How the attack works
An administrator of Google Workspace or Cloud Identity can take a user's access away in three ways. Suspending an account blocks sign-in and keeps the data. Archiving does the same for people who have left and frees the license. Deleting removes the account, and Google keeps it restorable for 20 days. Each can be done for one user in the Admin console, for many users with a CSV upload, or through the Directory API.
These are everyday actions when people leave. Done to many accounts at once by an attacker, they are an attack on availability. With the workforce and the other administrators locked out of mail, files and the Admin console, the organization cannot work and cannot respond, which buys the attacker time for extortion or for destroying data. The same identities sign in to Google Cloud, so the lockout can reach the cloud console as well. Deletion adds a deadline, because after 20 days the data of a deleted user is gone.
The Admin audit log records SUSPEND_USER, DELETE_USER and ARCHIVE_USER, each with the affected account in USER_EMAIL. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com. A single event is routine, so the rule on this page counts them per administrator. Accounts that Google suspends by itself are written to the Login audit log and have their own page (Suspicious Sign-In Flagged by Google in Google Workspace).
What an attacker needs
- Control of an admin account with user management privileges. Google states that a user with a custom admin role can never make changes to another administrator account, so removing administrators needs a super admin account.
- No further condition. The Admin console, a CSV upload and the Directory API all work for bulk changes.
Impact
The affected users cannot sign in to any Google Workspace service, and suspended accounts stop receiving new mail. If the other super admins are among them, nobody inside the organization can undo the change, and recovery depends on Google's account recovery process. Deleted accounts can be restored by a super administrator for 20 days. After that their data cannot be recovered.
Detection rules
Many Users Suspended, Deleted or Archived by One Admin in Google Workspace
Counts, per acting administrator (principalEmail), the Admin audit events for users suspended (SUSPEND_USER), deleted (DELETE_USER) or archived (ARCHIVE_USER) in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account. Ten or more within 15 minutes is the pattern of accounts being removed in bulk: employees and other administrators locked out so that the organization cannot work or respond. Each of the three actions stops the user from signing in, and Google keeps a deleted account restorable for only 20 days. The affected account of each event is in the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata, which the rule cannot count separately, so the count is of events and one user who is suspended and then deleted counts twice. Google's reference does not say whether a bulk change made with a CSV upload writes one of these events per user, so test that path in your own tenant. The count and the window are starting points to tune. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
Fires when one protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail has at least 10 matching events within 15 minutes.
title: User Suspended, Deleted or Archived by an Admin in Google Workspace (Burst Base Event)
id: 9997d2a9-a18b-4701-a63a-90d903d78306
name: workspace_user_suspended_deleted_or_archived
status: experimental
description: >-
Base event of the threshold rule in this file. An Admin audit entry for a
user suspended (SUSPEND_USER), deleted (DELETE_USER) or archived
(ARCHIVE_USER) in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account, as it
arrives in Cloud Audit Logs under admin.googleapis.com.
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.admin.AdminService.suspendUser
- google.admin.AdminService.deleteUser
- google.admin.AdminService.archiveUser
condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Many Users Suspended, Deleted or Archived by One Admin in Google Workspace
id: af91d44b-3fed-4cef-b851-4e16892d84ff
status: experimental
description: >-
Counts, per acting administrator (principalEmail), the Admin audit events
for users suspended (SUSPEND_USER), deleted (DELETE_USER) or archived
(ARCHIVE_USER) in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account. Ten or
more within 15 minutes is the pattern of accounts being removed in bulk:
employees and other administrators locked out so that the organization
cannot work or respond. Each of the three actions stops the user from
signing in, and Google keeps a deleted account restorable for only 20
days. The affected account of each event is in the parameter USER_EMAIL
in protoPayload.metadata, which the rule cannot count separately, so the
count is of events and one user who is suspended and then deleted counts
twice. Google's reference does not say whether a bulk change made with a
CSV upload writes one of these events per user, so test that path in your
own tenant. The count and the window are starting points to tune. The
entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization
level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with
Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the
organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
- https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/suspend-a-user-temporarily
- https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/restore-a-recently-deleted-user
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1531
correlation:
type: event_count
rules:
- workspace_user_suspended_deleted_or_archived
group-by:
- protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail
timespan: 15m
condition:
gte: 10
falsepositives:
- Directory synchronization tools and offboarding automation that suspend or delete the accounts of leavers in one run, and in schools the end of a term. They act under one known identity. Exclude it in a filter_* selection of the base rule or give it a higher count.
- A reorganization or the closing of a site, in which the identity team removes many accounts by hand. Confirm the change record.
- The values of 10 events and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. A small organization can use a much lower count. Measure what your own offboarding produces and adjust both.
level: high
False positives
- Directory synchronization tools and offboarding automation that suspend or delete the accounts of leavers in one run, and in schools the end of a term. They act under one known identity. Exclude it in a filter_* selection of the base rule or give it a higher count.
- A reorganization or the closing of a site, in which the identity team removes many accounts by hand. Confirm the change record.
- The values of 10 events and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. A small organization can use a much lower count. Measure what your own offboarding produces and adjust both.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Suspension or deletion whose target is an administrator
A lockout does not need a burst. Suspending or deleting the few other super admins is enough to leave the attacker as the only administrator, and it stays under any count. The audit event does not say that the target is an administrator. Your list of administrators does.
- Keep a list of the accounts that hold an admin role. It can be built from
google.admin.AdminService.assignRoleandunassignRoleentries, where the user is in the event parameterUSER_EMAIL, or exported from the Admin roles page. - Take each
google.admin.AdminService.suspendUser,deleteUserorarchiveUserentry and compare itsUSER_EMAILwith the list. - Raise every match, with the acting admin from
authenticationInfo.principalEmail.
Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.suspendUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.deleteUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.archiveUsergoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRole
LimitsAn administrator who leaves the organization is suspended or deleted in the normal course, so each match needs a word with the identity team. A list built only from audit entries misses roles assigned before the logs begin, so start from an export of the current role assignments.
Triage
- Identify the actor in principalEmail. A directory synchronization or offboarding identity that produces bursts on a schedule is expected. A person's admin account, or a burst at an unusual hour, is not.
- List the affected accounts from USER_EMAIL in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata of the base events. Check whether administrators, executives or whole departments are among them.
- Ask human resources and the identity team whether a mass offboarding, a reorganization or the end of a school term explains the number.
- Review what the same actor did before the burst, such as password resets, admin role changes, changes to 2-Step Verification or single sign-on, and data transfers.
- Check the recent sign-ins of the actor account for a device, network or country its owner does not use.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- From another super admin account, suspend the admin account that made the changes or reset its password and sign-in cookies, and remove its admin roles until it is cleared.
- Restore the administrators first, then the users. Suspended accounts can be restored at any time and archived accounts can be unarchived. Deleted accounts must be restored by a super administrator within 20 days.
- If no super admin can sign in, start Google's process for recovering administrator access at once, because the 20 days for deleted accounts keep running.
- Review what happened under cover of the lockout, such as data transfers, mailbox exports, new admin roles, domain-wide delegation and changes in the Google Cloud organization.
- After recovery, confirm that every restored administrator can sign in, and check that licenses and group memberships of restored users are as before.
Mitigation
- Keep more than one super admin account, each held by a different person, as Google recommends, so that one compromised account cannot remove all the others unnoticed.
- Give user management privileges only to the roles that need them, limited to the organizational units they serve, so that a helpdesk account cannot suspend the whole directory.
- Add recovery information to the super admin accounts and know Google's process for recovering administrator access before it is needed.
- Protect admin accounts with security keys or passkeys for 2-Step Verification.
- Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM, which stays reachable when the Admin console is not.
Frequently asked questions
Can deleted Google Workspace users be restored after a mass deletion?
For a limited time. Google states that a user account, including an administrator account, can be restored up to 20 days after it was deleted, and that after 20 days the data is gone. Restoring requires being signed in as a super administrator. In a mass deletion that makes the recovery of super admin access the first task.
What is the difference between suspending, archiving and deleting a user for this attack?
All three stop the user from signing in. A suspended account keeps its data and can be restored at any time, and new mail to it is blocked. An archived account also keeps its data and gives up its license. A deleted account loses its data unless it is restored within 20 days. An attacker who wants disruption can use any of them, and deletion adds a deadline.
Why does the rule count events per administrator and not per affected user?
The affected account is in an event parameter inside `protoPayload.metadata`, which the threshold rule cannot count as a field of its own. The acting administrator is in `principalEmail`, so the rule counts how many suspension, deletion and archive events one administrator produced in the window. Read the affected accounts from the single events behind an alert.
Which legitimate processes produce the same burst?
Directory synchronization tools that suspend or delete accounts when people leave the source directory, offboarding automation, and in schools the end of a term. They run under one known identity and usually on a schedule. Exclude that identity from the rule or give it a higher count, and keep the rule strict for the admin accounts of people.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1531: Account Access Removal
- Suspend a user temporarily
- Delete or remove a user from your organization
- Archive former employee accounts
- Restore a recently deleted user
- Restore a suspended user
- Recovering administrator access to your account
- Security best practices for administrator accounts
- Audit logs for Google Workspace (Cloud Audit Logs)
- Admin audit events: user settings (SUSPEND_USER, DELETE_USER, ARCHIVE_USER)