the account or to the group, but who cannot yet use the account, removes the safeguard first. After that the stolen hash, the delegation path or the foreign host works. The change looks like routine account maintenance and no member is added to any privileged group.
The removals are logged on the domain controller. Leaving Protected Users is event 4729 for the group with the well-known RID 525, a global group. Clearing the sensitive flag appears in event 4738 as the user account control change 'Not Delegated' - Disabled. Taking an account out of an authentication policy or silo is a directory change, event 5136 with a value deleted from msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicy, msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicySilo or, on the silo object, msDS-AuthNPolicySiloMembers. The 5136 events need an auditing entry on the objects. The other two need only the audit policy.
What an attacker needs
- Write access to the membership of the Protected Users group, to the account control flags of the target account, or to its authentication policy attributes. Members of Domain Admins and Account Operators have such rights by default on most accounts, and a delegated help desk role may have them too.
- A way to profit from the removal, such as the NTLM hash of the account, a host that is trusted for delegation, or a compromised computer outside the silo.
Impact
The account can again be used with NTLM and RC4, be delegated, or sign in from hosts outside its silo, depending on which safeguard was removed. For a privileged account this turns a credential the attacker already holds, or a delegation path the attacker already controls, into the rights of that account, up to control of the domain. Credentials of the account are also cached again on the hosts it signs in to.
Detection rules
Account Removed From an Authentication Policy or Silo
Detects a value deleted from one of the attributes that tie an account to an authentication policy or an authentication policy silo (event 5136, Value Deleted). msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicy and msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicySilo are written on the account and name the policy and the silo assigned to it. msDS-AuthNPolicySiloMembers is written on the silo object and lists the principals assigned to the silo. An authentication policy restricts the devices an account may sign in from and the services it may request tickets to, and sets a short lifetime for its ticket-granting ticket. Without the assignment the account can again be used from any host. The account is in ObjectDN for the first two attributes and in AttributeValue for the third. Moving an account from one policy or silo to another deletes the old value and adds the new one, so look for a Value Added event with the same OpCorrelationID before treating the event as a removal. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and an auditing entry (SACL) for writes on the accounts and on the silo objects.
title: Account Removed From an Authentication Policy or Silo
id: 8403972b-8ffb-4fa2-95e2-35e4b7f3351e
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a value deleted from one of the attributes that tie an account to
an authentication policy or an authentication policy silo (event 5136,
Value Deleted). msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicy and msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicySilo
are written on the account and name the policy and the silo assigned to
it. msDS-AuthNPolicySiloMembers is written on the silo object and lists
the principals assigned to the silo. An authentication policy restricts
the devices an account may sign in from and the services it may request
tickets to, and sets a short lifetime for its ticket-granting ticket.
Without the assignment the account can again be used from any host. The
account is in ObjectDN for the first two attributes and in AttributeValue
for the third. Moving an account from one policy or silo to another
deletes the old value and adds the new one, so look for a Value Added
event with the same OpCorrelationID before treating the event as a
removal. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and an auditing entry
(SACL) for writes on the accounts and on the silo objects.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/authentication-policies-and-authentication-policy-silos
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/how-to-configure-protected-accounts
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName:
- msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicy
- msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicySilo
- msDS-AuthNPolicySiloMembers
OperationType:
- '%%14675'
- 'Value Deleted'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- An account that is moved to another policy or silo, which logs a Value Deleted and a Value Added event in the same operation, and accounts that are retired. Match the event to the change record.
level: medium
False positives
- An account that is moved to another policy or silo, which logs a Value Deleted and a Value Added event in the same operation, and accounts that are retired. Match the event to the change record.
Member Removed From the Protected Users Group
Detects a member removed from the Protected Users group (event 4729), matched on its well-known RID 525 so that renamed and localized groups are covered. Protected Users is a global group, so the removal is logged as event 4729. Its members cannot authenticate with NTLM, cannot use DES or RC4 in Kerberos pre-authentication, cannot be delegated and get ticket-granting tickets limited to four hours. The group has no default members, so every member is an account someone decided to protect, in practice a privileged one. Removing it re-opens pass-the-hash, RC4-based ticket requests and delegation for that account, and an attacker who holds its hash or controls a delegation host makes this change first. The member that was removed is in MemberSid and MemberName and the actor in SubjectUserName. Requires Audit Security Group Management.
title: Member Removed From the Protected Users Group
id: d0ec8c56-f2d7-4386-9741-22463e875f45
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a member removed from the Protected Users group (event 4729),
matched on its well-known RID 525 so that renamed and localized groups are
covered. Protected Users is a global group, so the removal is logged as
event 4729. Its members cannot authenticate with NTLM, cannot use DES or
RC4 in Kerberos pre-authentication, cannot be delegated and get
ticket-granting tickets limited to four hours. The group has no default
members, so every member is an account someone decided to protect, in
practice a privileged one. Removing it re-opens pass-the-hash, RC4-based
ticket requests and delegation for that account, and an attacker who holds
its hash or controls a delegation host makes this change first. The member
that was removed is in MemberSid and MemberName and the actor in
SubjectUserName. Requires Audit Security Group Management.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/protected-users-security-group
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-security-group-management
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4729
TargetSid|endswith: '-525'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- An account taken out of the group because an application it uses needs NTLM, RC4 or delegation, or an administrator who leaves the organization. Both come with a ticket. Confirm it and check that the account is not privileged any more or has another protection.
level: high
False positives
- An account taken out of the group because an application it uses needs NTLM, RC4 or delegation, or an administrator who leaves the organization. Both come with a ticket. Confirm it and check that the account is not privileged any more or has another protection.
Sensitive and Cannot Be Delegated Flag Cleared on an Account
Detects a user or computer account change (4738, 4742) whose User Account Control changes include "'Not Delegated' - Disabled" (%%2062). It means that the option Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated was unchecked. While the option is set, the security context of the account is not delegated to a service even if that service is trusted for Kerberos delegation. Once it is cleared, a host with unconstrained delegation receives a reusable ticket of the account when it connects, and constrained delegation can act on its behalf. Microsoft's event documentation lists this change among the flags to monitor for accounts where the setting should be enabled. The rule cannot tell whether the account is privileged, so check the target. Accounts in Protected Users stay protected from delegation whatever the flag says. Requires Audit User Account Management and Audit Computer Account Management.
title: Sensitive and Cannot Be Delegated Flag Cleared on an Account
id: c5f38d9a-ed13-4315-a21f-dce525dbb08a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a user or computer account change (4738, 4742) whose User Account
Control changes include "'Not Delegated' - Disabled" (%%2062). It means
that the option Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated was
unchecked. While the option is set, the security context of the account
is not delegated to a service even if that service is trusted for
Kerberos delegation. Once it is cleared, a host with unconstrained
delegation receives a reusable ticket of the account when it connects,
and constrained delegation can act on its behalf. Microsoft's event
documentation lists this change among the flags to monitor for accounts
where the setting should be enabled. The rule cannot tell whether the
account is privileged, so check the target. Accounts in Protected Users
stay protected from delegation whatever the flag says. Requires Audit
User Account Management and Audit Computer Account Management.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4742
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/active-directory/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4738
- 4742
UserAccountControl|contains: '%%2062'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- An account that has to be delegated for an application, such as a service that acts on behalf of its users, and for which the flag was cleared on purpose. Confirm the change record. A privileged account should not need it.
level: medium
False positives
- An account that has to be delegated for an application, such as a service that acts on behalf of its users, and for which the flag was cleared on purpose. Confirm the change record. A privileged account should not need it.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Safeguard removed and the account then used in the way the safeguard had blocked
A removal that is followed by exactly the authentication the safeguard forbids is the attack in two steps. An administrator who removes an account from Protected Users because of an application problem produces the first step too, but the NTLM or RC4 use that follows then comes from the application server and not from a new host.
- An account leaves Protected Users: event 4729 with a
TargetSidthat ends in -525. KeepMemberSid,MemberNameand the time. - Within 24 hours the same account authenticates with NTLM: event 4776 with the account in
TargetUserNameand the source computer inWorkstation. - Or within 24 hours a ticket is issued for the account with RC4: event 4768 with the account in
TargetUserName, 0x17 inTicketEncryptionTypeand the source inIpAddress. - Compare the source computer or address with the hosts the account used before the removal.
Events472947764768
LimitsEvent 4729 gives the member as a SID and a distinguished name, and events 4776 and 4768 give an account name, so the join needs the account name resolved from the SID. The 24 hours are a starting point. An attacker who waits longer is not matched, and the single-event rule on the removal remains the alert.
Account removed from Protected Users and added back shortly after
An attacker who needs the account without its protections for one action removes it from the group, acts and adds it back, so that a later membership review shows nothing. A removal and an addition of the same member within a short time is rarely planned work.
- An account leaves Protected Users: event 4729 with a
TargetSidthat ends in -525. KeepMemberSidandSubjectUserName. - Within 12 hours the same
MemberSidis added to the same group again: event 4728 with aTargetSidthat ends in -525. - Review the authentication of the account between the two events, because that is the window in which it was unprotected.
Events47294728
LimitsAn administrator who tests whether Protected Users breaks an application removes and adds the account in the same way, usually with a ticket. The 12 hours are a starting point. A removal that is never reverted does not match and is covered by the single-event rule.
Triage
- Identify the account that lost the safeguard (MemberSid and MemberName in event 4729, TargetUserName in event 4738, ObjectDN or AttributeValue in event 5136) and the account that made the change (SubjectUserName, SubjectLogonId).
- Check whether the affected account is privileged or was put under the safeguard on purpose. Protected Users has no default members, so every member was added by a decision.
- Ask for the reason. Legitimate removals happen when a protected account breaks an application that needs NTLM or delegation, and they come with a ticket.
- Look at what the account did after the change. NTLM authentication (event 4776), tickets with RC4 (events 4768 and 4769), or sign-ins from hosts it never used before are what the safeguard had blocked.
- Check whether the safeguard was put back shortly after, which points to a removal that was needed for one action only.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Put the safeguard back. Add the account to Protected Users again, set the sensitive flag, or assign the authentication policy or silo again.
- Reset the password of the affected account where its NTLM hash or Kerberos keys may be known, and end its sessions.
- Disable the account that made the change and remove the write access that allowed it.
- Review the sign-ins and ticket requests of the affected account between the removal and the restoration, and investigate every host it authenticated to or from in that time.
- Check the other members of Protected Users and the other privileged accounts for the same change by the same actor.
Mitigation
- Limit who can change the membership of Protected Users and the account options of privileged accounts to Tier 0 administrators. Microsoft states that management of the group should not be delegated to non-service administrators.
- Review the access control lists of privileged accounts and of the Protected Users group for write access by accounts outside Tier 0.
- Keep privileged accounts in Protected Users and marked as sensitive at the same time, so that removing one safeguard does not open delegation.
- Report privileged accounts that are outside Protected Users or that can be delegated on a schedule, so that a removal is found even when the event was missed.
- Enable Audit Security Group Management and Audit User Account Management on all domain controllers, and add auditing entries for writes on the authentication policy silo objects and on privileged accounts.
Frequently asked questions
Which event shows that an account left the Protected Users group?
Event 4729, a member was removed from a security-enabled global group, with the group in TargetSid. Protected Users is a global group with the well-known RID 525, so the rule matches a TargetSid that ends in -525 and works for renamed and localized groups. The member that was removed is in MemberSid and MemberName.
What changes for an account the moment it leaves Protected Users?
The domain controller again accepts NTLM authentication and DES or RC4 pre-authentication for the account, the account can be delegated unless it is also marked as sensitive, and its ticket-granting tickets follow the domain policy instead of the fixed four hours. On the hosts it signs in to, credentials are cached again as for any other account.
Does removing the sensitive flag matter when the account is still in Protected Users?
Not for delegation. Members of Protected Users cannot be delegated with unconstrained or constrained delegation whatever the flag says. The flag matters for accounts that are not in the group, and it becomes the only protection against delegation the moment an account leaves the group. That is why both removals are watched.
Are these events enough to see every way an authentication policy is weakened?
No. The rule reads the removal of an account from a policy or silo. A policy that is switched to audit only, or whose conditions are edited, keeps its assignments and is a change to the policy object itself. Microsoft's pages for the feature give the display names of those settings and not their attribute names, so no rule reads them here.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098: Account Manipulation
- Protected Users security group
- Authentication Policies and Authentication Policy Silos
- Guidance about how to configure protected accounts
- Audit Security Group Management (event 4729)
- Event 4738: A user account was changed
- UserAccountControl property flags (NOT_DELEGATED)
- Event 5136: A directory service object was modified
- Security identifiers (Protected Users, RID 525)
- Event 4776: The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account
- Event 4768: A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested