How the attack works
Kerberos pre-authentication makes a client prove that it knows the account's password, normally with an encrypted timestamp (pre-authentication type 2), before the domain controller issues a ticket-granting ticket. When the DONT_REQ_PREAUTH flag ("Do not require Kerberos preauthentication") is set on an account, the KDC answers an AS-REQ for that account without any proof, and part of the AS-REP is encrypted with a key derived from the account's password.
An attacker who only knows the account name can collect that encrypted material and guess the password offline, without authenticating and without causing failed logons. The domain controller records the issued TGT in event 4768 with Pre-Authentication Type 0. Attackers with write access over a user can also enable the flag, roast the account and disable it again ("targeted AS-REP roasting"), which leaves a 4738 account change behind. A sweep over the accounts that have the flag shows as one address that receives tickets without pre-authentication for several accounts in a short time, and a threshold rule on this page counts that.
What an attacker needs
- Network access to a domain controller. No credentials are needed if account names are known; any domain account is enough to enumerate accounts with the flag.
- At least one account with "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" enabled, or write access to an account's userAccountControl to enable it.
Impact
A cracked password gives the attacker that account's access without any earlier foothold in the domain. Accounts with pre-authentication disabled are usually legacy service or integration accounts with old passwords and broad rights.
Detection rules
Kerberos Pre-Authentication Disabled on an Account
Detects a user or computer account change (4738, 4742) whose User Account Control changes include "'Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled" (%%2096). The account becomes AS-REP roastable; attackers with write access over an account enable the flag briefly for targeted AS-REP roasting. Requires Audit User Account Management and Audit Computer Account Management.
title: Kerberos Pre-Authentication Disabled on an Account
id: 84e82490-5612-4fbd-94a4-8018d99f495f
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a user or computer account change (4738, 4742) whose User Account
Control changes include "'Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled" (%%2096). The
account becomes AS-REP roastable; attackers with write access over an account
enable the flag briefly for targeted AS-REP roasting.
Requires Audit User Account Management and Audit Computer Account Management.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4742
- https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/0cb847ee-9423-11ec-b2df-acde48001122/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1558.004
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4738
- 4742
UserAccountControl|contains: '%%2096'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned onboarding of a legacy account that requires the setting. Confirm with the change owner and record the account so its AS-REP requests can be baselined.
level: high
False positives
- Planned onboarding of a legacy account that requires the setting. Confirm with the change owner and record the account so its AS-REP requests can be baselined.
Kerberos TGT Issued Without Pre-Authentication
Detects a successful Kerberos TGT request (event 4768) with Pre-Authentication Type 0. Domain controllers log this only for accounts that have "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" enabled, and it is the request an AS-REP roasting attack makes. Legitimate logons by such accounts produce the same event, so known accounts need to be baselined. Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service.
title: Kerberos TGT Issued Without Pre-Authentication
id: 4341b04f-f70f-4ac1-811c-4257b2c2bee6
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful Kerberos TGT request (event 4768) with Pre-Authentication
Type 0. Domain controllers log this only for accounts that have "Do not
require Kerberos preauthentication" enabled, and it is the request an AS-REP
roasting attack makes. Legitimate logons by such accounts produce the same
event, so known accounts need to be baselined.
Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1558.004
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4768
Status: '0x0'
PreAuthType: 0
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Accounts that legitimately run without pre-authentication (some legacy Kerberos clients and integrations). Confirm the need, then exclude them by TargetUserName and track them as accepted risk.
level: medium
False positives
- Accounts that legitimately run without pre-authentication (some legacy Kerberos clients and integrations). Confirm the need, then exclude them by TargetUserName and track them as accepted risk.
One Source Obtained TGTs Without Pre-Authentication for Several Accounts
Counts, per client address, the distinct accounts for which a domain controller issued a ticket-granting ticket without pre-authentication (event 4768 with result code 0x0 and Pre-Authentication Type 0). An account that does not require pre-authentication normally signs in from the one system that uses it. One address that receives such tickets for 3 or more different accounts within 10 minutes has the shape of an AS-REP roasting sweep, in which one host asks for the encrypted reply of every account that has the flag. The single-event rule of this page reports each of these tickets. This rule adds the pattern that a baseline of known accounts hides, because every request in a sweep is for an account that is allowed to sign in this way. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. Domains have few accounts with the flag, so the threshold is low, and a domain with fewer than three such accounts never reaches it. Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service on every domain controller.
Fires when one IpAddress has at least 3 different TargetUserName values within 10 minutes.
title: Kerberos TGT Issued Without Pre-Authentication (AS-REP Roasting Sweep Base Event)
id: 01da1549-b679-4f46-b643-2b0f459fadc9
name: tgt_without_preauthentication_many_accounts
status: experimental
description: >-
Base event of the threshold rule in this file. Event 4768 (a Kerberos
authentication ticket was requested) with result code 0x0 and
Pre-Authentication Type 0, which Microsoft documents as a logon without
pre-authentication.
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4768
Status: '0x0'
PreAuthType: 0
condition: selection
level: low
---
title: One Source Obtained TGTs Without Pre-Authentication for Several Accounts
id: 0e05e9ca-3396-4cf2-ae2b-d97c81e628cb
status: experimental
description: >-
Counts, per client address, the distinct accounts for which a domain
controller issued a ticket-granting ticket without pre-authentication
(event 4768 with result code 0x0 and Pre-Authentication Type 0). An account
that does not require pre-authentication normally signs in from the one
system that uses it. One address that receives such tickets for 3 or more
different accounts within 10 minutes has the shape of an AS-REP roasting
sweep, in which one host asks for the encrypted reply of every account that
has the flag. The single-event rule of this page reports each of these
tickets. This rule adds the pattern that a baseline of known accounts
hides, because every request in a sweep is for an account that is allowed
to sign in this way. The threshold and the window are starting points to
tune. Domains have few accounts with the flag, so the threshold is low, and
a domain with fewer than three such accounts never reaches it. Requires
Audit Kerberos Authentication Service on every domain controller.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-kerberos-authentication-service
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/alerts-xdr
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1558.004
correlation:
type: value_count
rules:
- tgt_without_preauthentication_many_accounts
group-by:
- IpAddress
timespan: 10m
condition:
field: TargetUserName
gte: 3
falsepositives:
- A server or gateway that signs in several legacy accounts without pre-authentication from one address, such as an application server that hosts several integrations. Baseline it, then exclude it by IpAddress.
- The values of 3 accounts and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. List the accounts that have the flag and the systems they sign in from, and adjust both.
level: high
False positives
- A server or gateway that signs in several legacy accounts without pre-authentication from one address, such as an application server that hosts several integrations. Baseline it, then exclude it by IpAddress.
- The values of 3 accounts and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. List the accounts that have the flag and the systems they sign in from, and adjust both.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Pre-authentication switched off, a ticket issued without it, and switched on again
In targeted AS-REP roasting an attacker with write access to an account enables "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication", requests a ticket-granting ticket for the account and disables the flag again. Afterwards the account looks normal. The change, the ticket and the reversal in that order on one account show the roast.
- The flag is enabled: event 4738 or 4742 whose
UserAccountControlcontains %%2096 ('Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled). KeepTargetSid,TargetUserNameand the account that made the change inSubjectUserName. - Within 60 minutes a ticket-granting ticket is issued for the same account without pre-authentication: event 4768 with result code 0x0,
PreAuthType0 and the sameTargetSid. - Later the flag is disabled again: event 4738 or 4742 for the same
TargetSidwhose User Account Control change reads 'Don't Require Preauth' - Disabled. - Read
IpAddressof the 4768 event and check whether it is the host that the account which changed the flag was working from.
Events473847424768
LimitsThe onboarding of a legacy account also enables the flag and is followed by a first logon, but the flag then stays on. The 60 minutes are a starting point, and an attacker can wait longer or leave the flag enabled. The rule for the flag being enabled already reports the first step on its own.
Triage
- Check whether TargetUserName is a known account that legitimately runs without pre-authentication; if not, find who changed its userAccountControl (event 4738).
- Look at IpAddress. Requests from a workstation, or for many different accounts in a short window, are typical of roasting tools.
- Note TicketEncryptionType. RC4 (
0x17) tickets crack much faster and are what roasting tools usually request. - If the account is not expected to have the flag, remove it and reset the password, assuming it may already be cracked.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Block or isolate the source address that requested the tickets, and treat every account for which it received a TGT without pre-authentication as an account whose password the attacker may already know.
- Reset the password of each of those accounts to a long random value and remove "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" in the same change, unless the account has a documented need for it.
- Where the flag was enabled shortly before the request (event 4738 or 4742), disable the account that enabled it and remove its write access to the roasted account.
- Review the logons of the roasted accounts since the first suspicious request, end their sessions and investigate the systems they reached.
- List the accounts that still have the flag and confirm that each one is documented and has a rotated password.
Mitigation
- Remove "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" from every account that does not have a documented, current need for it.
- Give any account that must keep the setting a long (25+ character) random password and rotate it.
- Disable RC4 for Kerberos so that issued tickets use AES, which makes offline cracking much slower.
- Restrict who can write
userAccountControlon user objects, so the flag cannot be enabled by delegated or compromised accounts.
Frequently asked questions
Why are there no failed logons before an AS-REP roasting alert?
The attacker never tries a password against the domain. For an account without pre-authentication the KDC returns the encrypted material to anyone who asks, and the guessing happens offline. There are no failed logons and no lockouts. The only trace on a domain controller is event 4768 with Pre-Authentication Type 0.
Can the rule tell a roasting request from a normal logon of an account without pre-authentication?
No. Both produce the same event 4768 with Pre-Authentication Type 0. Baseline the accounts that legitimately run without pre-authentication and exclude them by name. For the rest, look at the source address, at requests for many accounts in a short time, and at an RC4 ticket encryption type.
What does targeted AS-REP roasting leave behind when the flag was removed again?
An attacker with write access to an account can enable "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication", request the ticket and disable the flag again. By the time anyone checks the account, it looks normal. The account change events that show the flag being enabled (4738 for users, 4742 for computers) remain, which is why one rule matches the change and not the current state.
Does enforcing AES for Kerberos stop AS-REP roasting?
No. AES makes offline cracking much slower, but a weak password can still be guessed. Accounts that must keep the setting need a long random password that is rotated, and every other account should have the flag removed.