How the attack works
Unless the tenant restricts it, any user can create a new Microsoft Entra tenant from the admin center, under Manage tenant. Microsoft documents that the user who creates the tenant is automatically assigned the Global Administrator role in it, and that the new tenant does not inherit any settings or configurations. Conditional Access, logging and governance of the organization do not apply there.
Microsoft describes the risk in its Zero Trust guidance: a threat actor, or a well-intentioned but uninformed employee, can create a tenant outside the organization's governance and visibility, and such a shadow identity platform can be exploited for token issuance, brand impersonation, consent phishing or persistent staging infrastructure. For an attacker who holds an ordinary account, the new tenant is a place they fully control, created with an identity of the organization.
The creation is the one moment the home tenant sees. It is written to the audit log of the home tenant in the category DirectoryManagement as the activity Create Company, and Microsoft's security operations guide states that the target of the event shows the ID of the created tenant. What happens inside the new tenant afterwards is logged there, not in the home tenant.
What an attacker needs
- Any account of the tenant, while the setting "Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants" is set to No.
- With the setting on Yes, an account that holds at least the Tenant Creator role.
Impact
A tenant in which the attacker is Global Administrator, with no policy of the organization in force and no log the organization can read. On its own it gives no access to the home tenant. It is infrastructure for later steps, such as applications registered there and offered to users for consent, or a tenant that looks like it belongs to the organization.
Detection rules
New Microsoft Entra Tenant Created With an Identity of This Tenant
Detects the audit activity "Create Company" in the category DirectoryManagement, which Microsoft Entra ID writes to the home tenant when one of its identities creates a new Microsoft Entra tenant. Microsoft's security operations guide for infrastructure lists it as "Creation of a new Microsoft Entra tenant, using an identity from your tenant" with risk level Medium and states that the target shows the ID of the created tenant. The creator becomes Global Administrator of the new tenant, which inherits no settings of the home tenant. The event stays logged when tenant creation is restricted to the Tenant Creator role. The actor is in InitiatedBy.
title: New Microsoft Entra Tenant Created With an Identity of This Tenant
id: f235af5f-a8e8-41e7-8355-a7cbdcba1a84
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the audit activity "Create Company" in the category
DirectoryManagement, which Microsoft Entra ID writes to the home tenant
when one of its identities creates a new Microsoft Entra tenant.
Microsoft's security operations guide for infrastructure lists it as
"Creation of a new Microsoft Entra tenant, using an identity from your
tenant" with risk level Medium and states that the target shows the ID of
the created tenant. The creator becomes Global Administrator of the new
tenant, which inherits no settings of the home tenant. The event stays
logged when tenant creation is restricted to the Tenant Creator role. The
actor is in InitiatedBy.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-infrastructure
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-default-permissions
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/zero-trust-protect-tenants
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1585.003
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
Category: DirectoryManagement
OperationName: Create Company
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Developers and test teams who create a tenant for a lab, and administrators who set up a tenant for a subsidiary or a project. Add approved tenants to your inventory and follow up on the rest.
level: medium
False positives
- Developers and test teams who create a tenant for a lab, and administrators who set up a tenant for a subsidiary or a project. Add approved tenants to your inventory and follow up on the rest.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Tenant created by a user later appears as a trusted partner or as a sign-in destination
A tenant made for a test stays unconnected. A tenant made for staging is connected back to the organization, as a partner in the cross-tenant access settings, or as a tenant the organization's users are sent to sign in to. Keeping the IDs of created tenants and looking for them later finds the second kind.
- Audit log, category
DirectoryManagement, activityCreate Company: take the ID of the new tenant fromTargetResourcesand keep it in a watchlist with the creator and the date. - Audit log, category
CrossTenantAccessSettings: a partner added or updated whoseTargetResourcescarry an ID on the watchlist. - Sign-in log: sign-ins of your users whose
ResourceTenantIdis an ID on the watchlist and whose user is not the creator. - Alert on either match, however long after the creation it happens.
EventsCreate Company
LimitsA legitimate new tenant of the organization is connected on purpose in exactly this way, so the watchlist needs the approved tenants taken out. Where the tenant ID sits inside TargetResources is not documented beyond Microsoft's statement that the target shows it, so check one of your own events first.
Triage
- Read InitiatedBy for the account that created the tenant, and the ID of the new tenant in TargetResources.
- Ask the person and their manager what the tenant is for. Developers and test teams create tenants for honest reasons, often without knowing the policy.
- Review the sign-in behind the session, such as its IP address, device and risk level, to rule out a compromised account.
- Search the audit log for the new tenant ID in the following days, for example as a partner in the cross-tenant access settings or in guest invitations.
- Check whether an Azure subscription was moved to the new tenant.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- If the account was compromised, revoke its sessions, reset its credentials and review what else it did in the home tenant.
- Have the tenant deleted by its creator when it has no approved purpose, or bring it under the organization's ownership with named administrators.
- Remove any trust that was given to the new tenant in the home tenant, such as a partner entry in the cross-tenant access settings, guests invited from it and consent to applications registered in it.
- Turn on the restriction for tenant creation if it was off.
Mitigation
- Set "Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants" to Yes in the user settings, and assign the Tenant Creator role to the few people who need to create tenants.
- Keep an inventory of the tenants your organization owns, and add every new tenant to it with an owner and a purpose.
- Apply the Azure subscription policies that stop subscriptions from being moved out of the tenant. Microsoft names moving a subscription as a common pattern after an employee creates a tenant.
- Keep cross-tenant access defaults restrictive, so that a new tenant gets no trust unless somebody adds it on purpose.
Frequently asked questions
Can an ordinary user really create a Microsoft Entra tenant?
Yes, unless the tenant restricts it. Microsoft documents that users can create tenants in the admin center under Manage tenant, and that the creator is automatically assigned the Global Administrator role in the new tenant. Setting "Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants" to Yes limits tenant creation to accounts with at least the Tenant Creator role.
Does the new tenant give access to the data of the home tenant?
Not by itself. Microsoft states that a newly created tenant does not inherit any settings or configurations, and it holds no data of the home tenant. The risk is what it can be used for, which Microsoft lists as token issuance, brand impersonation, consent phishing and persistent staging infrastructure.
Can the home tenant see what happens in the tenant a user created?
No. The home tenant's audit log records the creation, as the activity Create Company in the category DirectoryManagement, with the ID of the new tenant as the target. Activity inside the new tenant is logged in that tenant, where the creator is the administrator.
Is tenant creation still logged when it is restricted?
Yes. Microsoft states that tenant creation continues to be recorded in the audit log when the restriction is set. With the restriction on, the event tells you that an account with the Tenant Creator role, or a higher role, used it.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1585.003: Establish Accounts, Cloud Accounts
- Security operations for infrastructure (monitoring for creation of new Microsoft Entra tenants)
- What are the default user permissions in Microsoft Entra ID? (restrict non-admin users from creating tenants)
- Configure Microsoft Entra for Zero Trust: Protect tenants and isolate production systems
- Discover your Microsoft cloud footprint FAQ
- Microsoft Entra audit log activities (Core Directory, DirectoryManagement)