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Admin Role Unassigned or Admin Privileges Revoked in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker who controls a super admin account in Google Workspace takes the admin roles away from the other administrators, so that nobody is left who can undo their changes or lock them out.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
High
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1531Account Access Removal
Tactic
Impact
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A super admin account, and no multi-party approval for role management or a second super admin who approves the change.
Impact
The legitimate administrators lose the Admin console and cannot contain the attacker, who keeps full control of users, data and settings.
Response
Suspend the account that removed the roles from a super admin account you still control, then assign the roles again to the legitimate administrators.
Mitigation
Require multi-party approval for role management and keep several protected super admin accounts, each held by one person.
API methods
google.admin.AdminService.deleteRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.removePrivilegegoogle.admin.AdminService.unassignRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.revokeAdminPrivilege
Threat groups
AkiraLAPSUS$

How the attack works

Administration of Google Workspace and Cloud Identity rests on admin roles. The Super Admin role controls everything, and prebuilt or custom roles delegate parts of it. A super admin can unassign a role from a user, which returns the account to a normal user without access to the Admin console. A custom role can also be deleted, or a privilege taken out of it, which changes every holder at once.

An attacker who has reached a super admin account uses this to stay in control. They unassign the Super Admin role from the other super admins and strip the roles of the security and helpdesk teams. The defenders keep their mailboxes but can no longer suspend the attacker's account, reset passwords or read the audit log. Google's own advice shows what is at stake. It tells organizations to have more than one super admin so that, if one account is lost or compromised, another can perform critical tasks. An attacker who removes the others leaves the organization with Google's recovery process, which asks for proof of domain ownership through a DNS record.

The Admin audit log records UNASSIGN_ROLE with the role and the user, REVOKE_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE with the user, DELETE_ROLE with the role and REMOVE_PRIVILEGE with the privilege and the role. The role name _SEED_ADMIN_ROLE stands for the Super Admin role. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive the events in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com.

What an attacker needs

  • A super admin account. Google requires one for removing admin privileges from a user.
  • No multi-party approval for role management, or a second super admin who approves the request.

Impact

The organization's administrators lose the Admin console. They cannot contain the attacker, restore settings or recover accounts, while the attacker keeps full control of users, mail, files and security settings. If no legitimate super admin is left, the way back is Google's account recovery with proof of domain ownership, which takes time the attacker can use.

Detection rules

Admin Role Deleted or Privilege Removed From a Role in Google Workspace

Detects an admin role being deleted (Admin audit event DELETE_ROLE, rendered as "Role {ROLE_NAME} deleted") or a privilege being removed from a role (REMOVE_PRIVILEGE, rendered as "Privilege {PRIVILEGE_NAME} removed from role {ROLE_NAME}") in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account. Both change every administrator who holds the role at once, without an event per user. An attacker can use them to take abilities away from the security or helpdesk team, for example the privilege to manage users or to read audit data. The role is the parameter ROLE_NAME in protoPayload.metadata, with ROLE_ID, and the removed privilege is PRIVILEGE_NAME. The admin is in principalEmail. The events do not list the users who held the role. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Admin Role Deleted or Privilege Removed From a Role in Google Workspace
id: b68536dc-e3a3-45ec-a852-c4b5e3f3cf62
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an admin role being deleted (Admin audit event DELETE_ROLE,
  rendered as "Role {ROLE_NAME} deleted") or a privilege being removed
  from a role (REMOVE_PRIVILEGE, rendered as "Privilege {PRIVILEGE_NAME}
  removed from role {ROLE_NAME}") in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity
  account. Both change every administrator who holds the role at once,
  without an event per user. An attacker can use them to take abilities
  away from the security or helpdesk team, for example the privilege to
  manage users or to read audit data. The role is the parameter ROLE_NAME
  in protoPayload.metadata, with ROLE_ID, and the removed privilege is
  PRIVILEGE_NAME. The admin is in principalEmail. The events do not list
  the users who held the role. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin
  Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once
  Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the
  SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/multi-party-approval-for-sensitive-actions
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.deleteRole
      - google.admin.AdminService.removePrivilege
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Cleanup of unused custom roles and least-privilege reviews that take privileges out of roles that were too broad. An edit of a role can remove several privileges in one session. Verify the change against a change record and check which administrators held the role.
level: medium

False positives

  • Cleanup of unused custom roles and least-privilege reviews that take privileges out of roles that were too broad. An edit of a role can remove several privileges in one session. Verify the change against a change record and check which administrators held the role.

Admin Role Unassigned or Admin Privileges Revoked From a User in Google Workspace

Detects an admin role being taken away from a user in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account. The Admin audit log has two events for it, UNASSIGN_ROLE (rendered as "Unassigned role {ROLE_NAME} from user {USER_EMAIL}") and REVOKE_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE (rendered as "Admin privileges revoked from {USER_EMAIL}"). Google's reference does not say in which cases each one is written, so the rule reads both. The affected user is the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata, the role is ROLE_NAME for UNASSIGN_ROLE, and the admin who removed it is in principalEmail. An administrator who loses the role loses the Admin console, which is how an attacker with a super admin account locks the defenders out. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Admin Role Unassigned or Admin Privileges Revoked From a User in Google Workspace
id: ac72d872-3335-4ad1-a846-7212e8a887aa
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an admin role being taken away from a user in a Google Workspace
  or Cloud Identity account. The Admin audit log has two events for it,
  UNASSIGN_ROLE (rendered as "Unassigned role {ROLE_NAME} from user
  {USER_EMAIL}") and REVOKE_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE (rendered as "Admin privileges
  revoked from {USER_EMAIL}"). Google's reference does not say in which
  cases each one is written, so the rule reads both. The affected user is
  the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata, the role is ROLE_NAME
  for UNASSIGN_ROLE, and the admin who removed it is in principalEmail. An
  administrator who loses the role loses the Admin console, which is how an
  attacker with a super admin account locks the defenders out. The entries
  reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level,
  which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google
  Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level
  logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/remove-google-workspace-administrator-privileges
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.unassignRole
      - google.admin.AdminService.revokeAdminPrivilege
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrators who change jobs or leave, and the end of time-bound role assignments. Google's offboarding guidance removes the role before an admin account is deleted. Role removals are infrequent, so verify each one with the affected administrator.
level: medium

False positives

  • Administrators who change jobs or leave, and the end of time-bound role assignments. Google's offboarding guidance removes the role before an admin account is deleted. Role removals are infrequent, so verify each one with the affected administrator.

Admin Roles Removed Several Times by One Admin in Google Workspace

Counts, per acting administrator (principalEmail), the Admin audit events for an admin role unassigned from a user (UNASSIGN_ROLE) or admin privileges revoked from a user (REVOKE_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE) in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account. Three or more within 30 minutes is the pattern of administrators being removed together, which is how an attacker with a super admin account locks the other administrators out. The affected user of each event is in the parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata, which the rule cannot count separately, so the count is of events. One user who loses two roles counts twice, and Google's reference does not say whether one removal can write both events. The count and the window are starting points to tune. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

Fires when one protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail has at least 3 matching events within 30 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Admin Role Removed From a User in Google Workspace (Burst Base Event)
id: b058acf7-726e-4289-8813-65ea6cfe0b19
name: workspace_admin_role_removed_from_user
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. An Admin audit entry for
  an admin role unassigned from a user (UNASSIGN_ROLE) or admin privileges
  revoked from a user (REVOKE_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE) in a Google Workspace or
  Cloud Identity account, as it arrives in Cloud Audit Logs under
  admin.googleapis.com.
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.unassignRole
      - google.admin.AdminService.revokeAdminPrivilege
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Admin Roles Removed Several Times by One Admin in Google Workspace
id: 66a76e48-2237-4b2b-aed2-852a752a6442
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per acting administrator (principalEmail), the Admin audit events
  for an admin role unassigned from a user (UNASSIGN_ROLE) or admin
  privileges revoked from a user (REVOKE_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE) in a Google
  Workspace or Cloud Identity account. Three or more within 30 minutes is
  the pattern of administrators being removed together, which is how an
  attacker with a super admin account locks the other administrators out.
  The affected user of each event is in the parameter USER_EMAIL in
  protoPayload.metadata, which the rule cannot count separately, so the
  count is of events. One user who loses two roles counts twice, and
  Google's reference does not say whether one removal can write both
  events. The count and the window are starting points to tune. The
  entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization
  level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with
  Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the
  organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/security-best-practices-for-administrator-accounts
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - workspace_admin_role_removed_from_user
  group-by:
    - protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail
  timespan: 30m
  condition:
    gte: 3
falsepositives:
  - A review of admin roles in which the identity team removes several assignments in one session, and the offboarding of an administrator who held several roles. Confirm the change record.
  - The values of 3 events and 30 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. An organization with few administrators can alert on every removal with the single-event rules of this page instead.
level: high

False positives

  • A review of admin roles in which the identity team removes several assignments in one session, and the offboarding of an administrator who held several roles. Confirm the change record.
  • The values of 3 events and 30 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. An organization with few administrators can alert on every removal with the single-event rules of this page instead.

Super Admin Role Unassigned From a User in Google Workspace

Detects the Super Admin role being unassigned from a user in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account. The rule reads the Admin audit event UNASSIGN_ROLE and searches the serialized event parameters in protoPayload.metadata for _SEED_ADMIN_ROLE, the value of ROLE_NAME that stands for the Super Admin role. The affected user is the parameter USER_EMAIL and the admin who removed the role is in principalEmail. Google advises organizations to keep more than one super admin so that another one can act when an account is lost or compromised. An attacker who removes the role from the other super admins leaves nobody who can suspend the attacker's account. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Super Admin Role Unassigned From a User in Google Workspace
id: 84bd31df-03f0-4bf5-9451-b7bd6ef628ba
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the Super Admin role being unassigned from a user in a Google
  Workspace or Cloud Identity account. The rule reads the Admin audit event
  UNASSIGN_ROLE and searches the serialized event parameters in
  protoPayload.metadata for _SEED_ADMIN_ROLE, the value of ROLE_NAME that
  stands for the Super Admin role. The affected user is the parameter
  USER_EMAIL and the admin who removed the role is in principalEmail.
  Google advises organizations to keep more than one super admin so that
  another one can act when an account is lost or compromised. An attacker
  who removes the role from the other super admins leaves nobody who can
  suspend the attacker's account. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an
  Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once
  Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches
  the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/security-best-practices-for-administrator-accounts
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/remove-google-workspace-administrator-privileges
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.unassignRole
  selection_role:
    protoPayload.metadata.event|contains: _SEED_ADMIN_ROLE
  condition: selection and selection_role
falsepositives:
  - A super admin who leaves or moves to a delegated role, and the cleanup of a super admin account that was used for a migration. Removals of this role are rare. Confirm each one with the affected person through a channel outside Google Workspace, and check how many super admins remain.
level: high

False positives

  • A super admin who leaves or moves to a delegated role, and the cleanup of a super admin account that was used for a migration. Removals of this role are rare. Confirm each one with the affected person through a channel outside Google Workspace, and check how many super admins remain.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Recently appointed admin removes the roles of other admins

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsJoins two logs

An administrator who received the role days ago and then unassigns the roles of long-standing administrators fits a takeover more than a handover. Joining the account that gained a role with the account that removes roles shows it.

  1. An account becomes an administrator: google.admin.AdminService.assignRole or grantAdminPrivilege of admin.googleapis.com. Keep the parameter USER_EMAIL.
  2. Within 7 days the same address is the caller (authenticationInfo.principalEmail) of google.admin.AdminService.unassignRole or revokeAdminPrivilege entries whose USER_EMAIL is another account.
  3. Raise it with the highest priority when the removed ROLE_NAME is _SEED_ADMIN_ROLE or when more than one administrator is affected.

Eventsgoogle.admin.AdminService.assignRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.grantAdminPrivilegegoogle.admin.AdminService.unassignRolegoogle.admin.AdminService.revokeAdminPrivilege

LimitsA planned handover, in which a new IT lead takes over and removes the roles of the predecessor, looks the same and needs the change record. An attacker who uses a long-standing admin account that they compromised is not found by this pattern. The 7 days are a starting point.

Triage

  • Read ROLE_NAME and USER_EMAIL in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. The role name _SEED_ADMIN_ROLE is the Super Admin role.
  • Identify the admin who removed the role (principalEmail) and when that account itself became an administrator.
  • Ask the affected administrator through a channel outside Google Workspace whether the removal was expected, for example because of a role change or a departure.
  • Count how many administrators lost roles in the same period and how many super admins are left.
  • For a deleted role or a removed privilege, list the users who held the role and what they can no longer do.
  • Check the recent sign-ins of the acting account and what else it changed, such as passwords, 2-Step Verification settings and recovery settings.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. From a super admin account that is still under your control, suspend the account that removed the roles and reset its sign-in cookies.
  2. Assign the removed roles again to the legitimate administrators and recreate deleted custom roles from your record.
  3. If no legitimate super admin is left, start Google's recovery of administrator access at once and prepare the DNS record it asks for.
  4. Reset the passwords and review the 2-Step Verification methods and recovery details of every account that held an admin role during the incident.
  5. Review everything the attacker's account changed while the others were locked out, including users, admin roles, domain-wide delegation, mail routing and security settings.

Mitigation

  • Turn on multi-party approval for role management where your edition offers it, so that a role assignment or removal needs a second super admin.
  • Keep several super admin accounts, each held by one person, separate from daily accounts and protected with security keys, as Google recommends.
  • Keep control of the organization's DNS with people who do not depend on Google accounts to sign in, because Google's recovery of administrator access asks for a DNS record.
  • Send the alert center alert for a revoked admin privilege to a mailbox outside the people who can be affected.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM, so that the record survives the loss of the Admin console.

Frequently asked questions

What is left when every legitimate super admin has lost the role?

Google describes a recovery process for administrator access. Without recovery options on the account, the recovery wizard asks the organization to verify the domain by adding a CNAME record to its DNS settings, and support-assisted recovery asks for a CNAME or TXT record as well. Google also describes how a user account can be promoted to super administrator with proof of domain ownership when the administrator cannot be reached.

What is the difference between the unassign role event and the revoke admin privilege event?

Google's reference lists both. `UNASSIGN_ROLE` is rendered as a role unassigned from a user and carries the role name. `REVOKE_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE` is rendered as admin privileges revoked from a user and carries only the user. The reference does not say in which cases each one is written, so the rules on this page read both.

Does multi-party approval stop one super admin from removing the others?

It requires a second one. Google states that with multi-party approval for role management turned on, a change to role assignments in the Admin console needs the approval of another super admin, and a separate setting covers changes through an API. An attacker who controls two super admin accounts is not stopped, and Google's page does not say that turning multi-party approval off needs an approval itself.

References

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