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Kerberoasting detection rules

Any domain user can request a Kerberos service ticket for an account with an SPN and crack it offline. RC4-encrypted tickets for user-backed services are the clearest signal on the domain controller.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
High
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Any domain user account, and at least one user account that has a service principal name.
Impact
A cracked service account password gives the attacker that account's access, often local admin on many servers and sometimes Domain Admins.
Response
Reset the targeted service accounts to long random passwords, and disable the account that requested the tickets.
Mitigation
Run services under group managed service accounts, and give the user-backed ones that remain long random passwords with RC4 disabled.
Event IDs
476947685136

How the attack works

In Active Directory, a service ticket (TGS) is encrypted with the password-derived key of the account that runs the service. Any authenticated user can ask a domain controller for a ticket to any service principal name (SPN), so an attacker can request tickets for service accounts and try to crack them offline, with no further interaction with the domain.

Accounts with a computer-generated password (machine accounts, gMSAs) resist cracking. User accounts with a human-chosen password and an SPN do not, and attackers prefer tickets encrypted with RC4 (encryption type 0x17), which crack orders of magnitude faster than AES. A run that requests a ticket for every account with an SPN also shows as one account that asks for many different user-backed services within minutes, whatever the encryption type. A threshold rule on this page counts those requests.

What an attacker needs

  • Any domain user account (no privileges needed).
  • At least one user account with a service principal name, ideally one that still supports RC4.

Impact

A cracked service account password gives the attacker that account's access. Service accounts are often over-privileged (local admin on many servers, sometimes members of Domain Admins), so Kerberoasting is one of the most common first steps from a single phished user to domain compromise.

Detection rules

One Account Requested Service Tickets for Many User-Backed Services

Counts, per requesting account, the distinct service names for which a domain controller logged a successful service ticket request (event 4769) for a service that is not a computer account and not krbtgt. A user normally asks for tickets to the few services it works with. An account that obtains tickets for 10 or more different user-backed services within 10 minutes has the shape of a Kerberoasting run, which requests a ticket for every account with a service principal name in order to attack all of them offline. The rule does not look at the encryption type, so it also sees a run that requests AES tickets, which the RC4 rule of this page does not match. The Account Name of the event is the requesting account in the form user@DOMAIN, and Client Address holds the source of the request. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. In a domain with fewer than 10 user-backed service accounts lower the threshold. Managed service accounts end with a dollar sign and are left out with the computer accounts. Requires Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations on every domain controller, because one run can spread its requests over several.

Fires when one TargetUserName has at least 10 different ServiceName values within 10 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Kerberos Service Ticket Requested for a User-Backed Service (Kerberoasting Sweep Base Event)
id: 4abf0515-8a67-44d0-82ca-938fe56e14a9
name: service_ticket_for_user_backed_service
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. Event 4769 (a Kerberos
  service ticket was requested) with result code 0x0 for a service whose name
  is neither a computer account (a name that ends with a dollar sign) nor
  krbtgt, whatever the encryption type of the ticket.
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4769
    Status: '0x0'
  filter_computer_accounts:
    ServiceName|endswith: '$'
  filter_krbtgt:
    ServiceName: krbtgt
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
level: low
---
title: One Account Requested Service Tickets for Many User-Backed Services
id: 65820200-d4e2-40fa-bd82-15d620cad773
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per requesting account, the distinct service names for which a
  domain controller logged a successful service ticket request (event 4769)
  for a service that is not a computer account and not krbtgt. A user
  normally asks for tickets to the few services it works with. An account
  that obtains tickets for 10 or more different user-backed services within
  10 minutes has the shape of a Kerberoasting run, which requests a ticket
  for every account with a service principal name in order to attack all of
  them offline. The rule does not look at the encryption type, so it also
  sees a run that requests AES tickets, which the RC4 rule of this page does
  not match. The Account Name of the event is the requesting account in the
  form user@DOMAIN, and Client Address holds the source of the request. The
  threshold and the window are starting points to tune. In a domain with
  fewer than 10 user-backed service accounts lower the threshold. Managed
  service accounts end with a dollar sign and are left out with the computer
  accounts. Requires Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations on every
  domain controller, because one run can spread its requests over several.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-kerberos-service-ticket-operations
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/alerts-xdr
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1558.003
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - service_ticket_for_user_backed_service
  group-by:
    - TargetUserName
  timespan: 10m
  condition:
    field: ServiceName
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Accounts of monitoring, backup, inventory and vulnerability scanning products that connect to many services in one pass, and administrators who work on many servers in a short time. Baseline them, then exclude them by TargetUserName or give them their own higher threshold.
  - Application servers and middleware that authenticate under one account to many back-end services that run under user accounts.
  - The values of 10 services and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Count how many user-backed services exist in the domain and how many one account normally reaches, and adjust both.
level: high

False positives

  • Accounts of monitoring, backup, inventory and vulnerability scanning products that connect to many services in one pass, and administrators who work on many servers in a short time. Baseline them, then exclude them by TargetUserName or give them their own higher threshold.
  • Application servers and middleware that authenticate under one account to many back-end services that run under user accounts.
  • The values of 10 services and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Count how many user-backed services exist in the domain and how many one account normally reaches, and adjust both.

RC4 Kerberos Service Ticket Requested for a User Account

Detects a successful Kerberos service ticket request encrypted with RC4 (0x17, or 0x18 for RC4-HMAC-EXP) for a service that is not a computer account or krbtgt. In domains where AES is the norm, RC4 tickets for user-backed services are a strong Kerberoasting signal. Requires Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: RC4 Kerberos Service Ticket Requested for a User Account
id: 14a79b7e-639f-4673-931b-4bf530b75479
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a successful Kerberos service ticket request encrypted with RC4 (0x17, or
  0x18 for RC4-HMAC-EXP)
  for a service that is not a computer account or krbtgt. In domains where
  AES is the norm, RC4 tickets for user-backed services are a strong
  Kerberoasting signal.
  Requires Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4769
    TicketEncryptionType:
      - '0x17'
      - '0x18'
    Status: '0x0'
  filter_computer_accounts:
    ServiceName|endswith: '$'
  filter_krbtgt:
    ServiceName: krbtgt
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - Legacy applications or clients that only support RC4 for a specific service; baseline them and exclude by ServiceName.
level: medium

False positives

  • Legacy applications or clients that only support RC4 for a specific service; baseline them and exclude by ServiceName.

Kerberos Service Ticket Issued Through the Authentication Service Exchange

Detects a successful Kerberos authentication service request (4768) whose Service Name is not krbtgt. Event 4768 records the authentication service exchange, which normally returns a ticket-granting ticket, and Microsoft documents krbtgt as the typical service name of the event. Another name means the exchange returned a ticket for that service directly. The ticket is encrypted with the service account's key and can be attacked offline like any other service ticket, but no event 4769 is written for it, so rules that watch 4769 for Kerberoasting do not see the request. When the requesting account does not require Kerberos pre-authentication, the requester does not even need that account's password. Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Kerberos Service Ticket Issued Through the Authentication Service Exchange
id: 1dda65c8-6a06-4917-b8d7-dfc522183293
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a successful Kerberos authentication service request (4768) whose
  Service Name is not krbtgt. Event 4768 records the authentication service
  exchange, which normally returns a ticket-granting ticket, and Microsoft
  documents krbtgt as the typical service name of the event. Another name means
  the exchange returned a ticket for that service directly. The ticket is
  encrypted with the service account's key and can be attacked offline like any
  other service ticket, but no event 4769 is written for it, so rules that
  watch 4769 for Kerberoasting do not see the request. When the requesting
  account does not require Kerberos pre-authentication, the requester does not
  even need that account's password. Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication
  Service.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
  - https://www.semperis.com/blog/new-attack-paths-as-requested-sts/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4768
    Status: '0x0'
  filter_krbtgt:
    ServiceName: krbtgt
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - Kerberos password changes, which ask for an initial ticket for the password change service and not for krbtgt. If your domain controllers log them with another service name, add that name as a filter on ServiceName.
  - Non-Windows Kerberos clients and applications that request a service ticket directly in the authentication service exchange. Baseline them and exclude the pair by TargetUserName and ServiceName.
level: medium

False positives

  • Kerberos password changes, which ask for an initial ticket for the password change service and not for krbtgt. If your domain controllers log them with another service name, add that name as a filter on ServiceName.
  • Non-Windows Kerberos clients and applications that request a service ticket directly in the authentication service exchange. Baseline them and exclude the pair by TargetUserName and ServiceName.

Service Principal Name Added to a User Account

Detects a servicePrincipalName value being added (5136, Value Added) to a user or inetOrgPerson object. Any account with an SPN can be Kerberoasted, so attackers with write access over a user add an SPN, request a service ticket and crack it offline ("targeted Kerberoasting"), often removing the SPN again afterwards. Computer and managed service accounts are not matched. Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits writes to servicePrincipalName on user objects.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Service Principal Name Added to a User Account
id: f2c0f06e-1824-4e69-859e-eb7aa8820009
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a servicePrincipalName value being added (5136, Value Added) to a
  user or inetOrgPerson object. Any account with an SPN can be Kerberoasted,
  so attackers with write access over a user add an SPN, request a service
  ticket and crack it offline ("targeted Kerberoasting"), often removing the
  SPN again afterwards. Computer and managed service accounts are not matched.
  Requires Audit Directory Service Changes and a SACL that audits writes to
  servicePrincipalName on user objects.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: servicePrincipalName
    OperationType:
      - '%%14674'
      - 'Value Added'
    ObjectClass:
      - user
      - inetOrgPerson
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrators registering SPNs for new user-based service accounts. Confirm with the service owner and exclude the provisioning account by SubjectUserName; prefer gMSAs for new services.
level: medium

False positives

  • Administrators registering SPNs for new user-based service accounts. Confirm with the service owner and exclude the provisioning account by SubjectUserName; prefer gMSAs for new services.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

SPN added to a user account, a service ticket requested for it, and the SPN removed again

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsJoins two logs

In targeted Kerberoasting an attacker with write access to a user account gives it a service principal name, requests a service ticket for it and removes the name again, so that the account looks unchanged afterwards. The three steps in that order on one account within a short time are not administration.

  1. A service principal name is added to a user object: event 5136 with AttributeLDAPDisplayName servicePrincipalName, OperationType Value Added and ObjectClass user. Keep ObjectDN and the writer in SubjectUserName.
  2. Within 60 minutes a service ticket is issued for that account: event 4769 with result code 0x0 whose ServiceName is the account name of the object in ObjectDN.
  3. Afterwards the same value is removed: event 5136 on the same ObjectDN with OperationType Value Deleted for servicePrincipalName.
  4. Compare the requester of the ticket (TargetUserName and IpAddress of event 4769) with the account that wrote the SPN.

Events51364769

LimitsEvent 5136 names the object by distinguished name and event 4769 names the service by account name, so the join needs a lookup of the account name. A change of an existing SPN also logs Value Deleted and Value Added, in the opposite order. The 60 minutes are a starting point. The SPN events need a SACL that audits writes to servicePrincipalName on user objects.

Triage

  • Check which account requested the ticket (TargetUserName) and from which host (IpAddress); a single user requesting tickets for many SPNs in a short window is typical of tooling.
  • Confirm whether the service account still needs RC4; most RC4 requests in a modern domain come from legacy clients or attacks.
  • If the account is privileged, treat its password as compromised and rotate it.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Disable or reset the user account that requested the tickets and isolate the host the requests came from (IpAddress). Requesting tickets takes only a valid domain account, so that account is in the attacker's hands.
  2. Reset the password of every service account whose ticket that user requested to a long random value, privileged accounts first, and update the services that run under them. A cracked password stays usable until it is changed.
  3. If a service principal name was added to a user account for the attack, remove it and take away the write access that allowed the change.
  4. Review the sign-ins of the targeted service accounts since the first request (4624 and 4768) and investigate every host they reached from an unexpected source.
  5. Verify the recovery. The reset accounts work for their services, no ticket requests arrive from the contained source, and no new SPN appears on user accounts.

Mitigation

  • Run services under group managed service accounts (gMSA) instead of user accounts; their passwords are long, random and rotated automatically.
  • For user-backed service accounts that must remain, set 25+ character random passwords and rotate them.
  • Disable RC4 for Kerberos (msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes on service accounts, domain-wide policy) so requested tickets are AES-only.
  • Remove SPNs that are no longer used and keep privileged accounts free of SPNs.

Frequently asked questions

Why is there no failed logon or lockout when a service account is Kerberoasted?

The attacker never tries a password against the domain. A service ticket is requested once, which is a normal and successful operation, and the guessing happens offline against that ticket. The traces on a domain controller are the ticket request itself (4769, or 4768 when the ticket comes from the authentication service exchange) and, for targeted Kerberoasting, the SPN change.

Does moving service accounts to AES stop Kerberoasting?

No. RC4 tickets crack orders of magnitude faster than AES tickets, but a ticket for an account with a human-chosen password can still be attacked offline. The RC4 rule on this page also stays silent when the requested ticket is AES. A long random password or a group managed service account is what makes the attack impractical.

Why does this page watch event 4768 in addition to 4769?

A service ticket can also be returned directly by the authentication service exchange, which is logged as event 4768 with a service name other than krbtgt. No event 4769 is written for that ticket, so rules that watch only 4769 miss it. The ticket is encrypted with the key of the service account and can be attacked offline like any other.

What legitimately requests RC4 service tickets for user accounts?

Legacy applications and clients that support only RC4 for a specific service. Baseline them and exclude the service by ServiceName while they are being fixed. In a domain where AES is the norm, an RC4 request for a user-backed service from anywhere else deserves a look.

References

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