1. Resources
  2. Detection rules
  3. Mass Suspension or Deletion of User Accounts in Google Workspace

Mass Suspension or Deletion of User Accounts in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker with admin rights in Google Workspace suspends, deletes or archives many user accounts in a short time, so that employees and other administrators cannot sign in while the attack continues.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
High
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1531Account Access Removal
Tactic
Impact
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Control of an admin account with user management privileges, and of a super admin account to remove other administrators.
Impact
The affected users cannot sign in to any Google Workspace service, and deleted accounts are lost unless they are restored within 20 days.
Response
From another super admin account, stop the account that made the changes, then restore the administrators first and the users after them.
Mitigation
Keep several super admin accounts held by different people and limit user management privileges to the roles and organizational units that need them.
API methods
google.admin.AdminService.suspendUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.deleteUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.archiveUser
Threat groups
AkiraLAPSUS$

How the attack works

An administrator of Google Workspace or Cloud Identity can take a user's access away in three ways. Suspending an account blocks sign-in and keeps the data. Archiving does the same for people who have left and frees the license. Deleting removes the account, and Google keeps it restorable for 20 days. Each can be done for one user in the Admin console, for many users with a CSV upload, or through the Directory API.

These are everyday actions when people leave. Done to many accounts at once by an attacker, they are an attack on availability. With the workforce and the other administrators locked out of mail, files and the Admin console, the organization cannot work and cannot respond, which buys the attacker time for extortion or for destroying data. The same identities sign in to Google Cloud, so the lockout can reach the cloud console as well. Deletion adds a deadline, because after 20 days the data of a deleted user is gone.

The Admin audit log records SUSPEND_USER, DELETE_USER and ARCHIVE_USER, each with the affected account in USER_EMAIL. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. A single event is routine, so the rule on this page counts them per administrator. Accounts that Google suspends by itself are written to the Login audit log and have their own page (Suspicious Sign-In Flagged by Google in Google Workspace).

What an attacker needs

  • Control of an admin account with user management privileges. Google states that a user with a custom admin role can never make changes to another administrator account, so removing administrators needs a super admin account.
  • No further condition. The Admin console, a CSV upload and the Directory API all work for bulk changes.

Impact

The affected users cannot sign in to any Google Workspace service, and suspended accounts stop receiving new mail. If the other super admins are among them, nobody inside the organization can undo the change, and recovery depends on Google's account recovery process. Deleted accounts can be restored by a super administrator for 20 days. After that their data cannot be recovered.

Detection rules

Many Users Suspended, Deleted or Archived by One Admin in Google Workspace

Counts, per acting administrator (principalEmail), the Admin audit events for users suspended (SUSPEND_USER), deleted (DELETE_USER) or archived (ARCHIVE_USER) in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account. Ten or more within 15 minutes is the pattern of accounts being removed in bulk: employees and other administrators locked out so that the organization cannot work or respond. Each of the three actions stops the user from signing in, and Google keeps a deleted account restorable for only 20 days. The affected account of each event is in the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata, which the rule cannot count separately, so the count is of events and one user who is suspended and then deleted counts twice. Google's reference does not say whether a bulk change made with a CSV upload writes one of these events per user, so test that path in your own tenant. The count and the window are starting points to tune. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

Fires when one protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail has at least 10 matching events within 15 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: User Suspended, Deleted or Archived by an Admin in Google Workspace (Burst Base Event)
id: 9997d2a9-a18b-4701-a63a-90d903d78306
name: workspace_user_suspended_deleted_or_archived
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. An Admin audit entry for a
  user suspended (SUSPEND_USER), deleted (DELETE_USER) or archived
  (ARCHIVE_USER) in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account, as it
  arrives in Cloud Audit Logs under admin.googleapis.com.
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.suspendUser
      - google.admin.AdminService.deleteUser
      - google.admin.AdminService.archiveUser
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Many Users Suspended, Deleted or Archived by One Admin in Google Workspace
id: af91d44b-3fed-4cef-b851-4e16892d84ff
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per acting administrator (principalEmail), the Admin audit events
  for users suspended (SUSPEND_USER), deleted (DELETE_USER) or archived
  (ARCHIVE_USER) in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account. Ten or
  more within 15 minutes is the pattern of accounts being removed in bulk:
  employees and other administrators locked out so that the organization
  cannot work or respond. Each of the three actions stops the user from
  signing in, and Google keeps a deleted account restorable for only 20
  days. The affected account of each event is in the parameter USER_EMAIL
  in protoPayload.metadata, which the rule cannot count separately, so the
  count is of events and one user who is suspended and then deleted counts
  twice. Google's reference does not say whether a bulk change made with a
  CSV upload writes one of these events per user, so test that path in your
  own tenant. The count and the window are starting points to tune. The
  entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization
  level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with
  Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the
  organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/suspend-a-user-temporarily
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/restore-a-recently-deleted-user
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - workspace_user_suspended_deleted_or_archived
  group-by:
    - protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail
  timespan: 15m
  condition:
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Directory synchronization tools and offboarding automation that suspend or delete the accounts of leavers in one run, and in schools the end of a term. They act under one known identity. Exclude it in a filter_* selection of the base rule or give it a higher count.
  - A reorganization or the closing of a site, in which the identity team removes many accounts by hand. Confirm the change record.
  - The values of 10 events and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. A small organization can use a much lower count. Measure what your own offboarding produces and adjust both.
level: high

False positives

  • Directory synchronization tools and offboarding automation that suspend or delete the accounts of leavers in one run, and in schools the end of a term. They act under one known identity. Exclude it in a filter_* selection of the base rule or give it a higher count.
  • A reorganization or the closing of a site, in which the identity team removes many accounts by hand. Confirm the change record.
  • The values of 10 events and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. A small organization can use a much lower count. Measure what your own offboarding produces and adjust both.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Suspension or deletion whose target is an administrator

Detection hypothesisNeeds your own lists

A lockout does not need a burst. Suspending or deleting the few other super admins is enough to leave the attacker as the only administrator, and it stays under any count. The audit event does not say that the target is an administrator. Your list of administrators does.

  1. Keep a list of the accounts that hold an admin role. It can be built from google.admin.AdminService.assignRole and unassignRole entries, where the user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL, or exported from the Admin roles page.
  2. Take each google.admin.AdminService.suspendUser, deleteUser or archiveUser entry and compare its USER_EMAIL with the list.
  3. Raise every match, with the acting admin from authenticationInfo.principalEmail.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.suspendUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.deleteUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.archiveUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRole

LimitsAn administrator who leaves the organization is suspended or deleted in the normal course, so each match needs a word with the identity team. A list built only from audit entries misses roles assigned before the logs begin, so start from an export of the current role assignments.

Triage

  • Identify the actor in principalEmail. A directory synchronization or offboarding identity that produces bursts on a schedule is expected. A person's admin account, or a burst at an unusual hour, is not.
  • List the affected accounts from USER_EMAIL in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata of the base events. Check whether administrators, executives or whole departments are among them.
  • Ask human resources and the identity team whether a mass offboarding, a reorganization or the end of a school term explains the number.
  • Review what the same actor did before the burst, such as password resets, admin role changes, changes to 2-Step Verification or single sign-on, and data transfers.
  • Check the recent sign-ins of the actor account for a device, network or country its owner does not use.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. From another super admin account, suspend the admin account that made the changes or reset its password and sign-in cookies, and remove its admin roles until it is cleared.
  2. Restore the administrators first, then the users. Suspended accounts can be restored at any time and archived accounts can be unarchived. Deleted accounts must be restored by a super administrator within 20 days.
  3. If no super admin can sign in, start Google's process for recovering administrator access at once, because the 20 days for deleted accounts keep running.
  4. Review what happened under cover of the lockout, such as data transfers, mailbox exports, new admin roles, domain-wide delegation and changes in the Google Cloud organization.
  5. After recovery, confirm that every restored administrator can sign in, and check that licenses and group memberships of restored users are as before.

Mitigation

  • Keep more than one super admin account, each held by a different person, as Google recommends, so that one compromised account cannot remove all the others unnoticed.
  • Give user management privileges only to the roles that need them, limited to the organizational units they serve, so that a helpdesk account cannot suspend the whole directory.
  • Add recovery information to the super admin accounts and know Google's process for recovering administrator access before it is needed.
  • Protect admin accounts with security keys or passkeys for 2-Step Verification.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM, which stays reachable when the Admin console is not.

Frequently asked questions

Can deleted Google Workspace users be restored after a mass deletion?

For a limited time. Google states that a user account, including an administrator account, can be restored up to 20 days after it was deleted, and that after 20 days the data is gone. Restoring requires being signed in as a super administrator. In a mass deletion that makes the recovery of super admin access the first task.

What is the difference between suspending, archiving and deleting a user for this attack?

All three stop the user from signing in. A suspended account keeps its data and can be restored at any time, and new mail to it is blocked. An archived account also keeps its data and gives up its license. A deleted account loses its data unless it is restored within 20 days. An attacker who wants disruption can use any of them, and deletion adds a deadline.

Why does the rule count events per administrator and not per affected user?

The affected account is in an event parameter inside `protoPayload.metadata`, which the threshold rule cannot count as a field of its own. The acting administrator is in `principalEmail`, so the rule counts how many suspension, deletion and archive events one administrator produced in the window. Read the affected accounts from the single events behind an alert.

Which legitimate processes produce the same burst?

Directory synchronization tools that suspend or delete accounts when people leave the source directory, offboarding automation, and in schools the end of a term. They run under one known identity and usually on a schedule. Exclude that identity from the rule or give it a higher count, and keep the rule strict for the admin accounts of people.

References

We respect your privacy

We use cookies to keep this site secure and working properly. With your permission, we also use optional cookies to understand usage and improve the experience. Cookie Policy

You can change your choice at any time.