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Leaked Credentials detection rules

A user's current password turns up in a breach dump or an infostealer log, and anyone who finds it can sign in wherever MFA is missing. Microsoft Entra ID Protection checks leaked pairs against the tenant and raises a detection.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Medium
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detections
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: Microsoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
The user name and current password of an account in the tenant, taken from leaked or stolen data, and an account or sign-in path without MFA for it to be enough.
Impact
A valid password for the account, which is a session as the user without MFA and is often valid for other services where the user reused it.
Response
Force a secure password change for the user, and if the sign-in log shows access the user cannot explain, block the account and revoke its sessions.
Mitigation
Require MFA for every user and block legacy authentication with Conditional Access, so that a leaked password is not enough to sign in.
Risk detection type
leakedCredentials

How the attack works

People reuse passwords, and passwords get stolen in places the organization does not control: a breach at another service where the user registered with the work address, malware on a private device, a phishing page. The stolen user names and passwords are traded and published. An attacker who finds a pair that still works for the tenant does not have to guess or phish anything.

Microsoft looks for such pairs on behalf of its customers. It collects leaked credentials from dark web forums, breach dump repositories, paste sites, law enforcement seizures and other sources, and checks them against the current valid password hashes of the tenant. Microsoft Entra ID Protection raises the "Leaked credentials" risk detection (leakedCredentials) only when a pair matches, and always at high risk. The detection is calculated offline and is available with Microsoft Entra ID Free and P1 as well as P2. For passwords that live in on-premises Active Directory it needs password hash synchronization.

The detection is a user risk without a sign-in attached. It says that the password is exposed, not that somebody has used it yet. Whether it was used shows in the sign-in log of the account.

What an attacker needs

  • A user name and the current password of an account in the tenant, obtained from leaked or stolen data.
  • For the password to be enough on its own, an account without MFA or a sign-in path that cannot be challenged for it, such as a legacy authentication protocol.

Impact

A valid password for the account. Without MFA that is a session as the user. With MFA the attacker holds the first factor and moves on to ways around the second, such as MFA fatigue or a phishing proxy. The same password is often valid for other services where the user reused it.

Detection rules

ID Protection Detected Leaked Credentials

Detects the Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detection "Leaked credentials" (riskEventType leakedCredentials). Microsoft raises it when it finds a user name and password pair of the user in leaked data and the pair matches the current valid password hash in the tenant. A detection is emitted only for a confirmed match and always at high risk. It is a user risk that is calculated offline, with no sign-in attached, and it is available with Microsoft Entra ID Free and P1. Passwords from on-premises Active Directory are covered only with password hash synchronization. Risk detections reach a SIEM through the UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of Microsoft Entra ID.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID Protection risk detections
title: ID Protection Detected Leaked Credentials
id: abbfe76e-8a61-4cd0-99ff-19f4534d7456
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detection "Leaked
  credentials" (riskEventType leakedCredentials). Microsoft raises it when it
  finds a user name and password pair of the user in leaked data and the pair
  matches the current valid password hash in the tenant. A detection is
  emitted only for a confirmed match and always at high risk. It is a user
  risk that is calculated offline, with no sign-in attached, and it is
  available with Microsoft Entra ID Free and P1. Passwords from on-premises
  Active Directory are covered only with password hash synchronization. Risk
  detections reach a SIEM through the UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of
  Microsoft Entra ID.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-investigate-risk
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/aaduserriskevents
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-15
tags:
  - attack.reconnaissance
  - attack.t1589.001
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: riskdetection
detection:
  selection:
    RiskEventType: leakedCredentials
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - None expected. Microsoft emits the detection only after matching the leaked pair against the current password of the user. A password that was already changed through a secure reset closes the exposure.
level: high

False positives

  • None expected. Microsoft emits the detection only after matching the leaked pair against the current password of the user. A password that was already changed through a secure reset closes the exposure.

Triage

  • Review the risk history and the sign-in log of the user for use of the password, such as sign-ins from unfamiliar locations, anonymous IP addresses or atypical travel.
  • Check whether the password was changed after the date of the detection. If it was changed through a secure reset, the exposure is already closed.
  • Check whether MFA is registered and enforced for the account, and whether the account holds privileged roles.
  • Look at the recent activity of the account for signs of an intruder, such as new application registrations, mailbox rule changes or access to sensitive resources.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Force a secure password change for the user. If the user cannot do it promptly, confirm the user as compromised in ID Protection and reset the password as an administrator.
  2. If the sign-in log shows access the user cannot explain, block the account, reset the password and revoke its sessions and refresh tokens.
  3. Review and remove what an intruder may have added, such as authentication methods, inbox rules and application registrations or consents.
  4. Make sure MFA is enforced for the account before it goes back to normal use.
  5. Tell the user to change the password on every other service where they used the same one.

Mitigation

  • Require MFA for every user, with phishing-resistant methods for administrators, so that a leaked password is not enough to sign in.
  • Block legacy authentication with Conditional Access, because those protocols cannot be challenged for MFA.
  • With Microsoft Entra ID P2, use a user risk policy that requires a secure password change at high user risk, so a leaked password is replaced without waiting for an analyst.
  • Enable password hash synchronization for accounts that come from on-premises Active Directory. Microsoft needs it to check leaked credentials against those passwords.
  • Send the UserRiskEvents diagnostic category to your SIEM and alert on the detection.

Frequently asked questions

Does a leaked credentials detection mean the account was breached?

Not by itself. It means that Microsoft found a valid user name and password pair of the account in leaked data and confirmed the match against the current password hash in the tenant. Whether somebody signed in with it shows in the sign-in log and the risk history of the user. Microsoft rates the detection as high risk in every case, because the exposure is confirmed.

Does the leaked credentials detection need Microsoft Entra ID P2?

No. Microsoft lists it as a detection that is available with Microsoft Entra ID Free and Microsoft Entra ID P1. Risk-based Conditional Access, which can force a secure password change automatically when the user risk is high, is part of Microsoft Entra ID P2.

Does it cover passwords from on-premises Active Directory?

Only with password hash synchronization. Microsoft compares leaked credentials with the password hashes it holds for the tenant, so for accounts whose password lives in on-premises Active Directory the hashes have to be synchronized. With it, a password reset through Microsoft Entra ID remediates the user risk for cloud and on-premises passwords.

References

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