How the attack works
NTLM authentication proves knowledge of the account's NT hash, not of the password itself. An attacker who dumps the hash from memory, the SAM database or NTDS.dit can therefore authenticate as that account to any service that accepts NTLM, without cracking anything.
On the host the attacker controls, tooling typically places the stolen hash in a new logon session created with "new credentials" (logon type 9), the same mechanism runas /netonly uses: the local identity stays the same and the injected credentials are only used for outbound connections. On the target, the result is an ordinary NTLM network logon (type 3). Because local Administrator passwords are often reused, the built-in Administrator account (RID 500) is the most common vehicle for moving between machines. A threshold rule on this page counts the computers that one workstation reaches with that account over NTLM within half an hour.
What an attacker needs
- The NT hash of an account, typically taken with local administrator rights from a host where that account was used.
- A target service that accepts NTLM, and network access to it.
Impact
The attacker moves laterally with the stolen account's rights. The hash of a shared local Administrator password opens every machine that uses it; a domain admin's hash opens the domain. The hash stays valid until the password is changed.
Detection rules
Built-in Administrator Logged On With NTLM to Many Computers From One Workstation
Counts, per source workstation name, the distinct computers that logged a successful NTLM network logon (event 4624, logon type 3) by a built-in Administrator account (SID ending in -500). A reused local Administrator password, or its hash, opens every computer that shares it, and moving through them leaves this logon on each one within a short time. One workstation name that reaches 5 or more computers within 30 minutes has that shape. Microsoft notes that NTLM logons carry the workstation name and may lack network details, so the rule groups by WorkstationName, which the client reports and can be empty or false. It needs the Security log of the member servers and workstations, not only of the domain controllers. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. Requires Audit Logon.
Fires when one WorkstationName has at least 5 different Computer values within 30 minutes.
title: NTLM Network Logon by a Built-in Administrator Account (Lateral Movement Base Event)
id: 0d4bb8b4-0114-4a18-abe4-68b60056d298
name: builtin_administrator_ntlm_logon_many_computers
status: experimental
description: >-
Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A successful network logon
(event 4624, logon type 3) authenticated with NTLM by an account whose SID
ends in -500, the built-in Administrator.
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 3
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
TargetUserSid|endswith: '-500'
condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Built-in Administrator Logged On With NTLM to Many Computers From One Workstation
id: 44eedde3-ca72-4e2d-bb24-7769fb298bb4
status: experimental
description: >-
Counts, per source workstation name, the distinct computers that logged a
successful NTLM network logon (event 4624, logon type 3) by a built-in
Administrator account (SID ending in -500). A reused local Administrator
password, or its hash, opens every computer that shares it, and moving
through them leaves this logon on each one within a short time. One
workstation name that reaches 5 or more computers within 30 minutes has that
shape. Microsoft notes that NTLM logons carry the workstation name and may
lack network details, so the rule groups by WorkstationName, which the
client reports and can be empty or false. It needs the Security log of the
member servers and workstations, not only of the domain controllers. The
threshold and the window are starting points to tune. Requires Audit Logon.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.002
correlation:
type: value_count
rules:
- builtin_administrator_ntlm_logon_many_computers
group-by:
- WorkstationName
timespan: 30m
condition:
field: Computer
gte: 5
falsepositives:
- Deployment, inventory and backup systems that still sign in to many computers with the built-in Administrator account. Document them and exclude them by WorkstationName, or replace the shared account with Windows LAPS.
- Events with an empty workstation name. Depending on the SIEM they are counted together as one source or left out of the count, so review them separately.
- The values of 5 computers and 30 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many computers the account normally reaches from one source and adjust both.
level: high
False positives
- Deployment, inventory and backup systems that still sign in to many computers with the built-in Administrator account. Document them and exclude them by WorkstationName, or replace the shared account with Windows LAPS.
- Events with an empty workstation name. Depending on the SIEM they are counted together as one source or left out of the count, so review them separately.
- The values of 5 computers and 30 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many computers the account normally reaches from one source and adjust both.
NTLM Network Logon by a Built-in Administrator Account
Detects a successful network logon (type 3) authenticated with NTLM by an account whose SID ends in -500, the built-in local or domain Administrator. Lateral movement with a reused local Administrator hash produces exactly this pattern. Where network logon is denied to local administrator accounts, as Microsoft recommends, these events should be rare. Requires Audit Logon.
title: NTLM Network Logon by a Built-in Administrator Account
id: b4196dce-383d-49b3-9a15-8ef2d32c7064
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful network logon (type 3) authenticated with NTLM by an
account whose SID ends in -500, the built-in local or domain Administrator.
Lateral movement with a reused local Administrator hash produces exactly this
pattern. Where network logon is denied to local administrator accounts, as
Microsoft recommends, these events should be rare.
Requires Audit Logon.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 3
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
TargetUserSid|endswith: '-500'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Break-glass or legacy administration with the built-in Administrator account. Document the source hosts and exclude them by IpAddress.
level: medium
False positives
- Break-glass or legacy administration with the built-in Administrator account. Document the source hosts and exclude them by IpAddress.
Logon With New Credentials for Outbound Connections
Detects successful logons of type 9 (NewCredentials), where the caller cloned its own token and supplied different credentials for outbound network connections only. This is how runas /netonly works and how pass-the-hash and overpass-the-hash tooling starts a process with a stolen hash. The account used on the network is recorded in TargetOutboundUserName. Requires Audit Logon.
title: Logon With New Credentials for Outbound Connections
id: 2341f6b1-bcc5-4d6f-8af1-04a601446705
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects successful logons of type 9 (NewCredentials), where the caller cloned
its own token and supplied different credentials for outbound network
connections only. This is how runas /netonly works and how pass-the-hash and
overpass-the-hash tooling starts a process with a stolen hash. The account
used on the network is recorded in TargetOutboundUserName.
Requires Audit Logon.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-createprocesswithlogonw
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 9
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrators who use runas /netonly, or tools that connect to another domain with separate credentials. Review the outbound accounts and exclude known admin workstations by Computer or TargetUserName.
- Applications that call LogonUser with LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS; identify them by ProcessName and exclude them.
level: medium
False positives
- Administrators who use runas /netonly, or tools that connect to another domain with separate credentials. Review the outbound accounts and exclude known admin workstations by Computer or TargetUserName.
- Applications that call LogonUser with LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS; identify them by ProcessName and exclude them.
Triage
- For a type 9 logon, compare TargetUserName (the local identity) with TargetOutboundUserName and TargetOutboundDomainName (the credentials used on the network). An administrative or service account in the outbound fields that the user does not own is suspicious.
- Check which process created the session (ProcessName) and look for access to LSASS or other credential dumping on the same host shortly before.
- For a built-in Administrator NTLM logon, identify the source (IpAddress, WorkstationName) and check whether the same account logged on to other hosts from that source within a short window.
- If confirmed, reset the affected account's password, isolate the source host and hunt for other logons with the same account.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Isolate the host where the stolen hash was used, which is the source of the NTLM logons or the host with the type 9 session, and the hosts it reached.
- Change the password of the account whose hash was used, because the hash stays valid until then. For a shared local Administrator password, change it on every computer that uses it and make each one unique.
- Find the host where the hash was stolen. Every other account that signed in there may be exposed in the same way, so reset those as well.
- Check each host that was reached with the account for what was left behind, such as new services, scheduled tasks, local accounts and further credential theft.
- Verify that the account no longer authenticates from the contained source and that no host accepts the old credentials.
Mitigation
- Deploy Windows LAPS so that every computer has a unique, regularly rotated local Administrator password.
- Deny network logon to local administrator accounts ("Deny access to this computer from the network" for "Local account and member of Administrators group") and disable the built-in Administrator where possible.
- Add privileged accounts to Protected Users and follow a tiered administration model so that admin hashes are not left on lower-tier hosts.
- Reduce NTLM use and enable Credential Guard to protect secrets held by LSASS.
Frequently asked questions
Is every type 9 logon a pass-the-hash attempt?
No. Logon type 9 is what runas /netonly creates, and some applications call the same API to connect to another domain with separate credentials. Look at TargetOutboundUserName and at the process that created the session. An administrative or service account in the outbound fields that the local user does not own is the case to investigate.
Why does changing the password help if the attacker never knew it?
NTLM proves knowledge of the NT hash, not of the password, so the hash works as a credential by itself. It stays valid until the password is changed. A password change produces a new hash and makes the stolen one useless.
Why does the rule on target servers look at the built-in Administrator only?
Local Administrator passwords are often reused across computers, which makes the account with RID 500 the most common vehicle for moving between machines. Where network logon is denied to local administrator accounts, such events should be rare. A stolen hash of any other account produces an ordinary NTLM network logon, which this rule does not match.
How is pass-the-hash different from overpass-the-hash?
Pass-the-hash presents the NT hash to a service that accepts NTLM. Overpass-the-hash uses the same hash as the RC4 Kerberos key of the account to obtain Kerberos tickets, so it also works where NTLM is restricted. A type 9 logon on the attacker's host can precede both. The trace of the second is an RC4 ticket request on the domain controller.