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Azure Role Assignments Removed in Bulk detection rules

One identity deletes many Azure role assignments in a short time. Administrators, responders and workloads lose their access to subscriptions and resources, which keeps defenders out while the attacker continues.

Platform
Azure
Severity
Medium
Log source
Azure Activity log
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1531Account Access Removal
Tactic
Impact
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A role with the right to delete role assignments at the scope, such as Owner, User Access Administrator or Role Based Access Control Administrator.
Impact
Administrators, responders and workload identities lose their access to subscriptions and resources while the attacker keeps its own.
Response
Regain access, by elevating access as Global Administrator if needed, then remove the caller's assignments and restore the deleted ones.
Mitigation
Limit Owner and User Access Administrator, keep tested break-glass identities at the root management group and manage assignments as code.
Operation
MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/DELETE
Threat groups
AkiraLAPSUS$

How the attack works

Access to Azure resources is granted by role assignments, each a small resource of its own at a scope: a management group, a subscription, a resource group or a single resource. Removing one is the operation Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/delete, which Microsoft lists among the Azure RBAC changes that the Activity log records, shown there as "Delete role assignment". A principal with Owner or User Access Administrator at a scope can delete the assignments of everyone else at that scope and below.

An attacker who has taken such a role, and often has first assigned it to an identity of its own, removes the assignments of the other administrators, of the security team and of the break-glass accounts. Nobody else can then stop running resources, rotate keys or restore data, and the managed identities and service principals that lose their roles stop working, which adds an outage to the incident. One deletion is routine: access is removed when people change teams, and time-bound access ends by itself. Many deletions by one caller within minutes are not routine, which is why this page counts. The event names the caller and the deleted assignment by its ID. Microsoft does not document that it carries the principal or the role, so those come from the earlier event that created the assignment.

What an attacker needs

  • A role with Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/delete at the scope: Owner, User Access Administrator, Role Based Access Control Administrator or a custom role with the action.

Impact

The people and systems that would respond lose access to the affected subscriptions and resources, and workloads whose identities lose their roles fail. The attacker keeps its own assignment and works undisturbed. Microsoft documents that a Global Administrator can regain access to subscriptions and management groups by elevating access, so the lockout delays the response and does not make it impossible.

Detection rules

Many Azure Role Assignments Removed by One Caller

Counts, per Caller, the successful deletions of Azure role assignments. Ten or more within 30 minutes is the pattern of one identity removing the access of administrators, responders or workloads at a scope, which locks defenders out before or during a destructive step. A single deletion is routine, which is why the rule counts. The event names the deleted assignment by its ID only, so the principals and roles have to be looked up in the events that created the assignments. The count and the window are starting points to tune.

Fires when one Caller has at least 10 matching events within 30 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAzure Activity log
title: Azure Role Assignment Deleted (Threshold Base Event)
id: fdcc4ce5-d5a9-4cb8-b135-74037ef566b1
name: azure_role_assignment_deleted
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A successful deletion of an
  Azure role assignment in the Azure Activity log
  (Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/delete).
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: activitylogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationNameValue: MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/DELETE
    ActivityStatusValue:
      - Success
      - Succeeded
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Many Azure Role Assignments Removed by One Caller
id: 5414e108-77bc-4b29-930a-a8558c21f4d1
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per Caller, the successful deletions of Azure role assignments.
  Ten or more within 30 minutes is the pattern of one identity removing the
  access of administrators, responders or workloads at a scope, which locks
  defenders out before or during a destructive step. A single deletion is
  routine, which is why the rule counts. The event names the deleted
  assignment by its ID only, so the principals and roles have to be looked up
  in the events that created the assignments. The count and the window are
  starting points to tune.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/change-history-report
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/management-and-governance
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1531
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - azure_role_assignment_deleted
  group-by:
    - Caller
  timespan: 30m
  condition:
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Access reviews, clean-up of assignments for deleted principals, and the teardown of environments, which remove many assignments in one run. Exclude those identities by Caller, or raise the count for them.
  - Services that end time-bound access on behalf of users, where they appear as the caller of the deletions. Check how such removals look in your own log before you alert on the count.
  - The values of 10 deletions and 30 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own processes produce and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • Access reviews, clean-up of assignments for deleted principals, and the teardown of environments, which remove many assignments in one run. Exclude those identities by Caller, or raise the count for them.
  • Services that end time-bound access on behalf of users, where they appear as the caller of the deletions. Check how such removals look in your own log before you alert on the count.
  • The values of 10 deletions and 30 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own processes produce and adjust both.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Role assignment created by a caller that then removes the assignments of others

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A takeover has two halves: the attacker makes sure its own access is in place, then removes everyone else. A caller that creates a role assignment and deletes several others at the same scope shortly after is replacing the administrators of that scope with itself.

  1. In the Azure Activity log, a role assignment is created with status Success: MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/WRITE. Keep the Caller and the scope from the resource ID.
  2. Within 60 minutes the same Caller deletes role assignments at that scope or below it: MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/DELETE with status Success, five or more times.
  3. Read the principal ID and the role definition ID of the created assignment from the request body in the Properties of the start event, and check whether the principal is the caller or an identity it controls.

EventsMICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/WRITEMICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/DELETE

LimitsA team hand-over, where the new owners are assigned and the old ones removed, is the same sequence, so match it with a request. The 60 minutes and the five deletions are starting points. An attacker whose assignment was created days earlier does not match.

Deleted assignments resolved to the principals and roles that lost access

Detection hypothesisJoins two logsNeeds your own lists

Ten removed Reader assignments and ten removed Owner assignments are the same count and very different events. Joining each deletion to the event that created the assignment shows who lost which role, so that the removal of administrators and break-glass accounts can be separated from clean-up.

  1. Take the successful MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/DELETE events and read the role assignment ID from the resource ID of each.
  2. Find the earlier MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/WRITE start event with the same assignment ID, and read the principal ID and the role definition ID from the request body in its Properties.
  3. Alert when the role is Owner, User Access Administrator or Contributor, or when the principal is on your list of administrators, responders and break-glass accounts.

EventsMICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/DELETEMICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ROLEASSIGNMENTS/WRITE

LimitsAssignments that were created before the start of your log retention cannot be resolved this way and need an export of the role assignments taken beforehand. The list of protected principals has to be kept by the reader.

Triage

  • Identify the Caller and the caller's IP address, and whether this identity runs access reviews, clean-up jobs or deployments that remove assignments.
  • List the deleted assignments by the ID in the resource ID of each event, and find the earlier create events with the same IDs to learn the principals and the roles.
  • Check whether administrators, security team members, break-glass accounts or the identities of production workloads are among them.
  • Look for a role assignment that the caller created for itself or for a new identity shortly before the deletions.
  • Check the current assignments at the affected scopes to see who still has access.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Regain access. If no trusted administrator is left at the scope, a Global Administrator elevates access and assigns the roles again.
  2. Remove the role assignments of the caller and of the identities it assigned, revoke its sessions and rotate its credentials.
  3. Restore the deleted assignments from your access-as-code repository or from the create events in the Activity log, starting with responders and production workload identities.
  4. Review what the caller did at the affected scopes while others were locked out, with priority on deletions, key listings and changes to logging.
  5. Remove the elevated access of the Global Administrator again once the roles are restored.

Mitigation

  • Limit Owner and User Access Administrator, assign them through Privileged Identity Management with approval, and give delegated administrators the Role Based Access Control Administrator role with conditions instead.
  • Keep at least two break-glass identities with access at the root management group, and test that they work.
  • Document the elevate access procedure for Global Administrators, so that access can be regained quickly when assignments are removed.
  • Manage role assignments as code, so that the intended state exists outside Azure and can be applied again.
  • Send the Azure Activity log of every subscription, and of the scopes above them, to a SIEM that the subscription administrators cannot change.

Frequently asked questions

Does the Activity log show whose access was removed?

Not directly. The delete event names the caller and the role assignment by its ID, in the resource ID and in the scope of the event. Microsoft does not document that it contains the principal or the role. Find the earlier create event for the same assignment ID, whose request body holds the principal ID and the role definition ID, or use an export of the assignments.

Can access be recovered when every administrator of a subscription was removed?

Yes. Microsoft documents that a Global Administrator can elevate access to regain access to a subscription or a management group when a user has lost access. The elevation gives the User Access Administrator role at root scope, from which the roles can be assigned again. Remove that elevated access when the work is done.

Why does the page have only a counting rule?

A single removal of a role assignment happens all the time, when access is cleaned up or expires. Microsoft does not document fields in the delete event that would tell an important removal from a trivial one. A burst of removals by one caller is the pattern that stands out, so the rule counts per caller. The count and the window are starting points.

Is there a public incident report for this technique?

No public incident report of bulk removal of Azure role assignments was found for this page. The page is based on Microsoft's documentation of the operation and of the Azure RBAC changes the Activity log records, and on the general pattern of removing defenders' access before a destructive step.

References

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