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Silver Ticket detection rules

A service ticket forged with the key of a service or computer account gives access to that one service as any user, without contacting a domain controller, which sees the forgery only if the ticket is later handed to it.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
High
Log source
Windows System event log (domain controllers)
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
The key of the computer account or service account that runs the target service, for example from a cracked service ticket or from credentials taken on that server.
Impact
The attacker reaches that one service as any user, including an administrator of it, until the password of the account that runs the service changes.
Response
Restrict access to the affected service or isolate its server, and change the password of the account that runs the service twice so that the old key is gone.
Mitigation
Run services under group managed service accounts and give the remaining user-backed ones long random passwords, so their keys cannot be recovered by cracking a service ticket.
Event IDs
434422
Threat groups
None listed in MITRE ATT&CK for this technique

How the attack works

A Kerberos service ticket is encrypted with the key of the account that runs the service: a computer account for services such as file sharing, or a service account. The service decrypts the ticket and reads the user's identity and group memberships from the PAC inside it. An attacker who knows that account's key can therefore build service tickets for it without asking a domain controller, for any user and with any group memberships. That forged service ticket is called a Silver Ticket.

The ticket goes straight to the service. No domain controller issues it, so there is no ticket request (event 4769) in the domain controller logs, and on the target server the sign-in looks like an ordinary Kerberos network logon.

Since the November 2022 updates, tickets carry a full PAC signature made with the krbtgt key, which the attacker does not have. The Key Distribution Center (KDC) checks it whenever a service ticket is handed back to a domain controller, for example as evidence in constrained delegation, and from October 10, 2023 it refuses tickets where the signature is missing or wrong, writing an event to its System log. A Silver Ticket that is only ever shown to the service itself never reaches that check, which is why this attack is detected far less reliably than it is prevented. A second path exists since the April 9, 2024 updates (KB5037754): a server that validates the PAC of an inbound ticket sends the ticket to a domain controller, and when the domain controller denies it the server writes event 22 from the source Security-Kerberos to its own System log.

What an attacker needs

  • The key (password hash) of the computer account or service account that runs the target service, for example from a cracked service ticket (see Kerberoasting) or from credentials taken on that server.
  • The domain SID and the service principal name of the target, which any domain user can read.

Impact

The attacker reaches that one service as any user, including an administrator of it: the file system of a server, a database, a web application. The scope is limited to services run by the compromised account, but so is the visibility, because no domain controller takes part. Access lasts until that account's password changes.

Detection rules

KDC Found a Ticket With a Missing or Invalid Full PAC Signature

Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when the Key Distribution Center processes a ticket whose full PAC signature cannot be validated (43) or is missing (44). The signature is made with the krbtgt key, so a service ticket forged with only a service account's key does not have a valid one. The domain controller sees such a ticket only when it is handed back to it, for example as evidence in constrained delegation: a forged ticket used directly against the service is not detected by this rule. Collect the System log of every domain controller; the events exist on domain controllers with the November 2022 or later updates.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows System event log (domain controllers)
title: KDC Found a Ticket With a Missing or Invalid Full PAC Signature
id: 72dff5bc-582d-4897-9eae-e0c691dbccc1
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when the Key
  Distribution Center processes a ticket whose full PAC signature cannot be
  validated (43) or is missing (44). The signature is made with the krbtgt key,
  so a service ticket forged with only a service account's key does not have a
  valid one. The domain controller sees such a ticket only when it is handed
  back to it, for example as evidence in constrained delegation: a forged
  ticket used directly against the service is not detected by this rule.
  Collect the System log of every domain controller; the events exist on domain
  controllers with the November 2022 or later updates.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002/
  - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5020805-how-to-manage-kerberos-protocol-changes-related-to-cve-2022-37967-997e9acc-67c5-48e1-8d0d-190269bf4efb
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1558.002
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name|contains: Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
    EventID:
      - 43
      - 44
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Domains where not every domain controller has the November 2022 or later updates, or where service tickets issued before the updates are still valid. The events stop once the domain is fully updated and old tickets have expired.
  - Third-party devices or domain controllers that implement Kerberos without the full PAC signature.
level: high

False positives

  • Domains where not every domain controller has the November 2022 or later updates, or where service tickets issued before the updates are still valid. The events stop once the domain is fully updated and old tickets have expired.
  • Third-party devices or domain controllers that implement Kerberos without the full PAC signature.

Service Ticket Denied by a Domain Controller During Network Ticket Logon

Detects event 22 (Kerberos Ticket Logon Failure) from the source Security-Kerberos in the System log. Since the April 9, 2024 updates (KB5037754, CVE-2024-26248 and CVE-2024-29056) a Windows server that validates the PAC of an inbound service ticket sends the ticket to a domain controller through Netlogon, and the domain controller checks the PAC signatures. The server writes this event when the domain controller denies the ticket. The event is written on the server that accepted the Kerberos authentication, not on the domain controller, so its System log has to be collected. A service ticket forged with a service account's key cannot carry PAC signatures made with the krbtgt key, so a denial is the result to expect for such a ticket on this path, although Microsoft does not describe the event in those terms. The rule matches on the event and its source alone. Microsoft lists Account, Domain, DC, Reason and ErrorCode as the content of the event but does not publish the possible reasons, so the level is one step lower and the reason has to be read in the event. A forged ticket that the service accepts without this validation is not detected.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows System event log (domain controllers)
title: Service Ticket Denied by a Domain Controller During Network Ticket Logon
id: 775a3b47-1475-4020-b078-3110a322f5f6
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 22 (Kerberos Ticket Logon Failure) from the source
  Security-Kerberos in the System log. Since the April 9, 2024 updates
  (KB5037754, CVE-2024-26248 and CVE-2024-29056) a Windows server that
  validates the PAC of an inbound service ticket sends the ticket to a domain
  controller through Netlogon, and the domain controller checks the PAC
  signatures. The server writes this event when the domain controller denies
  the ticket. The event is written on the server that accepted the Kerberos
  authentication, not on the domain controller, so its System log has to be
  collected. A service ticket forged with a service account's key cannot carry
  PAC signatures made with the krbtgt key, so a denial is the result to expect
  for such a ticket on this path, although Microsoft does not describe the
  event in those terms. The rule matches on the event and its source alone.
  Microsoft lists Account, Domain, DC, Reason and ErrorCode as the content of
  the event but does not publish the possible reasons, so the level is one
  step lower and the reason has to be read in the event. A forged ticket that
  the service accepts without this validation is not detected.
references:
  - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/2024/04/how-to-manage-pac-validation-changes-related-to-cve-2024-26248-and-cve-2024-29056
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1558.002
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name|contains: Security-Kerberos
    EventID: 22
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Domains in which not every domain controller and server has the April 2024 or later updates, and trusts across which the authorization data of a ticket is filtered. Read the reason and the error code in the event before treating it as a forgery.
  - Third-party Kerberos implementations that issue tickets without the signatures Windows expects.
level: medium

False positives

  • Domains in which not every domain controller and server has the April 2024 or later updates, and trusts across which the authorization data of a ticket is filtered. Read the reason and the error code in the event before treating it as a forgery.
  • Third-party Kerberos implementations that issue tickets without the signatures Windows expects.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Kerberos network logon on a server that matches no service ticket issued by a domain controller

Detection hypothesisJoins two logsSequence of events

A client normally receives a service ticket from a domain controller (event 4769) and then presents it to the server, which logs the network logon (event 4624). Microsoft documents that the Logon GUID of event 4769 on the domain controller correlates with the same Logon GUID in event 4624 on the target computer. A Silver Ticket is presented without ever being issued, so the server records a Kerberos logon whose Logon GUID matches no service ticket request on any domain controller.

  1. On the servers to protect, take successful event 4624 with LogonType 3 and AuthenticationPackageName Kerberos. Keep LogonGuid, TargetUserName, IpAddress and the server in Computer.
  2. Drop the events whose LogonGuid is all zeros. Microsoft states that the value then was not captured.
  3. From the Security log of every domain controller, collect LogonGuid of successful event 4769 (Status 0x0).
  4. Look up the LogonGuid of each logon in that set over a look-back of at least the maximum service ticket lifetime, 600 minutes by default. Report the logons with no match, first those of privileged accounts and those from an address that is not an administrative workstation.

Events46244769

LimitsIt needs the Security log of the protected servers as well as that of every domain controller, and both event types are high volume. Microsoft does not describe how the Logon GUID is built, so check on a known logon that the two values match in your collection before relying on it. Tickets issued before collection started, lost to log rollover or issued by domain controllers of another domain also match nothing. The look-back is a starting point.

Triage

  • Read the Client value in the event and find which service handed that ticket to the domain controller (services configured for constrained delegation are the usual path).
  • Check whether every domain controller is fully updated and whether tickets issued before the updates could still be valid; both produce these events without an attack.
  • If the ticket belongs to a service whose account key may be known to an attacker, change that account's password twice and review recent access to the service.
  • On the server itself, look for Kerberos network logons by privileged users that have no matching service ticket request on any domain controller.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Restrict access to the affected service, or isolate its server, while the key is replaced.
  2. Change the password of the account that runs the service twice, so that the old key is gone. For services such as file sharing that is the computer account of the server, otherwise the service account.
  3. Find out how the key was obtained. If it was cracked from a service ticket, give the account a long random password or move the service to a group managed service account. If it was taken on the server, treat the server and the credentials used on it as compromised.
  4. Review what the forged identities did inside the service, such as files read or changed, database access and new local administrators.
  5. Verify afterwards that KDC events 43 and 44 no longer appear for the service.

Mitigation

  • Run services under group managed service accounts (gMSA) and give remaining user-backed service accounts long random passwords, so their keys cannot be recovered by cracking a service ticket.
  • Keep domain controllers and member servers on current updates so the full PAC signature (November 2022 updates) is issued and enforced everywhere.
  • Change the password of a service or computer account twice when its key may have been exposed; the forged tickets stop working once the old key is gone.
  • Limit local administrator rights on servers, since an administrator of a server can read its computer account key.

Frequently asked questions

Why is there no event 4769 for a Silver Ticket?

The attacker builds the ticket with the key of the account that runs the service and presents it straight to the service. No domain controller issues it, so no ticket request is logged. On the target server the sign-in looks like an ordinary Kerberos network logon.

Which forged tickets does this rule catch, and which not?

It catches a ticket only when it is handed back to a domain controller, for example as evidence in constrained delegation. There the KDC checks the full PAC signature, which is made with the krbtgt key, and logs event 43 or 44. A forged ticket that is only ever shown to the service itself never reaches that check and is not detected. The Detection logic section describes a correlation of the server's Kerberos logons with the service ticket requests on the domain controllers that can point to such a ticket.

Do KDC events 43 and 44 always mean a forged ticket?

No. The same events appear when not every domain controller has the November 2022 or later updates, when service tickets issued before the updates are still valid, and with third-party devices that implement Kerberos without the full PAC signature. They stop once the domain is fully updated and the old tickets have expired.

Does resetting the password of the impersonated user stop a Silver Ticket?

No. The ticket is built with the key of the service or computer account and can name any user with any group memberships. Access lasts until the password of that account changes. Change it twice, so that the old key is gone and the forged tickets stop working.

References

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