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Zerologon (Vulnerable Netlogon Secure Channel) detection rules

CVE-2020-1472 lets an unauthenticated attacker take over a machine account when a domain controller accepts a Netlogon secure channel without secure RPC. Patched domain controllers log every such connection in the System log.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
Critical
Log source
Windows System event log (domain controllers)
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Network access, without any account, to a domain controller that accepts a Netlogon secure channel without secure RPC for the targeted account.
Impact
The attacker takes over the targeted machine or trust account, and when it belongs to a domain controller an unauthenticated network position ends in full domain compromise.
Response
Block and isolate the client that opened the vulnerable connection, remove the abused account from the allow list, and reset the password of the account that was taken over.
Mitigation
Keep every domain controller on current security updates, and keep the allow list for vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections empty.
Event IDs
583858395840584158295830583158275828
Threat groups
UNC3886

How the attack works

Domain-joined computers, domain controllers and trusts authenticate to a domain controller over the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC) and build a Netlogon secure channel on the password of their machine or trust account. CVE-2020-1472, known as Zerologon, is an elevation of privilege flaw in that protocol. An attacker who can reach a domain controller on the network, without any account, establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel in the name of a machine account and takes that account over. The account can be the domain controller's own.

Microsoft closed the hole by making domain controllers require secure RPC on the Netlogon secure channel. Since the updates of August 11, 2020 that applies to Windows machine accounts, trust accounts and domain controllers, and since the enforcement phase that began with the updates of February 9, 2021 it applies to every account. A connection that does not use secure RPC, which Microsoft calls a vulnerable connection, is refused.

One exception remains. The Group Policy setting "Domain controller: Allow vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections" names accounts, meant for third-party devices that cannot use secure RPC, for which the domain controller still accepts vulnerable connections. Microsoft states that an attacker can take over the identity of any machine account on that list, and research published in 2026 under the name Onelogon describes a practical attack on such accounts. A domain controller that never received the 2020 and 2021 updates is exposed for all accounts.

The domain controller reports each case through NETLOGON events in its System log. Events 5827 (machine account) and 5828 (trust account) record a vulnerable connection that was refused. Events 5830 and 5831 record one that was accepted because the account is on the allow list. Event 5829 appears only on domain controllers still in the 2020 deployment phase and records a vulnerable connection that was accepted and would be refused under enforcement. Two further rules on this page read the events of a later hardening of the same channel, CVE-2022-38023: 5838 and 5839 for a client or a trust that uses RPC signing instead of RPC sealing, and 5840 and 5841 for a secure channel that uses RC4.

What an attacker needs

  • Network access to a domain controller. No account is needed.
  • A domain controller that accepts a Netlogon secure channel without secure RPC for the targeted account. Either the account is on the allow list of "Domain controller: Allow vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections", or the domain controller is missing the August 2020 and February 2021 updates.

Impact

The attacker takes over the targeted machine or trust account and can do whatever that identity is allowed to do. When the account belongs to a domain controller this includes replicating the password hashes of the whole domain, so an unauthenticated position on the network ends in full domain compromise.

Detection rules

Netlogon Client or Trust Used RPC Signing Instead of RPC Sealing

Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when the Netlogon service encounters a client (5838) or a trust (5839) that uses RPC signing instead of RPC sealing on the Netlogon secure channel. With signing the Netlogon protocol only signs its messages. With sealing it signs and encrypts them. CVE-2022-38023 is a weakness of the protocol when signing is used without sealing, and since the updates released on or after July 11, 2023 a domain controller refuses such connections from every client. The client is a third-party or outdated device, or a system that opened a Netlogon channel in the name of the account without sealing. Microsoft's article gives the event text and does not list event data fields, so the rule matches the event IDs and the provider only, and the affected account has to be read from the event itself. Events with the same content are logged at most once per hour. Collect the System log of every domain controller. The events exist on domain controllers with the November 8, 2022 or later updates.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows System event log (domain controllers)
title: Netlogon Client or Trust Used RPC Signing Instead of RPC Sealing
id: 324bec9e-f687-4fa5-9735-324f63d34ce4
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when the
  Netlogon service encounters a client (5838) or a trust (5839) that uses RPC
  signing instead of RPC sealing on the Netlogon secure channel. With signing
  the Netlogon protocol only signs its messages. With sealing it signs and
  encrypts them. CVE-2022-38023 is a weakness of the protocol when signing is
  used without sealing, and since the updates released on or after July 11,
  2023 a domain controller refuses such connections from every client. The
  client is a third-party or outdated device, or a system that opened a
  Netlogon channel in the name of the account without sealing. Microsoft's
  article gives the event text and does not list event data fields, so the
  rule matches the event IDs and the provider only, and the affected account
  has to be read from the event itself. Events with the same content are
  logged at most once per hour. Collect the System log of every domain
  controller. The events exist on domain controllers with the November 8,
  2022 or later updates.
references:
  - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/2022/10/kb5021130-how-to-manage-the-netlogon-protocol-changes-related-to-cve-2022-38023
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1212
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name|contains: NETLOGON
    EventID:
      - 5838
      - 5839
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Third-party devices and non-Windows domain members whose Netlogon implementation does not seal the channel, and Windows devices that are out of support or not updated. Microsoft's guidance is to update the device and to keep "Domain member Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)" enabled.
level: medium

False positives

  • Third-party devices and non-Windows domain members whose Netlogon implementation does not seal the channel, and Windows devices that are out of support or not updated. Microsoft's guidance is to update the device and to keep "Domain member Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)" enabled.

Netlogon Secure Channel Created or Denied With RC4

Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when the Netlogon service creates a secure channel with a client that uses RC4 (5840), or denies a client that uses RC4 because of the RejectMD5Clients setting (5841). Microsoft added the events with the updates for CVE-2022-38023 to find clients that do not use the strongest available cryptography, and describes 5840 as a sign that a client in the domain is using weak cryptography. The enforcement of RPC sealing does not reject a client for using RC4. Only RejectMD5Clients does, and Microsoft recommends enabling it. A channel protected with RC4 is weaker than one protected with AES, so each event names a device to update. Microsoft's article gives the event text and does not list event data fields, so the rule matches the event IDs and the provider only. Events with the same content are logged at most once per hour. The events exist on domain controllers with the November 8, 2022 or later updates.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows System event log (domain controllers)
title: Netlogon Secure Channel Created or Denied With RC4
id: ed4266e2-63b8-40fb-8086-beab4593b3f6
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when the
  Netlogon service creates a secure channel with a client that uses RC4
  (5840), or denies a client that uses RC4 because of the RejectMD5Clients
  setting (5841). Microsoft added the events with the updates for
  CVE-2022-38023 to find clients that do not use the strongest available
  cryptography, and describes 5840 as a sign that a client in the domain is
  using weak cryptography. The enforcement of RPC sealing does not reject a
  client for using RC4. Only RejectMD5Clients does, and Microsoft recommends
  enabling it. A channel protected with RC4 is weaker than one protected with
  AES, so each event names a device to update. Microsoft's article gives the
  event text and does not list event data fields, so the rule matches the
  event IDs and the provider only. Events with the same content are logged at
  most once per hour. The events exist on domain controllers with the
  November 8, 2022 or later updates.
references:
  - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/2022/10/kb5021130-how-to-manage-the-netlogon-protocol-changes-related-to-cve-2022-38023
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1212
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name|contains: NETLOGON
    EventID:
      - 5840
      - 5841
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Older domain members and third-party devices that support only RC4 for the Netlogon secure channel. These are the clients the events are meant to find. Update or replace them, then exclude what remains by the device named in the event.
level: low

False positives

  • Older domain members and third-party devices that support only RC4 for the Netlogon secure channel. These are the clients the events are meant to find. Update or replace them, then exclude what remains by the device named in the event.

Netlogon Allowed a Vulnerable Secure Channel Connection

Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when it accepts a Netlogon secure channel connection that does not use secure RPC: the machine account (5830) or trust account (5831) is on the allow list of "Domain controller: Allow vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections", or the domain controller is still in the 2020 deployment phase (5829). This is the kind of connection CVE-2020-1472 and its later variants need, so each event is either the exempted device or someone using its exemption, and the event does not say which. Collect the System log of every domain controller; the events exist on domain controllers with the August 2020 or later updates.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows System event log (domain controllers)
title: Netlogon Allowed a Vulnerable Secure Channel Connection
id: b538e5b2-86df-41ae-a778-410829236d85
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when it
  accepts a Netlogon secure channel connection that does not use secure RPC:
  the machine account (5830) or trust account (5831) is on the allow list of
  "Domain controller: Allow vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections",
  or the domain controller is still in the 2020 deployment phase (5829). This
  is the kind of connection CVE-2020-1472 and its later variants need, so each
  event is either the exempted device or someone using its exemption, and the
  event does not say which. Collect the System log of every domain controller;
  the events exist on domain controllers with the August 2020 or later
  updates.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212/
  - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows-server/2020/10/how-to-manage-the-changes-in-netlogon-secure-channel-connections-associated-with-cve-2020-1472
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1212
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name|contains: NETLOGON
    EventID:
      - 5829
      - 5830
      - 5831
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - The third-party or legacy device the exemption was created for. The exemption is the exposure, so remove the account from the allow list instead of tuning the rule.
  - Event 5829 for devices that do not use secure RPC, on a domain controller that has not received the February 2021 or later updates. Update the domain controller.
level: high

False positives

  • The third-party or legacy device the exemption was created for. The exemption is the exposure, so remove the account from the allow list instead of tuning the rule.
  • Event 5829 for devices that do not use secure RPC, on a domain controller that has not received the February 2021 or later updates. Update the domain controller.

Netlogon Denied a Vulnerable Secure Channel Connection

Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when it refuses a Netlogon secure channel connection that does not use secure RPC, from a machine account (5827) or a trust account (5828). The client is an outdated or third-party device, or a system that tried to open a vulnerable connection in the name of that account. The attempt failed, so the value of the event is the account and the client it names. Collect the System log of every domain controller; the events exist on domain controllers with the August 2020 or later updates.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows System event log (domain controllers)
title: Netlogon Denied a Vulnerable Secure Channel Connection
id: 3af981e1-77ea-4eda-8acb-7d9015d67b1c
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when it
  refuses a Netlogon secure channel connection that does not use secure RPC,
  from a machine account (5827) or a trust account (5828). The client is an
  outdated or third-party device, or a system that tried to open a vulnerable
  connection in the name of that account. The attempt failed, so the value of
  the event is the account and the client it names. Collect the System log of
  every domain controller; the events exist on domain controllers with the
  August 2020 or later updates.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212/
  - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows-server/2020/10/how-to-manage-the-changes-in-netlogon-secure-channel-connections-associated-with-cve-2020-1472
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1212
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name|contains: NETLOGON
    EventID:
      - 5827
      - 5828
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - 'Third-party or unsupported devices that cannot use secure RPC, and Windows devices that are not fully updated or have "Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)" disabled. Fix the device; do not add it to the allow list.'
level: medium

False positives

  • Third-party or unsupported devices that cannot use secure RPC, and Windows devices that are not fully updated or have "Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)" disabled. Fix the device; do not add it to the allow list.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Vulnerable secure channel allowed for a machine account, then its password changes outside the normal cycle

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsJoins two logsCompares with an earlier value

Taking over a machine account through a vulnerable secure channel is useful to an attacker once the account has a password the attacker knows, and the change is logged on the domain controller. Machine accounts change their password every 30 days by default. A password change of the account named in an allowed vulnerable connection, shortly after that connection and outside the normal cycle, points to the takeover.

  1. A vulnerable connection is allowed for a machine account: NETLOGON event 5829 or 5830 in the System log of a domain controller. Read the account the event names (Machine SamAccountName) and the client details.
  2. Within 60 minutes, find event 4742 on the domain controllers with that account in TargetUserName and a PasswordLastSet value that is not a dash.
  3. Compare with the previous password change of the account. A change less than 30 days after the last one, without a reset by an administrator, is the finding.
  4. If the account is a domain controller's, look at once for directory replication requests and logons with the account from an address that is not the domain controller's own.

Events582958304742

LimitsA device on the allow list changes its own password over the vulnerable channel on its normal cycle, which is why the interval matters. An administrator who resets the computer account produces the same event. Trust accounts (event 5831) are not covered here. The 60 minutes are a starting point.

Triage

  • Read the account named in the event (Machine SamAccountName or Trust Name) and the client details the event gives (operating system fields, or Client IP Address in the trust events). Decide which device this is and whether it is known to need an exemption.
  • For 5830 and 5831, confirm that the connection came from the device the exemption was made for. A domain controller, a trust or a privileged account on the allow list is an exposure to remove at once, whatever caused this event.
  • For 5827 and 5828 on a supported and updated Windows device, check its secure channel settings as Microsoft's article describes. If the real device is healthy, another system is using its account name.
  • Look in the Security log for a password change of the named account (event 4742 with a new Password Last Set value) that its owner cannot explain, and for logons with that account from an unexpected address.
  • If the takeover of a domain controller account cannot be ruled out, treat it as a domain compromise.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Block the client that opened the vulnerable connection on the network and isolate it.
  2. Remove the abused account from the allow list of the policy that permits vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections, and confirm that every domain controller has applied the change.
  3. Update a domain controller that still accepts vulnerable connections in general (event 5829), or take it off the network until it is updated.
  4. Reset the password of the machine or trust account that was taken over, and confirm that the real device or trust has a working secure channel again.
  5. If the account belongs to a domain controller, handle it as a domain compromise, because that identity can replicate the password hashes of the whole domain.
  6. Review what was done with the account since the first vulnerable connection, including directory changes and replication requests.

Mitigation

  • Keep every domain controller, read-only domain controllers included, on current security updates. The fix for CVE-2020-1472 protects the forest only when all of them have it.
  • Keep the allow list of "Domain controller: Allow vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections" empty. Update, replace or retire a device that cannot use secure RPC instead of exempting it.
  • Where an exemption cannot be avoided yet, never exempt a domain controller, a trust account or an account with administrative rights, and review the list on a schedule.
  • Keep "Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)" enabled on domain members.
  • Collect the System log of every domain controller and alert on NETLOGON events 5827 to 5831.

Frequently asked questions

Is a fully patched domain still exposed to Zerologon?

Only through exceptions. Updated domain controllers refuse a Netlogon secure channel without secure RPC, except for accounts on the allow list of the Group Policy setting for vulnerable connections. Microsoft states that an attacker can take over the identity of any machine account on that list. A domain controller that never received the 2020 and 2021 updates is exposed for all accounts.

What is the difference between events 5827 and 5828 and events 5830 and 5831?

Events 5827 (machine account) and 5828 (trust account) record a vulnerable connection that the domain controller refused. Events 5830 and 5831 record one that it accepted because the account is on the allow list. The first pair shows an attempt or an outdated device. The second pair shows a connection of the kind the attack needs.

Does event 5830 tell me whether the exempted device or an attacker connected?

No. Each event is either the exempted device or someone using its exemption, and the event does not say which. Confirm that the connection came from the device the exemption was made for. In either case the exemption is the exposure, so remove the account from the allow list.

What does event 5829 say about a domain controller?

It appears only on domain controllers that are still in the 2020 deployment phase, which means they have not received the February 2021 or later updates. The event records a vulnerable connection that was accepted and would be refused under enforcement. Update that domain controller.

References

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