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Golden Ticket detection rules

A forged Kerberos ticket-granting ticket, signed with the key of the krbtgt account, lets an attacker act as any account in the domain. Patched domain controllers log the forgeries that lack the newer PAC fields.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
Critical
Log source
Windows System event log (domain controllers)
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
The key of the krbtgt account, which takes a domain-level compromise first, such as replication rights, a copy of the directory database or a domain controller backup.
Impact
The attacker can impersonate any account in the domain without knowing a password, and access lasts until the krbtgt password has been changed twice.
Response
Close the way the key was obtained before anything else, then carry out the double krbtgt password reset and reset the passwords of privileged accounts.
Mitigation
Keep directory replication rights to domain controllers only, treat domain controller backups as Tier 0, and reset the krbtgt password on a regular schedule.
Event IDs
363738
Threat groups
Ke3chang

How the attack works

Every Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) in a domain is encrypted and signed with the key of one account, krbtgt. A domain controller trusts any TGT that carries a valid krbtgt signature. An attacker who has obtained that key, which takes a prior compromise of the domain (see DCSync and NTDS.dit Extraction), can build TGTs without asking a domain controller: for any user name, with any group memberships and any lifetime. That forged TGT is called a Golden Ticket.

The ticket is created offline, so no domain controller logs a ticket request (event 4768) for it. It first becomes visible when it is presented to a domain controller to obtain service tickets, and to that domain controller it looks like any other valid TGT.

Microsoft changed that in two steps. Since the November 2021 updates the Key Distribution Center (KDC) records in the ticket's PAC which account requested the TGT and checks it when the ticket comes back; since the October 11, 2022 updates this is enforced. Since the November 2022 updates tickets also carry a full PAC signature, enforced from October 10, 2023. A ticket that has no PAC, has no requestor information, or names a requestor whose SID does not match Active Directory is now refused, and the domain controller writes an event to its System log. Forgeries built without those fields, or for an account that does not exist, are caught this way. A forgery that carries correct values for an existing account is not: these events reduce the attack, they do not remove it.

What an attacker needs

  • The key (password hash) of the krbtgt account. Getting it requires domain-level compromise first: replication rights (DCSync), a copy of the directory database, or a domain controller backup.
  • The domain name and domain SID, which any domain user can read.

Impact

The attacker can impersonate any account in the domain, including domain administrators and accounts that do not exist, without knowing a password and without passing through normal sign-in. Resetting the impersonated user's password does not help, because the ticket never depended on it. Access lasts until the krbtgt password has been changed twice, which is why a Golden Ticket is used to keep control of a domain after the original way in has been closed.

Detection rules

KDC Refused a Ticket With a Missing or Inconsistent PAC

Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when a ticket presented to the Key Distribution Center has no PAC (36), has no information about the account that requested it (37), or names a requesting account whose SID does not match Active Directory (38). Forged ticket-granting tickets that were built without these PAC fields, or for an account that does not exist, produce them. A forgery with correct values for an existing account does not. Collect the System log of every domain controller; the events exist on domain controllers with the November 2021 or later updates.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows System event log (domain controllers)
title: KDC Refused a Ticket With a Missing or Inconsistent PAC
id: daadf6a6-0c4e-47ac-bb0a-730eed0d475f
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the events a domain controller writes to its System log when a ticket
  presented to the Key Distribution Center has no PAC (36), has no information
  about the account that requested it (37), or names a requesting account whose
  SID does not match Active Directory (38). Forged ticket-granting tickets that
  were built without these PAC fields, or for an account that does not exist,
  produce them. A forgery with correct values for an existing account does not.
  Collect the System log of every domain controller; the events exist on domain
  controllers with the November 2021 or later updates.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
  - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008380-authentication-updates-cve-2021-42287-9dafac11-e0d0-4cb8-959a-143bd0201041
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1558.001
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name|contains: Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
    EventID:
      - 36
      - 37
      - 38
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Tickets issued by a domain controller that is missing the November 2021 or later updates, or by a third-party Kerberos implementation. Check the domain controller named in the event and update it.
  - An account renamed between the issue and the use of its ticket (event 38). The two SIDs in the event match the same account.
  - Password set or change operations on domain controllers without the 2022 fixes for the known issue with event 37.
level: high

False positives

  • Tickets issued by a domain controller that is missing the November 2021 or later updates, or by a third-party Kerberos implementation. Check the domain controller named in the event and update it.
  • An account renamed between the issue and the use of its ticket (event 38). The two SIDs in the event match the same account.
  • Password set or change operations on domain controllers without the 2022 fixes for the known issue with event 37.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Service ticket requested with a ticket-granting ticket that no domain controller issued

Detection hypothesisJoins two logsSequence of events

A Golden Ticket is built offline, so no domain controller ever issued it. Domain controllers with the January 2025 or later updates log a hash of the TGT they issue (event 4768) and of the TGT a client presents to request a service ticket (event 4769). A service ticket request whose presented TGT matches none of the issued ones used a TGT that did not come from a domain controller, whatever the forged ticket says about the account.

  1. From the Security log of every domain controller, collect the ResponseTicket value (shown as Response ticket hash) of successful event 4768 (Status 0x0): the TGTs the domain issued.
  2. Add the ResponseTicketHash of successful event 4769 whose ServiceName is krbtgt. A ticket issued for krbtgt is itself a TGT.
  3. For each successful event 4769, look up its RequestTicketHash in that set over a look-back that covers the TGT lifetime and its renewal, by default 10 hours and 7 days. In Microsoft's example events, the hash a 4768 returns is the hash the following 4769 presents.
  4. A request whose hash matches nothing, for an account and IpAddress with no TGT renewal before it (event 4770 with ServiceName krbtgt, which carries no hash), presented a TGT that no domain controller in the logs issued. Read TargetUserName, IpAddress and the domain controller in Computer.

Events476847694770

LimitsOnly Windows Server 2016 or later domain controllers with the January 14, 2025 or later update log the hash fields, and Microsoft does not describe the hash further: check that the values are filled in before relying on it. Renewed TGTs have no logged hash. Tickets issued before collection started or lost to log rollover, and referral tickets from trusted domains, also match nothing. The look-back is a starting point.

Service ticket requested by an account that got no ticket-granting ticket from that address

Detection hypothesisJoins two logsSequence of eventsNeeds your own lists

A client normally asks a domain controller for a TGT (event 4768) and then uses it to request service tickets (event 4769). A forged TGT skips the first step, so service ticket requests appear for an account that never obtained a TGT from that address. This works on domain controllers without the 2025 hash fields. A TGT stolen from one computer and used from another leaves the same pattern.

  1. Take successful event 4769 (Status 0x0) and keep the account part of TargetUserName (the part before the @, built from the account name and not the user principal name), TargetDomainName and IpAddress.
  2. Look back in the Security logs of all domain controllers for a successful event 4768 with the same account in TargetUserName and the same IpAddress, or a TGT renewal (event 4770 with ServiceName krbtgt) for the same account and address. Start with the TGT lifetime plus its renewal, by default 10 hours and 7 days.
  3. Normalise both sides before the join: event 4768 logs the bare account name while 4769 and 4770 log account@DOMAIN, and addresses appear with or without the ::ffff: prefix.
  4. Report the requests with no match, first for privileged accounts and domain controller computer accounts, where volume is low and impact is highest.

Events476847694770

LimitsAddress changes (DHCP, VPN, NAT, hosts with several addresses), requests made on a domain controller itself, referral tickets from trusted domains, a domain controller whose logs are missing and log rollover all leave gaps. A forgery used from a computer where the same account also signed in normally is not seen. Event 4769 is high volume. The look-back is a starting point.

Triage

  • Read the Client and "Ticket for" values in the event. Does the client account exist, and is it one that should be requesting that service?
  • For event 38, compare the two SIDs the event lists (from Active Directory and from the ticket). A renamed account explains a mismatch; an account that was not renamed does not.
  • Check the domain controller named in "Ticket PAC constructed by". A domain controller that is missing updates, or a third-party Kerberos implementation, produces these events without an attack.
  • If no benign cause is found, treat it as a domain compromise, reset krbtgt twice and find out how the key was obtained (replication requests from a non-domain controller, access to the directory database or to backups).

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Close the way the krbtgt key was obtained before the key is reset. Remove unexpected replication rights, and secure the domain controller, backup or virtual disk the key was taken from. A reset done before that only gives the attacker the new key.
  2. Carry out the double krbtgt reset as an incident action and record both times. Microsoft's forest recovery guidance gives 10 hours, the default maximum ticket lifetime, as the wait between the two resets.
  3. Reset the passwords of privileged accounts as well. Whoever held the krbtgt key had domain-level access and may hold other credentials from the same source.
  4. Review the hosts and services that were reached with the refused or suspected tickets, and remove what was installed or changed there.
  5. After the second reset, confirm that updated domain controllers no longer log KDC events 36 to 38 without a benign cause.

Mitigation

  • After any suspected domain compromise, reset the krbtgt password twice, waiting for replication and for the maximum ticket lifetime between the two resets; the second reset invalidates everything signed with the stolen key.
  • Reset the krbtgt password on a regular schedule as well, so a key stolen unnoticed does not stay valid for years.
  • Keep every domain controller on current updates, so the PAC requestor check (November 2021) and the full PAC signature check (November 2022) are enforced on all of them; one unpatched domain controller weakens the check.
  • Protect what yields the krbtgt key in the first place. Keep directory replication rights to domain controllers only, and treat domain controller backups and virtual disks as Tier 0.

Frequently asked questions

Does this rule detect every Golden Ticket?

No. It reports forged tickets that have no PAC, lack the requestor information, or name a requestor whose SID does not match Active Directory. A forgery that carries correct values for an existing account passes these checks and produces no event. The events reduce the attack, they do not remove it. The Detection logic section describes two correlations that can also point to such a forgery. One looks for service ticket requests whose ticket-granting ticket no domain controller issued, the other for requests from an account that got no ticket-granting ticket from that address.

Why does a forged ticket-granting ticket leave no event 4768?

Event 4768 is written when a domain controller issues a TGT. A Golden Ticket is built offline with the `krbtgt` key, so no domain controller is asked and nothing is logged at that point. The ticket first becomes visible when it is presented to a domain controller to obtain service tickets.

Why does the krbtgt password have to be reset twice?

Active Directory keeps the two most recent passwords of the `krbtgt` account in its password history. Only the second reset removes the stolen key from that history and invalidates everything signed with it. Wait for replication and for the maximum ticket lifetime between the two resets.

What produces KDC events 36 to 38 without an attack?

A ticket issued by a domain controller that is missing the November 2021 or later updates, or by a third-party Kerberos implementation. An account that was renamed between the issue and the use of its ticket causes event 38. Password set or change operations on domain controllers without the 2022 fixes for a known issue cause event 37.

References

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