How the attack works
Account access removal comes at the end of an intrusion. Once the attacker controls an identity that can manage users, they take access away from the people who could respond: accounts are deleted or disabled, usually starting with administrators and the security team. The purpose is pressure in an extortion case, sabotage, or time to finish something else while the organization cannot sign in.
In Microsoft Entra ID a deleted user stays in a suspended state for 30 days and can be restored with all its properties. A permanently deleted user cannot be restored by anyone, including Microsoft support, and has to be created again by hand. That makes permanent deletion the step that turns an outage into lasting damage. The bulk operations of the admin center add scale: one action deletes every user listed in an uploaded file.
All of this is written to the audit log, with the actor in InitiatedBy and the account in TargetResources: Delete user, Disable account, Hard Delete user and, for the admin center's bulk operation, Bulk delete users - finished (bulk). A single deletion is routine offboarding. The signal is in who did it, which accounts were removed, and in permanent or bulk deletion, which normal operations rarely need. Two more rules read the removal of role assignments, directly or through PIM, because an attacker who strips the administrators of their roles locks them out without deleting a single account. A last rule reads the reverse actions Enable account and Restore user, which responders use to recover and an attacker uses to bring back an account that was disabled to contain it.
What an attacker needs
- A compromised identity with a role that can delete or disable users (User Administrator or higher), or an application with equivalent Microsoft Graph permissions.
Impact
Staff and administrators lose access to the tenant and to everything that signs in through it, and the response to the intrusion slows down. Permanently deleted accounts must be rebuilt by hand, with their group memberships, role assignments and licenses. If every administrator account is removed or disabled, the organization can no longer manage its own tenant.
Detection rules
Bulk User Deletion Run From the Admin Center
Detects the bulk delete operation of the Microsoft Entra admin center finishing. The operation deletes every user listed in an uploaded file in one action, which is rare in normal administration and an efficient way to remove access for many people at once.
title: Bulk User Deletion Run From the Admin Center
id: 5b21d2a7-0364-4252-92e1-e6d4b103895d
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the bulk delete operation of the Microsoft Entra admin center
finishing. The operation deletes every user listed in an uploaded file in
one action, which is rare in normal administration and an efficient way to
remove access for many people at once.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/users-bulk-delete
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1531
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName: Bulk delete users - finished (bulk)
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned clean-ups, for example removing the accounts of a closed site, a finished project or a school year. Confirm the change record and the list of users with the administrator who ran it.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned clean-ups, for example removing the accounts of a closed site, a finished project or a school year. Confirm the change record and the list of users with the administrator who ran it.
Disabled or Deleted Microsoft Entra Account Brought Back
Detects the reverse of account access removal: a disabled account is enabled again (Enable account) or a deleted user is restored from the recycle bin (Restore user). Responders see these events when they undo an attack. The same events are written when an attacker brings back an account that was disabled to contain it, or an account of someone who left the organization that nobody watches any more. A deleted user can be restored with all its properties for 30 days. The rule matches the two activity names and nothing else, so the account in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy decide what the event means.
title: Disabled or Deleted Microsoft Entra Account Brought Back
id: ff390972-c73c-42fb-b36d-a9ac0500ffc4
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the reverse of account access removal: a disabled account is enabled
again (Enable account) or a deleted user is restored from the recycle bin
(Restore user). Responders see these events when they undo an attack. The
same events are written when an attacker brings back an account that was
disabled to contain it, or an account of someone who left the organization
that nobody watches any more. A deleted user can be restored with all its
properties for 30 days. The rule matches the two activity names and nothing
else, so the account in TargetResources and the actor in InitiatedBy decide
what the event means.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-restore
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1531
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Enable account
- Restore user
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Staff who return from leave, seasonal workers and accounts restored after a mistaken deletion. Expect them from the identity team and from the HR-driven provisioning service.
- Recovery after an incident, when responders restore the accounts an attacker deleted or disabled.
- Alert on it for accounts that were disabled during an incident, for privileged accounts and for actors that do not normally manage users.
level: low
False positives
- Staff who return from leave, seasonal workers and accounts restored after a mistaken deletion. Expect them from the identity team and from the HR-driven provisioning service.
- Recovery after an incident, when responders restore the accounts an attacker deleted or disabled.
- Alert on it for accounts that were disabled during an incident, for privileged accounts and for actors that do not normally manage users.
Many Microsoft Entra Role Assignments Removed Within an Hour
Counts removals of Microsoft Entra role assignments, active or eligible, made directly or through PIM. Microsoft's security operations guide for PIM tells defenders to alert on bulk deletion changes to privileged account permissions and to investigate immediately when the change was not planned. An attacker who strips the administrators of their roles produces a run of these events. The rule fires at five or more removals of the same kind within one hour. The count is per audit activity name, because the audit log mapping has no single field for the initiator, so read InitiatedBy in the matching events to see whether one actor made them. Microsoft gives no number for removals (its default for additions is 4 in 60 minutes), so the threshold and the window are starting points.
Fires when one OperationName has at least 5 matching events within 1 hour.
title: Microsoft Entra Role Assignment Removed (Bulk Removal Base Event)
id: 319c6167-bbb6-4fa0-a3ac-0b423ad9c99c
name: entra_role_assignment_removed
status: experimental
description: >-
Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A Microsoft Entra role
assignment, active or eligible, was removed directly or through PIM. The
PIM activities written when an activation ends are not in the list.
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
Category: RoleManagement
OperationName:
- Remove member from role
- Remove eligible member from role
- Remove scoped member from role
- Remove member from role in PIM completed (permanent)
- Remove eligible member from role in PIM completed (permanent)
- Remove permanent direct role assignment
- Remove permanent eligible role assignment
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
level: low
---
title: Many Microsoft Entra Role Assignments Removed Within an Hour
id: 1b7b4bb8-1db8-4e73-a1b1-621517c05805
status: experimental
description: >-
Counts removals of Microsoft Entra role assignments, active or eligible,
made directly or through PIM. Microsoft's security operations guide for PIM
tells defenders to alert on bulk deletion changes to privileged account
permissions and to investigate immediately when the change was not planned.
An attacker who strips the administrators of their roles produces a run of
these events. The rule fires at five or more removals of the same kind
within one hour. The count is per audit activity name, because the audit
log mapping has no single field for the initiator, so read InitiatedBy in
the matching events to see whether one actor made them. Microsoft gives no
number for removals (its default for additions is 4 in 60 minutes), so the
threshold and the window are starting points.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1531
correlation:
type: event_count
rules:
- entra_role_assignment_removed
group-by:
- OperationName
timespan: 1h
condition:
gte: 5
falsepositives:
- Access reviews that remove many unused assignments when they are applied, and cleanup projects that move standing assignments into PIM. Announce them to the SOC.
- In tenants that use PIM, the end of an activation may also be written by Core Directory as a removal made by PIM's own service, which raises the count of "Remove member from role" in busy hours. Check the initiator in InitiatedBy and raise the threshold if this is your normal level.
- The values of five removals and one hour are starting points, not tested limits.
level: high
False positives
- Access reviews that remove many unused assignments when they are applied, and cleanup projects that move standing assignments into PIM. Announce them to the SOC.
- In tenants that use PIM, the end of an activation may also be written by Core Directory as a removal made by PIM's own service, which raises the count of "Remove member from role" in busy hours. Check the initiator in InitiatedBy and raise the threshold if this is your normal level.
- The values of five removals and one hour are starting points, not tested limits.
Privileged Microsoft Entra Role Assignment Removed
Detects the removal of an active or eligible assignment of a role that controls the tenant or its security settings: Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, Privileged Authentication Administrator, Security Administrator, Conditional Access Administrator and User Administrator. An attacker who holds a privileged account removes the other administrators so that nobody is left to respond. The rule reads the removal activities Microsoft lists for Core Directory and for PIM and matches the role in TargetResources by its display name (Microsoft's guidance names the Role.DisplayName modified property) and by Company Administrator, the legacy name of Global Administrator. Two PIM activities are left out on purpose, "Remove member from role (PIM activation expired)" and "Remove member from role completed (PIM deactivate)", because they are written when an activation ends. The timebound variants of the PIM removal activities are left out as well, because Microsoft does not say whether the normal end of a time-bound assignment writes them.
title: Privileged Microsoft Entra Role Assignment Removed
id: 36e9e3c3-863d-48c0-bd17-4152e3e72b57
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the removal of an active or eligible assignment of a role that
controls the tenant or its security settings: Global Administrator,
Privileged Role Administrator, Privileged Authentication Administrator,
Security Administrator, Conditional Access Administrator and User
Administrator. An attacker who holds a privileged account removes the other
administrators so that nobody is left to respond. The rule reads the removal
activities Microsoft lists for Core Directory and for PIM and matches the
role in TargetResources by its display name (Microsoft's guidance names the
Role.DisplayName modified property) and by Company Administrator, the legacy
name of Global Administrator. Two PIM activities are left out on purpose,
"Remove member from role (PIM activation expired)" and "Remove member from
role completed (PIM deactivate)", because they are written when an
activation ends. The timebound variants of the PIM removal activities are
left out as well, because Microsoft does not say whether the normal end of a
time-bound assignment writes them.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1531
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection_activity:
Category: RoleManagement
OperationName:
- Remove member from role
- Remove eligible member from role
- Remove scoped member from role
- Remove member from role in PIM completed (permanent)
- Remove eligible member from role in PIM completed (permanent)
- Remove permanent direct role assignment
- Remove permanent eligible role assignment
selection_role:
TargetResources|contains:
- Global Administrator
- Company Administrator
- Privileged Role Administrator
- Privileged Authentication Administrator
- Security Administrator
- Conditional Access Administrator
- User Administrator
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: all of selection_* and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- An administrator who leaves the team or changes duties, and access reviews that remove unused assignments. Match each removal to a request and check that enough other administrators remain.
- In tenants that use PIM, the end of an activation may also be written by Core Directory as a removal made by PIM's own service. Confirm the initiator in InitiatedBy before you exclude that service.
- The role list is a starting point. Align it with the roles your responders depend on.
level: medium
False positives
- An administrator who leaves the team or changes duties, and access reviews that remove unused assignments. Match each removal to a request and check that enough other administrators remain.
- In tenants that use PIM, the end of an activation may also be written by Core Directory as a removal made by PIM's own service. Confirm the initiator in InitiatedBy before you exclude that service.
- The role list is a starting point. Align it with the roles your responders depend on.
User Deleted or Disabled
Detects a user being deleted or a user account being disabled. Both happen every day in offboarding, so this rule is a building block: scope it to administrators and emergency access accounts, or to actors that do not normally manage users, before alerting on it.
title: User Deleted or Disabled
id: dd98e690-e301-4513-831c-6aa33c2c0834
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a user being deleted or a user account being disabled. Both happen
every day in offboarding, so this rule is a building block: scope it to
administrators and emergency access accounts, or to actors that do not
normally manage users, before alerting on it.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-restore
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1531
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Delete user
- Disable account
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Routine offboarding by the help desk, HR-driven provisioning and identity governance workflows. Exclude those actors in a filter on InitiatedBy once they are documented, and keep the alert for privileged target accounts.
level: low
False positives
- Routine offboarding by the help desk, HR-driven provisioning and identity governance workflows. Exclude those actors in a filter on InitiatedBy once they are documented, and keep the alert for privileged target accounts.
User Permanently Deleted
Detects the permanent (hard) deletion of a user. A deleted user can be restored for 30 days; a permanently deleted user cannot be restored by anyone, including Microsoft support. Normal offboarding leaves the account to expire on its own, so a manual permanent deletion deserves a check of who did it and to which account.
title: User Permanently Deleted
id: 8d06b964-25a1-40fa-8839-ec8218376fdb
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the permanent (hard) deletion of a user. A deleted user can be
restored for 30 days; a permanently deleted user cannot be restored by
anyone, including Microsoft support. Normal offboarding leaves the account
to expire on its own, so a manual permanent deletion deserves a check of
who did it and to which account.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-restore
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1531
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName: Hard Delete user
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Administrators who clear deleted users to free a user principal name or to meet a data deletion request. Confirm the ticket and the account.
- Deleted users that reach the end of the 30 days, if your tenant records their automatic removal under this activity. Check the actor in InitiatedBy and add a filter for the directory service if so.
level: medium
False positives
- Administrators who clear deleted users to free a user principal name or to meet a data deletion request. Confirm the ticket and the account.
- Deleted users that reach the end of the 30 days, if your tenant records their automatic removal under this activity. Check the actor in InitiatedBy and add a filter for the directory service if so.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Role assignments removed by an account that received a privileged role shortly before
An attacker who takes over the tenant first gives a role to an account they control and then removes the roles of the real administrators. The same account appearing as the new member of a privileged role and, soon after, as the actor who removes other members is that takeover in two steps.
- A privileged role is assigned: category RoleManagement, activity
Add member to roleorAdd eligible member to role, with the new member inTargetResources. - Within 24 hours the same account removes role assignments of others:
Remove member from roleorRemove eligible member from role, with that account inInitiatedByand a different account inTargetResources. - Raise the priority when the removed accounts are your long-standing administrators or emergency access accounts.
EventsAdd member to roleAdd eligible member to roleRemove member from roleRemove eligible member from role
LimitsA new lead administrator who reorganizes the team's roles on the first day produces the same sequence, so confirm the handover. The 24 hours are a starting point. An attacker who uses one account to gain the role and another to remove the others is not joined.
Account disabled and enabled again by a different actor
Responders disable an account to contain it. If someone else enables it again soon after, either the containment was undone by mistake or an attacker with the right to manage users is bringing the account back.
- An account is disabled: audit activity
Disable account, with the account inTargetResourcesand the actor inInitiatedBy. - Within 7 days the same account is enabled:
Enable accountwith the same account inTargetResources. - Alert when the actor in
InitiatedByof the second event differs from the actor of the first, and check the sign-ins of the account after it was enabled.
EventsDisable accountEnable account
LimitsLeave and return processes, and a provisioning service that enables what a person disabled, produce the same pair. Exclude the provisioning identity by name. The 7 days are a starting point.
Triage
- Identify the actor (InitiatedBy) and the accounts (TargetResources). Does the actor normally offboard users, and is there a leaver ticket for each account?
- Check whether the removed accounts are administrators, emergency access accounts or members of the security team.
- Count the deletions and disablements by the same actor in the period, and look at the actor's sign-ins before them for unfamiliar IP addresses or risk.
- If the removal is not legitimate, restore the deleted users, enable the disabled ones, revoke the actor's sessions and reset its credentials, then review everything else the actor changed.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Block sign-in for the identity that removed the accounts and revoke its sessions. If the actor is an application, disable its service principal. If the administrators are already locked out, do this with an emergency access account.
- Take the role or Microsoft Graph permission that allows deleting users away from every identity the attacker used, and look for accounts, role assignments and application credentials the attacker created to come back.
- Restore the deleted users while the 30 days still run, administrators and the security team first, and enable the accounts that were disabled.
- Create permanently deleted accounts again by hand, with their group memberships, role assignments and licenses, because nobody can restore them.
- Confirm that the restored administrators can sign in and that the emergency access accounts are untouched, then keep watching the audit log for further deletions by other actors.
Mitigation
- Keep at least two cloud-only emergency access accounts with the Global Administrator role, store their credentials offline and alert on every change to them.
- Limit the roles that can delete users to the people who need them, and protect those roles with phishing-resistant MFA and Privileged Identity Management.
- Protect permanent deletion with a Conditional Access protected action (
microsoft.directory/deletedItems/delete), so it needs a fresh, strong authentication. - Review service principals that hold user management roles or Microsoft Graph permissions; an application can delete accounts as well as a person can.
- Restore wrongly deleted users within the 30 days in which that is still possible.
Frequently asked questions
Can a permanently deleted user be restored?
No. A deleted user stays in a suspended state for 30 days and can be restored with all its properties in that time. A permanently deleted user cannot be restored by anyone, including Microsoft support. The account has to be created again by hand, with its group memberships, role assignments and licenses.
Why is the rule for deleted or disabled users only a building block?
Deleting and disabling accounts is daily offboarding work, so one event says little. The signal is in who did it and to which accounts. Scope the rule to administrators, emergency access accounts and the security team, or to actors that do not normally manage users, before you alert on it.
Does the bulk deletion rule also see many accounts deleted one by one?
No. `Bulk delete users - finished (bulk)` is written for the bulk operation of the admin center, which deletes every user listed in an uploaded file. Accounts deleted one at a time each produce their own `Delete user` event. To see that pattern, count the deletions and disablements of one actor over a short period.
What should we do first when administrators are being deleted?
Stop the actor before you repair anything. Sign in with an emergency access account, block the identity named in InitiatedBy and revoke its sessions. Then restore the deleted administrators, which is possible for 30 days unless they were permanently deleted.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1531: Account Access Removal
- Microsoft Entra audit log activities (Core Directory, Microsoft Entra Management UX)
- Restore or permanently remove a recently deleted user
- Bulk delete users in Microsoft Entra ID
- Manage emergency access accounts in Microsoft Entra ID
- What are protected actions in Microsoft Entra ID?