How the attack works
Kerberos lets the client and the domain controller agree on an encryption type. With AES the keys are derived from the password together with a salt. With RC4-HMAC the key is the account's NT hash itself. An attacker who has taken an NT hash from a compromised computer or from a copy of the directory database therefore already holds a working Kerberos key. By running the authentication service exchange with RC4 only, the attacker receives a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) as that account without ever knowing the password. This is known as overpass-the-hash, and it turns a hash into Kerberos tickets even where NTLM has been restricted.
The same downgrade applies to service tickets. A requester that offers only RC4 receives an RC4-encrypted service ticket when the service account's settings allow it, and such a ticket is far quicker to attack offline than an AES one (see Kerberoasting). Microsoft tracks this as CVE-2026-20833. Since the April 2026 updates, domain controllers assume AES only for accounts that have no explicit encryption type setting.
On the domain controller the request is an ordinary success. What gives it away is the encryption type: event 4768 or 4769 with ticket encryption type 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) or 0x18. Domain controllers running Windows Server 2016 or later with the January 2025 updates also record which keys the account has and the encryption type of the session key, so RC4 use by an account that has AES keys can be told apart from an account that has nothing better. Domain controllers with the January 2026 updates add System log events 201 to 209, which report service ticket requests and settings that still depend on RC4. Windows Server 2025 domain controllers do not issue RC4 ticket-granting tickets at all.
What an attacker needs
- The NT hash of an account, typically taken with administrator rights from a computer where the account was used, or from a copy of the directory database.
- A domain controller that still accepts RC4 for that account. Members of Protected Users cannot use RC4 in Kerberos pre-authentication, and Windows Server 2025 domain controllers do not issue RC4 ticket-granting tickets.
Impact
The attacker holds valid Kerberos tickets for the account and can reach every service the account can, including in networks where NTLM is blocked. If the account is privileged, that is the domain. The hash stays usable until the account's password is changed.
Detection rules
KDC Reported a Service Ticket Request From a Client That Offers Only RC4
Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when a client that does not offer AES asks for a service ticket. Events 201 and 206 report that the request used a cipher that enforcement will refuse; events 203 and 208 report that the Key Distribution Center blocked or denied it. The cause is a legacy client, or a requester that deliberately asks for RC4 to obtain a ticket that is easier to attack offline. Each event names the account, the service and the client address. Microsoft's article names the event source Kdcsvc; the provider of KDC events in the System log is Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center, and the rule accepts both names. The events exist on domain controllers running Windows Server 2012 or later with the January 13, 2026 or later updates.
title: KDC Reported a Service Ticket Request From a Client That Offers Only RC4
id: be6e41d7-70c7-4947-b2fd-91028cfd094b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when a client
that does not offer AES asks for a service ticket. Events 201 and 206 report
that the request used a cipher that enforcement will refuse; events 203 and
208 report that the Key Distribution Center blocked or denied it. The cause
is a legacy client, or a requester that deliberately asks for RC4 to obtain a
ticket that is easier to attack offline. Each event names the account, the
service and the client address. Microsoft's article names the event source
Kdcsvc; the provider of KDC events in the System log is
Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center, and the rule accepts both
names. The events exist on domain controllers running Windows Server 2012 or
later with the January 13, 2026 or later updates.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-manage-kerberos-kdc-usage-of-rc4-for-service-account-ticket-issuance-changes-related-to-cve-2026-20833-1ebcda33-720a-4da8-93c1-b0496e1910dc
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.002
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1558.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains:
- Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
- Kdcsvc
EventID:
- 201
- 203
- 206
- 208
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legacy or non-Windows devices and applications that only support RC4. The event lists the client address and the encryption types it offered; fix or replace the client, or exclude it once verified.
level: medium
False positives
- Legacy or non-Windows devices and applications that only support RC4. The event lists the client address and the encryption types it offered; fix or replace the client, or exclude it once verified.
KDC Reported a Service Account or Domain Policy That Still Depends on RC4
Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when RC4 is needed because of the directory's own configuration and not because of the client. Events 202 and 207 report a service ticket request for a service account that has no AES keys; events 204 and 209 report that such a request was blocked or denied. Event 205 is written when the Key Distribution Center starts and the DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes value allows a cipher other than AES. These are exposure signals; the accounts and domain controllers they name are the ones an RC4 downgrade works against. Microsoft's article names the event source Kdcsvc; the provider of KDC events in the System log is Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center, and the rule accepts both names. The events exist on domain controllers running Windows Server 2012 or later with the January 13, 2026 or later updates.
title: KDC Reported a Service Account or Domain Policy That Still Depends on RC4
id: 213457ed-3272-40f0-adbb-718810cbb2ad
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when RC4 is
needed because of the directory's own configuration and not because of the
client. Events 202 and 207 report a service ticket request for a service
account that has no AES keys; events 204 and 209 report that such a request
was blocked or denied. Event 205 is written when the Key Distribution Center
starts and the DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes value allows a cipher other
than AES. These are exposure signals; the accounts and domain controllers
they name are the ones an RC4 downgrade works against. Microsoft's article
names the event source Kdcsvc; the provider of KDC events in the System log
is Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center, and the rule accepts
both names. The events exist on domain controllers running Windows Server
2012 or later with the January 13, 2026 or later updates.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-manage-kerberos-kdc-usage-of-rc4-for-service-account-ticket-issuance-changes-related-to-cve-2026-20833-1ebcda33-720a-4da8-93c1-b0496e1910dc
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.002
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1558.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name|contains:
- Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
- Kdcsvc
EventID:
- 202
- 204
- 205
- 207
- 209
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None expected as false alarms. Every event is a real RC4 dependency. Reset the password of the service account so that AES keys are generated, or correct DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes, and the events stop.
level: low
False positives
- None expected as false alarms. Every event is a real RC4 dependency. Reset the password of the service account so that AES keys are generated, or correct DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes, and the events stop.
RC4 Kerberos Service Ticket for a Service That Has AES Keys
Detects a successful Kerberos service ticket request (4769) for a service account whose available keys include AES, where the issued ticket or its session key is nevertheless RC4 (0x17 or 0x18). The service could have been given an AES ticket, so either the requester offered only RC4 or the service account is still configured to accept RC4. An RC4 service ticket is the kind an attacker asks for in order to attack the service account's password offline. Unlike the Kerberoasting rule for user-backed services, this rule covers every service account and needs the Available Keys and Session Encryption Type fields, which exist on domain controllers running Windows Server 2016 or later with the January 14, 2025 or later updates. Requires Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations.
title: RC4 Kerberos Service Ticket for a Service That Has AES Keys
id: e6074ff8-134c-495f-91ae-ef3397e4eda0
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful Kerberos service ticket request (4769) for a service
account whose available keys include AES, where the issued ticket or its
session key is nevertheless RC4 (0x17 or 0x18). The service could have been
given an AES ticket, so either the requester offered only RC4 or the service
account is still configured to accept RC4. An RC4 service ticket is the kind
an attacker asks for in order to attack the service account's password
offline. Unlike the Kerberoasting rule for user-backed services, this rule
covers every service account and needs the Available Keys and Session
Encryption Type fields, which exist on domain controllers running Windows
Server 2016 or later with the January 14, 2025 or later updates. Requires
Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/detect-remediate-rc4-kerberos
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-manage-kerberos-kdc-usage-of-rc4-for-service-account-ticket-issuance-changes-related-to-cve-2026-20833-1ebcda33-720a-4da8-93c1-b0496e1910dc
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.002
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1558.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4769
Status: '0x0'
ServiceAvailableKeys|contains: AES
selection_rc4_ticket:
TicketEncryptionType:
- '0x17'
- '0x18'
selection_rc4_session_key:
SessionKeyEncryptionType:
- '0x17'
- '0x18'
condition: selection and 1 of selection_rc4_*
falsepositives:
- Domain controllers without the April 2026 or later updates, where a service account with no msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes value is given RC4 tickets by default. Update the domain controllers or set the attribute on the service accounts.
- Service accounts on which RC4 was enabled on purpose for a legacy application, and legacy clients that offer only RC4. Baseline them and exclude by ServiceName or IpAddress until they are fixed.
level: medium
False positives
- Domain controllers without the April 2026 or later updates, where a service account with no msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes value is given RC4 tickets by default. Update the domain controllers or set the attribute on the service accounts.
- Service accounts on which RC4 was enabled on purpose for a legacy application, and legacy clients that offer only RC4. Baseline them and exclude by ServiceName or IpAddress until they are fixed.
RC4 Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket for an Account That Has AES Keys
Detects a successful Kerberos authentication service request (4768) for an account whose available keys include AES, where the issued ticket or its session key is nevertheless RC4 (0x17 or 0x18). The account could have used AES, so the client chose or was limited to RC4. That is what a request made with a stolen NT hash looks like (overpass-the-hash). It is also what a legacy client looks like. The Available Keys and Session Encryption Type fields exist on domain controllers running Windows Server 2016 or later with the January 14, 2025 or later updates; older domain controllers never match. Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service.
title: RC4 Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket for an Account That Has AES Keys
id: fb6acbc1-8224-4bcf-935a-15246c5e88e3
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful Kerberos authentication service request (4768) for an
account whose available keys include AES, where the issued ticket or its
session key is nevertheless RC4 (0x17 or 0x18). The account could have used
AES, so the client chose or was limited to RC4. That is what a request made
with a stolen NT hash looks like (overpass-the-hash). It is also what a
legacy client looks like. The Available Keys and Session Encryption Type
fields exist on domain controllers running Windows Server 2016 or later with
the January 14, 2025 or later updates; older domain controllers never match.
Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/detect-remediate-rc4-kerberos
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4768
Status: '0x0'
AccountAvailableKeys|contains: AES
selection_rc4_ticket:
TicketEncryptionType:
- '0x17'
- '0x18'
selection_rc4_session_key:
SessionKeyEncryptionType:
- '0x17'
- '0x18'
condition: selection and 1 of selection_rc4_*
falsepositives:
- Legacy or non-Windows clients, and applications with a key table that holds only RC4 keys, that offer RC4 although the account has AES keys. Read the Advertized Etypes field, fix or replace the client, and exclude the pair by TargetUserName and IpAddress until then.
level: medium
False positives
- Legacy or non-Windows clients, and applications with a key table that holds only RC4 keys, that offer RC4 although the account has AES keys. Read the Advertized Etypes field, fix or replace the client, and exclude the pair by TargetUserName and IpAddress until then.
Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket Issued With RC4
Detects a successful Kerberos authentication service request (4768) whose ticket is encrypted with RC4 (0x17 RC4-HMAC, or 0x18 RC4-HMAC-EXP). The RC4 key of an account is its NT hash, so a request limited to RC4 is what an attacker makes who holds a stolen hash and not the password. Microsoft recommends monitoring this event for ticket encryption types other than 0x11 and 0x12 (AES). Accounts that have no AES keys and clients that only support RC4 produce the same event. On domain controllers that log the fields added in January 2025, the rule "RC4 Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket for an Account That Has AES Keys" is the narrower choice. Windows Server 2025 domain controllers do not issue RC4 ticket-granting tickets. Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service.
title: Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket Issued With RC4
id: adda8420-636b-4735-9ba6-0c7121589b9a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful Kerberos authentication service request (4768) whose
ticket is encrypted with RC4 (0x17 RC4-HMAC, or 0x18 RC4-HMAC-EXP). The RC4
key of an account is its NT hash, so a request limited to RC4 is what an
attacker makes who holds a stolen hash and not the password. Microsoft
recommends monitoring this event for ticket encryption types other than 0x11
and 0x12 (AES). Accounts that have no AES keys and clients that only support
RC4 produce the same event. On domain controllers that log the fields added
in January 2025, the rule "RC4 Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket for an Account
That Has AES Keys" is the narrower choice. Windows Server 2025 domain
controllers do not issue RC4 ticket-granting tickets. Requires Audit Kerberos
Authentication Service.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/detect-remediate-rc4-kerberos
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4768
Status: '0x0'
TicketEncryptionType:
- '0x17'
- '0x18'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Accounts that have no AES keys because their password was last set before the domain supported AES. Reset the password so AES keys are generated.
- Legacy or non-Windows clients that only support RC4. Baseline them and exclude the pair by TargetUserName and IpAddress until they are replaced.
level: medium
False positives
- Accounts that have no AES keys because their password was last set before the domain supported AES. Reset the password so AES keys are generated.
- Legacy or non-Windows clients that only support RC4. Baseline them and exclude the pair by TargetUserName and IpAddress until they are replaced.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
New-credentials logon on a computer, then an RC4 ticket request for its outbound account from that computer
Overpass-the-hash usually starts with a logon of type 9 on the attacker's computer, which keeps the local identity and attaches other credentials for outbound connections. Event 4624 records that account in its outbound fields. The first use of those credentials is a ticket-granting ticket request for the account. When that request from the same computer is answered with RC4, the two events together show a hash used as a Kerberos key.
- On workstations and servers, take event 4624 with
LogonType9. KeepTargetOutboundUserName,TargetOutboundDomainName,ProcessNameand the computer inComputer. - Resolve the computer to its addresses at that time from DNS, DHCP or the asset inventory.
- Within 5 minutes, find on the domain controllers event 4768 with result code 0x0 for the outbound account (
TargetUserName) from one of those addresses (IpAddress) whoseTicketEncryptionTypeis 0x17 or 0x18. - On domain controllers with the January 2025 updates, read
AccountAvailableKeysandClientAdvertizedEncryptionTypes. An account that has AES keys and a client that offered only RC4 types raise the priority.
Events46244768
LimitsA legitimate logon with separate credentials for another domain, followed by RC4 because the account or the client is configured for it, looks the same. It needs the Security log of the endpoints and a correct mapping of computers to addresses. The 5 minutes are a starting point.
Triage
- Read TargetUserName and IpAddress. Is the address a computer this account normally signs in from, and does that computer run software that could only use RC4?
- On a domain controller with the January 2025 updates, compare the account's available keys with the encryption types the client offered (Advertized Etypes). A current Windows computer offers AES when it signs a user in, so an offer of RC4 types only from such a computer did not come from a normal sign-in.
- Look for what the same account and address did next (service ticket requests in 4769, logons on other servers) and for credential theft on the source computer shortly before.
- If no legacy client explains it, reset the account's password, which replaces the NT hash, and investigate the computer where the hash was exposed.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Isolate the computer the RC4 request came from, and the computer where the hash was taken if it is a different one.
- Reset the password of every account whose hash may have been on the exposed computer, not only the one named in the alert. Each reset replaces the NT hash of that account and with it the RC4 key the attacker holds.
- If the hash came from a copy of the directory database and not from one computer, every account is affected. Handle it as described for NTDS.dit Extraction.
- Review the servers that were reached with the tickets and undo what was changed in those sessions, such as new accounts, group memberships, services and scheduled tasks.
- After the reset, confirm in event 4768 that the account has AES keys and that no further RC4 ticket is issued for it from an address nobody can explain.
Mitigation
- Add privileged user accounts to the Protected Users group. Domain controllers then refuse DES and RC4 in Kerberos pre-authentication for them. Do not add service or computer accounts.
- Remove RC4 from the encryption types allowed for Kerberos (the "Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos" security option) on domain controllers and members, after using events 4768 and 4769 to find the clients and accounts that still depend on it.
- Reset the password of accounts that have no AES keys, so that AES keys are generated. Event 4768 lists an account's keys under Available Keys.
- Keep domain controllers on current updates, resolve what KDC events 201 to 209 report, and do not set
DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypesto a value that includes RC4 (event 205 reports that). - Protect NT hashes in the first place with Credential Guard, tiered administration and unique local administrator passwords.
Frequently asked questions
How do I tell overpass-the-hash from a legacy client that only supports RC4?
On a domain controller with the January 2025 updates, event 4768 lists the keys the account has and the encryption types the client offered. A current Windows computer offers AES when it signs a user in, so an offer of RC4 types only from such a computer did not come from a normal sign-in. A legacy device repeats the same request from the same address for the same account, which is what a baseline captures.
Does restricting NTLM protect an account whose NT hash was stolen?
Not by itself. The NT hash is also the RC4-HMAC Kerberos key of the account, so its holder can request Kerberos tickets where NTLM is blocked. The hash loses its value when the password of the account is changed. Members of Protected Users cannot use RC4 in Kerberos pre-authentication at all.
Why do the two rules for accounts with AES keys never fire on some domain controllers?
They read the Available Keys and Session Encryption Type fields of events 4768 and 4769. Those fields exist only on domain controllers running Windows Server 2016 or later with the January 14, 2025 or later updates. For older domain controllers use the broader rule for RC4 ticket-granting tickets, which matches on the ticket encryption type alone.
Are KDC events 201 to 209 a sign of an attack?
Most of them are exposure signals. Events 202, 204, 205, 207 and 209 report service accounts without AES keys or a default encryption type setting that allows RC4. Events 201, 203, 206 and 208 report a client that did not offer AES, which is a legacy client or a requester that asks for RC4 on purpose. That second group names the account, the service and the client address, so the client can be checked.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1550.002: Pass the Hash
- Detect and remediate RC4 usage in Kerberos
- Event 4768: A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested
- Event 4769: A Kerberos service ticket was requested
- KB5073381: Kerberos KDC usage of RC4 for service account ticket issuance (CVE-2026-20833), KDC events 201 to 209
- Protected Users security group
- Defender for Identity classic alerts: Suspected overpass-the-hash attack (Kerberos)
- RFC 4757: The RC4-HMAC Kerberos Encryption Types Used by Microsoft Windows
- Event 4624: An account was successfully logged on (logon type 9, outbound account fields)