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Mass Disabling or Deletion of User Accounts detection rules

An attacker with rights over user accounts disables or deletes many of them in a short time to lock an organization out of its own domain. Detected as one account that disables or deletes many accounts (4725, 4726).

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
High
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1531Account Access Removal
Tactic
Impact
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
An identity that may disable or delete many user accounts, such as a domain administrator, an Account Operators member or a delegated help desk account.
Impact
Users, administrators and services lose access at once, and deleted accounts return with their memberships only if the Recycle Bin was enabled before.
Response
Disable the acting account with an account it could not touch, then enable the disabled accounts and restore the deleted ones, administrators first.
Mitigation
Enable the Active Directory Recycle Bin, and limit the right to disable or delete accounts to the few identities that need it.
Event IDs
472447264725
Threat groups
AkiraLAPSUS$

How the attack works

Removing access is an impact technique. Near the end of an intrusion, often together with ransomware or data destruction, the attacker disables or deletes the accounts of the people who could respond or who keep the business running: administrators, the help desk, service accounts, or simply everyone. A disabled account can no longer authenticate. A deleted account is gone together with its SID, its group memberships and the permissions that were granted to it.

In Active Directory this needs nothing special. Any identity that may write to user objects can disable them, any identity that may delete them can remove them, and a script works through a list of accounts in seconds. Domain controllers log each change when Audit User Account Management is enabled: event 4725 when a user or computer account is disabled and event 4726 when a user account is deleted, with the acting account as the subject and the affected account as the target. A password that is reset by another account has the same effect for its owner, who can no longer sign in, and is logged as event 4724. A third threshold rule on this page counts the accounts whose password one acting account reset.

One such event is daily work. Leavers are disabled, stale accounts are cleaned up, and identity management systems do both all day. What sets an attack apart is the rate, so the rules on this page are threshold rules. They count the distinct accounts that one acting account disabled or deleted within a short window. The values are starting points to tune, and an attacker who works slowly or spreads the work over several accounts stays below them.

What an attacker needs

  • An identity that may disable or delete many user accounts. Members of Domain Admins have that right by default, members of Account Operators can create, modify and delete user accounts, and delegated help desk and identity management accounts usually can as well.
  • Network access to a domain controller.

Impact

Users, administrators and services lose access at the same moment, and the response to the rest of the intrusion slows down because the responders are locked out as well. Disabled accounts can be enabled again. Deleted accounts can be restored with their group memberships only if the Active Directory Recycle Bin was enabled before they were deleted. Without it, recovery means an authoritative restore from a backup or creating the accounts again. If every administrative account is affected, the organization depends on its emergency access to the domain.

Detection rules

One Account Reset the Passwords of Many Accounts

Counts, per acting account, the distinct accounts for which event 4724 (an attempt was made to reset an account's password) was logged. A reset by another account replaces the password without knowing the old one, so the owner can no longer sign in and whoever did the reset can. One account that resets 10 or more accounts within 10 minutes is either a help desk or identity management job, or an attacker who changes credentials in bulk to lock the organization out or to take the accounts over. Changed credentials are one of the ways MITRE lists for account access removal, next to deleting and locking accounts. Computer accounts and other names that end with a dollar sign are not counted. The event is written for every attempt. A failure event is written when the new password does not meet the password policy, so a few of the counted accounts may not have been changed. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. On domain controllers the event covers domain accounts, and on member servers and workstations it covers local accounts. Requires Audit User Account Management.

Fires when one SubjectUserName has at least 10 different TargetUserName values within 10 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Account Password Reset (Mass Password Reset Base Event)
id: 61aa938e-bbca-441f-b43b-13658e232db9
name: password_reset_by_one_account
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. Event 4724 (an attempt was
  made to reset an account's password) for a target whose name does not end
  with a dollar sign. Microsoft documents that the event is also written when
  a computer account is reset, and the filter leaves those out.
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4724
  filter_computer_account:
    TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
  condition: selection and not filter_computer_account
level: low
---
title: One Account Reset the Passwords of Many Accounts
id: ae8984fd-2a16-4ad9-87ac-a5f17e256c8f
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per acting account, the distinct accounts for which event 4724 (an
  attempt was made to reset an account's password) was logged. A reset by
  another account replaces the password without knowing the old one, so the
  owner can no longer sign in and whoever did the reset can. One account that
  resets 10 or more accounts within 10 minutes is either a help desk or
  identity management job, or an attacker who changes credentials in bulk to
  lock the organization out or to take the accounts over. Changed credentials
  are one of the ways MITRE lists for account access removal, next to
  deleting and locking accounts. Computer accounts and other names that end
  with a dollar sign are not counted. The event is written for every
  attempt. A failure event is written when the new password does not meet the
  password policy, so a few of the counted accounts may not have been
  changed. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. On
  domain controllers the event covers domain accounts, and on member servers
  and workstations it covers local accounts. Requires Audit User Account
  Management.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4724
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-user-account-management
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - password_reset_by_one_account
  group-by:
    - SubjectUserName
  timespan: 10m
  condition:
    field: TargetUserName
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Help desk staff during a busy period, identity management systems, and the connector account of a directory synchronization or self-service password reset product, which resets passwords on behalf of the users. Give such jobs their own service accounts and exclude those by SubjectUserName, or give them a higher threshold.
  - Planned bulk resets, such as the first day of a school term or a forced reset after a suspected credential leak. Compare the alert with the change calendar.
  - The values of 10 accounts and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many accounts one administrator normally resets in that time and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • Help desk staff during a busy period, identity management systems, and the connector account of a directory synchronization or self-service password reset product, which resets passwords on behalf of the users. Give such jobs their own service accounts and exclude those by SubjectUserName, or give them a higher threshold.
  • Planned bulk resets, such as the first day of a school term or a forced reset after a suspected credential leak. Compare the alert with the change calendar.
  • The values of 10 accounts and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many accounts one administrator normally resets in that time and adjust both.

One Account Deleted Many User Accounts

Counts, per acting account, the distinct accounts for which event 4726 (a user account was deleted) was logged. One account that deletes 10 or more user accounts within 10 minutes is either a cleanup job or an attacker who removes access as part of a destructive attack. Deletion is harder to undo than disabling. A deleted account comes back with its group memberships only if the Active Directory Recycle Bin was enabled before, which is why this rule has a higher level than the one for disabled accounts. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. On domain controllers the event covers domain accounts, and on member servers and workstations it covers local accounts. Requires Audit User Account Management.

Fires when one SubjectUserName has at least 10 different TargetUserName values within 10 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: User Account Deleted (Mass Deletion Base Event)
id: aba730ec-327b-41f0-8570-f25c7cdf31a9
name: user_account_deleted_by_one_account
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. Event 4726 (a user account
  was deleted), which Microsoft documents as written every time a user object
  is deleted.
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4726
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: One Account Deleted Many User Accounts
id: 48632276-0ca1-44ae-8dbc-f7cf532dcf5f
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per acting account, the distinct accounts for which event 4726 (a
  user account was deleted) was logged. One account that deletes 10 or more
  user accounts within 10 minutes is either a cleanup job or an attacker who
  removes access as part of a destructive attack. Deletion is harder to undo
  than disabling. A deleted account comes back with its group memberships only
  if the Active Directory Recycle Bin was enabled before, which is why this
  rule has a higher level than the one for disabled accounts. The threshold
  and the window are starting points to tune. On domain controllers the event
  covers domain accounts, and on member servers and workstations it covers
  local accounts. Requires Audit User Account Management.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4726
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-user-account-management
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/get-started/adac/active-directory-recycle-bin
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - user_account_deleted_by_one_account
  group-by:
    - SubjectUserName
  timespan: 10m
  condition:
    field: TargetUserName
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Identity management systems and cleanup jobs that delete accounts after a retention period, and the removal of test or training accounts in bulk. Give such jobs their own service accounts and exclude those by SubjectUserName, or give them a higher threshold.
  - Planned bulk changes, such as a company divestiture or the retirement of an application with many accounts. Compare the alert with the change calendar.
  - The values of 10 accounts and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many accounts one administrator normally deletes in that time and adjust both.
level: high

False positives

  • Identity management systems and cleanup jobs that delete accounts after a retention period, and the removal of test or training accounts in bulk. Give such jobs their own service accounts and exclude those by SubjectUserName, or give them a higher threshold.
  • Planned bulk changes, such as a company divestiture or the retirement of an application with many accounts. Compare the alert with the change calendar.
  • The values of 10 accounts and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many accounts one administrator normally deletes in that time and adjust both.

One Account Disabled Many User Accounts

Counts, per acting account, the distinct accounts for which event 4725 (a user account was disabled) was logged. One account that disables 10 or more user accounts within 10 minutes is either a bulk job or an attacker who removes access before or during a destructive attack. A single disabled account is routine offboarding. Computer accounts and other names that end with a dollar sign are not counted. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune against what your own offboarding and cleanup jobs produce. On domain controllers the event covers domain accounts, and on member servers and workstations it covers local accounts. Requires Audit User Account Management.

Fires when one SubjectUserName has at least 10 different TargetUserName values within 10 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: User Account Disabled (Mass Disabling Base Event)
id: fea752d4-95ed-436b-a382-05ea281020d1
name: user_account_disabled_by_one_account
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. Event 4725 (a user account
  was disabled) for a target whose name does not end with a dollar sign.
  Microsoft documents that the event is written for user and for computer
  objects, and the filter leaves the computer accounts out.
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4725
  filter_computer_account:
    TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
  condition: selection and not filter_computer_account
level: low
---
title: One Account Disabled Many User Accounts
id: 4d3d5371-4dc5-42ed-a0e5-186aac3fab94
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per acting account, the distinct accounts for which event 4725 (a
  user account was disabled) was logged. One account that disables 10 or more
  user accounts within 10 minutes is either a bulk job or an attacker who
  removes access before or during a destructive attack. A single disabled
  account is routine offboarding. Computer accounts and other names that end
  with a dollar sign are not counted. The threshold and the window are
  starting points to tune against what your own offboarding and cleanup jobs
  produce. On domain controllers the event covers domain accounts, and on
  member servers and workstations it covers local accounts. Requires Audit
  User Account Management.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4725
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-user-account-management
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - user_account_disabled_by_one_account
  group-by:
    - SubjectUserName
  timespan: 10m
  condition:
    field: TargetUserName
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Identity management systems, offboarding scripts and cleanup jobs for inactive accounts, which disable many accounts in one run. Give them their own service accounts and exclude those by SubjectUserName, or give them a higher threshold.
  - Planned bulk changes, such as the end of a school term, a company divestiture or the retirement of an application with many accounts. Compare the alert with the change calendar.
  - The values of 10 accounts and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many accounts one administrator normally disables in that time and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • Identity management systems, offboarding scripts and cleanup jobs for inactive accounts, which disable many accounts in one run. Give them their own service accounts and exclude those by SubjectUserName, or give them a higher threshold.
  • Planned bulk changes, such as the end of a school term, a company divestiture or the retirement of an application with many accounts. Compare the alert with the change calendar.
  • The values of 10 accounts and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many accounts one administrator normally disables in that time and adjust both.

Triage

  • Identify the acting account (SubjectUserName, SubjectLogonId) and list the accounts it disabled or deleted (TargetUserName, TargetSid). Is the actor an identity management or cleanup account, and does the list match a leaver file or a planned cleanup?
  • Look at which accounts are on the list. Administrators, service accounts, the security team or a whole department at once are not routine offboarding.
  • Find the logon behind the changes (event 4624 with the same logon ID on the domain controller) and the host it came from. Does the actor normally work from there and at that hour?
  • Check what else the actor did in the same period, such as password resets (4724), group changes (4728, 4732, 4756) and new accounts (4720).
  • Look for the wider attack this usually belongs to, such as mass file changes on servers, stopped services and deleted backups.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Stop the actor first. Disable the acting account with an account it could not touch, end its sessions, and isolate the host it worked from.
  2. Remove the right the attacker used. Take the account out of the groups and delegations that let it disable or delete users, and look for other accounts under the attacker's control that hold the same rights.
  3. Enable the disabled accounts again, administrators and service accounts first, and reset their passwords before use where the attacker could know them.
  4. Restore the deleted accounts from the Active Directory Recycle Bin, which brings back their group memberships. Where it was not enabled, restore them authoritatively from a backup taken before the incident, or create them again.
  5. Verify that services run again under their restored accounts, and review the domain for the persistence that normally comes before such an attack before you call it clean.

Mitigation

  • Enable the Active Directory Recycle Bin. It is not enabled by default and cannot be disabled afterwards, and it lets deleted accounts be restored with all their attributes and group memberships.
  • Limit who may disable or delete accounts. Keep Account Operators empty, scope help desk delegation to the organizational units it needs, and remove write and delete rights on user objects from broad groups.
  • Decide in advance how the domain is administered if every named administrator account is disabled or deleted, for example with an emergency account whose credentials are stored offline, and test it.
  • Give identity management and cleanup jobs their own service accounts, so that their bulk changes can be told apart from those of an administrator and excluded by name.
  • Keep regular, tested backups of Active Directory that cannot be reached with the credentials of a domain administrator.
  • Enable Audit User Account Management on all domain controllers and collect the events centrally.

Frequently asked questions

Can deleted Active Directory accounts be restored?

With the Active Directory Recycle Bin enabled, yes. A deleted object keeps all its attributes, and a restored user regains the group memberships and access rights it had immediately before the deletion. The Recycle Bin is not enabled by default and covers only objects deleted after it was turned on. Without it, the choices are an authoritative restore from a backup or creating the accounts again, and a new account has a new SID, so permissions granted to the old one do not apply to it.

Why do the rules count accounts instead of alerting on every event?

Because one disabled or deleted account is ordinary administration. Leavers are processed every day and identity management systems do it automatically. The rules count the distinct accounts that one acting account disabled, deleted or reset the password of within ten minutes and fire at ten. Both numbers are starting points. Measure what your own offboarding and cleanup jobs produce, exclude their service accounts by name, and then lower the threshold for everyone else.

Does the rule for disabled accounts also count computer accounts?

No. Microsoft documents that event 4725 is written when a user or a computer object is disabled, and a cleanup of stale computers disables many of them at once. The rule leaves out targets whose name ends with a dollar sign, which is how computer accounts are named. Managed service accounts end with a dollar sign too, so a wave of disabled accounts of that kind is not counted either.

What if the attacker works slowly or uses several accounts?

Then each acting account stays below the threshold and the rules do not fire. A count per acting account is a simple signal for the common case, a script that runs through a list. Add a second view that counts all disabled and deleted accounts in the domain per hour, whoever changed them, and alert on changes to administrator and service accounts individually.

References

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