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User Access Removed in OCI IAM detection rules

An attacker with user management rights deletes or deactivates users, removes them from administrator groups or deletes their API keys, so that administrators and responders cannot get in while the attack continues.

Platform
Oracle Cloud Infrastructure
Severity
Medium
Log source
Oracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1531Account Access Removal
Tactic
Impact
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A principal with manage users or manage groups in the tenancy, or the user administrator or user manager role in an identity domain.
Impact
The affected users can no longer sign in or lose their permissions, so the attacker works without interference and the response starts late.
Response
Sign in through the break-glass administrator, disable the credentials of the account that made the changes, then restore the affected users and groups.
Mitigation
Keep user and group management rights to a minimum, and keep a tested break-glass administrator that everyday administrators cannot delete.
Event types
com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteApiKeycom.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteAuthTokencom.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteCustomerSecretKeycom.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteUsercom.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.RemoveUserFromGroupcom.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteGroup
Identity domain events
admin.user.deactivated.successadmin.user.delete.successadmin.group.remove.member.successadmin.group.delete.success
Threat groups
AkiraLAPSUS$

How the attack works

Access to an OCI tenancy rests on a few objects that an administrator can take away without the owner's cooperation. A user can be deleted, and in an identity domain it can be deactivated, after which Oracle states that it cannot sign back in once its current session ends. Membership of a group such as Administrators is what gives a user its permissions, so removing the membership or deleting the group removes the permissions while the user still exists. API keys, auth tokens and customer secret keys can be deleted one by one, which stops every script and tool that signs requests with them.

Attackers do this late in an intrusion, for impact and not for access. Locking out the administrators and the people who would respond buys time to destroy or encrypt data or to run resources at the owner's expense, and it slows recovery. No public incident report describes this at the audit event level for OCI. The page follows what Oracle documents about these operations and their events, and mirrors the library's AWS page on removed IAM user access. The same operations are routine administration: offboarding, key rotation and the containment of a compromised user all produce them. What separates an attack is who made the change, how many users lost access within a short time, and whether administrators or break-glass accounts are among them.

The Audit log records the IAM control plane operations DeleteUser, RemoveUserFromGroup, DeleteGroup, DeleteApiKey, DeleteAuthToken and DeleteCustomerSecretKey under the prefix com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.. Oracle's reference events carry the user name in data.resourceName for user and credential events, the group name in data.resourceName and the user OCID in data.additionalDetails.userId for membership events, and the acting user in data.additionalDetails.actorName. Identity domains write admin.user.delete.success, admin.user.deactivated.success, admin.group.remove.member.success and admin.group.delete.success to data.additionalDetails.eventId. Removing a user's MFA device or changing a sign-on policy has a different purpose and has its own page. Collection is the same as for the other OCI pages. Ship the _Audit log group of the root compartment (subcompartments included) and of any compartment that holds an identity domain to the SIEM.

What an attacker needs

  • A principal with manage users in the tenancy for deleting users and their credentials, use users and use groups for removing memberships, or manage groups for deleting a group.
  • In an identity domain, the identity domain administrator or user administrator role, or the user manager role, which Oracle lists as able to deactivate and remove user accounts.
  • Administrators or break-glass accounts that depend on the objects being removed.

Impact

The affected users can no longer sign in, lose their permissions or lose the keys their tools use. If the attacker removes every other administrator, nobody on the defending side can undo the change from inside the tenancy and recovery depends on a break-glass account. Oracle blocks one case in identity domains: a user who is the last holder of the identity domain administrator role cannot be deleted. Until access is restored the attacker works without interference and the response starts late.

Detection rules

OCI API Key, Auth Token or Customer Secret Key Deleted

Detects the IAM control plane operations DeleteApiKey, DeleteAuthToken and DeleteCustomerSecretKey. A deleted credential can no longer be used, so every script, pipeline and tool that signs requests with it stops working. Oracle's reference event for credentials is a DeleteApiKey event and carries the user name in data.resourceName, the user OCID in data.additionalDetails.userId and the acting user in data.additionalDetails.actorName. The calls are part of normal key rotation, so the rule is a low-level signal: compare the actor with the user and count how many users lost a credential by the same actor.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: OCI API Key, Auth Token or Customer Secret Key Deleted
id: 777719ba-8da6-4afb-8002-429da4391151
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the IAM control plane operations DeleteApiKey, DeleteAuthToken and
  DeleteCustomerSecretKey. A deleted credential can no longer be used, so
  every script, pipeline and tool that signs requests with it stops working.
  Oracle's reference event for credentials is a DeleteApiKey event and carries
  the user name in data.resourceName, the user OCID in
  data.additionalDetails.userId and the acting user in
  data.additionalDetails.actorName. The calls are part of normal key rotation,
  so the rule is a low-level signal: compare the actor with the user and count
  how many users lost a credential by the same actor.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/policyreference/iampolicyreference.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    eventType:
      - com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteApiKey
      - com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteAuthToken
      - com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteCustomerSecretKey
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Credential rotation by users and by rotation automation, which deletes the old key after the new one is in place. A user working on its own credential shows the same name as actor and as target.
  - Offboarding, and the containment of an exposed key by the response team.
level: low

False positives

  • Credential rotation by users and by rotation automation, which deletes the old key after the new one is in place. A user working on its own credential shows the same name as actor and as target.
  • Offboarding, and the containment of an exposed key by the response team.

OCI Identity Domain User Deactivated

Detects the identity domain event id admin.user.deactivated.success, which Oracle's IAM report tutorial reads from the Audit log. Oracle states that a deactivated user who is signed in keeps the current session with limited capabilities and cannot sign back in once it ends. Deactivation needs no clean-up of group memberships first, so it is the quickest way to lock an identity domain user out. Read the user in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName, the actor in data.additionalDetails.actorName and the domain in data.additionalDetails.domainDisplayName.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: OCI Identity Domain User Deactivated
id: a6b79c7b-0183-47d5-9c8c-34f302a6c08b
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the identity domain event id admin.user.deactivated.success, which
  Oracle's IAM report tutorial reads from the Audit log. Oracle states that a
  deactivated user who is signed in keeps the current session with limited
  capabilities and cannot sign back in once it ends. Deactivation needs no
  clean-up of group memberships first, so it is the quickest way to lock an
  identity domain user out. Read the user in
  data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName, the actor in
  data.additionalDetails.actorName and the domain in
  data.additionalDetails.domainDisplayName.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/users/change-status-user-account.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/roles/understand-administrator-roles.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.user.deactivated.success
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Offboarding, leave of absence and the containment of a compromised user by the response team. Allow-list the identity team and life cycle processes, and review deactivations of administrators and break-glass accounts whoever made them.
level: medium

False positives

  • Offboarding, leave of absence and the containment of a compromised user by the response team. Allow-list the identity team and life cycle processes, and review deactivations of administrators and break-glass accounts whoever made them.

Many OCI Users Deleted or Deactivated by One Actor

Counts, per acting user (data.additionalDetails.actorName), the user deletions and deactivations it made. Five or more within 15 minutes is the pattern of identities being removed in bulk, which fits a lockout of the people who administer and defend the tenancy. Oracle's reference event for users carries actorName in data.additionalDetails, and Oracle's report queries read the same field for identity domain events, which is why the count is grouped by it. The count and the window are starting points to tune. If your tenancy records one deletion both as a control plane event and as an identity domain event, each deletion counts twice: check a single deletion first and adjust the count.

Fires when one data.additionalDetails.actorName has at least 5 matching events within 15 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: OCI IAM User Deleted or Deactivated (Removal Burst Base Event)
id: 5fbb7722-7cac-4f2a-bd98-05191d596a12
name: oci_user_deleted_or_deactivated
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. The IAM control plane
  operation DeleteUser, or one of the identity domain event ids
  admin.user.delete.success and admin.user.deactivated.success.
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_control_plane:
    eventType: com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteUser
  selection_identity_domain:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId:
      - admin.user.delete.success
      - admin.user.deactivated.success
  condition: 1 of selection_*
level: low
---
title: Many OCI Users Deleted or Deactivated by One Actor
id: 053ea155-d009-45fe-9ecc-2a7ae1d4dc2a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per acting user (data.additionalDetails.actorName), the user
  deletions and deactivations it made. Five or more within 15 minutes is the
  pattern of identities being removed in bulk, which fits a lockout of the
  people who administer and defend the tenancy. Oracle's reference event for
  users carries actorName in data.additionalDetails, and Oracle's report
  queries read the same field for identity domain events, which is why the
  count is grouped by it. The count and the window are starting points to
  tune. If your tenancy records one deletion both as a control plane event
  and as an identity domain event, each deletion counts twice: check a single
  deletion first and adjust the count.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - oci_user_deleted_or_deactivated
  group-by:
    - data.additionalDetails.actorName
  timespan: 15m
  condition:
    gte: 5
falsepositives:
  - Offboarding of several people at once, a life cycle process that deactivates accounts in a batch, and clean-up of unused users by the identity team. Exclude those actors or confirm the change record.
  - An identity provider that removes users through SCIM in bulk, which shows the provisioning client as the actor.
  - The values of 5 removals and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own processes produce and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • Offboarding of several people at once, a life cycle process that deactivates accounts in a batch, and clean-up of unused users by the identity team. Exclude those actors or confirm the change record.
  • An identity provider that removes users through SCIM in bulk, which shows the provisioning client as the actor.
  • The values of 5 removals and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own processes produce and adjust both.

OCI IAM User Deleted

Detects the deletion of a user in OCI IAM: the IAM control plane operation DeleteUser and the identity domain event id admin.user.delete.success. Oracle's reference event for users carries the user name in data.resourceName and the acting user in data.additionalDetails.actorName. For the identity domain event, Oracle's report query reads the target from data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName. In a tenancy without identity domains a user can only be deleted when it is in no group, so the deletion is the last step of taking an identity away. Check who the deleted user was, who deleted it and how many users were deleted by the same actor.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: OCI IAM User Deleted
id: 7bc642e3-e802-40a6-8e4e-ff672474c143
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the deletion of a user in OCI IAM: the IAM control plane operation
  DeleteUser and the identity domain event id admin.user.delete.success.
  Oracle's reference event for users carries the user name in
  data.resourceName and the acting user in data.additionalDetails.actorName.
  For the identity domain event, Oracle's report query reads the target from
  data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName. In a tenancy without identity
  domains a user can only be deleted when it is in no group, so the deletion
  is the last step of taking an identity away. Check who the deleted user
  was, who deleted it and how many users were deleted by the same actor.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Tasks/managingusers.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/users/delete-user-accounts.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_control_plane:
    eventType: com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteUser
  selection_identity_domain:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.user.delete.success
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Offboarding and clean-up of unused users by the identity team, and infrastructure-as-code runs that remove users they created. Allow-list those actors by data.additionalDetails.actorName or data.identity.principalName and review deletions of administrators and break-glass accounts whoever made them.
level: medium

False positives

  • Offboarding and clean-up of unused users by the identity team, and infrastructure-as-code runs that remove users they created. Allow-list those actors by data.additionalDetails.actorName or data.identity.principalName and review deletions of administrators and break-glass accounts whoever made them.

User Removed From an OCI Administrators Group

Detects a user being removed from one of the default administrator groups of OCI IAM: Administrators (Default domain, full access to the tenancy), Domain_Administrators (secondary domains) and IDCS_Administrators (domains converted from Identity Cloud Service). For the IAM control plane event RemoveUserFromGroup the group name is in data.resourceName and the user OCID in data.additionalDetails.userId, as Oracle's reference event for group membership shows. For the identity domain event admin.group.remove.member.success Oracle publishes no sample: the second selection is inferred from the AuditEvent schema, where adminResourceName is the naming attribute of the resource the event happened on (the group). Confirm it with one test membership change before relying on that selection. Add your other tenancy-wide administrator groups to both lists.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: User Removed From an OCI Administrators Group
id: 5fca5a43-5127-4f63-94bc-77b145f984a9
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a user being removed from one of the default administrator groups
  of OCI IAM: Administrators (Default domain, full access to the tenancy),
  Domain_Administrators (secondary domains) and IDCS_Administrators (domains
  converted from Identity Cloud Service). For the IAM control plane event
  RemoveUserFromGroup the group name is in data.resourceName and the user
  OCID in data.additionalDetails.userId, as Oracle's reference event for
  group membership shows. For the identity domain event
  admin.group.remove.member.success Oracle publishes no sample: the second
  selection is inferred from the AuditEvent schema, where adminResourceName
  is the naming attribute of the resource the event happened on (the group).
  Confirm it with one test membership change before relying on that
  selection. Add your other tenancy-wide administrator groups to both lists.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en/cloud/paas/iam-domains-rest-api/op-admin-v1-auditevents-id-get.html
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/conversion/groups.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_control_plane:
    eventType: com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.RemoveUserFromGroup
    data.resourceName:
      - Administrators
      - Domain_Administrators
      - IDCS_Administrators
  selection_identity_domain:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.group.remove.member.success
    data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName:
      - Administrators
      - Domain_Administrators
      - IDCS_Administrators
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Planned changes to tenancy or domain administrators, which should be rare. Confirm each one with the acting administrator and check that at least two administrators remain.
  - A custom group that reuses one of these names in a secondary identity domain. Tune by domain.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned changes to tenancy or domain administrators, which should be rare. Confirm each one with the acting administrator and check that at least two administrators remain.
  • A custom group that reuses one of these names in a secondary identity domain. Tune by domain.

OCI User Removed From a Group or Group Deleted

Detects the IAM control plane operations RemoveUserFromGroup and DeleteGroup and the identity domain event ids admin.group.remove.member.success and admin.group.delete.success. A user in OCI receives its permissions through groups, so removing a membership or deleting a group takes the permissions away while the user still exists. For RemoveUserFromGroup, Oracle's reference event carries the group name in data.resourceName and the user OCID in data.additionalDetails.userId. Oracle notes that group delete events carry no additional details. These are everyday operations, so the rule is a low-level signal: look at which group was affected, who made the change (data.additionalDetails.actorName) and how many memberships the same actor removed. A separate rule on this page covers the default administrator groups at a higher level.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: OCI User Removed From a Group or Group Deleted
id: 1db158cc-4c72-4035-8f59-e28e7d8a34a0
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the IAM control plane operations RemoveUserFromGroup and DeleteGroup
  and the identity domain event ids admin.group.remove.member.success and
  admin.group.delete.success. A user in OCI receives its permissions through
  groups, so removing a membership or deleting a group takes the permissions
  away while the user still exists. For RemoveUserFromGroup, Oracle's
  reference event carries the group name in data.resourceName and the user
  OCID in data.additionalDetails.userId. Oracle notes that group delete events
  carry no additional details. These are everyday operations, so the rule is
  a low-level signal: look at which group was affected, who made the change
  (data.additionalDetails.actorName) and how many memberships the same actor
  removed. A separate rule on this page covers the default administrator
  groups at a higher level.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/policyreference/iampolicyreference.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_control_plane:
    eventType:
      - com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.RemoveUserFromGroup
      - com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.DeleteGroup
  selection_identity_domain:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId:
      - admin.group.remove.member.success
      - admin.group.delete.success
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Offboarding, role changes and access reviews that take memberships away, and clean-up of unused groups. Expect regular volume. Allow-list the identity team and provisioning automation, and use the rule for hunting and for counting changes per actor.
level: low

False positives

  • Offboarding, role changes and access reviews that take memberships away, and clean-up of unused groups. Expect regular volume. Allow-list the identity team and provisioning automation, and use the rule for hunting and for counting changes per actor.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Members of an administrator group removed and a different user added by the same actor

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

An attacker who wants the tenancy for themselves removes the existing administrators and adds an account they control. One actor that removes members from an administrator group and adds a user that was not a member before, within a short time, has replaced who administers the tenancy.

  1. The Audit log records com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.RemoveUserFromGroup with the group name Administrators (or another administrator group of yours) in data.resourceName. The removed user is in data.additionalDetails.userId.
  2. Within 60 minutes the Audit log records AddUserToGroup for the same group, with a data.additionalDetails.userId that differs from every removed user.
  3. Compare data.additionalDetails.actorName of the events. The same actor on the removals and on the addition is the pattern to act on, most of all when the added user was created recently.

EventsRemoveUserFromGroupAddUserToGroup

LimitsA planned handover of tenancy administration looks the same, so check the change record. The 60 minutes are a starting point. Memberships that come from an identity provider group mapping do not produce these events, so administrators who are removed in the identity provider are not seen here.

Triage

  • Identify the actor (data.additionalDetails.actorName, data.identity.principalName) and compare it with the affected user. A change made to someone else by an account outside the identity team is the key signal.
  • Read the affected user or group. For user and credential events it is in data.resourceName, for membership events the group is in data.resourceName and the user OCID in data.additionalDetails.userId, and for identity domain events the target is in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName.
  • Count how many users lost access in the same hour by the same actor. Several administrators within minutes is not offboarding.
  • Review what the actor did around the same time, such as new users, new API keys, policy changes, and deletions of data, backups or log configuration.
  • If the change is not approved, regain access through the break-glass account, contain the actor and restore the affected users.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Sign in with an access path that does not depend on the removed objects, such as the break-glass administrator, and from there disable or delete the credentials of the account that made the changes.
  2. Look for what the lockout was meant to cover before you restore everyday access, such as deleted data and backups, new users, new API keys, changed policies and resources started at your expense.
  3. Restore the affected users. Activate deactivated accounts, add users back to the groups they were removed from and issue new API keys in place of deleted ones.
  4. Create deleted users and groups again with the memberships and policies they had. A user created again under the same name is a different user with a new OCID, so update whatever referred to the old one.
  5. Afterwards, confirm that every restored administrator can sign in with MFA, and test the break-glass account again.

Mitigation

  • Keep manage users, manage groups and the user administrator and user manager roles to a minimum, and scope user managers to selected groups that exclude administrators, which Oracle's role model allows.
  • Keep at least one break-glass tenancy administrator whose credentials are stored offline and that no everyday administrator can delete, and test that it works.
  • Give human administrators access through a federated identity provider and a mapped group as well as a local account, so that the loss of one path does not lock everyone out.
  • Alert on every change to the membership of Administrators and of the other groups that policies grant wide access.

Frequently asked questions

How do I tell a lockout from routine offboarding or key rotation?

A single event proves nothing, because offboarding, key rotation and the containment of a compromised user produce the same events. Look at who made the change, how many users lost access within a short time, and whether administrators or break-glass accounts are among them. Several administrators within minutes, by an account outside the identity team, is not housekeeping.

Does a deactivated user lose access at once?

Not always. Oracle states that an administrator or user who is signed in to an active session when they are deactivated still has access to that session with limited capabilities, and cannot sign back in after the session ends. Treat the time of the deactivation event as the start of the lockout, not as proof that the session was cut.

Why is removing a user from a group treated like deleting the user?

In OCI a user has no permissions of its own. Oracle states that a user has no permissions until it is placed in a group that a policy grants access to. Removing the membership, or deleting the group, takes the permissions away while the user still exists and can still sign in. For Administrators that is the loss of tenancy administration.

Is there a public incident where attackers removed access in OCI this way?

No public incident report describes this at the audit event level for OCI. The page is derived from Oracle's documentation of the operations and their events. Oracle's own Cloud Guard ships detector rules for a user removed from a group and for a deleted group, which shows that Oracle treats the same events as worth watching.

References

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